




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


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THE

THEORY OF PRACTICE.

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THE
THEORY OF PRACTICE

AN

Ethical Enquiry

IN TWO BOOKS

BY

SHADWORTH H. HODGSON.

IN TWO VOLUMES.

VOL. I.

LONDON:
LONGMANS, GREEN, READER, AND DYER.

1870.

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
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MORTUIS MEIS.

THE
THEORY OF PRACTICE.

BOOK I.—ANALYTIC.
ANALYSIS OF FEELING, ACTION, AND CHARACTER.

HÉLAS ! QU'EN SAIS-JE
QUE VOUS NE SACHIEZ MIEUX, ET QUE VOUS APPRENDRAIS-JE ?

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THE
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BOOK I.

CHAPTER I.

NATURE AND METHOD OF ETHIC.

Insino a qui l' un giogo di Parnaso
Assai mi fu ; ma or con amendue
M' è uopo entrar nell' aringo rimaso.

Dante.

§ 1. 1. I PROPOSE in the present work to complete the examination of the phenomena which belong properly to Metaphysic, that is, phenomena which can be satisfactorily treated only from a subjective point of view or in their subjective aspect, by examining in some detail the feelings and actions of man, his judgments on them, and the moral and legal conceptions which he deduces from or builds upon them. One half of the total examination of these phenomena has already been performed in a work entitled "Time and Space, a Metaphysical Essay;" and the analysis there contained serves both to mark out the field remaining to be explored, and to furnish the principles and the framework, in other terms, the Logic, to be applied in its exploration. In that work it was maintained that phenomena, the whole world of phenomena in the widest sense of the term, and

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every portion of it however minute, had a double aspect, subjective and objective, was at once a mode of consciousness and an existing thing; but that these opposite aspects of a phenomenon applied to the whole of it, and were not elements constituting it by their combination. It was farther maintained that every phenomenon had, besides this, at least two such constitutive elements, metaphysical, and logically discernible in it, but not empirically separable from each other; the inseparable union of which constituted an empirical or complete phenomenon; which phenomenon then had, as a whole, the two aspects just mentioned, so that the same two kinds of constitutive, metaphysical, elements could be discerned alike in either aspect. These elements were of two kinds, Time and Space the formal, and Feeling the material, element; time, or time and space together, entering into all phenomena whatever, along with some mode or modes of feeling; which latter were however indefinitely numerous, so that the formal element, being of two kinds only, served as the common link or bond between them all. Metaphysic in its strict sense, it was said, was the theory of the formal element in consciousness, of the general modes of its combination with the material element, and of its function in supporting redintegrations or series of perceptions, if spontaneously occurring, and in guiding them if voluntary or undertaken for a foreseen purpose. Accordingly the second part of "Time and Space" contained a view of Formal Logic and its laws, and of the further functions of the formal element in the processes of Reflection and the formation of Ideas.

2. The present work is intended to deal with the

remaining half of the subject, namely, the material element in consciousness, the feelings ; under which term, as will become evident in the sequel, actions are properly included ; for the proof of which inclusion I may perhaps be permitted besides to refer to "Time and Space" § 32. It will be equally impossible here as there to isolate the material element from the formal in order to its examination. Just as in "Time and Space" the formal element had to be examined in combination with its matter, the purpose of the inquiry furnishing only the direction and mode of treatment which the investigation was to assume, so in the present work the combination of the formal element with feelings can never be left out of view ; indeed the degree and mode of complexity with which different feelings involve this element will be found the chief index to their appropriate analysis and classification. The form is the logic of the feelings ; to arrange them logically is therefore to examine their relations to their formal element. In this way it is that the work already done in "Time and Space" furnishes us with a method and a key to the work remaining to be done here. There we had the establishment of the Logic, here we have its application. In the first Book of the present work accordingly I shall endeavour to apply this logic of the formal element to the analysis and classification of the different modes of feeling, whether sensations, emotions, passions, desires, pleasures, pains, efforts, volitions, or actions ; to the modes of movement or working which pervade them and connect them into a life ; and to their combination, in consequence of such working, into types of character, so far as these can be dealt with without taking into

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consideration the effects of different external circumstances, which in all cases so largely contribute to mould them. I hope that this analysis will put me in a position to sketch out, in the second Book, a system of principles of judgment, applicable to feeling and action, a system to guide judgment in all cases that may arise, in short what I may perhaps call a Logic of Practice; a logic in the same sense as the formal element is a logic in application to the material, that is, a fixed method, by applying which to actions and systems of actions, to history and to life, we may ascertain whether or not we have the object-matter before us in its natural and real shape, with all its essential aspects brought out in their true relative importance, without omission and without addition. It will be reserved for such a logic of practice to examine and if possible to determine the various questions which are still agitated respecting moral obligation, such as, for instance, whether happiness is its only source, or a sufficient account of its origin; whether it is the true happiness of the individual, or that of the race, or that of sentient beings generally, which must be held to have this character; where the ultimate criterion is found for judging doubtful questions of morals when they arise; whether and on what grounds it is possible to condemn an action while acquitting or even honouring the agent, or to condemn the agent while honouring the act. Such questions as these would fall properly within the scope of the system of principles I have endeavoured to picture, while they would be almost hopeless of solution without a previous analysis of the phenomena, such as the first Book will contain; since, although a solution might be made to appear

highly probable a priori, it would lack the justification attainable by its evident applicability to the phenomena, prepared by the analysis. On the other hand, the second examination of the phenomena by the systematisation of a logic of practice is plainly requisite to complete the subject as a whole; and it is this part of the work which justifies its claim to be an enquiry into the Theory of Practice in general.

§ 2. 1. The necessity for entering in the first Book upon an analysis of the whole of the material furniture of consciousness will be more apparent if we consider the different views which are entertained of the nature and scope of Ethic, and the different ways in which its study may be approached. Ethic seems in the first place to be conversant with actions and habits; and farther, since the motive in all action is to obtain or increase some pleasure, or else to avoid or diminish some pain, pleasure and pain being well called by Bentham the springs of action, Ethic seems to be conversant also with pleasures and pains. These two views are easily united, for pleasures and pains stand to actions and consequent habits in the relation of cause to effect, so that in studying pleasures and pains we are studying actions and habits at their source, and in studying actions and habits we are studying pleasures and pains in their stream; and by combining both views, and studying the relations between stream and source, it seems as if the whole subject would be sufficiently exhausted.

2. But this is only one side or aspect of the subject, for so far as it has now been stated it aims only at discovering what actions or habits are or will be done or exist, not what ought to be done or exist. From another side Ethic seems to be conversant

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with judgments about actions and habits, pleasures and pains, as better or worse than one another, judgments of approval or disapproval; in which view of the case, the actions and habits are classified under the two heads of virtues and vices. These two views are again capable of combination; and it is only as such combination, and in virtue of the addition of the second view to the first, that Ethic becomes a practical enquiry; since it would not differ from sciences of pure observation and experiment if it confined itself to studying the sequences of phenomena, and did not proceed to guide opinion in preferring some to others in future conduct. It is its influence on future action and habit, by means of a judgment on the past, that makes Ethic what it is, a practical study.

3. There is then a sort of reduplication, ἐπαναδί-
πλωσις, in Ethic, a returning back on its own obser-
vations and a fresh traversing of them, arranging
them under new categories expressive of praise or
blame. In the first limb of its course it is a science
of speculation, in its second one of practice; and it
makes no difference that practice, consisting of ac-
tions and habits, is the object-matter of its investi-
gations, unless it treats them in a way to influence
future practice. Now it is in determining the rela-
tion, and the relative rank or primacy, between these
two branches of Ethic that disputes arise which ne-
cessitate the careful metaphysical analysis of the phe-
nomena, previous to the establishment of any ethical
theory whatever. The speculative branch of Ethic
deals with what is, has been, will be, or will not be;
the second with what ought to be, or is better or
worse than something else. Now every judgment

asserting an "ought" is itself a phenomenon or fact, which belongs to the speculative branch and falls under its cognisance, as being determined by the laws governing the sequence of phenomena as such. In other words, the judgment which asserts the preferability of one thing to another is made what it is, say, 'that courage is better than craft,' by causes which are irreversible and belong to the domain of facts; apparently, therefore, however much the judgment may express an "ought," there is no validity in it beyond the validity of its being a fact, since if no one whatever passed the judgment it would become not merely invalid but nonexistent; and apparently also those judgments only which do continue as facts and outlast or outweigh in fact other judgments, so as actually to influence practice, have a right to be obeyed,—a right derived in no measure from their containing an "ought," but solely from their actual permanence as facts. In this way the special function of the practical branch of Ethic seems destroyed, and itself subsumed under the speculative branch, the weight of its "ought" being exhibited as a case of weight of fact, and its right as a case of might.

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4. But in so stating the dispute for the primacy we shall have proved too much; if this view were true, the practical branch would be not merely subordinated to the speculative, but it would be destroyed as a distinct branch. What is erroneous in it may be thus exhibited. It is true that all judgments are facts; but the practical validity of judgments consists in their being existent at a particular time, in their being passed at the moment of the action passing from the present to the future. All

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conscious acts—and it is only conscious acts and their consequences that are the object-matter of Ethic—are judgments at the moment of their becoming acts, are preferences of one mode of acting to another. It is only when we look back upon them as past actions that they have a fixed or purely speculative character; each action has been a judgment in the moment of its birth as action, and its character as a judgment is that which has given it its character as a fact, that is, has made it, and not something else, a fact at all. The debate therefore between the two branches of Ethic must be thus settled: the judgment is supreme at the moment of acting, but the actions which are its product have their validity not from their being practical judgments but from their being accomplished facts; and when it is urged that every judgment has its nature and content determined solely by the entire course of past actions and events, it must be replied that these actions at least have themselves become such, and have acquired their determinant force, solely by having once in their turn been judgments. The reference of judgment and action to different times dissolves the apparent contradiction between their claims. In looking at actions as past we consider them speculatively and as matters of fact; in looking at them in the moment of becoming past we consider them practically and as matters of judgment. Yet the apparent contradiction is too deep-seated and thorough-going to be satisfactorily removed by such brief remarks as the foregoing. It will soon reappear in a somewhat different shape.

5. When Ethic, then, is treated as a practical science, the debate is changed from one between judg-

ment and action to one between different kinds of judgment. Judgment is supreme in practice, in determining the future; but among judgments themselves what differences are discoverable, what judgments are superior, what inferior? Here is the question which, by dividing the opinion of moralists, renders necessary the thorough examination of the furniture, the phenomena, of consciousness. It is admitted that, since the enquiry is a practical one, the judgment, the preference of a better to a worse, the assertion of an "ought," is supreme; that we are not blind actors but judges and choosers of conduct. But if the judgment determines the conduct, what determines the judgment; aye and what ought to determine the judgment; for, in admitting judgment as supreme, we do not admit it in its character of fact but in its character of judgment, that is, as the assertion of a better or of an "ought"? Not that it is actually passed, but that it is a preference of a better to a worse, is what we mean by calling it a judgment. What kinds of judgments are better than others, what kinds of preferences are best, what is the supreme "ought,"—these are the questions which seem to have presented inextricable difficulties to ethical writers.

6. Now it is worthy of remark that the same question which has been raised between the speculative and the practical branches of Ethic, or rather the difficulty which lay at the root of that question, presents itself here again in a different shape, in the dispute between different kinds of judgment for the primacy. Pleasures and pains, it was said, are the springs of action. All conscious acts are done from these motives. As a matter of fact, they do produce

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and guide action. No action takes place which is not the product of them, of course in their largest and widest sense. Gather up into one ideal the greatest and best, the most refined and most finely harmonised pleasures, including those which arise from a sense of duty fulfilled, with the smallest admixture of pain, and you have the famous conception of the Summum Bonum, *εὐδαιμονία*, happiness. When it is asserted that pleasure of this kind not only actually is, but also ought practically to be, the motive in determining judgment, when no difference of kind is recognised between the actual motive of action and the practical motive of choosing,—or, if these two things are distinguished logically, it is yet maintained that the motive determining the judgment has no other validity than the pleasure, of whatever kind, which determines the action,—then is held the theory which, in many various modifications, is known commonly as the theory of the Utilitarian school. But if on the other hand it is held, that, besides the motive to action which is universal, namely, the avoidance of pain and the procuring of pleasure, of any or all kinds, there is another motive which alone has validity in determining the judgment, different in kind from pleasure and not derived from it, although always accompanied by it, namely, a sense of duty or moral obligation; and that this element in the judgment is what gives it practical validity, though it may or may not determine it to become further action according as the pleasure attaching to it is greater or less than the pleasure attaching to other lines of conduct at the moment of choice; then is asserted the counter theory to the Utilitarian, a theory which for want of an already current single

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name may perhaps be called the theory of a Moral Law. And I believe that all theories of morals, ancient or modern, will be found to be some modification of these two, and to rest ultimately upon one of the two principles which I have indicated as the basis of each. For instance, under the Utilitarian principle may be reckoned both those theories which would deduce all moral virtues from self-love, or enlightened self-interest, and those which would deduce them from sympathy or benevolence, Schopenhauer's *Neminem læde, immo omnes quantum potes juva*, and Auguste Comte's *Vivre pour autrui*; for in both of these happiness or well-being is considered as the sole source of right, whether the person who is to enjoy it is oneself or another. And under the general principle of the other school, the principle of duty or obedience to a moral law, may be brought those theories of a self-determining Ego, Will, or Person, which is exhibited best in Kant's *Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*, and also those which assume a religious shape, namely, obedience to the Will of God, which displays itself in the concrete duties of holiness, purity, self-denial, unworldliness, humility, and so on.

7. The intricacy in which all discussions are involved, which go deeply into the principles of these two schools, seems to me to flow from the difficulty of logically distinguishing between the validity which a thing has for determining the judgment as judgment and the force which it has for determining the judgment as action; for every judgment is an action. It does not follow, because a motive determines the judgment as action, that it must also have determined it as judgment; the greater pleasure, it is

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clear, determines the judgment as action; we both do the thing and appear to think it the best thing to do, for the judgment as a total act is itself determined, not the action determined against the judgment. But does the greater pleasure supply a valid reason as well as an effectual motive to the judgment for its determination? This is a question which is not so clear. Now those who insist that the motive determining the judgment actually is eo ipso the thing which the judging or reasoning element of the judgment thinks best overlook the possible effects of a distinction, which is always to be found in the judgment itself, between its volitional and its comparing functions. Judgment, inasmuch as it is action, is compound; will as well as reason is contained in it. The determination of the judgment may mean the determination of the volitional element alone, with small contribution, even almost none, from the comparing element, or again in direct opposition to the knowledge given by that element, as where we persist in doing what we know at the time is pernicious. This analysis of acts of judgment is all-important. All volition is reasoning, since it includes some degree of comparison, and conversely every act of reasoning is a voluntary act; it includes the two component elements or strains, perception of a comparison or relation between two perceptions, and volition to hold them together till they either combine or one excludes the other. Pleasure is a motive which acts on and determines volition; the truth or untruth of the perceptions in relation is what is perceived by the comparing element, in virtue of which the volition is reasoning. It is the empirical method only which persists in treating an

act of reasoning and an act of volition as two separate and complete acts, in separating so-called actions from so-called reasonings. Nothing but confusion can result from such a deviation from the truth of nature.

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8. However, when we have drawn this distinction the question still remains, whether there is any ground or reason determinant of the reasoning element or strain in judgment, different from pleasure, which is confessedly the determinant or motive of the volitional element. The Utilitarian school seem to me to have answered this question in the negative, without having clearly enough perceived the distinction of the two elements in the act of reasoning which gives it significance. They are thus always recurring to the question of fact instead of to the question of right. What makes one course of conduct to be judged better than another? They reply, Its being perceived to be productive ultimately of the greater pleasure. But is this judgment right? They reply, The greater pleasure is its own justification. They thus take up, with respect to the determination of judgment, the same ground which was above supposed to be occupied by those who denied the validity of judgment against fact; the question of right and of justification is in both cases merged in the question of fact.

9. In opposition to this the other school of moralists ask, Why is it that we have the conception of right, of duty, of moral obligation, as things different in kind from pleasure, even from those pleasures which are attached to the observance of these conceptions themselves? And although various theories have been started in order to satisfy this demand,

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such as, for instance, that the conceptions in question have been produced by long association and experience of the superior kinds of pleasure with steady resolution in virtuous conduct; or that they have arisen from the notion of debt enforced, or of punishment inflicted, by superior power; or by means such as these with the additional ingraining force of hereditary transmission, (see, for instance, Mr. Herbert Spencer's Letter to Mr. Mill, printed in Prof. Bain's Mental and Moral Science, page 721, 2d edit.); yet still the enquirers are not satisfied, but keep steady to their conviction, that conceptions so different must have a different source, and conceptions so much loftier a loftier one than those to which they are thus referred. You must prove to us, they would say, that such a transformation of notions of expediency or might into the notion of moral right is not only possible but actual, must lay your finger, as it were, on the moment of operation, before we can consent to give up the belief that the latter has always been, what it appears to be now, a primary and original fact in consciousness. For, as a matter of fact, the conception of right constantly recurs in contradistinction to that of pleasure or of power, as is subtilly remarked in the following passage from a well-known work of this school,—Price's Review of the Principal Questions and Difficulties in Morals, Chap. vi. p. 185, 2d edit. "One cannot but observe on this occasion, how the ideas of right and wrong force themselves upon us, and in some form or other, always remain, even when we think we have annihilated them. Thus, after we have supposed all actions and ends to be in themselves indifferent, it is natural to conceive, that therefore it is

right to give ourselves up to the guidance of unrestrained inclination, and *wrong* to be careful of our actions, or to give ourselves any trouble in pursuing any ends. Or, if with *Hobbs* and the orator in *Plato's Gorgias*, we suppose that the strongest may oppress the weakest, and take to themselves whatever they can seize ; or that unlimited power confers an unlimited right ; this plainly still leaves us in possession of the idea of *right*, and only establishes *another species* of it.—In like manner, when we suppose all the obligations of morality to be derived from laws and compacts, we at the same time find ourselves under a necessity of supposing something *before* them, not absolutely indifferent in respect of choice ; something good and evil, right and wrong, which gave rise to them and occasion for them ; and which, after they are made, makes them regarded." This however is not inconsistent with the explanations offered by the opposite school ; but it is evident that the objection will not be removed, until the actual transformation of expediency or might into moral right has been indubitably established.

10. And so also on the other hand, although the disciples of the school of moral law are thus staunch in maintaining their conviction of the original difference and superiority of some principle of right as opposed to expediency or to might, it is clear that the only proof of their conviction being true would consist in their being able to put their finger, as it were, on the spot, and say what precisely it is in a judgment, or in the object of a judgment, which gives it this distinct character of right, duty, moral goodness, or moral obligation. Until this is either done or shown to be impossible, the controversy be-

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tween the two schools must continue. But to point out this element precisely is a matter which depends on analysis of the phenomena of consciousness, an analysis more searching and accurate than any which has yet been performed. Here then we are driven back upon Metaphysic.

11. Metaphysic proper is purely speculative, and contains two branches, statical analysis and dynamical; the statical analysis determines the nature, the *τί ἐστι*, of an object or state of consciousness, the dynamical determines the general modes of movement or sequence of such objects or states, and to that extent the *πῶς παραγίνεται* of each of them. But that part of Metaphysic in a larger sense, which is practical as well as speculative, namely Ethic, while it retains as purely and entirely speculative the dynamical branch of enquiry, which determines the *πῶς παραγίνεται* of judgments and actions, introduces into the statical branch, the analysis of the *τί ἐστι*, a distinction between what is and what ought to be. The practical moment, the moment of validity, of judgment, of better or worse, the moment of "ought,"—this is discoverable only in the statical analysis, the *τί ἐστι*, of objects and states of consciousness.

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Ethic to
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§ 3. 1. The same considerations which show the insufficiency of the methods of the just mentioned schools, unless founded on previous analysis of the phenomena of consciousness, show also the insufficiency of the method which approaches the examination of the practice of individuals from the side of their relation to society, and endeavours to determine the laws of their practice by deduction from the laws of the practice of men acting in masses, whether statically in a nation or state as it exists at

any one time, or dynamically in its historical changes and developments in long periods of time. For when the question is, not what the state actually does or what it actually tends towards, but what it ought to do or ought to become, which are the practical questions proposed to every individual in his sphere, and peculiarly to those who are called to guide or directly influence the collective action of the state, the same difficulties arise again which arose in the case of the individual, relating to the criteria of desirability in the choice of ends. Ought the state to have a conscience, as it is called; ought it to direct its measures towards promoting the moral virtues in its individual citizens; or ought it to aim solely at their material prosperity as individuals, or at the material aggrandisement of itself as a state? Such difficulties as these are unavoidable the moment the question is put practically; and to ignore the question of what is best to be done or ought to be done, expecting an answer which shall be a guide to future action, is nothing else than to treat Ethic and Politic as purely speculative sciences, and, since all human action is choice and must be guided by some consideration or other, however we may treat it, to deliver it up to the blind determination of foreign or external causes. It is, comparatively speaking, easy to discover what the actual constitution of a state is, what its history has been, and what it is actually tending to become. This is treating the subject merely as a matter of observation of fact, as in the physical sciences. Every one, however, admits that Politic is a practical science, having for its scope to modify the actual condition, in some measure at least, for the better, and therefore to study the laws of society and of

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history as laws of natural phenomena, with a view to imprint upon them a better tendency, in other words, to introduce improvements where it is found practicable. Now the moment society begins to entertain the practical question, it is necessarily some individual or individuals in consultation who entertain it. What society thinks best to be done, that some individuals think best to be done; the practical judgment of society is the practical judgment of some individuals, many or few, in that society. They become its organs in all choice of conduct, and without organs it would be a blind non-deliberating agent, an object of observation and experiment alone, like the objects of chemistry or astronomy. This necessity of society's acting practically only through individuals is that which compels it to act according to the conditions of an individual's judgment, and therefore subjects it to the difficulties which, as already shown, constitute the, at present at least inevitable, embarrassment of Ethic. Consequently the science of Politic is subordinate to that of Ethic, the science of the whole mass of individuals to that of the individual separately, in the practical branch of the science. But in the speculative branch of Ethic, the action of the mass, or society as a whole, upon the individual is a part of the external conditions to which he is subject; and with the total of those conditions must be studied speculatively, as if it were the object of a science of pure observation or experiment. There is one branch of Ethic, the speculative branch, in which it is subordinate to the corresponding branch of Politic; and there is one branch of Politic, the practical, in which it is subordinate to the corresponding branch of Ethic.

2. If we cast a glance back at history, or at the history of philosophy, we shall find this view confirmed. The earliest complete theory which embraced both sciences, Plato's Republic, was the expression of the view that Ethic was entirely subordinate to Politic in its practical branch. (See Sir Alexander Grant's *Ethics of Aristotle*, vol. i. Essay III.) That which was desirable for the community was first determined, and the individuals were to be instructed not to consider what might be desirable for them individually. It is certainly remarkable, though by no means inexplicable, that Plato should have taken this view, Plato who was the great upholder of the idea of justice as opposed to pleasure, and of the conception of the virtues being ἐπιστήμαι. It is an instance of the fact that great moral truths are seen more easily and therefore earlier when exemplified on a large scale, as in society, than on a small scale, as in the individuals, in whom they nevertheless originate. Plato could conceive the realisation of the idea of justice only by imagining it applied at once to the relation between a community and its members, not as obtaining between two individuals apart from the state; although, in truth, only by first satisfying its claims between the individuals, as such, could there exist any true justice in the whole; for justice is an idea conceived necessarily, if at all, by individual minds, and except as so conceived has no existence. The question really was, not what Plato, a spectator *ab extra*, thought just in a state, but what the individuals of the state would concur with such a spectator in thinking so. "Das Princip der neuern Welt überhaupt ist Freiheit der Subjektivität, dass alle wesentliche Seiten, die

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in der geistigen Totalität vorhanden sind, zu ihrem Rechte kommend sich entwickeln." Hegel, Rechtsphil. § 273. Zusatz. Werke, vol. viii.

3. Ethic then was by Plato involved in Politic. With Aristotle the two became distinguished. We have separate treatises devoted to each. The actions, habits, and characters, of the individuals were examined, and classified as virtues or vices; and a general characteristic of the virtues was pointed out, namely, that they were all "means" between two extremes which were vices. Besides this, what was much more important, the logic of the *ἔργον* and its *τέλος* was introduced, with the supreme *τέλος* of all conscious action, *εὐδαιμονία*. Yet, notwithstanding that some prominence was given to the question of choice in its subjective aspect, *προαίρεσις*, no criterion for the subjective determination of choice at the moment of action or judgment was given, beyond what lay in the general perception of *εὐδαιμονία*. Beyond this a tribunal, and a function in man corresponding to it, were indicated, to which recourse was had in all doubtful points, I mean the frequent appeals to *ὁρθὸς λόγος*, and *ὡς ὁ ἀγαθὸς ὀρίσσει*. It is one thing however to have a judge appointed to decide questions, and another to have a judge furnished with a criterion or test which he must apply. He may not, even in the latter case, be able to decide all questions, but he can go farther than if he were left to his unguided sense, and the farther in proportion as the criterion is distinct and of immediate applicability. Aristotle, then, made the immense step of separating the practical branch of Ethic from Politic, but he did not treat it subjectively to any great extent, nor carry his analysis of choice far enough to discern a sub-

jective criterion beyond the conception which "right reasoning" or "the good man" might form for himself of happiness as the end of life. The practical question in Ethic however is, as already shown, whether there is or is not such a subjective practical criterion.

4. If we turn to history proper we find a corresponding fact. Neither in Greece nor in Rome was there a spiritual power, in the usual sense of the term, side by side with or above the temporal, as Auguste Comte has shown. The development of the mind of man had not reached that stage at which the subjective side of practical judgment could make itself manifest, either in the shape of a theoretical philosophy or in that of a political constitution. It is only dawning in the Aristotelian doctrine of *πραξις*. It is however the most prominent feature in the writings of St. Paul, the point on which he most earnestly insists: "Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind" (Rom. xiv. 5); and "Whatsoever is not of faith is sin" (Rom. xiv. 23). St. Paul is the law reformer of rising Christianity, as the writers of the Epistle to the Hebrews and of the Fourth Gospel and First Epistle of St. John are its religious philosophers, or reformers in theology proper. He substituted the law of Conscience for the law of ordinances, the status of grace, of faith, of sonship, for the status of servitude to an external authority; free grace and free obedience being two expressions for one and the same thing, namely, the relation between the subject and the sovereign, between man and God. The doctrine of a conscience which could not be bound by temporal laws was the specific shape in which the subjective aspect of choice made its im-

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portance felt; and this is what underlies the terms, moral obligation, duty, moral sense, moral law, and the like, which we have seen are the watchwords of one of the two great schools of moralists. In history, the origin and separate existence of the Spiritual Power, the Church, are the manifestation of the same phenomenon, conscience asserting itself against power, the conviction that there is something in practical judgments which gives them a validity superior to any force or might which they derive from motives of happiness, whether these are exhibited as attractive or deterrent, as pleasures or as pains, as rewards or as punishments. What precisely this something is, in what precisely consists the supreme validity of conscience, demands a more searching analysis of the facts or phenomena of consciousness, and that subjectively, than they have as yet received.

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§ 4. 1. It follows from what has been said, that the method proper to Ethic is that of subjective or internal observation. Actions and habits, and chains of actions and habits, are objectively nothing but events and chains of events, and these may be observed and examined without any more reference to subjective feelings than is necessary in the case of physical phenomena, the succession of waves on a beach, or the stages of growth and development of a tree. But the moment we enter on the consideration either of the motives or springs of action, or of the end aimed at in actions, we enter on the question of the value of feelings to the agent, their comparative value in kind, and in degree of intensity. We have to consider what these motives and ends are to him as feelings; and the same is the case with the actions of men in masses and the events of his-

tory. For when we would form a judgment of the comparative value of the goal to which the actions of a nation or of the race appear to be tending, or of the several tendencies which compose its entire course, we have to ask what feelings and thoughts that goal or course will consist of, what capacities for enjoyment will be developed, what characters will be produced, what the minds of the men will be. This necessity for entering on the subjective analysis of feelings in order to determine their comparative value to consciousness is irrespective of the view which we may take as to the merits of the Utilitarian school or its opposite. All consideration of motive or of end, whether these consist of pleasure only or also of duty, all practical enquiry, involves the taking up a subjective point of view. Pleasure and pain in all their kinds and degrees are subjective feelings, the names of them do not even appear to have a meaning apart from such feeling, nor can we reason about them without bearing in mind their subjective significance. But physical objects, actions of men and events of history, though equally consisting of subjective feelings in their last analysis, and therefore capable of being subjectively treated, yet can be also analysed as objective things, and their laws discovered, without the necessity of a constant reference to the fact of this subjective constitution and nature; we need not be constantly translating the terms describing them and their sequences into terms significant of their subjective aspect; it is enough that they can be so translated if occasion for such verification should arise; otherwise the course of investigation would be interrupted, the objects being sufficiently well known in their objective aspect.

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2. Although therefore there is no class of objects which is not capable of being examined both in its objective and in its subjective aspect, there are yet two classes of objects which are most effectively treated, the one from its subjective, the other from its objective side. Physical objects, generally, belong to the class which is most effectively treated from the objective side, and are objects of special empirical sciences. Among these may be distinguished, for the purposes of the present work, first, the nerves and nervous organism as forming one whole class of the causes of states of consciousness; and secondly, those changes of sequence in physical objects which are known as human actions and historical events. But on the other hand, feelings and thoughts, in all their varieties, among which it has been shown that everything which is a motive or an end of action must be reckoned, belong to the class which can be best treated subjectively, which indeed can be only treated subjectively, so long as the phenomena belonging to it have not been made, by the course of thought, into complete and familiar objects, with names which have a definite and admitted connotation, as in the case of physical objects.

3. Now it has been shown in § 2, that Ethic comprises two branches, to one of which, the speculative, it is now clear that the study of actions and events, of changes in physical circumstances, and especially of nerve structure and function, as causes of feeling and thought, belongs; while to the other, the practical branch, belongs the study of feelings and thoughts, and of ends and motives of action. This latter study is also necessarily the study of feelings and thoughts as they are to the individual, because only to an in-

dividual do they appear in the character of feeling and thought; as belonging to masses of men they are feelings and thoughts of the individuals composing the mass. Ethic therefore can only be completely and satisfactorily studied by a combination of the three sciences of History, Nervous Physiology, and the Metaphysical analysis of states of consciousness in the individual; but it is nevertheless the last of these which is the chief domain and distinguishing feature of Ethic, in virtue of its being a practical science; and this it is which renders it a branch of Metaphysic. Neither history nor nervous physiology can be pursued entirely without reference to subjective analysis, since it would deprive the events described in history of all significance, if they could not be compared in respect of the value of the tendencies which they exhibit; and the investigation into the structure and functions of nervous matter would be left equally without meaning (assuming that the nervous organism generally is the organ upon which feeling and thought depend), if we did not attach or endeavour to attach some mode of feeling or change of feeling to each different structure and different function of nerve as it was discovered. So also, on the other hand, subjective analysis has to depend upon history for the conditions which surround and modify the feelings and thoughts of the individual imagined to be under analysis, and upon nervous physiology for the causes producing or supporting the individual's feelings and thoughts, and bringing external objects, actions, and events, to bear upon them by acting upon nerve. But there is also a great part in each of these three studies, which is peculiar to it and independent of the other two.

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The analysis of feelings and thoughts and their sequences by themselves, or in their character as feeling and thought, apart from their conditions and causes, is the independent part of subjective analysis. The conclusions reached by such analysis may be suggested and supported by the collateral conclusions of history and physiology; but the analysis itself must be conducted on its own independent basis. Were it not independent it could give no support in its turn to the conclusions of history or physiology; and yet it has been seen that they do receive such a support, in the significance which is lent to their conclusions by the feelings attached to them or involved in them.

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§ 5. 1. Since subjective analysis is to be the staple of the present work, and yet there is at the present day a deep distrust and dislike, even among men of science, to anything that bears the name of subjective or internal observation, or worse still of Metaphysic, a distrust and dislike which I cannot but think unreasonable and erroneous, I venture (though it is a task I would gladly avoid) to enter at somewhat greater length upon the true meaning and real validity of this method. For Metaphysic also claims to be a part of positive science, if by positive is meant verifiable. And first to take up the matter from the point already reached, the study of history compared with that of the individual.

2. It has been ably maintained by Auguste Comte and others that the study of the organisation and development of society, that is, of men in masses or of the whole human family, must precede the investigation of the organisation and development of the individual consciousness, the study of which is

Ethic. The grounds of this opinion are, first, that the general laws of human doings can be better seen in the gross, or when acting on a large scale, since then abstraction is made of partially operative and accidental circumstances, and secondly, that the individual units of society are governed by the strong tendencies of the mass to which they belong, somewhat as straws are carried down by a stream; so that not only as a rule of logic, a rule to help investigation, is this method advisable, but also in order of history and of nature the laws of the whole precede and dominate the laws of the component parts. To these grounds must be added the notion, common to Auguste Comte and to most positivists, that the method employed by metaphysicians and known as the method of internal observation is delusive and pernicious. The study of the individual apart from society seems to demand the application of this method, while that of society as a whole appears to require an objective empirical method only. (See Buckle, *Hist. of Civilisation in England*, vol. i. Chap. iii.)

3. Now first as to the method of internal or subjective observation. It was shown in "Time and Space" that one objection which Auguste Comte made to Metaphysic was owing to his confounding it with Ontology; but there is another cause, which is his disbelief in the method of subjective observation. The first ground of objection can be obviated by showing that Metaphysic is perfectly distinct from Ontology; but it cannot be denied that Metaphysic employs the method of subjective observation. In fact subjective observation with its application to other minds and to the events of history is the whole

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of the method of Metaphysic. In the first case Comte was wrong in his estimate of what Metaphysic is ; but in the second, he is right in his estimate of what Metaphysic is, and wrong only in his opinion of its validity. No doubt the term and the method have both been employed delusively ; they have been employed to the establishment of Ontological systems ; hence Comte's dislike and disbelief of them as capable of a true and valid use. The ontological metaphysicians employed this method to the establishment of a theory of a Self in some shape or other ; wherever they were unable to analyse, there they established an entity, of which they said that they were intuitively and immediately certain by their own internal observation. They were thus conscious of a Self, of which they could give no account and no analysis ; and then they used this entity to account for other phenomena, and constructed the world out of the Self wholly, or else out of the contact or conjunction of the Self and some external entities equally unknown, or Things-in-themselves. It is clear that on this track all progress was barred, by a limit being set to further analysis, while the result reached was eminently unsatisfactory. Hence the dissatisfaction of scientific men with a method which appeared always to lead to such results.

4. But is such the necessary result of this method ? An answer may perhaps be thought to be given by "Time and Space" itself. But independently of that work a few remarks will show not only the soundness of the method but also its inevitable nature, seeing that it is and always must be employed, even by those who reject it in name. It is supposed by these writers to require, that the per-

son employing it shall observe the operations of his consciousness in the very moment of their operation, that he shall divide himself from himself, and at once think or perceive and observe his thinking or perceiving; if this were possible, it would even then, they say, so disturb the normal operation of perception and thought that no conclusion could be drawn from them in this disturbed state to their normal mode of operation. See Comte, *Cours de Phil. Positive*, vol. i. p. 31-33, 2^{me} édition.

5. Both objections would be unanswerable if the method of subjective observation did require such coinstantaneous application. But the fact is not so. Past states of consciousness are all that can be observed, and all that need be observed, by the applier of the method; and this is done in memory or redintegration, spontaneous and voluntary. Past states of consciousness recalled in memory are objective, that is, are objects to the reflecting consciousness, to the applier of the method of subjective observation. And all past states of consciousness when recalled in memory are equally objective. It matters not whether the observer recalls a house seen or a sentiment experienced yesterday, whether he recalls the result of a problem in astronomy or chemistry, or the method of its solution, or his feelings before and after his attempt at solving it. All states of consciousness recalled in memory are objects of consciousness; and nothing can be recalled in memory which is not an object of consciousness, and which, consequently, is not an object of subjective observation. In whatever operations of thought, therefore, memory is employed in addition to or combination with direct presentative perception, in those is em-

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played the method of subjective observation. Nor is the case different with purely presentative observations; for suppose we are watching a visible object, the sun, for instance, rising out of the sea; the object consists of feelings of ours; and whenever we hear the words sun, or sunrise, the meaning of the words consists in those same feelings recalled in memory. Would we know what the object seen is, what we really see, and what we infer from, add to, or combine with, what we really see, we must fix our attention on our feelings, the visible light and colour and shape; and in doing this we are applying the method of subjective observation. In fact, subjective observation is nothing but objective observation taken subjectively; the same thing is seen or observed, but in the one case as if it were an absolute independent object, part of an absolute independent external world; in the other, as a complex of feelings belonging to the observer. Both aspects are equally objective to reflection; but the former, the objective, aspect alone is supposed, erroneously, to have been always objective and not subjective to direct perception.

6. It is erroneously supposed that the opposite method to that of subjective observation rests on no metaphysical theory. It rests, however, on the assumption of a difference, an essential but unexplained difference, between consciousness and the objects of consciousness. This difference in kind and in position between the two worlds, the inner of consciousness, the outer of things, is adopted as a theory from which to start by the current positive philosophy; yet it is adopted without enquiry solely because it is familiar. A little thought properly directed shows

that the two supposed worlds are inextricably interwoven, and are in fact but one world which a subjective delusion makes us regard as two; the delusion consisting in transferring our present view of the matter, the divorce we have established between consciousness and things, to the world itself as a perennial fact of its constitution. The truth is, as I have endeavoured to show elsewhere, that there is one world with two aspects, consciousness the one, and the objects of consciousness the other. To study consciousness is to study its objects; and to study the objects of consciousness is to study consciousness itself. The attempted divorce between science and subjective observation stands, therefore, itself upon a metaphysical theory, and that an erroneous one, the metaphysical nature of which is concealed from the eyes of its votaries by its familiarity. This is no argument against the validity of the objective method, but only against the notion that it is independent of Metaphysic. The two aspects, subjective and objective, are given by, and the two methods corresponding to them are founded in, reflection; and the distinction between the two methods can no more be overlooked or given up than that between the aspects; which latter, as we have seen, is so evident as to lead sometimes to its members, one or both, being regarded as absolute existences.

7. But since there is nothing, for let anything be named, which is an object exclusively of either one or the other of these aspects, and the two aspects are thus inseparable and coextensive, the question arises, how the corresponding methods are discriminated from each other, how they come to be separately applicable in science, and what are the peculiar

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functions of each. The discrimination of the methods depends on the distinction of the aspects; and this distinction is the following. Any object, simple or complex, when treated in its relation to consciousness alone, has its analysis given by subjective observation, as consisting of a complex of feelings in time or in time and space together; and any object, simple or complex, when treated in connection or relation to other objects in consciousness, has the laws of its sequences and configuration given by objective observation, as an object among objects. The question of *τί ἐστὶ* is answered subjectively, the question of *πῶς παραγίνεται* objectively. The connection between empirical or complete objects is given by objective observation, the analysis of such objects separately is given by subjective observation. See this distinction in "Time and Space" §§ 11. 18.

8. Thus, although everything is inseparably both objective and subjective, the difference between treating things separately by themselves and treating them in connection with other things external to them is a difference between methods which are the one subjective, the other objective; for to treat anything separately is to treat it in its relation to consciousness alone, and to treat anything in connection with other things external to it is to make its relations to other things the predominant object of enquiry. The functions of these two methods are thus implicitly determined also. The first sketch and direction of enquiry in any matter must clearly be given by subjective observation; which results in a provisional definition of the thing to be examined. It is then compared with other objects; that is, its place among these, the causes which produce it, the

consequences which flow from it, the measure of its constituent parts, in extension, intensity, energy, duration (which is only done by treating each of its constituent parts as an object among other objects), are determined; and all this is the work of objective observation or experiment. Lastly, the new shape thus given to the object as a whole is tested or verified by subjective observation; and not only the verification of the whole object in its new shape, but also the verification of each instance of measurement of its constituent parts in the course of objective observation, is a subjective process, an appeal to consciousness itself as to matters of fact. The proper functions of subjective observation therefore are two, provisional definition and verification. That of objective observation is measurement or calculation. Hence all apagogic reasoning, the reasoning in Algebra for instance, belongs to objective observation; but the reduction of apagogic reasoning into ostensive is a kind of verification which belongs to subjective observation. In every chain of reasoning we are continually passing backwards and forwards between the two methods, objective and subjective; and this is what we should expect from the nature of the distinction which has been drawn between them.

9. All kinds of object-matter whatever are necessarily treated by both methods combined. There is no class of objects which is exclusively the object of one method and not of the other; just as there was no object which was not subjective and objective inseparably. Everything alike is the object of provisional definition, measurement, and verification. The objects of the physical sciences are no exception.

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Verification in them is plainly an appeal to actual presentative perception,—to sensations as facts. This may be shown by supposing the proof to be separated from the verification; since without such verification, or subjective experience, to appeal to in others no proof of any proposition to them would be possible. You may prove to an Indian that rivers must be frozen in northern winters, but he will not understand what being frozen is, unless it be from personal experience either of this or similar phenomena. His own experienced feelings are at once the test and the fountain of all his knowledge. While you are proving to him your thesis out of your knowledge, he is ordering and combining in his brain not your knowledge but his own, not your states of consciousness but a succession of states of consciousness of his own, recalled in his own memory and consisting of his own feelings. When he has got at last the true notion of rivers frozen into ice, he has not got out of feelings into facts, but he has got feelings which will be verified by presentations, which are equally feelings. If you should actually show him a frozen river, he would still not have left feelings for facts, but he would be actually and presentatively having feelings which admit of no further verification.

10. This way of describing the matter, however, brings us to the real difficulty in the method of subjective observation, to that difference between the subjective and objective methods, which makes the results of the former so much more uncertain than those of the latter. It is this, that in subjective observation the same phenomenon, in point of place or number, can never be examined by more than one

observer. The same frozen river can be seen at once by many; but the memory which each has of the river, or the actual perception taken subjectively, can be examined only by each observer for himself. In observing the phenomena of consciousness, it is as if a set of specimens of all the various plants of a garden was taken home by different botanists, and each set examined separately by each botanist; and the whole of the attainable knowledge of those plants had to consist exclusively in the agreement of the separate descriptions furnished by each botanist from his own set of specimens, without it being possible to point out with the finger which plant was intended by which description. This difference is no doubt a great disadvantage on the side of subjective observation; but it does not attach to it because it is subjective. All verification is a subjective process; but in verifying the phenomena of consciousness, the same phenomenon cannot be handed round, as it were, for verification by different observers. Each observer must verify subjectively in all cases; but in consciousness he can only verify a similar, and not the very same, phenomenon as another observer. This is a difficulty to which all observation of the phenomena of consciousness is exposed, and not only their subjective observation; it could only be avoided by renouncing the observation of them altogether.

11. The two methods have the same functions, and the same order of application, when their object-matter consists of the phenomena of consciousness and of the actions of conscious agents. I do not suppose that any man ever deliberately sat down to recall and analyse his own mental furniture, without first having a purpose or object provisionally defined

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in the first place, and, in the second, without taking some description or narrative to be verified by that analysis. The process I apprehend to be something of this kind: A certain class of feelings, provisionally defined, is fixed upon as the object-matter of investigation, and this is kept more or less present in memory; then biographies or narratives of actions are read, actions and incidents in daily life are noted, containing or similar to the class of feelings in question, and the sequences of their parts are compared and measured, which is objective observation; lastly, the phenomena so collected and compared are verified and interpreted, at every step of the process of comparison, by reference to the personal subjective experience or feelings of the investigator, which are themselves recalled to his memory by the phenomena which he is examining. He is precisely in the position of the Indian endeavouring to understand the meaning of rivers being frozen. Words describing feelings or states of consciousness, as well as words describing actions and events which flow from feelings, describe them as objective phenomena, the analysis of which in relation to consciousness alone must be given, if at all, by subjective observation. There is no isolation of the single self of the enquirer, no abstraction from other persons or from the world of phenomena at large. He does not analyse and describe himself as a separate object apart from them, but he describes them, in the only way he can describe anything, namely, as they appear to him. The external actions, speech, gestures, expressions of countenance of men, whether actually seen and heard, or described in books, with or without the attribution of motives to them, would be entirely void of mean-

ing, were it not for the subjective experience of such phenomena connected with certain feelings and motives in oneself. In reasoning about such phenomena without any such subjective experience, if it were possible to do so, we should be reasoning about unknown quantities, and our terms would have only the value of algebraical symbols, or a currency without purchasing power. On the other hand, without a large gathering of phenomena by objective observation, subjective observation would be impoverished, and lack matter to be exercised upon. The result would approximate to a mere description of the phenomena of self, abstracted from the world at large. But this, which is a vice or a weakness in Metaphysic, where it occurs, is by no means a necessary feature of subjective observation; it is a vice to which all branches of knowledge, and not Metaphysic only, are liable; as indeed they are also to the opposite vice, that of having too little subjective insight. But the latter vice is most dangerous in the metaphysical, the former in the physical, sciences; because the subjective method preponderates in the one, the objective in the other.

12. Let us now draw some of the practical conclusions from the foregoing analysis, so far at least as Ethic is concerned. There is a comparatively great amount of agreement among men about the meaning of terms describing external actions and circumstances, and this agreement hides from our view the necessary antecedent processes of subjective observation upon which it is founded. There is a far less amount of agreement about the meaning of terms describing feelings and states of consciousness; and this disparity of the agreement in the two cases

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leads us to disparage the use of the latter class of terms, and to trust exclusively to the former, although the subjective method of observation has been a necessary source of the agreement attained in the one case, and is our only hope of attaining greater agreement in the other. Again, the line usually drawn between objects of objective and subjective observation is fluctuating and uncertain; men are prone to call an object, when described in terms the meaning of which they do not accept or understand, an object of subjective observation, or an object existing only in the brain of the describer; while objects described in terms which they do understand, and accept as at least not self-contradictory, they will call objective, as objects which may possibly exist in a given case. For instance, a man will say he observes fear in the faces of a terrified mob; yet he sees only the evidences of fear, and the connection between the evidence and the emotion evidenced is given only by his own subjective observation. The agreement of men in the meaning they attach to any term is the circumstance which seems hitherto to have determined them to consider the fact described by it as a fact of objective observation. And in arriving at such agreement, where it exists, we are driven back upon ourselves, upon our subjective observation, at every step of the process. Yet we are required by the Positive school of philosophers to build upon this sandy foundation, to erect this fluctuating limit into a strict philosophical distinction, and to renounce in consequence the appeal to consciousness at the very point where agreement ceases and uncertainty begins, as if it was not owing to this very appeal that the agreement

at present existing has been actually obtained. It is only by further appeals to consciousness, subjective observation, that the boundaries of agreement can be pushed forward, and its domain enlarged. I do not say that nothing can be done in working with the terms upon which there is agreement already, but that to enlarge the number of these terms, and to make new progress in investigating human nature, which is the problem of ethical analysis, the same method must be resorted to which has been a constant condition of all the previous advance, the combination of subjective with objective observation, in provisional definition, objective reasoning on phenomena external to the observer, subjective verification and interpretation. To restrict enquiry to a so-called objective observation is the most retrograde doctrine ever heard from philosophers who aim at the advancement of science. (See the remarks, to me quite conclusive, of Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his *Principles of Psychology*, Part i. Chap. vii. § 56, edit. 1868, although I by no means adopt his mode of using the terms objective and subjective.)

13. Lastly let us recur to the question with which this § commenced, the relation between Ethic studied subjectively and History studied objectively. History studied objectively alone is the discovery and narration of actions and events as they have actually occurred; and although certain general facts may be demonstrated about the order of sequence and recurrence of these phenomena, there is yet no science of history until this order is shown to result from certain causes, less general than the order as a whole, which have recurred or are capable of recurrence; thus producing parallel or analogous con-

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sequences in different nations, or in different sets of phenomena, such phenomena, for instance, as are contained in the different sciences. Thus Auguste Comte's Law of the Three States may be regarded as a generalisation of the course of development found, first, in the different sciences, and secondly, in the different branches of human activity as well as in those of speculation. But, in the first place, such a generalisation of the events of history, although it completes the first step towards a science of history, is, taken by itself, to be paralleled with such observations as that the planets move in ellipses, in Astronomy; observations which require to be farther analysed into the forces and their measurements which in composition produce or result in the curves described. The astronomy of the solar system could not be said to be constituted as a science by the general observation of the elliptical orbits of the planets. But the further analysis of such general laws as that of the Three States consists in pointing out the feelings and motives which have influenced human action and speculation, so as to produce the result described by the generalisation. And no doubt the generalisation itself was attained chiefly by the consideration of such motives of action. In other words, this and other such generalisations are both effected originally and must be applied subsequently by means of subjective observation combined with objective. It is not mere movements and configurations of physical objects that are described by such generalisations, but changes in the feelings and opinions of men, embodied in and evidenced by such movements and configurations; the actions and events which are generalised are phenomena consisting of

both physical and mental changes, of which the latter give significance to the former. The motive and the result of every human action is a feeling, and the events of history are but actions in combination. The generalisation therefore of the phenomena of history requires completion by being analysed into the actions which compose it, and by these being again analysed into their several motives and results. The persons whose lives have made up human history did not indeed aim at acting and reasoning so as to produce the result described in the Law of the Three States, but they acted from some immediate motives, and for some immediate ends, which have had this as their general result. The problem of history as a science is to find, 1st, what kind of immediate motives these were, and 2d, what were the intermediate steps between the so motivated actions of the individuals and the general result described by that Law. The connection between such immediate motives and intermediate steps, the media axiomata of history, are the kind of results which are of practical use to the politician and statesman in forming judgments to guide future policy; such judgments as may be found, for instance, in the works of De Tocqueville. But the motives and feelings of individuals can only be known to others by objective observation interpreted and verified by subjective. Ethic, then, is no less the complement of History studied objectively than History is of Ethic studied subjectively; and the necessary complement of both is the study of the physical environment and physical organisation. (See on the whole subject of this § Book vi. of Mr. J. S. Mill's System of Logic, especially Chapters ix. and x., 6th edit.)

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§ 6. 1. Let us now enter more closely upon the method which Metaphysic follows in applying its subjective observation to the phenomena of Ethic. Metaphysic claims for this method that it is equally positive with the objective method, that is, demonstrates facts which are equally verifiable with the facts demonstrated by the objective method. The guarantee of this consists in its strict application of the distinction between first and second intentions, that is, between things as perceived directly by consciousness and things described in comparison with other things by general names. ("Time and Space" § 10.) This distinction is the logical corner-stone of Metaphysic, which primarily deals only with things as they are to consciousness alone, not in their second intentions or general descriptions. A general term reasoned on by itself is at once eo ipso elevated into an abstract entity. For instance, time, space, matter, are such general terms which might be reasoned on by themselves and made into entities though abstractions; but instead of this Metaphysic deals always with the things containing these abstractions, analyses the phenomena in which they are combined, using the terms, time, space, and matter, solely to fix and connote the features which are actually perceived in the phenomena. The ontological philosophers, on the other hand, not having drawn the distinction in question, always use such abstract and descriptive terms, words of second intention, as connoting independent things, and in this way make entities of abstractions. Finiteness and infiniteness, unity and plurality, being and not-being, possibility and actuality, thought and intuition, and many more such terms, are reasoned on as if they were pheno-

mena instead of being descriptions of phenomena ; and thus the description becomes an entity, and philosophy an ontology. See an instance in Schelling's Bruno, Werke, vol. iv. Abth. 1. The same was shown at some length in respect to Hegel's Logic in "Time and Space" § 45. Notwithstanding, therefore, that Metaphysic approaches phenomena from the subjective side, the fact that it keeps steady to phenomena in their first intention, that is, to phenomena as they are perceived, renders it as positive and verifiable as objective science.

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2. But does not the Metaphysician claim to construct the world out of his consciousness ? This is the most usual objection. Most certainly he does not, in the sense of constructing it a priori out of abstract descriptions of phenomena. This is the ontological method. The metaphysician bases himself on perceived phenomena, experience, alone. The grain of truth in the objection is, that the metaphysician approaches phenomena from the subjective side, appealing to experience to verify the fact which he asserts, namely, that all phenomena are subjective as well as objective. How else indeed could they be verified ; is not all verification an appeal to subjective perception,—look and see, hear, touch, measure, and so on, all of them subjective acts ? It is, on the contrary, the usual division and separation of the world into two compartments, mind here, objects there, which makes verification, logically speaking, impossible, and at the same time introduces an absolute existence, unknowable as well as unknown, behind phenomena. For suppose, to take an instance, I am looking at a tree ; if you tell me that what I see is determined partly by my own

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constitution of nerve or of mind, and is no real indication of what the external cause is like which produces the effect of a tree on me, or appears as a tree to me, your arguments make the phenomenal tree, the thing which is denoted by the name tree, unreal, and at the same time refer me to something behind, or below, or previous to, the tree, which is both more real than it and unknowable by me. You tell me in one breath to busy myself only with phenomena and only with the unreal. Can such a method deserve the name of positive? To the metaphysician however the phenomena are the realities.—Then as to verification; is the verification which you have in view a verification of the relation between the phenomena and their unknowable cause, or between the phenomena themselves? Of course the latter, as we both agree. Is not then, according to your view, the verification not only comparatively unreal, but (real or unreal) also subjective in the same way as the first observed phenomena were which are now verified? I conclude therefore that, so long as it is phenomena alone which are observed and examined, these are equally capable of verification by the subjective as by the objective method.

3. In arguing as above I do not claim for Metaphysic that it has not taken new ground, or is enforcing only what it has always urged. Some old ground has been abandoned, namely, Ontology; for Metaphysic had not till lately separated itself from Ontology, and perhaps would not have done so but under the influence of positive science, and especially, at least if I may speak of myself, of the works of Auguste Comte. His writings will be prized, and his name honoured, by all seekers after truth. But

I think that in the old compound structure of ontology and metaphysic there were truths, which were not and are not now recognised by the positive schools, truths which can be separated and made the basis of a systematic and verifiable structure, which structure is or will be Metaphysic. The first step towards this, in this country at least, was taken in 1841 by the late Prof. Ferrier, in a short paper to be found in his *Remains*, vol. ii., entitled *The Crisis of Modern Speculation*. Yet even he afterwards wrote as an Ontologist. I claim then for Metaphysic not only that it is a verifiable, but also that it is an advancing study. It must not be thought, because the objects which are proper to it are universal and necessary, being the elements of all phenomena, that the mode of conceiving these objects, the theories about them, are therefore bound to be stationary. I see no connection between these two things. Metaphysic advances in dependence on the advance of the special sciences; its method alone, subjective observation of the elements of phenomena logically and not empirically separable, is what it retains as its constant distinguishing characteristic.

4. The need for Metaphysic, as the complement of the special sciences, and as their logical basis, may be brought to a very simple test. If the elements of phenomena, which Metaphysic speaks of, are universally present in combination and yet only logically discernible, as is maintained, then they ought to be discernible in the simplest and ultimate objects which are known to physical science, out of which the physical sciences construct their hypotheses and explain their facts, or into which they resolve them analytically. Now there are two things which at

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the present day are regarded by physicists, I believe almost unanimously, as such ultimate and simplest objects, namely, Atoms and Force. What is an atom? It is an extremely minute body, size and shape not agreed upon, but far smaller in size than to be seen by the microscope, yet still occupying space in three dimensions, and capable of affecting our sense of touch were that sense sufficiently acute, just as it is capable of affecting our sense of sight had we sufficient visual energy. In short, an atom is imagined like a grain of dust extremely reduced in size. I hope physicists will pardon my untechnical phraseology. Now what I want to point out is, that the qualities of visibility and tangibility are not altered in kind by this extreme reduction in size. The grain of dust is a presentation, the atom is a representation or mental image; this is the only difference. It still occupies space in three dimensions, and still contains tangible and visible qualities; we picture ourselves seeing and touching it. It also occupies some duration of time, since to exist for no time is not to exist at all. Here then is the union of feeling, or matter, with space and time, or form, which are the metaphysical elements of the empirical or complete object, the atom. In other words, the ultimate element of the physical sciences is analysed metaphysically into elements which are only logically separable; and subjectively is the product of imagination working on the perceptions of visible and tangible objects of presentative experience.

5. Again as to Force. I think I shall not be contradicted in saying that no physicist conceives force apart from atoms, or from molecules, or from masses, except by way of logical abstraction. Force,

then, would be conceived as motion or change in atoms or between them, in molecules or between them, in masses or between them ; as motion if space is involved as well as time ; as change of condition if time alone is involved, and a single atom envisaged, though even this would seem to involve imagining the atom itself distinguished into parts. But change of condition in larger masses involves space as well as time, and is change of configuration, or motion of parts. The conception of rest, the negation of motion, is a compound conception ; it is the equilibrium produced by two or more forces working in opposite directions ; it is not the absence of motion, but the balance of more motions than one. The terms statical and dynamical are therefore terms of method, signifying the adoption of a point of view or a starting point in the treatment of the phenomena. (See Mr. Grove's *Correlation of Physical Forces*, and esp. page 206-7, 3d edition.)

6. If this, though untechnically stated, is correct, what does it amount to but saying that force is the combination of new time and space relations with what we had already before us in the conception of single atoms ; for some time and space relations we had already in them ? When, therefore, the physicist has reached his ultimate and simplest elements, atoms and force, or change in time and space relations of atoms, he has not reached what is absolutely ultimate and simplest, even so far as our knowledge goes ; he has not gone so far in analysis as our knowledge enables him to do, for he can still distinguish the logically separable elements, which compose his ultimata, just as much as they compose the obvious perceptions and presentations of daily life. The

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argument does not rest only upon the fact that the representation of an atom is formed by imagination from the presentation of visible and tangible objects, but also on the circumstance that both presentation and representation can be analysed into the same logically separable elements.

7. Metaphysic, then, digs down deeper into phenomena than physical science does; deeper in one direction at least; for the method of physical science which analyses phenomena into minute empirical portions, atoms and their movements, is deep in another sense or direction, not entered on at all by metaphysic. If however the physicist could show, either that the ultimate elements of the physical sciences, atoms and their movements, were not farther distinguishable into metaphysical elements, logically but not empirically separable from each other; or that the ultimate elements of metaphysic, feelings, time, and space, were empirical or complete objects, such as are the ultimate elements of physic;—then, in either case, the logical priority of metaphysic to physic, in dealing with phenomena from the subjective side, would have to be abandoned. But to show that atoms cannot be conceived without force, nor force without atoms, is merely to show that the metaphysical conception, of elements only logically separable from each other, has a wider application than merely to the phenomena of metaphysic, namely, to physical science itself; for it would be showing the ultimate elements of physic to be still more complex than they have been here supposed to be. Again it is often said that the conception of pure force, or force as a cause of motion, is subjective, but that motion, the effect, is objective. The latter

is then regarded as the object of physical science, and the former relegated to some metaphysical limbo. But the fact is, that force, when conceived as such a "cause" of motion, is conceived as objectively existing, and as much by the physicist as by the metaphysician, and equally unprofitably by both, since it is nothing but motion itself counted over again; while on the other hand motion is conceived and analysed subjectively as much as objectively, by the metaphysician as much as by the physicist, and profitably by both to the extent that each deals with it. In short there are no notions and no objects which are exclusively objective or exclusively subjective; none which are exclusively objects either of physic or of metaphysic. It is not in this empirical way that the line can be drawn between them.

§ 7. 1. While the method of subjective observation is applicable to all phenomena without exception, in conjunction with that of objective, the moment in which we pass from observing presentations to observing representations, that is, repetitions in the mind of things actually seen, heard, or felt, that moment the subjective method remains to a great extent the only one available or useful to any purpose. But to what precise extent is it the only one available? Precisely to the extent that general agreement has not been effected about the meaning of the words in which the representations are described; and the immediate purpose of the method is to observe and describe the representations so accurately that others may recognise their accuracy, and have the same fixed and definite thoughts and feelings called up by the same words. There are many representations which are already in this condition; for instance,

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those of many past events in history, say the execution of Charles I. All men attach the same meaning to the words describing such events, so as to have the same pictures in their minds when the words are heard. But there is much even in a representation of this sort which is not fixed, namely, the feelings of the actors in the event described. No description can be supposed to give these with perfect certainty and definiteness. The cause of this is, that neither those who have described such events nor we who read the descriptions have had a logic of feelings sufficiently accurate, or supplied with such minutely appropriated terms, as to catch and fix them in a narrative which all persons should understand. Generally we may say, that, when the representation which is examined or described is a representation of something that has been or can be an object of presentation to the external senses, then there may be agreement as to the meaning of the words describing it, and the method may be predominantly objective, the subjective aspect of it ceasing to attract attention. But on the other hand, where the representation is of an emotion, or passion, or desire, attaching to such external objects, there, the immediate question being as to the particular feeling involved in them, and this being the matter to be settled and brought to a definition, the subjective method, that of observing the subjective aspect of the phenomena, becomes of itself, owing to that very circumstance, prominent and attractive of the attention.

2. There is then no "hard and fast line" between the methods of subjective and objective observation; both keep the eye steadily fixed on the phenomena;

but while all observation, and methodical observation which is reasoning, inasmuch as it belongs to and is exercised by beings who have reflected, who are self-conscious and distinguish themselves from the objects of their thoughts, is necessarily both objective and subjective at once, the objective aspect of the observation is then first prominent, in any object-matter, when the definition and analysis of the object has been agreed upon and expressed by definite terms; in effecting which, while agreement is yet being arrived at, the subjective aspect is the prominent one. The possibility of changing into the objective method is a proof that the subjective work has been done.

3. Now in the history of events, the historian's first task is to discover what events and how have actually taken place, or have been presentations to the actors in them; this being done, there is a wide field left for the interpretation of those events, assignment of their emotional meaning both to the actors and for ourselves; and here is needed, as the first step, a logic or analysis of feeling, which as yet the subjective method can alone supply. Similarly in physiology of the nervous system, the first task of the physiologist is to show what the structure and functions of the nervous system are, and what actions definitely take place in it; and again, this being done, there is a wide field for the assignment of the definite feelings and thoughts, which depend upon those actions of the nervous system, and here again is needed as the first step the same analysis of feeling and thought, supplied as yet only by the subjective method. So that, while there is one field of enquiry which at present is only open to the sub-

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jective method, yet this stands between, and in close connection with, the two sciences of history and physiology, each employing the objective method. This subjective enquiry consists in the analysis and classification of feelings and thoughts, the content of consciousness; and is the analytic part of Ethic. Our efforts must be directed to bring this object-matter up to the point where it can be treated objectively, that is, expressed in minutely appropriate terms with definite and acknowledged meanings; and not until this has been done, and only to the extent that it is done, can the complete or connected treatment of the three branches, history, physiology, ethic, be taken in hand. Not for a moment must it be supposed that ethic makes pretension to settle single-handed questions of practice, whether of individuals or of societies; questions which can only be settled by the united branches, treated in connection as parts of a great systematic whole. To prescribe political or social duties, for instance, can only be done by such a combined science, and so much the more imperfectly the more imperfect is any one of the three branches, and the more imperfect their combination. Till the establishment of the principles of such a combined science, moral and legal, social and political, national and international, codes and ordinances are more or less tentative, more or less on trial. In the present work I make this attempt only, namely, to bring up one of the three branches, ethic, to the objective state, or to make it more capable than it is at present of objective treatment.

4. The method therefore is not only subjective but analytic. I make no pretence at demonstration, except in the sense in which a physiologist is said

to demonstrate the structure of a tissue, when he describes what he has seen through his microscope. The greatest differences of opinion may and do exist as to what is "demonstrated" by the microscope in such tissues; yet this is no reason against examining them in that way. Only by repeated observations, under different modes of preparation, by different observers, and under more and more powerful microscopes, can agreement be arrived at as to the facts really to be seen. So it is also with the subjective observation of feelings and thoughts. The present disagreement is no reason against employing renewed observation. The demand that we should assert nothing which cannot be deduced from some already certain proposition is a demand which does not recognise the early stage at which the enquiry at present stands, and one which would launch us at once into an ontological method, since at present we know little beyond the meanings, necessarily vague by themselves, of the general terms describing the phenomena. The analysis of these general terms must be given first by the analysis of the phenomena which they describe; and, to carry on the figure, the microscope to be employed is that offered by metaphysic in her distinction between the formal and material elements of phenomena, taken in their first intention.

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CHAPTER II.

ANALYSIS AND CLASSIFICATION OF FEELINGS.

PART I. THE SENSES AND SENSATIONS.

Purumque relinquit
Ætherium sensum atque aurai simplicis ignem.
Virgil.

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§ 8. 1. THE task immediately before us is no less than to arrange the mass of feelings, which constitute the material element in the subjective aspect of the world of man and of nature, according to their natural kinds and relations to each other. The instruments with which this task is to be attempted are, first, those distinctions which have been already established as applicable to such objects, namely, the distinction between the formal and material elements in consciousness, that between the two great modes of consciousness, direct and reflective, and that between the different degrees of development or complexity in different stages of experience, namely, presentation, representation, and imaginative representation, which apply to both modes of direct and

reflective consciousness; and secondly, such general distinctions in the material element, the feelings themselves, as are at once the most obvious and the most comprehensive, such as, first, the distinctions between the feelings themselves, as sight and sound, taste and smell, love and hatred, and, secondly, such as the distinction between feelings which have a special and definite character of their own, which they never lose, and feelings which, while they never exist separately, will combine with or enter into any others and, on so doing, take upon them a colour from those with which they combine; to which latter class belong pleasure and pain, and the sense of effort with its derivatives. The applicability however of all these distinctions can only be shown by their proving themselves capable, in the event, of serving to arrange the phenomena in a complete and satisfactory manner; for the method is not pure deduction, but examination of an already existing complex object.

2. The mass of feelings is thus traversed by a number of distinctions which are the first outlines of its classification and analysis; but these distinctions cross each other, so that what is entirely included in one category of one of the distinctions is either only partly included, or included along with something else, in a similar category of some other distinction. For instance, the distinction of presentation and representation serves to distinguish sensation from emotion, but the distinction between general and special feelings, that is, between pleasure, pain, and effort, on one side, and such feelings as hunger, warmth, love, anger, on the other, applies equally to both sensations and emotions; that is,

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there is effort, pain, and pleasure, in sensations as well as in emotions, without destroying their respective sensational and emotional character. There will arise, therefore, side by side with the distinction into sensation and emotion, a further distinction into sensations which either contain or exclude pleasure, pain, or effort, and emotions which either contain or exclude the same; or, in other words, there will be a threefold distinction, into sensation, emotion, and those states, which whether sensational or emotional include pleasure, pain, or effort, the third category excluding states which are emotion or sensation merely, and letting them fall back into one or other of the two former categories.

3. But, in attempting the application of these distinctions, which of them is to be employed first and laid at the foundation, as it were, of the others? It can be no other than the distinction between presentation and representation; for, in the first place, this distinction gives at once the ground of the popular and current and most fundamental distinction into sensation and emotion, or, as it is usually called, physical and moral, bodily and mental, outer and inner, feeling. All those feelings which do not require any representation as a groundwork or framework in which to arise, or upon which to be superinduced, are coincident with sensations; all those which do require a representation or memory of past sensations in order to arise are emotions. In laying this distinction, then, at the foundation of our analysis we shall be following the beaten track, and received method of regarding the question, which in this case will be found to have the warrant of reason. In the next place, there is no other of the

distinctions mentioned which is directly and at first applicable; the distinction of form and matter applies to every state of consciousness alike, and consequently it could only be the greater or less degree of either of these elements in any given case which could cause it to be classed under one or the other category; but such a greater or less degree, or predominance, of either element can only be judged of when the states themselves have been already ranged in some classification, and distinguished although roughly from each other. Again, the distinction between reflective and direct modes of consciousness is in itself subordinate to the distinction between presentation and representation, since reflection is one mode of the latter; this distinction, then, will be found to be the basis of a classification of the feelings falling under representation, that is, of the emotions, but not of the feelings as a whole. If however we turn to the other class of distinctions, distinctions in the matter of feeling itself, it will be seen that the differences between special feelings are indeed immediately discernible, but, from their being the last specialities, τὰ καθ' ἑκάστα, of experience, are rather the matter to be classed than the ground of classification; since it is the very difficulty of distinguishing these specialities of feeling which causes us to undertake the task of analysis and classification. As to the remaining distinction, between general or pervading feelings, pleasure, pain, and effort, and special feelings pervaded by them, it is true that this distinction is broad and sound and obvious; but it neither leads us to anything further than itself, nor becomes the ground of further distinctions to be developed out of it. As the distinction between form

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and matter could make no beginning of a classification, so this can make no progress towards one, but remains in itself as an observed general fact. See on pleasure and pain in this respect Prof. Bain, *The Emotions and the Will*, Chap. ii. 2d ed. The distinction of presentation and representation on the other hand produces out of itself the further distinction of direct and reflective representation, which exhausts the whole field of consciousness.

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The systemic
sensations.

§ 9. 1. We obtain thus for our first step towards analysis and classification of feelings the following scheme :

Presentations or Sensations.

Representations or Emotions { Direct.
Reflective.

The first thing then to be done is to examine and arrange the sensations, or feelings which consist of presentative perceptions only, at the same time showing, by the application of the distinction between general or pervading and special or pervaded feelings, how they are connected with and pass over into representations and emotions. In presentative perception there are always the two elements of form and matter; and this distinction will now serve us to carry on the analysis, if we attend to the modes of combination of the two kinds of form, time and space, with matter, and to the preponderance of one or of the other element. The lowest, as they are called, and simplest states of consciousness are those in which time alone and not space is found, and in which also there is no other distinction between the portions of time but simple duration. What states are those in which these conditions are alone observable? They are those feelings which are called

organic, or systemic to adopt Mr. Lewes' term ; and which are metaphysically distinguished only by a special difference in their matter, or in kind, and physiologically by the different organs or parts of the body or nervous system to which they belong. Accordingly, this first great group of systemic sensations may be distinguished into the following sub-groups ; see Prof. Bain's classification in *The Senses and the Intellect*, Book i. Chap. ii., to which I am much indebted :

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1. Sensations of the digestive organs ; among others, relish, disgust, nausea, hunger, thirst, satiety.
2. Sensations of the nutritive and circulatory organs ; among others, activity, inanition, impeded circulation, active circulation, parchedness, moisture.
3. Sensations of the respiratory organs ; among others, active respiration, impeded respiration, oppression or stifling.
4. Sensations of the reproductive organs.
5. Sensations of the muscles ; among others, of degree and different kinds of their exertion, e.g. in lifting weights, walking and moving limbs.
6. Sensations of the nerves themselves ; among others, dejection or depression, *tædium vitæ*, energetic action of nerves, health, liveliness, dizziness, fainting.
7. *Sensus communis* ; among others, feeling of pressure, sharp pressure or pushing, pricking, tickling, of a blow, of cutting, lesion, ache dull or acute, heat and cold.

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Two sensations here enumerated under *sensus communis*, namely, pressure and temperature, or heat and cold, are sometimes counted as belonging to the special sense of touch, on the ground that they have the same organ, nerves with their peripheral ends distributed to the surface of the external skin, and that accordingly superficial extension in space is always involved in the sensation. Heat and cold, it is said, are not felt as such, but only as pain, when applied to the course of a nerve; only when applied to its extremity are they felt as heat and cold, and then they contain also some perception of superficial extension. The same is said of those low degrees of pressure which do not call forth muscular exertion. (Prof. Funke's *Lehrbuch der Physiologie*, § 180. 4th ed.) And both of them combine immediately, like other sensations of touch, with a *Vorstellung*, or perception of an external object, or, as I should say, with the perception of a "remote" object. There are however distinct sensations when pressure, heat, or cold, are felt internally, and these distinct sensations will perhaps be best classed under *sensus communis*. Touch is involved when they are applied to the nerve extremities, and, in the case of pressure, muscular sensation seems also inseparable. All we can do here is to distinguish inseparable elements in a complex sensation. But heat and cold, when applied to the nerve extremities, are so different in quality or kind of sensation from the other sensations of touch, that we must at any rate assign them a separate and intermediate place between that and the *sensus communis*. They are of the same sensational or material character as sensations of ache or lesion, cutting or pricking, but at the same time have super-

ficial extension in them, owing to their application at the extremities of the nerve in skin surface. *Sensus communis*, then, I conceive as a group of distinct sensations which have no peculiar group of nerves appropriated to them. The sensations are distinct, but not their organs.

2. These seven groups, or eight if we treat heat and cold apart, may be also distinguished among themselves by reference to their continuance or intermittence. The second, third, and sixth group are continuous; there is always, except in sleep, some state of feeling present to us, belonging to each of these groups, though it may be a very dim feeling. The other groups are intermittent; it is only when the organs are in certain states that the sensations belonging to these groups arise. The seventh group is potentially continuous, that is, we may have the feelings belonging to it at any moment, if the appropriate stimulus should occur, while the general and distributed character of the organ, being spread over the whole body, prevents any one stimulus from being specially appropriated to produce the feelings. This distinction is not unimportant, since it is the intermittent and special character of the first and fourth groups which, together with the pleasurable character of some of their sensations, enables them to become the foundation of what are afterwards called appetites.

3. But in all these sensations alike there is pleasure and pain, a pleasure and a pain which take their colour from the sensations in which they arise. There may be also in all of them the sense of effort, which arises not indeed at all times but only when there is a certain degree of pleasure or of pain. Whenever

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there is pain of sensation, there is also effort, named afterwards an effort to decrease the pain; and whenever there is pleasure, there may be in addition an effort, named afterwards an effort to increase the pleasure; that is, named by what it has been perceived to tend towards. For instance, in hunger there is pain and a craving for it to be diminished; this stimulates to reckless action, when it is intense, because it fills all the consciousness and prevents other feelings from influencing us; hence the motive power of hunger, and the ferocity which attends it in its extremes. When food is given and begun to be tasted, the pleasure excites craving for it to be increased; there is then a double motive force at work, the craving to escape the pain, and the craving to increase the pleasure. This explains the increase of ravenous ferocity of hungry animals at the moment when food has just been smelt or tasted by them. In the appetite for sleep again it is the same, the craving for the increase of the pleasure of indulging drowsiness is combined with the craving for diminishing the pain of weariness. Pleasure, pain, and effort, then, are common or general states of feeling superinduced upon or arising in each of these sensations.

4. It has been hitherto supposed that these sensations are sensations alone; they have been regarded (except in the two foregoing illustrations) as not combined with the knowledge either of the organs in which they arise, or of the objects which are their appropriate stimulus, adapted to arouse or to satisfy them. But now suppose that the person feeling these sensations combines with them such a knowledge; which he does when he sees or represents to

himself the body or special parts or organs of the body to which they belong, and when he sees or represents to himself the objects appropriate to satisfy the sense of effort arising in them. In the case of the intermittent groups of sensations, in those, for instance, of the digestive system, he represents to himself the object food as such a stimulus; the definiteness of the represented object, an object represented as desirable, makes what was before mere effort become volition; he has the desire of food. Food is represented as pleasant; hence all volition is emotional in its nature, as depending on representation. Mere effort is sensational only, but effort for a purpose is emotional; though there may also be emotional effort which is not volition, or effort for a purpose. The volition to satisfy any systemic sensation is properly called appetite, although the term appetite is commonly restricted to the sensations of the digestive and reproductive systems. And it will be seen afterwards that what appetite is to these sensations, where these are its substratum or framework, passion is to emotions, having emotions for its framework; appetite is the desire of sensation, passion the desire of emotion. Desire, which is a common feature or element in sensations, is also in another shape, as passion, a common feature or element in emotions. It is common to both the great groups of feeling, and makes a link between them.

5. This common feature, however, does not transform the one into the other; sensation with its desire still remains sensation, and emotion with its desire still remains emotion. Nevertheless sensation is taken up and included in emotion, and in this way: the sensations with their organs, and with the objects which

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satisfy them, are represented as images, are thought of as satisfied, or capable of satisfaction, together with the means and modes of their satisfaction ; and in these representations there arise feelings which are not sensations but emotions. Whenever this takes place, the representation of sensation does not become emotion of all kinds indifferently, but there are only four kinds of emotion which it can become, namely, grief, joy, aversion, fondness ; grief and joy when the sensation is represented as arising in the body itself without respect of the object causing it, aversion and fondness when the sensation is referred to such an external object, when we are said to feel aversion or fondness for that object. The sensations, on receiving citizenship among the emotions, are drafted into four tribes only, grief, joy, aversion, fondness ; becoming there, as representations, the groundwork or framework in which emotional elements of feeling, called by these names, arise, each coloured by the particular kind of sensation which is included in its representational framework.

6. It is by no means easy to distinguish what is the feeling which is due to the bodily organ of sense and properly to be called sensation, and what is the feeling due to the representation or redintegration and properly to be called emotion, even when the objects are distinctly represented. But the task becomes harder still, when the sensations are not distinctly represented as visible objects and so included in emotion, but combine with the otherwise emotional train of thought, as sensations or presentations dimly felt. For instance, healthy or agreeable states of sensation combine with the otherwise emotional train of thought and feeling, and render it cheerful ;

morbid or disagreeable states of sensation render it gloomy. How much of this gloom or cheerfulness is to be attributed in each case to the sensation, how much to the train of thought and feeling? Each factor moreover stands in the relation of cause or of effect to the other, and tends to produce the other even when it did not previously exist. This is the phenomenon familiarly known by the name of the influence of the mind on the body and of the body on the mind. I should be inclined to appropriate the terms energy and *tædium vitæ* to the healthy and morbid states of sensation, vivacity and ennui to the corresponding states of the emotional train of thought. The remarks here made on the carrying up of the systemic sensations into emotion apply also, in the main, to the other sensations now about to be examined.

§ 10. 1. The remaining sensations form one great group, as the systemic sensations did, the sensations of the special senses. There are five sub-groups, the special senses, smell, taste, touch, hearing, sight. The rank of each as a special sense, in contradistinction to a group of sensations, is given by its containing sensations different in matter or specific kind of feeling from each other, the different odours, the different tastes, for instance, yet all belonging to the same general kind; whereas this common generic bond was absent in the several groups of systemic sensation.

2. But the two lowest of the special senses, smell and taste, agree with the groups of systemic sensations and differ from touch and sight in containing only the formal element of time, and differ from hearing in containing time only in its simplest mode of duration. The discrimination which is possible between their specifically different sensations, the

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different odours and tastes, is due to the matter and not to the form of the sensations. The different qualities of these sensations can be compared and contrasted with each other, even though they do not involve any difference in their formal element. This applies also to the systemic sensations, but the systemic sensations of each group, when compared with each other, do not belong to one genus as those of smell and taste do, the different odours and sours. The pain involved in these two senses is less than in the systemic groups, and the objects which produce odours and tastes are very much in our power, to apply or not to apply as we like. Hence these senses are very educable, and their sensations are arranged in a sort of scale of degree and kind of pleasure, as refined or unrefined, subtil or coarse; and a very acute power of discrimination between them can be attained. But the different tastes and odours are not opposite or contrary to each other, only different; they are opposite or contrary only by a figure of speech, since there is no difference in the formal element; nor do they even apparently run in pairs; for instance, sweetness is opposed sometimes to sourness, sometimes to bitterness. The common genus to which they belong does not stand between them, so as to make a common point of reference to which they are differently related. Except in the characteristics of belonging to one distinct genus, and of educability, the sensations of these two special senses, taste and smell, differ in nothing from the systemic sensations. In all alike there can be distinguished only these modes of sensation, quality, intensity, pleasure and pain. The difference between them lies in the greater discriminateness and organisation in

quality of the sensations of taste and smell. The pleasure and pain also which is involved in the systemic sensations and in odours and tastes is pleasure and pain of the same mode; for it will be seen shortly that a distinction in the mode of pleasure and pain must be drawn, when we come to speak of sensations where the formal element is involved in greater complexity. By anticipation then it may be said, that the pleasure and pain of all the foregoing sensations may be called pleasure and pain of enjoyment, as distinguished from pleasure and pain of admiration; a distinction drawn by Kant, in the *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, § 13, 14. The two lowest of the special senses, smell and taste, may accordingly be classed apart, making a transition or intermediate group between the systemic sensations and the remaining three special senses. And the same remarks will apply to them as to the systemic sensations, with reference to their combination with emotions, namely, that it is by their being represented with their pleasure and pain, so as to form the framework of an emotion.

3. The lowest of the three remaining special senses is touch. In it a new formal element is contained, the superficial extension of space; the matter of touch is always the same, the feeling of hardness, resistance, or contact, which cannot be described but must be felt, and has no single name but that of the sense itself—touch. The object of touch consists of these two elements, this sensation and superficial extension; these two elements are however variously combined, and their various combinations are the different specific qualities which we apprehend by touch, and which stand to it in the same relation as

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odours to smell and sapours to taste. These perceptions or qualities are hardness and softness, roughness and smoothness, wetness and dryness. It will be seen that they run in pairs of opposites; but the case is the same with them as with the qualities of smell and taste, namely, the opposition is the work of a supervening comparison; there is nothing in the perception itself to which the two opposed perceptions are referred. Yet they differ from the sensations of smell and taste in this, that the opposition between each pair is a real opposition, and not one merely figuratively so named, as soon as it is perceived; and it is so because the formal element in each sensation affords a measure or standard to which to refer each sensation of the pair. In hardness, for instance, we have the same matter, the feeling of touch, in one form; in softness, the same matter in another form; the difference in the form, the degrees of the movement, or distance, in space of the particles of matter or sensation, can be measured and compared in the two cases. So it is with roughness and smoothness; roughness is change, or repeated cessation and renewal of dissimilar sensations of touch, smoothness the continuous perception of similar sensations. So also with wetness and dryness; wetness is the covering of a surface with particles of matter, or touch sensation, which cohere very loosely, dryness with particles which cohere with stability; wetness and dryness are the extremes of softness and hardness.

4. As to the inseparability of the form of superficial extension from touch, as an element of its perceptions, it may be remarked that even what we popularly call a point, as the point of a needle, has

superficial extension; nor is this only a property given to touch by a supervening reflection, for it can never be taken from it in thought; and if a mathematical point be thought of, this is no tangible thing but a logical abstraction. The least tangible object, then, has superficial extension, and it is no valid objection to urge that we are unable by touch alone to distinguish whether a point or a surface of the skin is touched, or how large a surface, or in what position or direction it is touched; for this only affects the interpretative or discriminative acuteness of the sense of touch, a point touched and a surface touched differing from each other in degree only, and a point being nothing but an extremely small surface.

5. The sense of touch adds nothing to the differences of mode already remarked in the material element of perception; it has quality, intensity, pleasure and pain; but the qualities, roughness, smoothness &c. are such as to be distinguished from each other, not by a difference of quality in their material element, as in all the foregoing senses, but by a difference in the relation of their formal to their material element, and to the different degrees of intensity in the latter. Space comes forward first in touch, and then only in two of its dimensions, length and breadth, or superficial extension. This however causes or enables touch to combine with another sense, sight, which is always in the same way bound up with the same two dimensions of space. The difference of the matter of these two senses and the community of their form, space, are what enables them to combine into a single perception or a single object. This object, namely, superficial extension with two kinds

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of qualities, tangible and visible, then by a further process, a process of representation and reasoning, completes itself as a solid, or developes out of itself the third dimension of space. For superficial extension is at first incomplete, that is, it is not originally perceived as distinct from and opposed to depth, which is the way in which we now think of it, after that the perception of depth has arisen to contrast it with ; but it must be conceived, at this first stage, as indifferent to whether depth will be added to it or not ; a conception which we may perhaps realise by such an image as that of the flat surface of a great water-lily leaf, the *Victoria Regia* for instance, which from above appears flat, but, when the edge is lifted up, and the under surface seen, exhibits a deep furry network of ribs by which it supports itself and penetrates and grasps the underlying surface of the water. An attempt has been made in "Time and Space" § 13 to exhibit the mode in which this completion of space in three dimensions takes place. The criterion of completion is not the notion of space in three dimensions itself, applied by us to the phenomena out of our present after-developed knowledge ; but the criterion consists solely in the fact that the third dimension of space harmonises completely with what was expectant, as it were, in the superficial extension, while it requires no further completion itself, expects nothing further, but looks back, as it were, to what has gone before, contains an answer but no further question.

6. The sensations of temperature, heat and cold, when external to the body, must be considered as a special kind of sense, akin to touch in having as its organ the nerves distributed to the surface of the

skin, and in being produced only by stimuli applied to that surface, so that superficial extension is perceived in all sensations of heat and cold just as it is in touch, but having a material element very different from the sensations of touch and closely allied to sensations of the *sensus communis*, such as lesion, cutting, aching, pricking, and to those sensations of taste which are from this circumstance called hot tastes, as of pepper and ginger. It is probable that the stimuli producing the sensations of heat and cold must produce some molecular change in the skin surrounding the nerve extremities which they affect, in a way similar to the stimuli of taste and smell; so that the sensations of heat and cold might not unaptly be called the chemical mode of touch. Although in this respect their place in the *scala sensuum* would be between the senses of taste and touch, and they might be considered as a sixth special sense, yet this rank must be denied them if we consider their poverty in sensational qualities, and consequent defect of educability. For which reason I continue to class them among systemic sensations.

§ 11. 1. In the remaining two senses, hearing and sight, a much higher and more complex field of sensation is entered; in both of these an entirely new mode of sensation is added to those already remarked, for not only are they special senses, and not only are their opposite qualities more distinctly opposed to each other than was the case in touch, but they both contain, besides the modes of quality, intensity, pleasure and pain, a new mode, which in hearing is the mode of pitch. In all sound, which is the matter of hearing, three things are to be distinguished, for which see the valuable work of Prof. Helmholtz, Die

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Lehre von den Ton-empfindungen, a work which has thrown an entirely new light upon these questions. These three things are, 1st, the intensity or loudness of the sound, which depends upon the amplitude of the vibrations in the air conveying it; 2d, the pitch, low or acute, bass or treble, which depends upon the rapidity, or, what is the same thing, the number or the length of the vibrations in a given time; and 3d, the quality, or colour, or character, of the sound, as in different instruments, strings or pipes, and in different tones of voice; which was formerly referred to the shape of the undulations in the air conveying the sound, but has now been referred by Prof. Helmholtz to the different series of subsequent partial vibrations which combine with the single sound from which they proceed. Pitch therefore is the only new mode of sensation introduced in hearing, and the quality or colour of sound depends upon pitch in its last analysis. And the three modes of sound, intensity, pitch, and colour, are all modes of the matter of hearing, or of the sound itself as heard.

2. The formal element in hearing is time alone, and not space; although, as will be seen farther on, we often interpret sound and make its relations clearer to ourselves by applying to them the figure of space, as being a form which is more composite, and therefore more fit to serve as a logical framework, than time alone. Every sound has a certain duration, and this duration is its formal element; the quality, pitch, and intensity, which are modes of its material element, are noticed within this duration, that is, in the sound itself while it lasts. This may be called the metaphysical analysis of sound, being

the analysis of it as heard, and not an analysis of its causes, of the vibrations or undulations of the air conveyed to the auditory nerve, which produce the varieties of its intensity, pitch, and quality. We hear the pitch, the intensity, the quality, but are not aware of the amplitude, number, or composition of the vibrations which produce these effects. The analysis of these is the work of physiology and acoustics; it goes deeper than metaphysical analysis and justifies it; goes deeper because the vibrations which produce each pitch can be analysed into separate vibrations, while the pitch itself cannot be analysed into separately heard moments of sound; and justifies it because it can be shown that the measurement of pitch, and consequently of quality, by the ear, in hearing together two pitches or two qualities, corresponds to the measurement of the vibrations and their composition, which produce the several pitches and qualities heard. Every sound heard, which has of course a certain duration, its metaphysical formal element, may be conceived as if it were made up of a series of shorter sounds, each depending on vibrations of particles of air, in waves conveyed to the auditory nerve; and since these vibrations can be analysed as to their rapidity and their combination with each other, so also we may conceive that the series of shorter sounds, composing the sound heard, could be analysed were they audible separately; and, notwithstanding that they cannot be heard separately, that they yet determine and compose the pitch and the quality of the composite heard sound, and are the justification of the measurement of it by the ear, in comparison with other sounds heard. In other words, we may conceive

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that the formal element of a heard sound, its duration, has divisions of time within it, which, though not empirically perceived, are as real as the separately inaudible sounds which they contain, and are the ground of the measurement and comparison, as to pitch and quality, to which every actually heard sound is subject. The differences between pitches and qualities of sounds may therefore be conceived as differences depending upon variations in the formal element no less than in the material element of sound; and thus we can more easily understand the meaning of saying that the pleasure or the pain, which belongs to the composition of various sounds of different pitch and quality, is pleasure or pain of admiration, depending upon measurement, no less than of enjoyment. The metaphysical matter of hearing, the sound itself, has been already cast in the mould of form at the moment when it comes into actual and empirical existence as a heard sound of a certain pitch; and two of the three modes of this matter, the pitch and the quality, depend upon the relations of the form to the matter, in portions of it which are too short to be heard separately, but lie below consciousness.

3. In the senses hitherto examined, the intensities and the qualities of sensation had only pleasures and pains of enjoyment; but in hearing, the intensities remain as before, while the qualities become dependent on the new mode of sensation, pitch, now introduced for the first time. In sound everything depends on the formal element and its divisions, whether these are actually perceived or only inferred from the physical analysis of the air vibrations. Accordingly sounds are distinguishable first into two great classes,

musical and unmusical, notes and noises. A sound produced by unequal and irregular vibrations is a noise, one produced by equal and regular vibrations is a note. Both alike contain the three material distinctions, intensity, pitch, and quality; but only the musical sounds can be measured and judged by the ear, so as to be the foundation or material of harmony. The qualities in unmusical sounds are distinguished only roughly as rolling, grinding, grating, hissing, growling sounds, and so on; in musical sounds they are the sounds of different instruments, violin or clarionet, for instance, and the various tones of voice which are heard in speaking or singing. In speaking the consonants are noises, the vowel sounds are compound notes, each having its specific quality, colour, or tone of voice.

4. It is only regular or musical sounds which can be analysed to any purpose. And in these, first in respect to their intensity. The ear judges pretty accurately between different degrees of intensity or loudness, just as the muscular sense distinguishes different weights or degrees of resistance to pressure. Yet in intensity of sound there is no previous distribution or articulation of the formal element, but the force with which the vibration strikes the nerve determines the loudness of the sound. Consequently the perception of intensity does not include a comparison, nor can we say that one sound is doubly or half as loud as another. Intensity is purely material, and the pleasure or pain arising in it is pleasure or pain of enjoyment, not of admiration. It is one of the two sources of what is called expression in musical playing or singing; the other source being the length of time a note is dwelt upon, or the length of time

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interposed between it and those which precede and follow it. In speaking there is another source of expression, namely, the differences of colour or tone of voice used to pronounce different words or different sentences. But this in music or singing is part of the melody or harmony, the music itself, and does not belong to the expression given by the performer. There is nothing in intensity alone which distinguishes sound from the sensations of other senses.

5. It is not so with the second mode of sound, its pitch. The pitch of a sound depends upon the rapidity, the number in a given time, of its vibrations; and when these occur in equal periods the result is a musical sound of a certain pitch. Prof. Helmholtz has made it probable, in *Abtheilung 1, Abschnitt 6*, of the work already quoted, that the nervous machinery of the labyrinth of the ear is so formed that each fibre is, as it were, tuned to perceive certain separate periods of vibration, and thus with different fibres to perceive different pitches of sound. This view would very readily explain how it is that pitch is the first thing heard, not distinguishable by the ear into moments or beats of sound, and yet that two pitches heard together are compared and measured by the ear, as if they were each divided by the ear into beats. Every differently periodic vibration is perceived by its appropriated nerve fibre, and by it alone; the whole series of pulses in the vibration is heard as one pitch. Each pitch being thus separately heard can be compared to the others similarly heard, while the measurement of the pulses in the vibrations proves the accuracy of the ear in its judgment of the pitches. But if all the nerve

fibres of the ear were employed in hearing each separate series of vibrations, then, in order to distinguish between two or more series conveyed to the ear together, it would be requisite to imagine that the nervous organ of the ear should keep separate the different series of uniform pulses, yet without hearing separately the separate pulses of each series. This difficulty is removed by supposing an appropriation of separate nerve fibres to separate series of pulses, that is, to separate pitches; which is in fact to refer the work of distinguishing pitches to the structure instead of to the function of the organ. The phenomenon of distinguishing differently pitched sounds is as follows: when two or more sounds are heard together, the ear has distinct perceptions varying distinctly according as their respective periods of vibration vary. If these are the same, no difference of pitch is heard; if one is double of the other, we hear the octave; if one is four times the other, the second octave; when they are as three to two, the fifth; as four to three, the fourth; and so on. These distinct perceptions of the relation between sounds of different pitch, perceptions which are invariable whatever may be the intensity of the sounds, or whatever their quality, show that there is some definite relation between the form and the matter of every single sound, though it is a relation which is not perceived in the perception of the sound itself, the duration of it being unanalysed in perception; but still a relation which makes it capable of definite comparison with other single sounds in point of pitch. The accurate perception of pitch is the first requisite for what is called an ear for music. According as the periods of vibration of two notes more

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or less accurately coincide, the two notes together are a concord or a discord. Two discordant notes have comparatively few vibrations which coincide, or the beats of which occur at the same instant; concordant notes are those the beats of which coincide frequently, so that the two series of pulses can proceed together without disturbing each other, while the difference between the times of their other beats makes them distinguishable as notes of different pitch. The accurate perception by the ear of these differences of pitch, and the concords and discords which they produce, is a perception caused by differences in the formal element, the time or duration of the sounds, while its object, or the perception itself, is a mode of the material element, the feeling of sound; since it is only different compositions and arrangements of the periods of vibration which make differences of pitch. Pitch in short is nothing but an infinitesimal elaboration or articulation of sound into time portions. The perception of pitch, of concord, and of discord, is therefore an intellectual perception, since intellect is distinguished from feeling only by the greater predominance of the formal element in consciousness; and the pleasure and pain arising from these perceptions are pleasure and pain of admiration, not of enjoyment.

6. The third mode is that of quality, colour of sound, Klangfarbe. It is perhaps the greatest service of Prof. Helmholtz that he has shown the origin of this from the partial tones which are heard together with their ground tone in almost every musical sound which is heard. When these harmonic notes, as they are called, are by artificial means prevented from coming to the ear, the sound heard, that of the

ground tone alone, is comparatively characterless, and the same from whatever instrument* it may arise. The vowel sounds of the human voice give the colour to the sounds uttered; and in this respect the organs of voice are of precisely similar nature to other musical instruments, only of a very perfect construction, admitting of far greater variability in the colour. The difference between musical instruments consists in the difference of colour which they produce, and the range or power which they have in producing variations within that colour. The colour of sound corresponds to the specific quality in other senses, to the different odours in smell, sapours in taste, and so on; but, as already remarked, these specific qualities of sound excel those of the other senses in this, that they depend upon and have their roots in differences of pitch, an intellectual sensation, since it is only from the composition of differently pitched sounds, in the harmonic notes, that the colours of musical sound arise. The colours of unmusical sounds, grating, rolling, hissing, rustling and so on, depending as they do upon vibrations so irregular as to be incapable of distinct measurement, correspond more accurately to the specific qualities of the senses of touch, taste, and smell; and it is only because, in hearing and sight, a domain of regular or periodic sensations, involving or containing a minute elaboration of the formal element, is added to the domain of their less regular sensations, which they have in common with the other senses, that hearing and sight are the source of pleasures and pains of admiration, and of the æsthetic perceptions of the fine arts.

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analysis of sound, by the nerve organism of the ear, that of colour upon a synthesis of various pitches heard together; in both cases the ear is unconscious of what it is doing, perceiving only the result,—the pitch in one case, the colour in the other. Yet the synthesis which results in colour is less abstruse than the analysis which results in pitch; by attention the ear can be brought to perceive the harmonic notes, out of the combination of which with the ground note the colour has arisen; whereas no attention will enable us to perceive the separate moments of sound which together produce a perceived pitch; these are entirely below consciousness, and the pitch itself is the first and only thing heard. For, if the ear heard the separate beats in the periodic vibrations which determine the pitch, and composed the pitch out of them as heard pulses, we ought by an effort of attention to be able to hear the several beats in one pitch, just as we are to hear the harmonies which compose the colour. This attentive perception however destroys the pleasure of perceiving colour. The combination must be perceived unanalysed, in order to the pleasurable effect of colour on the ear. This gives the colour a less intellectual character than the pitch; for greater differences are combined together, the act of combination being equally unperceived. Yet the different pitches which are combined into colour give the possibility of an intellectual measurement when two colours are heard together, the ground tones of which may be either concordant or discordant with each other. This gives a second kind of harmony, founded on the comparison of colours, in addition to that founded on the comparison of pitches. Notes of the same pitch have different har-

monics in different instruments; and thus, harmony of pitch being laid at the basis, colour harmony arises within or upon it, having its pleasure dependent upon more complicated relations of form and matter.

§ 12. 1. The sense of sight remains to be examined. It is in several ways the most perfect of the senses; the pleasure and pain peculiar to it are perhaps less intense than in any other sense, as those of hearing are less than those of touch, those of touch than those of taste and smell, and these than the pleasures and pains of the systemic sensations. Again it is in sight first that we come to single words as names for single specific sensations, the names of colours, whereas in other senses descriptive phrases or letters of the alphabet are used for this purpose; the reason of which is, that sight contains the element of space more clearly than any other sense, and, though it does not contribute more than touch to the perception of space in three dimensions, yet contributes far more than touch to the interpretation of the perceptions common to both. (See this whole subject discussed in Mr. Abbott's *Sight and Touch*, especially Chap. iii.) We judge of almost everything by its visible marks: they are the signs by which we interpret it, as to its size, its distance, its shape, as well as its colour; and the visible marks of everything are that to which we chiefly attach our associations of its inner or moral qualities, according to which its effects will be. Sight then is the most closely allied to space; and space is the form which, as already remarked in the § on hearing, serves as the logic of all phenomena whatever, in virtue of its completeness and the complexity of its three dimensions.

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2. The material element in sight consists of light, and colours which are modes of light. If we adopt the undulation theory, the sensations of light and colours arise in the nerve substance of the ocular nerve upon the impact of successive waves, or rays, of ether atoms, and depend upon the relation of these to this nerve substance and its modes of activity. A thorough examination of this whole subject has been recently given by Prof. Helmholtz in his *Handbuch der Physiologischen Optik*, which forms the 9th volume of the *Allg. Encycl. der Physik*, edited by Karsten. And from this I shall attempt to derive such a brief sketch of the phenomena of sight as may be necessary for the purposes of the present work.

3. In the first place it must be noticed that the colours of what are called coloured objects depend upon their absorbing and reflecting different rays of ether atoms in different proportions, rays which are emitted, or the atoms of which are set in motion, by bodies which are called, from that circumstance, self-luminous. Black and white are to these coloured bodies what darkness and extreme light are to self-luminous bodies or to light itself. The waves of light and colours which extend from the eye to the object seen, which is their ultimate or their immediate source, consist of vibrations of ether atoms in directions transverse to that of the wave itself; differing in this respect from the vibrations of air particles in sound, which have the same direction as that of the wave of sound.

4. In all the phenomena of sight three features may be distinguished as modes of the material element, corresponding to the three modes of the material element of sound, intensity, pitch, and colour.

These are, in sight, brilliancy or intensity, which corresponds to loudness or intensity in sound; colour, which corresponds to its pitch; and tone, which corresponds to its colour. Speaking generally, the brilliancy depends upon the amplitude or length of space traversed by the ether atoms of vibrations, in directions transverse to the direction of the waves; the colour depends upon the time occupied by each vibration; and the tone upon the different amplitudes in the same time, or within the same colour.

5. White light, such as that of the sun, is a mixture of many rays, of different duration of vibration, which rays may be sundered, and exhibited as rays of different colours, by passing them through a prism, in consequence of the different degrees of refrangibility which distinguish rays of different durations of vibration. On this being done, we obtain what is called the solar spectrum, which consists of a series of colours in the following order, beginning with those of least refrangibility: Red, Orange, Gold Yellow, Yellow, Greenish Yellow, Green, Bluish Green, Blue, Indigo, Violet, Ultraviolet. Helm. p. 227.

6. To begin with colour. Colour corresponds to pitch in sound in the circumstance that each is ultimate, the minimum sensible, in its kind; but they differ in this, that a pitch, resulting from the successive impact of beats at equal intervals, is always distinguishable from other pitches, though they may be in harmony with it, even from its own octave; whereas a colour, resulting from a single impact of a ray, the atom vibrations of which are transverse to the direction of the ray, is not distinguishable from another colour falling on the same portion of the retina, but the two or more colours so mixed

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melt into a compound colour different from any or either of them, in which the simple colours are not discernible. Helm. p. 272. The correspondence between colour in sight and pitch in sound consists in their being ultimate features of their respective senses, and in their depending upon the corresponding circumstances in the waves producing them, namely, the rapidity or the duration of the appropriate vibrations.

7. The tone in colours corresponds to the colour in sounds in respect of their both being results of a composition of causes; the colour in sounds from a composition of pitches in the harmonic notes, as above stated, and the tone in colours from the conjunction of different degrees of intensity with different durations of vibration. Every colour accordingly has a number of different tones, or shades as they are sometimes called, according as the intensity is greater or less, that is, according as a greater or less length of space is traversed by the ether atoms in the particular time which is the duration of vibration producing that particular colour. And the greater the intensity, the whiter or more brilliant is the tone of the colour; the less the intensity, the darker the tone.

8. The intensity of sight has accordingly two modes, one in which it is seen in white or mixed light, the other in which it is seen in separate colours or coloured rays. Two rays of mixed or white light may have different intensities, and then each ray or colour in their respective spectra will have a different brilliancy from that of the same colour in the other spectrum; and also, in the spectrum of one and the same ray of white light, each

separate ray or colour may have, and in fact has, a different degree of intensity, which may be called its normal brightness. The colours of the solar spectrum may be arranged, according to their normal brightness, in the following ascending order :

Violet, Indigo, Red=Blue, Orange=Green, Yellow.

Helm. p. 278.

Yellow thus forms the centre of the spectrum in point of brightness, from which on either hand the normal brightness decreases, *pari passu* at first, but sinks at last lowest at the blue end of the spectrum. The intensity of light and colours depends also, not only on the extent of the vibrations of ether atoms, but on the reactive vigour of the nerve apparatus receiving the rays. An untired eye perceives minuter differences of intensity than a tired one; and there are points of intensity above as well as below which no eye perceives differences of intensity, which nevertheless are inferred with certainty to exist, though they are not felt. In this sight is but analogous to all the other senses.

9. If it is said that the brilliancy of single colours or of white light depends on the amplitude of the ether vibrations, it must be added, in equal times; and if it is said that the colour depends upon the duration of ether vibrations, it must be added, in equal spaces. Thus not only is brilliancy always found together with colour and vice versa, but also the brilliancy in a certain way depends upon the colour, and the colour upon the brilliancy. Helm. pp. 309, 317. The tones of each colour are changes in its degrees of brilliancy; and changes in its degrees of brilliancy are changes in its tone. The same

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holds good of white or mixed light; it cannot become more brilliant without becoming whiter, nor less brilliant without assuming a tinge of colour, either by the absorption of some of its rays by the media through which they pass, or by a change in the relations of the differently coloured rays at their source. If the duration of vibration remains the same, the change of brilliancy is a change of tone in the same colour; if the amplitude of the vibration remains the same, the only change can be a change of colour; if both amplitude and duration vary, there is a change from one colour to another through intermediate tones, which may be described as mixed, but which are strictly speaking transition colours. Every colour in the spectrum at its central point has an equal right with every other to be considered a primary or uncompounded colour. This is shown by the fact that the mere superposition of two or more colours of the spectrum can not generate a third colour precisely the same in tone as the colour itself, as it appears in the spectrum; the colour produced by such a superposition is always less brilliant than the real spectral colour. The precise effect of any single colour in the spectrum can only be produced out of a superposition of two or more other rays than its own, by combining white or mixed light with them in certain degrees of intensity. In this way every colour of the spectrum may be considered as a result of three components, namely, a certain quantity of white light, and a certain quantity of mixed colours with their determinate normal brightness. Helm. p. 281-2. Every colour of the spectrum moreover may be isolated, and the measure of its vibrations in amplitude and duration, or in other

words its wave-length, assigned; the proof of their isolation resting principally on the discovery of Fraunhofer's lines, which indicate that certain stages of refrangibility are not occupied by any of the solar rays. Helm. pp. 226, 236.

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10. But although every colour of the spectrum is equally primary and irreducible to others, this does not imply that certain colours are not primary with regard to the constitution and functions of the retina. If, for instance, we adopt Young's theory, that there are three kinds of nerve in the retina, one of which is most readily stimulated by red, another by green, another by violet rays, these nerves being numerous and closely intermixed in every portion of the retina, the colours produced by each simple ray of the spectrum will depend upon the proportion in which the ray stimulates each kind of nerve, without being itself compounded of other rays, or depending upon their presence. In this sense, that is, in relation to the nerve and not to the rays of light, red, green, and violet, would be primary colours, out of different proportions of which all the other colours are composed. The nerve structure and function would thus be exhibited with some particularity as a concurrent cause of the phenomena of light and colours; contributing its threefold kind of activity in conjunction with the vibrations of ether atoms in their scale of rays, or different measures of amplitude and duration, to the production of the different brilliancies, colours, and tones of light. An hypothesis of this sort is not only analogous to the probable constitution of the auditory nerve, as exhibited in the preceding §, par. 5, but affords, says Prof. Helmholtz, "an extraordinarily simple and clear

mode of viewing and accounting for all phenomena of physiological colour-science." p. 291.

11. The changes of colour produced by decreasing or increasing the brilliancy of white light in different colours do not occur in the same order in which the colours occur in the spectrum. For instance, violet in decreasing intensity of white light becomes first rose, then purple; green in increasing intensity becomes first yellowish green, then white; yellow becomes directly white, but only in very great intensities of white light. The colours beyond violet in the spectrum become, by decreasing intensity, indigo; by increasing, light bluish grey or lavender. Helm. p. 233. Every colour ends ultimately in white under sufficient intensities of white light. Grey is identical with white light of feeble intensity; brown with yellow or red of feeble intensity. All the colours that can be named may be produced in the same way, by changing the intensities of white light and the combinations of different simple rays of the spectrum. Sight however differs favourably from sound in the circumstance that there are no colours, simple or compound, which correspond to noise in sound. There is no confusion perceptible in the mixture of its colours. Confusion like harmony in colour arises first in the juxtaposition of separate masses of colour in figures of space.

12. The series of colours in the spectrum has already been distinguished, first, by the relative degrees of normal brightness in the colours, secondly, by the degrees of their refrangibility; the greatest degree of normal brightness was found in yellow, the greatest refrangibility was found in ultra-violet. We come in the third place to arrange the colours

in another order, that of their relation to white, in mixture with each other. All the colours together yield white; and there are also certain pairs of colours which together yield white; these are called the complementary colours. They are the following:

Red and Greenish Blue,
Orange and Blue,
Yellow and Indigo,
Greenish Yellow and Violet.

Green has no single complementary colour; the mid-point of green is the mid-point of the spectrum, on each side of which lie the two complementary colours in each pair. But purple, which is a compound of the colours at the two extremities of the spectrum, the darkest red and ultraviolet, is the complementary of green. When two colours are mixed which are not complementary, the following are the results: if they are nearer to each other in the spectrum than complementary colours, the resulting colour is one that lies between them in the spectrum, and is whiter in proportion to their distance from each other; thus, for instance, red and green yield whitish yellow; orange and greenish yellow yield yellow. If they are farther from each other than complementary colours, the resulting colour is either purple or a colour lying between one of them and its own end of the spectrum; for instance, red and blue yield whitish purple or rose colour; red and indigo yield dark rose colour. Helm. pp. 276-9, where is given also a complete table of these mixed colours.

13. It is not necessary, I think, for the present purpose to enter upon the wide field of contrast of colours, simultaneous or successive, and the produc-

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tion of positive or negative after-images. Enough has been said to show the nature of the material element in sight, and to introduce the following remarks on the relation which it bears to the formal element. When we compare the phenomena of hearing and seeing as they have now been described, it appears that they fully correspond to each other. But there is in sight another element which has not yet been drawn into the comparison. Every sensation of light or colour occupies space, fills a certain surface however small; but the particular shape or outline of this surface, its size, and the boundary lines between its colours, have not been considered. There is something in the phenomena of sight which remains over, after finding an analogue for all the phenomena of hearing; something to which the whole phenomenon of sound, form and matter together, has nothing correspondent to show. Its formal element, time, is employed in producing the phenomena of musical pitch and colour, the correspondents to which in sight, colour and tone, arise without any special modification of the formal element peculiar to sight and touch, namely space. The pleasure and the pain arising in brilliancy, colour, and tone, which are modes of the material element of sight, and in the contrasts or agreements between them, must be set down as pleasures or pains of enjoyment, not of admiration; and the pleasures or pains of admiration in sight must be referred to the boundary lines, outlines, or figures, which are found in surfaces covered with light or colour.

14. When one colour bounds or limits another, there arises a line of demarcation of a certain direction; several colours limiting each other have each

a certain shape or figure in reference to the rest. When these shapes can be easily measured and classified by the eye, there is such a phenomenon as was exhibited in hearing, in the distinction of equable sounds from unequable. The shapes may then be either harmonious or inharmonious, of which the eye is the judge; and it may be that the harmonious shapes and figures may receive corroboration of this judgment from actual measurement, and that principles may be discovered, expressible by relations of number, upon which the harmony in form depends, just as the musician is enabled to justify the scale. This whole part of the subject has been well discussed and developed in Mr. D. R. Hay's *First Principles of Symmetrical Beauty*. Such proportions of figure are capable of combination with great variety in the material modes of sight, as, for instance, in the colours and figures of the kaleidoscope. But wherever this is the case, the total pleasure or pain contains two elements, that of admiration from the form, and that of enjoyment from the matter of the object. In some figures that are pleasing there is also an element of enjoyment from the form, as for instance in figures which are easy of comprehension or easy of production; the sense of effort, a sensation, is flattered by both; diagrams which exhibit much matter in little space are called 'elegant' by mathematicians; and usually figures of curved lines are more pleasing than angular figures, because of the ease of motion of the eye in traversing them, or from the association of ease in our own limb movements, which naturally sweep out curves; though this properly belongs to representation. A curved line such as the ogee curve has both these elements

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of pleasure ; the correspondence of the two curves in it is the source of the pleasure of admiration, and the ease of the curves themselves of the pleasure of enjoyment. These two sources of pleasure or of pain, and the pleasures and pains themselves, which are found together only in the two senses of hearing and sight, or, if in touch, yet in touch only as interpreted by sight, are carried over into representation with the objects in which they are found, and will be there discovered in greater perfection and complexity. Here it is proper only to consider them so far as they exist in single objects, that is, in objects or moments so small in space, or so brief in time, as to be fairly considered objects of presentative perception, not including memory or representation.

CHAPTER II.

PART II. THE EMOTIONS.

Our dark foundations.

Wordsworth.

§ 13. 1. LET me first give what appears to be the current or psychological view of the emotions and their relation to representations. In redintegration, whether memory or imagination, and the representations of which it consists, we appear to have before us phenomena which are purely subjective in character; we seem to be spectators in a theatre the scene of which consists of empty space and empty time, which the spectators themselves fill with scenery and actors of their own, drawn from their own experience. The curtain draws up, and instead of real scenery and real actors, the objects of presentation, there is a phantasmagoria of representations, the proper seat and home of which is in the brain of the spectator, and only projected by him upon the stage. This train of subjective images may, it is true, be more or less correspondent to the reality, to the objects of presentation by which it has been produced and of which it is a repetition, but it is in itself entirely

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subjective, and its truth consists in the exactness with which it renders the objects and events of presentative perception. The distinction between object and subject falls here entirely beyond the train of representations, falls between that train and the objects of presentation which it represents. But, within this train of representations itself, the place formerly occupied by the distinction between object and subject is now occupied by another distinction, that between the representations themselves and the emotions which they excite, these emotions being new feelings aroused in us by the representations, deriving their character from them, and answering by minutely corresponding changes of emotion to every change in the representations which cause them. The emotions thus depend immediately upon the representations, mediately upon the objects of presentation which they reproduce; and that which the presented objects, or real things, are to the representations, these again in their turn are to the emotions, namely, comparatively real objects to feelings which are out and out subjective. Such I apprehend to be the current view.

2. Now it is true that emotions arise first in representation. Representation first completes the formation of remote objects of perception, the common objects which we see and hear and feel around us, which consist of presentative perceptions gathered up and combined into portions of space and of time in the way which it was attempted to describe in "Time and Space" § 26. Then first, on this having been done, a new set of feelings is disclosed, of feelings inhering in or attached to these objects, all which feelings are, by themselves, in the form of time only

and not of space, just as all the sensations are, except those of touch and sight. These new feelings pervade the entire remote objects when represented, and change with any the least changes in those representations. The represented qualities in the remote objects have each some share in the new feelings, the emotions, which attach to them. Change any one of these qualities and the emotion is changed; or, if you start with observing a change in the emotion, you will find on examination that a change has taken place in the representation. But this change is, on the metaphysical view of the matter, not a case of causation of the one phenomenon by the other, but one of simultaneous change in the two phenomena in consequence of a change or a cause common to both. A change in emotion is not caused by a change in representation, but one change is the obverse aspect of the other; the pervading emotion and its representational framework are to each other as a ray of sunlight to its prismatic spectrum; they are the cognitive and the emotional aspects of one and the same state of consciousness.

3. It will be necessary to examine at some length the psychological theory of the emotions; but before doing so the true relation between the subjective and objective aspects of phenomena in presentation and representation must be made clear, since it is here that the misconception lies which gives rise to that theory, and here the central truth on which all metaphysical systems must be based. The act or moment of reflection, or self-consciousness, in which for the first time the distinction between the objective and subjective aspects is drawn, or discovered in phenomena, is the cardinal point in philosophy;

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and on the analysis of it depends the solution of all the most important questions in philosophy which are still agitated. An analysis of it was offered in "Time and Space" § 21, which I still think true; though I am very far from thinking that no more can be done to its elucidation. Nevertheless, since I am myself convinced, not only of its truth, but also that it offers the only means of reconciling Metaphysic with the special sciences, and of incorporating it into their system as a science among the rest, I will take leave to start from the point there reached, and proceed to show how the distinction between the objective and subjective aspects is applicable to all phenomena, whether presentative or representative, and in what sense these two aspects are inseparable from each other in fact, while they are always logically distinguishable.

4. Placing ourselves at the Subject's point of view (suppose an infant newly born), he feels a crowd of sensations occupying some duration in time and some extension in space; but these are to him mere phenomena, he has not reflected that he feels them, or that they are feelings coming from without him; in the next place, partly by redintegration, partly by new presentations combined with the old, these phenomena shape themselves into groups or things, his own body being one of these groups, and the rest coming and going around it; these groups of phenomena are what I have called remote objects of perception, "Time and Space" § 26. Then arises as one representation among the rest the distinction of Self from all its perceptions, and the consequent distinction of the subjective and objective aspects of what were previously mere phenomena, by a process

which I have attempted to analyse in "Time and Space" § 21, and need not here repeat. The result is, that all phenomena are now distinguished as being on one side states of consciousness, on the other objects among objects ; and that the whole of every object is a state of consciousness, the whole of every state of consciousness an object ; one not the cause of the other, but each an inseparable aspect of one and the same thing. To have demonstrated the latter part of this view, though without carrying it out to the analysis of the Subject itself, is the immortal glory of Berkeley.

5. From this point onwards we are in the domain of pure representations, and we feel emotions pervading them, as already described. Still however the same distinction applies, and every representation with its pervading emotion has an objective aspect, the thing represented with its qualities of sensation and its qualities of emotion. In other words, every emotion with its cognitive framework appears both subjectively, as a mode of thought and emotion, and objectively as an existing object, the independent existence of which is a belief, with qualities corresponding both to the thought and to the emotion ; the emotion being what may be called the character of the existing represented object. This is the explanation of the personality which poets find in nature, the glory and grandeur of landscapes, the cheerfulness or melancholy of winds and waves ; or, to take an instance which I have already employed, the cup of water which we know to be poisoned receives from that knowledge a character of hatefulness in addition to, yet pervading, the image or framework in representation which is the knowledge or

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belief of its physical properties. The same is the case in contemplating persons; the emotions which we feel in the contemplation are represented by us as mental qualities of the person contemplated, as virtues or as vices, as *ἔξεις* or traits of character, such as patience, firmness, courage, selfishness, ambition, generosity, candour, and so on. That which is emotion subjectively is mental quality objectively, just as in physical objects that which is sensation, sight or touch for instance, subjectively is physical quality objectively. And it makes no difference whether the Subject, from which the subjective view is taken, is in the person contemplated or in ourselves, so far as the subjective nature of the phenomena is concerned, though the judgment passed by the two Subjects will be different. Subjectively to the person contemplated his own mental qualities are emotions, and though he can contemplate them also objectively, or as qualities of his own mind, just as he can those of another person, yet in neither case has he any other knowledge of them than as emotions, or any other analysis to give of them than into emotions. Aristotle's *Ethic* is chiefly occupied with these mental qualities, treating them objectively, as virtue, courage, benevolence, and so on. It was reserved for more modern times, Spinoza leading the way, to begin the examination of them from the subjective side.

6. Now in what does the inseparability of the objective and subjective aspects of phenomena consist, and how is it to be understood, since it is clear that, although in presentations and perception of remote objects there is a certain continuity of space and of time between the things perceived and the mind perceiving them, this continuity is not what is

meant by the inseparability in question, because this continuity does not exist in the case of pure representations and their objects? The order of sequence in representations does not correspond with the order of sequence in the objects represented as constituting the existing world of nature, of which the representations are a miserably poor and fragmentary picture; and again, the representations are often pictures of objects which never have and never could have existed in the order of nature such as we know it, as for instance in dreams and works of fiction. Besides which, the course of nature and natural objects have an existence not only more perfect and complete than our representations of them, but also entirely independent of our existence and our representation. In what then consists the inseparability of the objective and subjective aspects of phenomena? Clearly not in the dependence of either aspect on the other; clearly not in the order of their respective sequences; clearly not in the continuity of time or of space between the separate objects and their representations in the mind. The distinction between Nature and History, *οὐσία* and *γένεσις*, is that which must help us to an answer. The inseparability of the objective and subjective aspects of phenomena applies only to the nature of phenomena, and not to their history. Given any phenomenon, its nature is a feeling or complex of feelings in time and space; this is its subjective aspect. But what is its existence? Its bare existence is the reflection, or imagination, or perception, or belief of it; its bare existence also, as well as its nature, is a part of, or finds its counterpart in, its subjective aspect. The subjective aspect of any phenomenon, then, is the presentation or re-

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presentation of a feeling or feelings in time and space. And conversely, given any such presentation or representation, the objective aspect of it is the bare existence of a phenomenon of such and such qualities in time and space. Its qualities in time and space and their bare existence are fully mirrored in the state of consciousness which is its subjective aspect. This, which applies to every single phenomenon, applies to it however large or small, simple or complex, it may be; it applies to phenomena, whether we take them each separately, or gathered together into aggregates; it applies to the entirety of them, the universe itself, which is but one vast phenomenon.

7. I have used the term bare existence to guard against the mixing up the existence which a phenomenon has for consciousness alone, irrespective of its certainty, permanence, or frequency, with the existence which phenomena have in comparison to each other, which includes not only the degrees of their comparative certainty, permanence, and frequency, but also the relations which they have between themselves, as conditioned by and conditioning each other. The existence of phenomena including these considerations is their historical existence, with which the inseparability of objective and subjective aspect has no concern. Bare existence on the other hand is presence in consciousness, irrespective of whether this is actual or possible presence, and of what is commonly known as reality or unreality of things. And this is the consideration which excludes the assumption of an Absolute, or of a Ding-an-sich; for these cannot be less than bare existence, and bare existence has its subjective side.

8. We know from habitual reasoning founded on habitual experience, that the world of objects has existed for an enormous period of time; that it contains many objects and forces which are unknown to us, except of course the mere generality, that they are objects and forces; that these objects and forces have produced and are ever producing effects which are quite independent of whether we or any one else knows anything about them or not; that we ourselves, and many other living and sentient beings, have been born upon the earth at a late epoch in the history of this universal world of objects, and that we depend upon, and are the products of, some of the objects and forces which this world contains. When we consider this knowledge or belief, we find that it is itself, as to its own nature, as well as that of the objects and forces about it, objective as well as subjective. But as to the history, both of the knowledge and of the things known; as to the order of sequence, certainty, permanence, or frequency, of the things known; and as to the place of the knowledge itself in that order of sequence, the conditions of its several portions, and certainty of each of them; in short, as to the *γένεσις* of everything, whether regarded as a subjective state or an objective thing; here, that is to say, in this class of considerations, the inseparability of the objective and subjective aspects has no influence and no place. It applies only to the relation between consciousness and its objects as such, that is, objects in relation to consciousness alone, not in relation to other objects in consciousness; to the nature, the *τί ἐστίν*, of phenomena. It applies to the relation between an individual consciousness, arising in this or

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that organised body, and the objects of that individual consciousness, when taken separately and as objects to that consciousness alone; but it does not apply to the relation between this or that individual consciousness and the order of nature, or sequence of objects discovered by the accumulated reasonings of mankind. Compared to that order and that sequence of objects an individual consciousness is, not its subjective counterpart, but one phenomenon in its sequence. The world, then, which exists with its objects and its forces independently of our puny existences and our feeble thoughts, though its nature, its *τί ἐστίν*, its bare existence, is to be actually or possibly present to consciousness, is yet in its certainty, its permanence, its causative agency, and its inherent power, no counterpart of the consciousness of any of its individual members. The states of consciousness of any individual, and their order of sequence, are determined partly by the physical organisation of his body, partly by forces and objects which act upon it; and, just as his whole conscious life is one among many conscious lives of other individuals, so his physical organisation and its history is one portion of the objects and forces which fill the world. The consciousness which depends upon such a minute portion of the world as this can be no subjective counterpart, but a very limited and fragmentary picture, of the world which it reflects. The complete subjective counterpart of the universe is for us an Ideal Being of perfect knowledge.

9. When, therefore, we approach the phenomena of consciousness as existing in an individual, and examine them, as we must, from the subjective side,

there are two branches of the enquiry; the first is statical, an analysis of each phenomenon and group of phenomena by itself; the second is dynamical, an analysis of the movements or changes between the phenomena or their groups. The first branch only is the object of the present chapter. Every such phenomenon or group of phenomena has its objective aspect as well as its subjective; and this objective aspect consists, for the individual, in the fact of his presenting, representing, imagining, or believing in, the objects which he is said to have in his mind, the objects of his states of consciousness. Their existence is to him subjectively a belief or a disbelief. The first of these groups of phenomena contains the various sub-groups of presentations; examined in Part I. of this chapter. The second contains those of remote objects of perception, with which I shall not here concern myself; they form the domain of the special physical sciences. The third contains pure representations, and the groups into which they fall. Emotions belong, as we have seen, to this third group, being involved in representations. Emotions must be analysed as component parts, aspects, or elements of the representations in which they arise; and both the emotion and its representational framework must be treated as equally subjective, equally objective. The metaphysical distinction between subjective and objective aspects of phenomena demands this treatment of them, unless grounds should appear for separating emotion and framework, as effect and cause respectively; in which case, the representations must be treated first, and the emotions become the object-matter of a fourth group of phenomena, standing to representations as these to re-

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mote objects or presentative perceptions, and formed out of representations themselves, not added to them in redintegration as additional pervading elements, having their origin elsewhere than in the representations themselves.

§ 14. 1. The theory that it is the qualities of sensation which, when known or imagined, produce as their effects emotions in the mind necessarily imposes on itself the task of accounting for the particular kind of any emotion by its resemblance to some particular kind of sensation which is its cause, and of pointing out the steps in the transition from one to the other in cases where the sensation does not at first sight resemble the emotion caused by it. For the theory is, that there is nothing in the emotion which was not originally contained in the sensation; if, then, the emotion does not resemble or repeat the sensation, its difference from it must lie in the changes wrought in the sensation by the various modes of representing it, by its combination with other sensations in representation, by its intensification by habit, by its reference to past or future time, by its being represented as the means to other sensations, or other sensations as the means to it, or by any other modes of change which may come under the meaning of the term association of representations, spontaneous or voluntary. This association in representation will then, it is held, if accurately enough analysed, give the different steps in the transition or transformation of sensation into emotion, and exhibit the emotion at the end identified with the sensation at the beginning. The theory here maintained is, on the contrary, that no such analysis of association, however accurate, can account for

the whole difference between sensation and emotion; that this association gives us only the framework or representational basis for the emotion; and that, though in this way the association is one requisite of the change of sensation into emotion, yet there is always a residue of feeling, namely, the emotional element itself, left unaccounted for, which must therefore be referred to its physiological condition, the nature or action of some part of the brain or nervous matter, the property of which is to support or produce, under the appropriate conditions, this kind of feeling, just as the senses themselves, sight, touch, hearing, &c., are produced or supported by the nervous matter appropriated to them. My argument is, that the elements of sensation, when represented, do not produce or generate, are not transformed into, emotions, but that the emotions are superinduced upon the represented elements of sensation; because those states of consciousness which we call emotional are found to contain both kinds of elements existing simultaneously, as elements of their nature, or of what they are, and not merely the element of emotion succeeding that of sensation. If you had analysed, in the case of any emotion, the entire framework of its represented sensation, you still would not have analysed the whole of the emotional state itself. When the sensation of white is produced by the combination of the colours of the prismatic spectrum, to adopt Mr. J. S. Mill's illustration in his note at page 252 Vol. ii. of his recent edition of Mr. James Mill's *Analysis of the Human Mind*, we have not the two sensations simultaneously, but we have either the white or the colours. Not so with the emotions. There both elements are in conscious-

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ness together. The emotions in my theory become a new kind or mode of feeling, depending upon the constitution and operation of nervous matter; and in this respect are similar to sensations; from which again they differ in that the appropriate conditions stimulating the actions of their nervous matter consist, not in the motion or impact of particles of external visible and tangible matter, but in those motions of the nervous matter itself which support the representational frameworks.

2. If this theory is true, it follows that the opposite theory must fail, either in its account of the steps of transformation of sensation into emotion, or else in its conception of the emotions themselves which are to be accounted for; if the analysis of the steps of transformation is complete, the end reached cannot be the emotion in its true shape, while, if the emotion is truly conceived, the steps towards its arising must be erroneously described. Both objections apply more or less, as it seems to me, to the accounts that have been given of the emotions by writers of this school. Hobbes is the originator of the theory, in its modern shape at least; Locke followed, but did not say much on this head; Tucker is perhaps the writer who has most minutely applied this theory to the analysis of the emotions; while James Mill has compendiously systematised the whole range of emotions, as he conceived them, in the manner of Hobbes but far more minutely. The theory is apparently adopted also by Prof. Bain in his valuable work *The Emotions and the Will*, Chap. ii. 2d edition. See also an explicit statement of it as a probable theory, by the same writer, in a note at page 231, Vol. ii., of the recent edition of Mr. James

Mill's work already mentioned; but he has not, I believe, aimed at giving a formal proof of it. Perhaps the theory can be best examined where the most express proof of it is offered; and accordingly I will follow Tucker and Mill in the account they give of some few of the emotions, and endeavour to make good the two objections which I have just urged. This will perhaps be at the cost of some repetition when the emotions are examined and arranged on my theory, but it will serve to clear the ground and smooth the way for that examination.

3. Tucker gives the following account of Anger or Revenge, in his *Light of Nature*, Vol. i. Chap. xxi. p. 163, 3d edit. "Whatever may be thought of other passions, this cannot be born with us, for there are several things to be learned before we come to the idea of anger: nature makes us concerned originally only with our own pleasures or pains; we feel not, and consequently regard not, what happens to other people, until having received hurt from them, and found that our retaliating the like prevails upon them to desist from offending us, we thence learn the expedience of exerting ourselves upon such occasions. Thus the desire of revenge is not a natural but a translated desire: we first look upon it as a means of procuring ease to ourselves, and security from injury; but having often beheld it in this light, the end at length drops out of sight, and desire, according to the usual process of translation, rests upon the means, which thenceforward become an end whereon our views will terminate. We may reckon at least four stages in our progress to the passion of anger: our experience of damage brought upon us by others, of our power to give them displeasure, of the effects

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of such displeasure to make them alter their measures, and of the opposition we must expect against the exercise of that power. But having by these gradations once brought satisfaction to connect immediately with revenge, it becomes a motive of action which we pursue many times by ways not at all conducive to the end that first rendered it recommendable." And again: "for, however it may be said that revenge is sweet, the sweetness does not come until the desire ends by having been glutted."

4. In the first place, let us carefully distinguish two things which in the above account are not distinguished, the feeling of revenge and the acts or circumstances which express that feeling; for it may happen that the same acts may be done both with and without the feeling of revenge. It appears to be of the acts alone that the expression is used "brought satisfaction to connect immediately with revenge." Now what satisfaction, or satisfaction of what kind? It must be, or ought to be, satisfaction of the kind we feel in avoiding or removing some bodily injury, for the satisfaction is transferred from this, as an end, and fixed upon the means; and so the satisfaction remains the same, while the embodiment or object of it is different. Is this then the kind of satisfaction which is the pleasure of revenge? Certainly not; the means are of a different kind from the end, and the satisfaction which attaches to the means is of a different kind from the satisfaction which attaches to the end; with the change in the object there arises a change in the satisfaction, or pleasureable emotion. The satisfaction of one kind in the end will not account for a satisfaction of another kind in the means. Hence it seems that the

true conception of what the satisfaction of revenge consists in has not been kept in view; it is not revenge that is accounted for, but either some general satisfaction or the satisfaction of avoiding pain. What then is it in which the satisfaction of revenge consists? It is requisite to it that its object should be a person made to suffer for inflicting injury on the person feeling revenge. This object may be produced in representation under the title of means to an end, by a voluntary redintegration which has become spontaneous, but the peculiar satisfaction attaching to it will belong to it in virtue of its own character, and not in virtue of the mode of its production in representation. If otherwise, the satisfaction would not have changed its character. Again, this account of the genesis of revenge contains nothing to distinguish revenge from any satisfaction which we take in the means of avoiding evil; we ought, on this theory, to feel revenge just as much against inanimate objects inflicting injuries which we can take measures to prevent, as against sentient beings; and this children do; but only while they attribute life and sentience to those objects. No man feels anger or revenge against an object which he regards as non-sentient. And yet, on this theory, the satisfaction should be translated to the means as much in one case as in the other.

5. Now to take the case of Grief. Tucker says, Vol. i. p. 165: "But of all the passions, there is none more difficult to be accounted for than grief, which keeps the mind intent upon a troublesome idea, that one would think she would endeavour most strenuously to throw off." His explanation is as follows: "Thus the mind having found the con-

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temptation of evil, and the increasing her sensibility of its pressure expedient, desire, as is usual in the like cases, becomes translated to the means, and her view terminates upon afflicting herself as much as possible, without prospect of any further end to be attained thereby. When she has often turned the spirits into this train, they will take it afterwards mechanically."

6. Thus grief is entirely a mistake. If man's voluntary efforts were by such a law of their action compelled to produce the very opposite of what they aim at, and thus to produce the more pain in proportion as they performed their function of avoiding pain more perfectly, man would indeed be an enigma. But now take James Mill's account, *Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind*, Vol. ii. p. 150-1 (Vol. ii. p. 191-2, ed. 1869). "An aversion is the idea of a pain." "My state of consciousness under the idea [of a pleasure], that is, the idea itself, I call a Desire." At page 158: "When a pleasurable sensation is anticipated with certainty, we call the state of consciousness Joy. When a painful sensation is thus anticipated, we call it Sorrow." Sorrow, then, is a painful sensation anticipated with certainty, for this is the meaning of "we call it Sorrow." Where Tucker employs the machinery of means and ends, Mill employs that of future time; his future certainty is a mode of explaining how grief is persisted in, so that he escapes from the objection of 'mistake' to which Tucker is liable. The chain of associations founded on knowledge which we cannot get rid of compels us plainly to have the idea of the circumstances of the painful sensation brought home to us. But whatever the machinery

employed, whether the involuntary representation of a future certainty of pain, or the voluntary representation of a means to avoid pain, the same objection holds good as in the case of revenge, namely, that the kind of pain in the sensation is different from the kind of pain in the emotion called grief or sorrow; and, whatever may be the steps by which the representation is effected and brought home to consciousness, if either of these accounts were true, the only pain in grief must be of the kind of sensational pain; whereas there are many sorts of grief, for instance, that for loss of friends, unkindness of friends, ingratitude of those benefited by us, remorse, wounded pride, and so on, which are very different in their kind of pain from the pain of any sensation. This new kind of pain, then, must it is true arise in the representation, but cannot be deduced from it or from the sensations which compose it.

7. I will take another instance, the emotion of Love. Tucker, Vol. i. p. 166, says: "Under the helpless condition wherein we are born, we stand indebted to the care of others for the continual supply of our wants, and the satisfaction received in such supply communicates a portion of itself to our idea of the person administering it; therefore a child's first love is its nurse." "But after having a little enlarged our acquaintance, and found that every body will not, like nurse, give us the same assiduous tendance upon all occasions, but are more or less willing to oblige us, according as they are at ease in themselves, or as we can oblige them, then are we ready to do and to wish them pleasure, that they may be the more ready to humour us. Yet this is not perfect love; which will suffer no advantage

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of our own to stand immediately in view. In further process of time, if we find our enjoyments arising chiefly from the conversation or intercourse of one or a few persons, we practise the like method of engaging them to serve us so frequently, until this end slips out of view, and satisfaction, as we have before remarked in cases of translation, adheres immediately to the thought of doing them kindness. Then it is that love becomes personal, and then arrives at its highest state of refinement, wherein it may be defined the pleasure of pleasing: for I cannot conceive a purer love than that which makes us feel a sensible delight in gratifying another, and in everything that happens conducive to his gratification, without thought of any other benefit redounding therefrom to ourselves, except that very delight. And this delight is of two sorts, which may be distinguished into Love and Fondness; the latter tends barely to gratify, the other to gratify without doing a disservice, and even to forbear a present compliance for the sake of a real advantage." "Thus the most resplendent love springs originally from our concern for ourselves, and our own desires, like a rose growing from a dunghill."

8. Mill's account seems to approach nearer to Tucker's than in the case of grief; he adopts the machinery of cause and effect, very much the same as that of means and end. At page 158, Vol. ii. (or p. 204, Vol. ii. ed. 1869) he says: "An object contemplated as a future cause of a future pleasure is an object *loved*, whether the anticipation is certain or uncertain." And this shows the constant union of joy and love, for joy is "a pleasureable sensation anticipated with certainty." When therefore, in think-

ing of the cause of a future pleasure, the pleasure is contemplated as certain, we feel love and joy together.

9. But here again I must repeat the same objection. The satisfaction which is translated from the end of personal advantage to the means, the gratification of another, must be a satisfaction of the same kind after translation as before. But if the satisfaction in "the pleasure of pleasing" is of a different kind from the satisfaction of procuring self-gratification, then the presence of one does not account for the presence of the other; but the satisfaction in "the pleasure of pleasing" must be referred to some other source, namely, to the new object which is now represented, as the proper and peculiar object or framework of the emotion, and to the kind or mode of operation of the nervous matter concerned in supporting this representation, as the physiological cause both of the emotion and of its connection with its proper framework. The enumeration and analysis of the steps in the representation of this new object, or cognitive framework, of the emotion is not a sufficient account of the change in the kind of satisfaction, without taking also into consideration the kind of object which has so arisen, as the object of the new kind of satisfaction.

10. One more instance from Tucker, an instance in which his analysis is partially successful, will serve, by showing the reasons of its success, to apply, as it were, the method of 'concomitant variations' to the question in hand. I mean his analysis of avarice. Avarice proper, he says, or the love of money for its own sake is a desire of the advantages which money procures translated from the ends to the

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means, that is, to the possession of money itself separately from, or even to the exclusion of, those advantages. This account of avarice is true of all those cases in which the advantages procured by money are visible and tangible possessions of the same kind, visible and tangible, as money itself; and for this reason, that the kind of satisfaction is the same; it is the satisfaction of possessing visible and tangible objects. But even here this general kind of satisfaction is differentiated into varieties by the sub-differences in kind of the objects possessed; and though the general kind of satisfaction is the same, and may be translated from end to means, the theory does not hold in its minutiae; the particular satisfaction of possessing coin or notes is not precisely the same satisfaction as that of possessing pictures, or plate, or horses, or servants. And as matter of fact, we rarely or never find that a man who cares much for the possession of objects which are consumed in the enjoyment, such as cigars, wine, or luxuries of the table, becomes avaricious either of money or of objects the enjoyment of which is reaped by the mere contemplation of possessing them. Still more, a man who desires power, or honour, or flattery, though all these may be commanded by money to a great extent, is never found to translate the desire of them to money as the means of procuring them. Avarice appears, in its fundamental characteristic, the love of possessions, to be not restricted to money; but, whatever a man is fond of possessing, of that he becomes avaricious, if that particular fondness is indulged to excess. The proportion of truth, then, which lies in Tucker's analysis of avarice, depends upon the sameness in the kind of satisfaction which

is translated from the possession of the end to the possession of the means.

11. The foregoing instances show clearly enough the method followed by the psychological theory. Distinguishing sensations from emotions as feelings of a different kind, this theory attempts to show that the one grows into the other by means of representation or association. It is an extension of the doctrine *Nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu* to the emotions, or as they used to be called affections or passions; *Nihil in affectu quod non prius in sensu*; and this further transition is wrought through the intellectus, or is an intellectual process. The difference in kind between sensation and emotion is not denied but insisted on, and then it is attempted to show that the one becomes or changes into the other. This attempt is necessitated by the distinction between them being at first drawn empirically, sensation set down as one thing and emotion as another, instead of metaphysically by conceiving emotion as sensation and something more besides. Consequently the psychological theory has not only to point out in an emotion the *disjecta membra* of sensation, but also out of these, together with the mode of their recomposition, to construct the whole of the emotion. This however cannot be shown, because in those states of mind which are called emotions we can distinguish not only these *disjecta membra* and their recomposition in new shapes, but also, simultaneously existing, the emotional element which gives its name to the whole.

12. Hartley was, I believe, the first to connect systematically the psychological theory with the physiological cause of sensation and emotion. I bring no

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objection against the physiological, but only against the psychological, part of his speculations. Indeed I would carry the physiological part more completely into action, by calling on it to account for the nature of the emotions, as well as for that of the sensations and their association. Hartley begins that section of his *Observations on Man* which treats of the Affections in general by saying: "Here we may observe—First, That our Passions or Affections can be no more than Aggregates of simple Ideas united by Association. For they are excited by Objects, and by the Incidents of Life. But these, if we except the impressed Sensations, can have no power of affecting us, but what they derive from Association; just as was observed above of Words and Sentences." Observe the reasoning: the affections can *be* nothing but what the sensations together with their association were, because it is by them that they are *excited*; the nature is made to depend upon the genesis, instead of being analysed independently. He proceeds: "Secondly, Since therefore the Passions are States of considerable Pleasure or Pain, they must be Aggregates of the Ideas, or Traces of the sensible Pleasures and Pains, which Ideas make up by their Number, and mutual Influence upon one another, for the Faintness and transitory Nature of each singly taken. This may be called a Proof *a priori*. The Proof *a posteriori* will be given, when I come to analyse the Six Classes of Intellectual Affections; *viz.* Imagination, Ambition, Self-Interest, Sympathy, Theopathy, and the Moral Sense."

13. But though the physiological conditions of consciousness are brought into play, and, as is evident, by an ardent supporter of the psychological

theory, that theory is not thereby strengthened but weakened ; and, I will add, the unreserved reference of conscious states to nerve action completes its destruction. In the first place, a *vera causa* is acquired for the emotional as well as for the sensational element in emotions ; and in the next, the nerve action, which supports sensations and their association, replaces the sensations and their association as the cause of the emotional states. That which is new in the emotion, its acknowledged and apparent difference from the sensations out of which it is supposed to be constructed, must now be referred not to the sensations and their association, but to the nerve and nerve action which support them, and, when continued, support the emotion. The notion that sensations grow by association into emotions supposes, on the contrary, that the cause of the emotions lies in the sensations and their association, not in the nerve and nerve action supporting them. Otherwise its doctrine, that emotion could be entirely analysed into sensation and association, if only we had sufficient insight, would have no meaning ; unless indeed it meant, what its maintainers will be slow to admit, that emotions are not different in kind from sensations.

14. It seems to me an error common to all psychological, and indeed more or less to all empirical, schools of thought, that they content themselves with giving the history or genesis of the phenomena before them, assuming as if already known the nature or analysis of each phenomenon in the series, phenomena which may indeed be familiar, but which are not on that account known ; and then that they imagine that each new phenomenon, so left unanalysed, con-

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tains those elements only which they were acquainted with in its antecedent phenomena. In psychology, the first and most important instance of this error is the assumption of the division between the body and its sensitive organs, on the one side, and the external objects of the world on the other ; or, what is equivalent in this case, of the division between mind and matter, as a primitive fact of consciousness. The psychological schools all make shipwreck on this rock ; for in consequence of this assumption they set down everything which we either know or feel about external objects, except what is contained in their structure and functions as masses of solid, that is, of visible and tangible bodies, as if it belonged exclusively to the mind and not also to the objects. Hence they look to the objects as the causes of all our feelings, and attempt to discover changes in them which cause corresponding changes in feeling ; and so far without error ; but then, since the only changes contemplated in the objects are such as cause changes in the sensations, it follows from this view, that all our feelings, the emotions included, must be either sensations or representations of sensation. They are however, as it seems to me, strangely forgetful of what they admit and indeed proclaim in the case of the sensations, namely, the important part which the nervous organism plays in the production of states of consciousness ; and if it is in a great measure to the nature and operation of this nervous organism that we owe the particular kinds of sensation as well as sensation itself, why should we imagine it to play a less important part in the production of emotions, and, restricting it in this field to being the mere medium or means of putting sensations together in

representations, deny it the office of determining in any way a change in the kind of feeling which these representations contain? It is surely agreeable to analogy with the case of sensations to suppose, that with every change, even the least, in the representations, carried on by this nervous matter in its function, there should arise, correspondingly, a certain difference or change in the feelings which they contain, as well as in the grouping of those feelings; and all such changes may properly be called emotional.

15. This oversight and this assumed difference between the sensations and the emotions, the sensations appearing objective as well as subjective, but the emotions subjective alone, causes the appearance of the comparative unreality of the emotions. Yet they are as stable in their obedience to fixed laws, and in their nature as capable of analysis and classification, as the sensations. It is not in point of reality but in point of truth that they may differ from sensations. If, however, a certain emotion always arises in a certain representation, it is as true as that representation itself, for the truth of states of consciousness consists in their permanence under examination. Experience and repeated examination is the test of truth. If therefore any emotions are found always arising in the same representations, as their permanent occupants, and if these representations are themselves permanent, it will be as difficult to eliminate these emotions from consciousness as it is to eliminate those conclusions of reasoning which always result from an examination into the phenomena about which they are concluded. There is no difference in this respect between emotions, the moral character of representations, and those relations of

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the represented objects which are expressed by logical propositions ; for the properties of generality and permanence under examination are common properties of both. While, then, the sensible qualities of objects admit readily of being brought to the test of presentation, from which there is no appeal, it is on the other hand the common property of emotions and conclusions of reasoning about representations that they are liable to contain error, from being founded on an imperfect acquaintance with the phenomena which they belong to or are concerned with. Hence only some of them are true and permanent, and the progress of enquiry eliminates the untrue or partially true, establishes and discovers the true. In the case of emotions, the laws which determine their truth or their permanence are also laws of their connection with their representational framework, just as, in the case of conclusions of reasoning, these laws are the laws of the connection of the represented phenomena between themselves. The laws which govern the connection of emotions with their representational framework, which bind them up together, or rather determine how they are bound up, what emotion with what framework, these laws must be discovered, in the first instance, by analysis of the emotional states into emotion and framework ; and this will give the first hypothesis or sketched theory, which must be afterwards tested by facts of experience.

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§ 15. 1. Before proceeding however to the analysis of the emotions it is requisite to examine briefly the work of one of the greatest intellects ever yet employed on these questions, so far at least as may be necessary to show why the analysis offered in that work is unacceptable to the student at the pre-

sent day. I mean the immortal Spinoza. I cannot allow either that his analysis is correct, so as to serve for the basis of present or future labours, or that its failure involves the failure of the metaphysical method; though one or other of these views would possibly be welcomed by many with eagerness. That Spinoza may have had as profound an insight into the characters of the several emotions and passions as we can easily imagine attainable by any one, no one will more readily admit than I; but he did not owe this to his deduction of them from the first principles of his system. It is in vain to attempt to change a science of observation into a science of deduction merely by exhibiting the results of observation as deductions, by a mathematical method, from certain definitions, postulates, and axioms; for these first principles will always be mere expressions for the general results of the observations, and will need interpreting by them. Let any one take the Definitions of the First Part of Spinoza's *Ethic*, and he will find them vague to so great an extent that he will say to himself, 'What does he mean by this, and this? I must see what he makes of it before I can assent to it.' Now in Euclid the definitions need no such future interpretation; they are as clear as if they were the statements of single and particular facts, while they are also the most general truths; and this they owe to the object-matter with which they deal, namely, space relations, space being not only the general form of all extended things and of reasoning itself, but also of every individual extended thing; and both in its first intention, as perceived space.

2. Now it may seem an extraordinary assertion,

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but the first objection which I have to bring against Spinoza is this, that he is not sufficiently metaphysical. He objects it is true to Descartes, that he separated Body and Mind; *Ethic*, Part v. *Præfatio*, "Quid quæso? per Mentis, et Corporis unionem intelligit? quem, inquam, clarum et distinctum conceptum habet cogitationis arctissimè unitæ cuidam quantitatis portiunculæ? vellem sanè, ut hanc unionem per proximam suam causam explicuisset. Sed ille Mentem à Corpore adeò distinctam conceperat, ut nec hujus unionis, nec ipsius Mentis ullam singularem causam assignare potuerit; sed necesse ipsi fuerit, ad causam totius Universi, hoc est, ad Deum recurrere." But how does Spinoza himself conceive this union of mind and body? As consisting in the perception of body by mind, in the same way as one state of mind is united to another when it is remembered or represented; *Propp.* 11. 21. Part ii.; in itself a profound conception, and the germ of all future metaphysical truth; I mean that the mode of connection, perception, not the distinction of the things connected, is a profound conception. But to return. The states of the body form one connected series of cause and effect, and the states of mind, ideas as Spinoza calls them, form another connected series perceiving the former; and "the order and connexion of the ideas is the same as the order and connexion of the things," *Prop.* 7. Part ii. We have therefore two parallel series of states, states of mind and states of body, separate in themselves but united in the fact of perception of one by the other. Body and mind are still sundered first to be united afterwards, just as with Descartes. To use my phraseology, they are two complete or empirical things,

side by side, not, as I conceive them, one complete empirical thing, with its single series, but with a double aspect objective and subjective. This is what I mean by saying that Spinoza is not sufficiently metaphysical. He is in fact an Ontologist, and only differs from the current ontology of psychological schools by conceiving his two existences, mind and body, as attributes of a single substance, the essence of which the attributes express in determinate modes.

3. Let us now trace this vein of thought back to its professed source in the definitions and axioms of the First Part of the *Ethic*; by doing which we shall see that there lies hid in them the assumption of a separation between empirical objects, which only comes to light in the conclusions professedly deduced from them; we shall only know what he means by "attributes" when we find that extension and consciousness (*cogitatio*) are what he has in his mind. Prop. 2. Part iii. runs thus: "The body can neither determine the mind to be conscious (*ad cogitandum*) nor the mind the body to motion or to rest, or to anything else, if anything else there be." This rests upon Prop. 6. Part ii., "The modes of any attribute have God as their cause so far only as he is considered under that attribute of which they are modes, and not under any other attribute." Taking body and mind as belonging each to its own attribute, this proposition gives the general law under which the former was a case. Now this proposition has two roots; the first is Prop. 10. Part i., "Every single attribute of one substance must be conceived by itself alone;" and the second, which brings the notion of cause into the matter, is Axiom 4. Part i., "The knowledge of an effect depends on the knowledge of

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its cause and involves it." I will not at present discuss this axiom, but, assuming its validity, go to the first root of the demonstration. Turning back then to Prop. 10. Part i., we find that it rests on Deff. 4 and 3. Part i. Def. 4 runs, "By an attribute I understand that which the intellect perceives of a substance, as if constituting its essence;" and Def. 3, "By a substance I understand that which is self-contained (in se) and is conceived by itself alone (per se); i.e. that, the conception of which stands in no need of the conception of anything else from which it should be formed." His reasoning is: since each attribute is perceived as constituting the essence of its substance, and substance is conceived as being itself alone, therefore each attribute is conceived by itself alone; a piece of reasoning which, undeniable as it is, I venture to think neither Spinoza nor anyone else would have constructed out of his Deff. 3 and 4, so vague and unexplained are these statements, unless he had previously pitched upon some phenomena, in this case body and mind, extension and consciousness; had conceived them first as separate phenomena; and had formed his definitions of attribute and substance to suit that conception. The real key to Spinoza's system I therefore consider to lurk in the 5th Axiom of the 2d Part: "*Nullas res singulares præter corpora, et cogitandi modos, sentimus, nec percipimus;*"—"We neither feel nor perceive any individual things except bodies and modes of consciousness." This however is precisely the point to which I take exception. It involves a distinction between phenomena which is not an ultimate one; and, in making a statement which is undeniable, if taken without reference to the ultimate validity of

that distinction,—since all things may be considered as either bodies or modes of consciousness, and the distinction is exhaustive if not ultimate—it tacitly assumes that ultimate validity in adopting extension and consciousness as the objects of discussion. The propriety of dividing knowable phenomena into bodies and modes of consciousness, instead of into other categories, is the very thing which ought to be shown. As with others so with Spinoza, everything must rest ultimately on analysis; only a true analysis can be the foundation of a true system. His conception of substance and attribute thus becomes otiose for scientific explanation of phenomena, adding nothing to our knowledge of what extension and consciousness are, nor of how they arise. His real ultimates are the independent attributes themselves; and his Substance, *Causa Sui*, is a mere hypostasising of the connection between them, a doubling of the phenomena in order to account for them, instead of taking them simply as inseparable phenomena, or, as I should say, aspects of each other; a proceeding rendered logically necessary, though involving also logically a process in infinitum, by his having begun by regarding the attributes as independent existences. His ontology is only more respectable than the current psychological ontology, because it endeavours to unite in a single conception the two orders of phenomena, mental and physical, which others are content to leave as independent ultimate facts. The conclusion, then, which I draw from the foregoing remarks is, that we are not precluded by Spinoza's mathematical demonstration from examining the phenomena for themselves, and seeing whether mind and body are such separate empirical phenomena as he

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professes to demonstrate that they are; whether they do not rather force us to interpret them, not as two parallel series proceeding from a single transcendent cause, but as a single series of phenomena, with a double but inseparable aspect, objective and subjective. For the science is one of observation and analysis of perceived objects, not of deduction from definitely known and admitted principles; and the definitions and axioms of Spinoza are necessarily suspended on the facts of immediate observation which they express in general terms, in words of second intention, as I should say; and cannot have the facts suspended on them, as is the case in geometry, as if they were themselves facts of immediate certainty expressed in words of first intention.

4. The next thing which it is necessary to prove against Spinoza is, that his analysis of man into mind and body, in the Corollary to Prop. 13. Part ii., "Hence it follows that man consists of Mind and Body, and that the human body exists as we feel it to do (*prout ipsum sentimus*)," is an analysis not pushed to its furthest limits. The proof that nothing else than body, that is, the body which the mind inhabits, and the changes or modifications (*affectiones*) which it undergoes from bodies external to it, is the object of the mind, contained in Prop. 13. to which this Corollary belongs, depends upon Axiom 5. Part II., "We neither feel nor perceive any individual things (*res singulares*) except bodies and modes of consciousness (*cogitandi modos*)." But it clearly does not follow from this that the only object of the mind is body, and not some mode or modes of consciousness, unless in the term mind we first include all its modes of consciousness, and then

exclude all bodies and affections of bodies; in other words, unless we assume that bodies cannot be analysed into modes of consciousness, but that the separation between bodies and modes of consciousness is a datum of ultimate analysis. This assumption seems tacitly made by Spinoza; and yet it is an erroneous one, since bodies are capable of analysis into feelings of sight and touch in the same portion of space, as I have endeavoured to show above, and also in "Time and Space" § 13. Spinoza assumes body to be one thing and mind another; body to be the object of mind; and each of them to be irreducible into the other. This is an assumption which it is impossible to grant since the time of Berkeley, who pushed the analysis of body to a much further point.

5. In the next place I proceed to give a very brief statement of Spinoza's theory of presentations and representations, to call them by the names which I adopt for them. His views about them are deduced from what has been already explained about the relation of mind and body. It is to presentations that Prop. 19, Part ii. is to be referred: "The human mind has no knowledge of the human body, nor is aware of its existence, except through the ideas of the affections with which the body is affected." By these "ideas" I understand Spinoza to mean what we call sensations or perceptions of sense; subjectively there are these perceptions, objectively there are changes or modifications of the body by bodies external to it; but these bodily changes are not with Spinoza causes of the perceptions; they are their objects, simultaneous, and proceeding in an exactly parallel order with the changes of perception; the

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bodily changes are the thing perceived, the "ideas" are the mind perceiving them. Prop. 22, Part ii. proceeds to representations: "The human mind not only perceives the affections of the body, but also perceives ideas of these affections." That is to say, it has ideas of ideas, representations of presentations.

6. This view of the matter follows strictly from the view already taken of the relation of mind and body, and consequently can be disproved only by first disproving that view, which it has been above attempted to do. The disproof consists in showing, as above, that we do not perceive bodies, either our own or bodies external to it, until we have first had perceptions of sight and touch, and, secondly, combined them into composite objects in three dimensions of space; whereas Spinoza assumes, without proof, that such composite objects in three dimensions of space, that is to say, bodies, are the first, and in analysis the ultimate, objects of perception. But that Spinoza's account of presentation is erroneous in itself, apart from the premises on which it rests, may be shown by considering it apart from them. Thus, when we see a visible and tangible object, Spinoza holds that what we see is the change produced in our body by the impact of the body external to ours; but the fact is, that this change is not seen or perceived at all in seeing the object; the bodily change is not the object seen or perceived. There are three things where Spinoza only admits two; there is, 1st, the "idea" or perception in the mind; 2nd, the object seen in space; 3rd, the changes produced in the body by the object seen, before or at any rate while it is seen. These changes are never seen themselves,

but always inferred by a subsequent act or state of consciousness; and the same holds good of all the senses as well as of sight. Spinoza runs together into one the object seen and the bodily changes inferred; whereas it is only the effects of these bodily changes that are seen, and seen as the object of sight; and he substitutes for the object, which he sees, the bodily change which he infers, calling this bodily change the object of sight, and asserting that it is simultaneous, and part of a parallel order, with the subjective perception, as indeed the object properly so called is. Representations have then, in the next place, the same nature, inasmuch as they are "ideas of ideas" of bodily changes; but since it is true that they are "ideas of ideas," or in other words repetitions of presentations, it follows that they have not these bodily changes for their causes, because the "ideas" which they represent have not. They may, however, have bodily changes preceding or accompanying them, unperceived at the time but inferred afterwards, just as the presentative ideas have.

7. It may be thought impossible that the difference between the object seen, or otherwise felt, and the bodily changes causing this effect of perception should altogether have escaped Spinoza. Nor did it entirely escape him; he was aware of a difficulty, and sought means to avoid it. He applied for this purpose his distinction between adequate and inadequate knowledge, exact and confused ideas. He could not entirely shake off his own inference, his own knowledge, that changes in the body accompanied changes in perception, especially when supported by his assumption that bodies were the ultimate ob-

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jects; but at the same time he was aware that he knew very little of these bodily changes, in spite of the constant perceptions of them which life consists of. Drawing the line therefore, as he did, between bodies on the one hand and states of consciousness on the other, he entirely omitted the analysis of the states of consciousness as such, and then maintained that we had only inadequate and confused ideas of the bodies and bodily changes, and of the ideas of these ideas, that is to say, of the true nature both of the body and of the mind. See Propp. 24 to 29, Part ii. inclusive. His theory compelled him to maintain that we have some knowledge of the human body in the moment of perception, and not only this but some knowledge of everything that takes place in it, in that moment, for "*nihil in eo corpore poterit contingere quod à Mente non percipiatur*," as he says in Prop. 12, Part ii.; but the whole and every part of this knowledge may be very confused; exact and adequate knowledge to God, but confused and inadequate to us. This mode of escape seems extremely plausible, as we read it in the masterly deduction of Spinoza; but the conception of the knowledge of the bodily changes being confused and inadequate is untenable in the face of the facts, that there is no knowledge of them at all in the moment of perception, and that, when we have attained the knowledge by inference, it is not confused knowledge, though it may be inadequate, but clear and exact so far as it goes. The bodily changes must accordingly be conceived as conditions preceding and causing the perceptions, both presentative and representative; and the objective aspects of these perceptions as their inseparable and simultaneous objects.

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8. We are now in a position to examine the foundations of Spinoza's theory of the emotions and passions, which was the purpose of undertaking the foregoing enquiry. In order to deduce the emotions Spinoza takes new ground at the beginning of Part iii. of the *Ethic*, namely, "Prop. 4. Nothing can be destroyed except by a cause external to it.—Demonstration.—This proposition is evident of itself; for the definition of each and every thing affirms, but not denies, the essence of the thing itself; or posits (ponit) but does not take away (tollit) its essence. And thus while we attend to the thing itself alone, and not to external causes, we shall be able to find nothing in it which is able to destroy it. Q. E. D." Now on this I remark that the term essence, *essentia*, contains an ambiguity which covers the transition from the assertion of *what* the thing is to the assertion *that* it actually exists. Essence must be distinguished from existence, the nature of a thing from its genesis, the logical definition from the historical existence. And we may affirm the essence of a thing to be so and so, having then before us what I have called in § 13 its bare existence, without either affirming or denying its existence as a fact of history. When, therefore, Spinoza says, "we shall be able to find nothing in it which is able to destroy it," he ought to have added 'or to produce it.' The importance of this will be seen as we proceed.

9. "Prop. 5. Things are so far forth contrary in nature, that is, unable to exist in the same subject, as one is able to destroy the other.—Demonstration.—For if they could agree, or be together in the same subject, then something could be found in the same

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subject which could destroy it, which (by preceding Prop.) is absurd."

"Prop. 6. Each and every thing, so far as in it lies, endeavours to persevere in its own existence (esse).—Demonstration.—For individual things are modes in which God's attributes are expressed in a certain and determinate way, (by Coroll. Prop. 25. Part i.) that is, (by Prop. 34. Part i.) things which express in a certain and determinate way the power of God, by which God exists and acts; nor does anything contain in itself anything by which it can be destroyed, or which takes away its existence (*existentiam tollat*) (by Prop. 4). But on the contrary is opposed to everything which can take away its existence (*existentiam*) (by preceding Prop.), and thus, as much as it can and as lies in it, endeavours to persevere in its own existence (*esse*). Q. E. D." In other words, from the circumstance of the logical definition of a thing not including a negation of it, combined with a reference of each thing to the power of God, the Substantia assumed at the beginning, he infers a constant endeavour, on the part of each individual thing, to persist in existence against other things which are not included in its definition. Here is the use which Spinoza makes of his reduplication of phenomena into cause and effect, substance and attribute; the reduplication conceals the assumption of a vast fund of Power.

10. These remarks may be thought unimportant, since it is clear that, whatever the explanation, individual things do persist in existence, and are promotive or destructive of the existence of each other. But there is a more important ambiguity introduced for the first time in the Prop. last quoted, consisting

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in the use of the word *conatur*, endeavours. Admitting, as we must, the fact of continued existence of things in time, we do not imply by this that any sense of effort, or sense of struggle for existence, is involved in it. This conception is introduced solely by its being, in consequence of our association and use of language, attached to the term *conatus*. Yet it is this surreptitious meaning of *conatus* upon which all the subsequent reasoning, deducing the emotions, depends. For Spinoza, after showing in the three subsequent Propositions that the mind, inasmuch as it is conscious of itself (and this being conscious of itself is the nerve of the argument), by means of ideas of affections of the body, is conscious of its own *conatus*, adds the following Scholium: "This *conatus*, when it is referred to the Mind alone, is called Will (*voluntas*); but when referred to Mind and Body at once, is called Appetite, which accordingly is nothing else than the very essence of the man, from whose nature those things which contribute to his own preservation necessarily follow; and thus the man is determined to do the same. Next, there is no difference between appetite and desire (*cupiditas*) except that desire is usually referred to men so far forth as they are conscious of their own appetite, and therefore can be thus defined—Desire is appetite with consciousness of it. It is evident then from all this that we endeavour, will, seek, and desire nothing because we judge it to be good, but that on the contrary we judge that anything is good because we endeavour, will, seek, and desire it."

11. Now if there is no sense of effort in the *conatus* itself,—and we are not entitled by Spinoza's deduction to suppose that there is,—there is none in

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the case at all, since none can be imported merely by our becoming conscious of the conatus. If there is none in its "idea," there is also none in its "idea ideæ." Where then is the justification for calling the conatus Will and Desire? And why should we judge a thing to be *good* because it is the object of this conatus? Spinoza's explanation of what the will is must be therefore held to have entirely broken down, for it is precisely the feature of desiring a good thing which we mean by willing, and which, being a familiar phenomenon, we want to have analysed. His explanation consists simply in calling existence effort to exist; whereas he ought to have shown how the perception of the bodily, unconscious, effort becomes itself Will, Desire, or Appetite, that is, conscious effort in the mind itself subjectively, as well as perception of the effort, figuratively so called, in states of the body and in the representations of those states. For, admitting with Spinoza, that these perceptions and representations constitute the mind itself, it follows that the mind, in being conscious of itself, will be conscious of that kind of effort and no other which those states, and the perceptions and representations of them, contain; in other words, of an unconscious tension or antagonism in states of body, but not of any sense of effort.

12. Spinoza then proceeds to deduce the emotions and passions from this will or desire. Prop. 11. Part iii. "Whatever increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of acting belonging to our Body, the idea of that thing increases or diminishes, aids or restrains, the power of being conscious belonging to our Mind." Demonstrated by Prop. 7; and also by Prop. 14. Part ii. He adds a Scholium: "Thus

we see that the Mind can suffer great changes, and pass now to greater, now to less perfection,—the suffering of which changes explains to us the emotions of Joy and Sorrow. Accordingly by *Joy* I shall in future mean *a passion by which the Mind changes to greater perfection*. By *Sorrow* likewise *a passion by which it changes to less perfection*. * * * What Desire is I have already explained in the Scholium to Prop. 9 of this Part; and besides these three I recognise no other primary emotion; the remaining emotions, as I will show in the sequel, arise from these three.”

13. Thus joy and sorrow and all the other emotions are explained by Spinoza as successful or unsuccessful efforts at self-preservation or self-perfection. The characters of feeling which we know by the names joy and sorrow are apparently explained, because we all know that, in cases where there is a distinct conscious effort for a purpose, it is pleasant to feel powerful, pleasant to be successful in self-preservation, pleasant to succeed in doing what we try to do, and that the opposites are painful. But this explanation fails, or is only apparent, because it is not shown either, first, that there is such an effort at self-preservation underlying all the emotions, or secondly, why this effort should be pleasureable if it succeeds, painful if it fails; that is to say, why there are such feelings as pleasure and pain at all, and why, if there are, they should be attached respectively to successful and unsuccessful effort.

14. The remaining emotions and passions are all explained by Spinoza as so many minutely differentiated modes of successful or unsuccessful efforts at self-preservation or self-perfection. But he does not

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show the cause or origin of the specific character of feeling involved in these emotions, any more than of those of joy and sorrow from which he derives them, or any more, it may be said, than of the sense of effort itself. What he has really done is to characterise the emotions in terms of second intention, in terms expressing their relation to successful or unsuccessful effort, when such effort for a purpose is really felt. For that there is pleasure and pain attached to such success and unsuccess is a fact of experience, and a distinct relation between the two is observable as a phenomenon of consciousness. It will be seen, when the emotions are analysed in this and the following Chapter, that they have, besides their specific character, another and a general character of pleasure or pain, derived from or consisting in this success or unsuccess in attaining the purpose aimed at. I do not propose to follow Spinoza farther in his deduction of the emotions; a complete examination of his system is not to be done as a bywork; and I have discussed it only so far as it opposed an obstacle to the analysis of the emotions as phenomena, by appearing to be an exhaustive explanation of them. It will now, I think, be evident that his deduction can at the most be only partially true; and that to attain a more complete truth it is requisite to undertake the analysis of the emotions for themselves, as phenomena or states of consciousness, without attempting to deduce them from a single principle *a priori*. This analysis, which will also be a classification, it now remains to take in hand.

CHAPTER II.

PART III. THE DIRECT EMOTIONS.

Ce qu'il éprouvait échappe aux paroles ; l'émotion est toujours neuve et le mot a toujours servi ; de là l'impossibilité d'exprimer l'émotion.

Victor Hugo.

§ 16. 1. IN proceeding to the analysis of the emotions it will be well perhaps to enumerate some of the chief distinctions at our disposal. There is 1st, the great distinction between the emotion and its framework of representation ; 2nd, the distinction between comparisons where the things compared differ in kind of specific feeling, as colour from colour for instance, and comparisons where they differ in the additional introduction of the formal element, as for instance differently pitched tones in music, or different shapes in space, as circle and triangle ; 3rd, the distinction of pleasure and pain from the specific feeling to which they belong ; 4th, the distinction of pleasure and pain of enjoyment from pleasure and pain of admiration ; 5th, the distinction of sense of effort from pleasure and pain, on the one hand, and from the specific feeling in which it arises on the other ; 6th, the distinction between sense of effort and sense

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of effort for a purpose, or volition ; 7th, the distinction between cases where emotions differ in general kind from each other and cases where one emotion differs from another only in circumstantials, and the difference is of variety from species, or species from genus, as for instance in avarice, where the excessive fondness for different kinds of objects gives but varieties of excessive fondness for possessions generally ; 8th, the distinction between the two great modes of representation, direct and reflective ; and, within each of these, that between representation which is pure remembrance and representation which is imagination ; and 9th, the distinction between the different degrees of complexity, in the emotions and their frameworks at once, which distinction will be the guiding thread of the analysis of the emotions, as it was before in that of the sensations.

2. Casting a glance back over these distinctions and referring to the remarks made in § 8, it becomes clear that the distinction between the direct and reflective modes of representation is the most general of all, breaking up the whole group of emotions into two sub-groups, each of which contains within it all the other distinctions, and thus forming the main fundamental division of the subject. In the next place, each of these sub-groups is similarly divisible into two, by the distinction between representation which is pure remembrance and representation which is imagination ; and each of the sub-groups so formed again contains within it all the remaining distinctions. After this we come to minor distinctions which can only be exhibited by applying the canon of greater or less complexity to the emotions in detail. The four sub-groups which are thus laid at

the basis of our examination are those of the direct, the direct and imaginative, the reflective, the reflective and imaginative emotions.

§ 17. 1. The first great group of emotions is accordingly that of the direct emotions which do not include imagination in their representational framework. These will be found to fall under four heads, first, according as they are or are not mixed with sense of effort or with volition,—emotions proper and desires or passions ; secondly, according as they include pleasures and pains of enjoyment or pleasures and pains of admiration. The simplest emotions proper, those which stand nearest to sensations, are those of joy, grief, fondness, and aversion. These arise from representation of external or internal sensations. Suppose a child tastes a bitter kind of food, he feels a pain of taste. When that same kind of food is presented to him again, to see only and not to taste, the painful taste is represented, and there arises a feeling of dislike or aversion to the food, which is quite distinct from the notion of the probability of his having again to eat it, i. e., which has nothing to do with hope or fear. The aversion is a feeling now attaching to the food, arising from the pain of taste, but different from that pain, although it is itself also painful. Suppose a child to suffer from cold, he feels pain ; when he suffers from cold a second time, or if the pain of cold is continued the first time, he feels grief or pain of representation. The cold may be said in popular phrase to act on the mind, and produce a painful mental state as well as a painful bodily state. The same reasoning applies to pleasureable states, the emotions of joy and fondness.

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2. Now when sensations and representations like those mentioned are attached to objects which are separate from the body of the person feeling them, so as to be capable of approaching and removing from it, it is proper to describe the emotions as aversion and fondness ; when they arise within the body itself, then it is proper to describe them as grief and joy. Even in this their simplest shape these emotions admit of as many differences in kind as there are differences in the sensations or groups of sensation, in representing which they arise ; and of course also of innumerable differences of degree or intensity. But they do not depend upon imagination, upon the expectation of a future feeling, a feeling different in mode of combination from what has been already actually experienced ; nor yet upon reflection, upon the distinction between the self and its modes of feeling. It is true that there is a joy and grief, an aversion and fondness, in reflection ; pleasure and pain of all kinds when contemplated in representation are grief, joy, aversion, and fondness, of that particular kind to which their representational framework belongs ; and grief and joy, aversion and fondness, are properly defined as the representation of the pain or pleasure of enjoyment in any object, whether direct or reflective, a thing or a person. In reflection it is emotions themselves which, when contemplated as pleasureable or painful, are the objects or frameworks of the reflective modes of joy or grief, fondness or aversion. For instance, the pleasure of being loved, when represented, is joy ; the pain of humiliation, when represented, is grief. There is pleasure in being loved, and a further pleasure in the thought or representation of it ; there

is pain in being humiliated, and a further pain in the representation of it. These are in fact often found distinct in point of time, so as to be capable of easy distinction; I mean they are so in the phenomena of paroxysms of grief or of joy, which are the moments when a sense of one's state, as pleasureable or painful, comes home to one as it is called, that is, when a clear representation of it arises. The reflective modes of these four emotions, then, stand at the end of the series of reflective emotions, as their simple modes stand at the beginning of the direct, or rather at the end of the sensations.

3. When the sense of effort arises within these emotions, it is volition, for the representation of the object makes the object of the effort distinct; there is desire of a particular object, or sense of effort with a purpose. This desire being added to grief, joy, aversion, fondness, or, generally, to any emotion, makes the emotion passion. When the emotion is joy or fondness in objects of certain classes of sensation, namely, those of the digestive and reproductive organs, and those of the sense of taste, the corresponding or arising passion has usually been called appetite. All appetite is a mode of passion. The distinct kinds of fondness are most easily marked as attached to particular kinds of separate, remote, objects; hence the corresponding passions, or desires for those objects, are more easily classified also. Fondness of such objects with desire is the love of possessions of various kinds, and its excess is avarice in its various forms, which it is needless to enumerate. But the reflective modes of them must be distinguished from the direct, as in other cases. Power of all kinds is a kind of possession; so also many

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personal accomplishments, titles, honour, and reputation. The passion for these and other reflective objects is the reflective mode of the passion of fondness. Aversions may be treated in the same way.

§ 18. 1. The four emotions and corresponding passions just described relate to or contain only pleasures and pains of enjoyment, not of admiration. Objects of all the senses are their objects. But only objects of hearing and sight, or of sight and touch combined, since all remote objects of the one are remote objects of the other, though touch contributes no portion of their specific pleasure, form the representational framework of the next class of direct emotions, the pleasures and pains of which are pleasures and pains of admiration. These are the æsthetic emotions, properly so called. Reference should be made here to §§ 11. 12. in which the pleasure and pain of admiration in sights and sounds was described in its earliest or sensational stage. The æsthetic emotions take up those sensations repeated in representation. When I hear a piece of music of a length greater than can be perceived by the ear at once, I represent the beginning of it when it reaches its close, and compare the two; the pleasure or pain which results from or arises in this comparison is a pleasure or pain of admiration, only different from that in sensation by the greater amount of representation or memory involved. Similarly in a picture, the harmony of form, the correspondence of an object here to an object there, all that is called technically "composition," differs only in quantity, subtilty, and complexity, from the arrangement of shapes in a kaleidoscope which I can take in at a glance. The subtilties of composition which Mr.

Ruskin points out in Turner's pictures, *Mod. Painters*, Part viii. Chap. ii., and the harmony of parts in a Greek statue, or in one by Michael Angelo, in a Greek Temple or Gothic Cathedral, all repeat the same pleasure on a larger scale, a scale which requires representation as well as presentation. Add now to this source of pleasure that which gives pleasures of enjoyment in sound or sight alone, as the harmony of different kinds of musical instruments and that of different colours, and suppose both kinds of pleasure combined, either in the piece of music or in the picture, statue, or temple, and there will arise from the combination a new pleasure which is at once a pleasure of admiration and of enjoyment, but in which the former element largely preponderates; since even the pleasure of enjoyment is given only by a comparison of two kinds or qualities of sensation, each pleasing in itself. This whole pleasureable emotion, in which the pleasure is chiefly one of admiration, is æsthetic emotion. The general name for the object of the æsthetic emotions, of that quality in the representational framework which is æsthetic emotion on its emotional side, is Beauty if pleasureable, Deformity or ugliness if painful. In this way, in representation, the object of hearing and the object of sight develop, or become distinguished into, a double character, an emotion and its framework; or in other words, the sounds and sights in which representation is involved, when they are of a regular, harmonious, or musical kind, become the frameworks of emotions which, from their similar character, are called by one general name, æsthetic emotion, or the sense of beauty. The beauty is the characteristic of the framework, the sense of beauty

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is the æsthetic emotion with which we contemplate the framework, its pervading emotional aspect.

2. Let us now examine farther this pleasureable æsthetic emotion, the object of which is beauty. Since it consists in representation, and representation requires a certain considerable length of time both in objects of hearing and in objects of sight, two things must be distinguished in it; first, the whole object may be treated as a whole, or statically; secondly, it may be treated as a movement, or dynamically. Take first a piece of music. Statically considered it is harmony; dynamically it is melody. The movement from note to note, different yet agreeable in their relations of pitch and quality, is melody. The quick succession of many notes, each of which is not far removed in pitch from that before it and after it, is a pleasure of enjoyment from its ease or facility; it is the emotion of cheerfulness, gaiety, or joy. The interruption of this succession by several long intervals of pitch between the notes, when equally rapid, gives a sense of difficulty or pain. A slow succession gives the sense of gravity or dulness; if interrupted by long intervals of pitch it adds difficulty or pain. Again, when the succession of sounds is emphasised by loudness or intensity in some of the notes as contrasted with others, or by longer intervals of time interposed between some than between others, the succession is broken up into feet or measures, and a character is impressed upon the succession, which character is also one of enjoyment not of admiration. But when these feet are perceived to have a relation to one another, when they form a system, then we pass over into harmony as well as melody.

3. When we dwell upon the melody or succession of sounds, we usually represent it to ourselves as a movement of some visual object along a line in space; as indeed with all objects occupying time,—space serving as the logic of time and objects in it, as already remarked in “Time and Space” § 58. The breadth of this imaginary line in space is given by the number of different but simultaneous sounds in which the harmony of the music resides. But not only the number of different simultaneous sounds will give the representation of breadth, but also lowness of pitch; a single bass note repeated will give the impression of a broad line; a high note of a narrow line; and the music then dwindles as it were to a thread. According then to the number of the simultaneous sounds, and according to their pitch, the melody broadens or narrows in its line of progression. Sometimes, when in any portion of the line a deep bass is heard with a succession of high notes, the breadth of the line given by the bass is represented as a dark background upon which plays, like summer lightning upon clouds, or a chain of fireflies upon a dark pool, the succession of high notes to which is committed the carrying on of the melody.

4. To turn now to the case of speech. The analysis of spoken words must include the formal and material elements of sound, and be based upon that distinction, time, together with the three material qualities of colour, pitch, and intensity. In spoken words accordingly there can be distinguished, first, the length or quantity of syllables; this is necessarily great if the syllable contains much or complicated consonantal sound or noise together with

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its vowel sound; consider for instance the quantity of the German word Fortpflanzungsgeschwindigkeit; and the vowel sound may be lengthened without such consonantal sound. Secondly, there is the emphasis, or weight as it may conveniently be called, which consists either in lengthening a syllable, or in making it louder than the rest, or in making a pause before or after it. To give emphasis or weight we must have recourse either to loudness or to time; an emphatic whisper gives weight only by length or by pausing. Thirdly, there is accent, which consists in a high or low pitch. These three modes of spoken sound, length, weight, and pitch, are the circumstances upon which turn the different modes of pronunciation and different characters of speech among different nations and in different individuals. The English and Germans, for instance, speak by weight; there is always one syllable at least in their words which is marked in their speaking as of greater weight than the rest; in German this syllable is always that which contains the ground meaning of the word, as distinguished from its suffix or affix; for instance, the word before adduced is pronounced Fortpflanzungsgeschwindigkeit. In English it is this same syllable in words of Saxon origin; but in words of Latin origin the tendency is to give weight to the first syllable in the word, or to move the emphasis towards it, as for instance in the words miracle, illustrated, admirable. This circumstance gives to English great variety of emphasis; and both English and German possess a spring and vigour from the circumstance of their moving by emphasis. French on the contrary disregards emphasis and moves by accent; every syllable has equal weight, but some have

a higher pitch than others. This gives French a great delicacy and refinement, but at the same time, to English ears at least, a certain fettered or artificial character, which however may be entirely owing to want of familiarity with it. It is obvious that these and similar circumstances and modes of pronunciation must have the greatest influence upon the versification and even prose composition of different nations. For instance, however the Greeks and Latins may have spoken, their verses were composed, in the classical times at least, on the principle of quantity, and not on that either of weight or of accent. The pronunciation of Latin however seems to have been by weight; but weight determined by quantity, the quantity of the penultimate syllable. If this was long, it was emphasised; if short, the antepenultimate. Fourthly, in all spoken words there is tone, which is the colour of the sound. This varies with the emotion, of which it becomes the chief exponent. This circumstance, which must have its cause in the physical organisation, namely, the dependence of the muscles of the organs of voice on the nervous centres, is most probably one cause of the tones and colour-harmonies of music calling up emotions, in consequence of our habitually associating with certain emotions certain kinds of tone of voice, which have been their natural expression; for it is the colour-harmonies in music which are, of all its features, the most closely connected with the emotion which pervades it. However this may be, the fact remains, that it is the tone or colour of voice in speaking, and not loudness, length, or pitch, not emphasis or accent, which is the immediate and unmistakeable expression of emotion, and of those emo-

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tions most which are least dependent on an intellectual framework, such as love and hate, veneration and scorn, the most deeply seated and the most purely emotional of all mental feelings.

5. Rhythm and metre are to spoken words what melody is to music ; when melody is itself rhythmical or metrical it becomes a tune, or song music. Tone, quantity, emphasis, and accent, are common to music and speech, and depend on the three qualities of sound, colour, intensity, and pitch, together with the formal element of time. Singing combines the two modes, music and speech, and leans sometimes to music, sometimes to speech by the metrical element preponderating in it ; the sense of the words does not properly belong to sound at all. Singing in fact differs from speech by the pleasure of sound alone being insisted on and aimed at ; hence the noises at the beginning and end of words are eliminated as much as possible, and the vowels brought into prominence. Certain colours of sound cannot be produced without certain vowels being produced with them. (Prof. Helmholtz' work already quoted, *Absch.* 5.) The different feet, metres, and rhythms, of speech have characters of their own, just as the different kinds of melody have ; in fact they compose a melody of speech. They are all movements which may be imagined as of visual objects in space, just as melodies are ; and the pleasure derived from them is also predominantly a pleasure of enjoyment. The trochaic movement is like a trot, the anapæstic like a gallop ; the anapæst seems to leap down, the dactyl to leap up ; the trochee starts forward from impulse, the iambus pauses for reflection. Although we have no dactyls, trochees, and so on, in English,

yet we have collections of syllables analogous to them, and analogous movements of rhythm, for the weighty syllables become centres round which the less weighty are grouped, thus forming feet, of syllables irregular in number. A verse is a certain number of such weighty syllables, or feet; with a middle pause, if they are more than three. The subtil differences in weight between different syllables is that which gives its great variety to English verse, which is one of its greatest beauties. Take for instance :

“ The leaves of wasted autumn woods shall float around thine head,

The blooms of dewy Spring shall gleam beneath thy feet :
But thy soul or this world must fade in the frost that binds the dead,
Ere midnight’s frown and morning’s smile, ere thou and peace may meet.”

How far the character which we attribute to melodies, rhythms, and metres, is due to the ease of their own movement, and how far to the association of these movements with other objects of enjoyment, is a question difficult to disentangle, but may perhaps receive some light when we come to consider the reflective elements in æsthetic emotion.

6. The harmony of a piece of music presents a far more complicated aspect than its melody. The harmony goes throughout its melody and gives it its character from beginning to end, so that the two are inseparable and produce but one complex effect. In fact there is harmony between the notes of each chord simultaneously struck, and there is harmony between successive chords at various distances from each other, and notably between the first and last

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chords of the whole piece. The latter kind of harmony depends obviously on representation. One chord or one note prepares another ; discords must be resolved, that is, must lead up to concords ; the whole piece is thus an evolution of harmonised sounds according to organic laws of growth. These two kinds of harmony may be called the harmony of simultaneously heard sounds and the harmony of melody or movement. Besides these there are those two kinds of harmony which have been already distinguished in § 11, as the harmony of pitch and the harmony of colour. Every note in our musical instruments is a coloured note. A chord is a harmony of colours, as a single coloured note is a harmony of pitches. Modern music, which like modern metaphysical philosophy depends upon the subjective side of phenomena being more systematically treated and examined, which subjective side in music is the emotion expressed peculiarly by colour and colour harmony in sound, and by tone of voice in spoken sound, —modern music is distinguished by taking as its fundamental principle the harmony of colours as distinguished from the mere harmony of pitches. The chord not the note is the unit, the individual, in its republic of sound. And this greater complexity and fulness of the unit is itself sufficient to give preponderance to colour harmony ; since every added note increases it, while simple harmony or harmony of pitch is already at its maximum. Its laws once ascertained and applied, no increase of this harmony or of pleasure from it is possible ; they become negative laws, limits, within or in obedience to which new combinations of sound may give new pleasure ; a new pleasure which must arise from the melting

together of concordant coloured sounds, just as the colour of a single note arises from the melting together of the harmonics with the ground tone. The combination of these chords themselves, their simultaneous execution whether on one or several instruments, or by voices in part-singing, gives the final extension to the principle of colour harmony. The chief pleasure and interest in music no longer lies in the melody alone, upon which it was necessarily thrown back when the simultaneous harmonies were meagre in colour; but the rich combinations of colour harmony take at least an equal place with it, serving as they do for the expression of strong and yet subtil emotion, as well as delighting the sense with fulness of harmonious sound.

7. The entire framework, then, of the æsthetic emotion or sense of beauty in music consists of a series of combined and analysable sounds, in which we may distinguish, first, the movement or melody, to which belong the intensity and the time measurement; secondly, the harmony in both its modes simultaneous and successive, in each of which it is a harmony of coloured sounds, and as such is again analysable into a harmony of pitches. The organic arrangement of these elements by the musical composer, the composition or structure of a piece of music, is its objective beauty, the representational and partly presentative framework of the æsthetic emotion which we experience in hearing it played or sung. The reflective emotions which are combined with this framework and with its æsthetic emotion constitute the poetry of music. These must be reserved for the Part which treats of the reflective emotions. The harmony of colour and of chords,

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and the combination of this kind of harmony with melody, is that in which these reflective emotions arise.

8. Music is not an imitative art. Its sounds imitate nothing; for, if you say that they imitate the sounds of the human voice, this is not imitation but repetition of sound; singing is itself music. Speech may in some cases be imitative, as for instance in onomatopœic names; but usually it is not imitative but simply designative, the sound being, at present at least, whatever it may have been in the origin of language, arbitrarily attached to the representation of the thing. Music then is not imitative. Painting, on the other hand, really imitates objects which differ from it in the nature of the space they occupy; a surface is made to resemble a solid; and the correctness of the imitation is often a great part of the æsthetic pleasure. In painting you have a language with a meaning, the meaning lying in the representations of the object imitated, or called up by means of the picture. A piece of music on the contrary is the thing itself, contains its own meaning; the succession and combination of its notes are picture and thing pictured in one; there are no images behind them; they are the framework of the emotion and its only framework. Bearing this fundamental difference in mind, let us turn to the examination of objects of sight. Since they include representation by requiring time to perceive them in all their parts, we shall find in them the two modes statical and dynamical, just as in the case of music. But in objects of sight it is the statical element which is first offered to us; not the dynamical, as in hearing, where we have to isolate a

portion of the movement from the rest, as an air, a piece of eight bars, a verse, a foot, in order to treat it statically at all. In objects of sight we see the representations at rest; in natural objects they move of themselves, in works of art the movement is implied and inferred; this is what is technically called the "motive" of the picture or statue, namely, the point or incident in it which determines the action. The past and the future of the visible object is always present to the thought of the spectator. In works of architecture this element is wanting; they have no movement except such as we import into them by imagining arches as springing, spires as shooting upward, and so forth. Their life is to stand at rest, in contrast with the living beings which surround them; and this kind of permanency is shared with them by other works of art. It may be remarked too that architecture is not an imitative art, differing therein from painting and resembling music. Sculpture must be regarded as imitative, though in a far less degree than painting. It has a beauty of its own, which allies it to architecture and allows us to take pleasure in statues treated stiffly and non-realistically, either as accompaniments to architecture or as standing alone. Its being actually in three dimensions, a solid capable of standing alone, makes a statue truly less imitative instead of more, as we might at first expect from its being thus more similar to the objects which it imitates. It acquires an independence, some of the independence of music and architecture, and disdains to serve merely as a language with a meaning behind it. Hence the repugnance excited by statues which are coloured so as to imitate the figures of real life. The slightest

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tinge of colour, purposely introduced, upon a statue makes it to some extent produce the effect of a beautiful toy; and the more so, the more completely it is coloured.

9. The movements of living beings are what answer to melody in music. These combine pleasure of enjoyment with pleasure of admiration, the former arising from ease and uninterrupted facility or power overcoming obstacles with little effort, the latter from proportion and beauty of shape preserved in the successive forms assumed in the movement. Dances are one of the chief modes in which these two pleasures are combined. But in pictures and statues which do not move it is a chief point of excellence that the movements antecedent and subsequent which are implied, and between which the moment given in the picture or statue stands, should be such as to be easy and natural consequences of that moment. In this respect, the æsthetic emotion of beauty in painting and sculpture passes over into one which is an imagination as well as a direct emotion. I conclude these remarks by repeating, that the æsthetic emotions, whether arising in sights or sounds, are carried up into reflection and combined with the reflective emotions, which constitute their poetry. They begin in the sensations of sight and hearing; then in direct representation they receive their emotional character as æsthetic emotions; and finally in combination with reflective emotions, such as love, revenge, pride, pity, and so on, they become the basis of poetry in all its kinds.

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§ 19. 1. We now come to emotions which include a comparison between the objects in their framework. When one of these objects is comparatively

new to us, or if a presentation entirely new, and at the same time unlike what we have seen before, the two objects together are the framework of the emotion of Surprise. When this unlikeness continues, so that both objects are familiar but unlike, there is Wonder. Astonishment is a great degree or intensity of surprise. When the new and unlike object is of such a kind in some of its features as to excite grief or aversion, there is Dread or Terror. When it is such as to excite joy or fondness, it is the object of Mirth, or joyful surprise, and to this belongs the phenomenon of laughing for joy. The comparison of new and old, familiar and unfamiliar, is the basis of the character of all these objects, and of the emotions which they are said to excite. When the two objects are familiar and old but incongruous in juxtaposition, being at the same time not such as to excite dread, there arises the simply laughable, the comic, or absurd. But of this incongruity there are two kinds; either the incongruity lies in the framework, the formal relations of the two objects which are brought forcibly together by some one or more points of relation in which they are congruous or by extraneous causes, or it lies in their emotional element, the one being an object of admiration, esteem, or fondness, the other of the reverse. In the former case, the contrast of thought or conception, there arises the sense of the witty; in the latter, the contrast of emotion, there arises the sense of the humorous. The interest of wit lies solely in the intellectual incongruity of the congruous, or congruity of the incongruous, that is, in a play of intellect. The interest of humour lies in the incongruity of the emotions, serious feelings with gay, important

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with trifling emotions, which are brought together under one intellectual conception or image. But wit and humour and their subdivisions must be reserved for treatment under the imaginative division of the direct emotions; for it is as actions, or when purposely invented or created, that their nature is best seen; when the desire for them prompts the imagination to pursue them. As passions or desires, wit and humour, the foundations of which have been now described, pass over into imaginative emotions. To return now to surprise or wonder, their common source.

2. Wonder is an emotion arising in contrast or dissimilarity of the familiar with the unfamiliar. This is an uneasy emotion; there arises then in it a desire to bring the two dissimilar objects into agreement; ease or the absence of effort in holding the two objects together in the mind is the motive, or thing desired, and is thus the foundation of the logical law of *Parcimony*, "*frustra fit per plura quod fieri potest per pauciora*," a law for *Conation*. The desire to assimilate the dissimilar, to equate the unequal, to measure the disproportioned, is the desire or passion which arises in the emotion of wonder; an intellectual desire, as the emotion is intellectual, an emotion of comparison. For it is not the particular feeling or emotion pervading each of the dissimilar objects which is ground or object of wonder or of its desire, but merely the fact of their dissimilarity or contrast. Anything or everything may be the object of wonder and of the desire for removing it; the desire and the emotion are general, universal, in reference to all objects whatever. The desire therefore is intellectual and general, a desire for knowledge. Hence the

truth of Aristotle's well known remark, that wonder is the parent of philosophy. There is in English no single good name for the desire of knowledge; for if we call it curiosity or inquisitiveness we are describing it by its results, characterising it by what it appears to be in contrast to something else, not defining it. The whole of purely intellectual activity, of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake, rests not upon the desire to know much or to know more than at present, for we easily acquiesce in a limit to our knowledge once ascertained to be irremovable, but upon the desire to remove an incongruity or dissimilarity in things which we already know or suspect to exist. Hence springs the a priori certainty of the axiom in Kant, *In natura non datur saltus, non datur hiatus*; to which he adds also—*non datur casus, non datur fatum*. That is to say, we cannot acquiesce in their continuance, but must endeavour to fill up the gap. The name I would propose instead of curiosity is logical instinct.

3. But although wonder is itself uneasy and requires removing by the completion of knowledge, the whole activity, of which it is the first step, is not painful but pleasurable; the want and its satisfaction together are an activity which is a natural need, and the absence of which is painful. This absence of the activity of wonder, logical instinct, and knowledge, is one branch of the feeling of Ennui; the other branch is the absence of emotional activity. In the first branch there is a craving for activity on the part of the intellect, which requires its natural food and stimulus. If wonder is the parent of philosophy, ennui is the parent of wonder, in the sense of being the appetite or hunger for intellectual activity, as it is

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also for emotional. (See the remarks in Auguste Comte's *Pol. Pos.* Vol. i. Ch. iii. p. 686.)

4. Before leaving this group of emotions I must mention one peculiar feeling, which seems to belong to it, and to be a particular mode of dread or terror, but for which I confess I am at a loss to assign a representational framework. Perhaps the very circumstance that there is no framework at hand in the feeling may be partly itself a constituent of its character. I mean to speak of that peculiar kind of awe or dread which makes the night-fears of children, and at times of older people also; which seems to be the same with the feeling, often sudden and marked in the moment of its arising, inspired by lonely mountain tops, or monuments of human agency in long deserted places, or by caverns or woods when we visit them alone. There is perhaps no better name for this feeling than Eeriness. It would seem that animals are not exempt from it; that children suffer most from it; and that the unoccupied mind is most liable to it. If it should be thought, as is not unlikely, that it is a feeling or consciousness of the presence of one's self without this consciousness being represented in a distinct shape, it would then be the emotion attending the first dawning of reflection or self-consciousness. It must be held too that men in the earliest stages of civilisation are the most subject to it, and feel it the most frequently and the most strongly, and on the incitement of the greatest number of objects; that it is in fact the main ingredient in what is to them religion, but which we are apt to call superstition. And this view seems to be confirmed by the circumstance that religious feeling is the special antidote to the pain of eeriness, as many

an understanding mother no doubt instructs her children; an antidote which combats the shadowy terror with weapons more subtil and penetrating than its own, namely, with the sense of repose beneath the protection of Almighty God, from whom no secrets are hid.

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§ 20. 1. In all the emotions hitherto examined there has been involved only the representation of objects as they have been actually presented; for in speaking of music and painting we have considered them from the spectator's not the composer's point of view; memory alone has been employed. But when new combinations of objects are introduced by redintegration, that is, old objects broken up and their fragments recombined in other shapes, this is to introduce new objects; and this kind of redintegration, whether it is spontaneous or voluntary, is imagination. First, objects of aversion or grief represented as future, or as likely to become presentations again, are objects of Fear. The representation of them as future is imaginative, since the remembered object is thereby represented in a new combination; an evil is imagined, the same with the old in point of content, but different from it in the circumstances which introduce and follow it. The simple consideration of happening in the future makes the representation imaginative. This is the simplest case; but the content of the future evil may also be represented as slightly different from before; this is an additional imaginative change. In the same way objects of joy or of fondness, represented as future, are imagined, and then become objects of Hope. It is plain that all the differences which attach to the objects and emotions of grief, joy, aversion, and fond-

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ness, will attach also to fear and hope; and this will be the case also when they are carried over into reflection, or when personal or reflective emotions are their objects. It is noticeable that the emotions of hope and fear refer indifferently to the historical past and the historical future; it is in the order of cognition that they refer only to the future. We say, for instance, that we hope or fear that a thing has happened when we know that the event has already decided one way or the other. The emotions refer only to the state of our knowledge and feeling about objects, not to the state those objects are really in did we know it. Yet the general knowledge that the event has been decided, though we do not know in what way, is not without effect upon the emotions of hope and fear, since it modifies the frameworks of those emotions. Its effect is to lessen the agitation of doubt as to the causes which tend to produce either result, and to fix the thoughts upon the consequences first of one result, then of the other, and so to brace the mind to the contemplation of either alternative.

2. The representation or imagination of the future in hope and fear brings into emotion a new element, that of certainty or uncertainty. The certainty of anything happening is a feeling which depends on the strength of the association connecting it with the rest of the framework, whether the links or steps in association are few or many; and the strength of the association depends in many cases on actual knowledge and reasoning. If it is a mere feeling without good grounds, the association is precarious; and the grounds may vary in quality. In itself, however, certainty is a feeling, a feeling of connection between two objects of representation; and this feeling of cer-

tainty has many degrees, from perfect certainty, if the connection is indissoluble, to mere suspicion if the connection is feeble or fluctuating. The other element in hope and fear is the pleasure or pain, of all kinds, of the objects feared or hoped for ; and this differs both in kind and in degree of intensity. These two elements are the whole of hope and of fear taken generally ; for in so doing we abstract from the particular objects, with their particular pleasures and pains, which may be feared or hoped for, and retain the feature of pleasure and pain which is common to all ; the object of every hope being pleasureable, of every fear painful. Now these two elements, that of certainty or uncertainty and that of pleasure or pain, supply each other's place and each other's deficiency, in all cases where action is taken upon the emotions of hope or fear. "A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush" expresses this relation of the two elements. Between two courses of action, of which one offers a small but certain, the other a great but uncertain, enjoyment, the choice will fix upon that the elements of which taken together outbalance the elements of the other taken together. The balance is struck by the vividness of the feeling ; there are no means of accurate measurement of either element separately ; the fact of choice alone decides which is the weightiest. Yet the two elements can be accurately measured against each other, as is done in betting. You can measure the degree of certainty by the sum of money a man is willing to pay if his opinion is wrong ; because, the more certain he feels, the more money he will stake upon his opinion. In this case the motive to stake the money must come from elsewhere ; since there

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is otherwise no reason for his comparing the amount of pleasure he will lose with the degree of his certainty; his wish to enforce his opinion on others, or to convince them of his own conviction, is here the motive of his bet; this wish being supposed fixed, the certainty is measured by the sum he will stake. There is another kind of betting, in which the money to be won or lost is itself the motive, as on the turf; here the degree of certainty is measured directly by the odds given and taken; the greater the chance in favour of any horse winning, the higher will be the sum which his backers undertake to pay if he loses, the smaller that which they will receive if he wins; and conversely, the less the probability of his winning, the higher the sum to be paid to his backers. The greater certainty is compensated by the less advantage, the greater advantage by the less certainty. Yet in all these cases there is always the unknown element of the character of the person; the measurement is only valid for one individual and shows only the comparative strength of the two feelings in his mind; but a certain degree of similarity there must be in the estimate formed by all who make bets, and the degrees of certainty admit of estimation by evidence open to all.—The same balance between the certainty and the importance of the feelings in the mind of the man who has to act upon them is shown in judicial verdicts. A jury always requires more stringent evidence to convict a man of a crime where the penalty is death, than where there is a minor offence and a smaller punishment. The verdict inflicts the greater or the less pain; the jurymen therefore requires it to be balanced in his mind by greater certainty in the one case, by less in the other.

3. The choice of action always depends upon the balance of these two elements in combination, upon their total in one case outweighing their total in another case; but reasoning, or action which is reasoning alone, has to do only with the element of certainty, and in this to consider the validity of the reasons on which associations depend, apart from the apparent certainty or strength of the resulting association itself, and apart from the importance or intensity of the feeling in the objects compared; and thus it supplies the premises of which choice or action is the conclusion. For all action, choice, feeling, or desire, may be represented in an intellectual form, in the form of a proposition. One object in representation, with the emotion belonging to it, may be affirmed or denied of another object with its emotion; for every emotion has its framework or object in representation, and these objects are connected together in trains of association or redintegration. Desire is affirmation that an object makes part of our trains of association, asserts that it belongs to our consciousness; dislike or repulsion of an object is negation of it, or denying that it is part of our train. "Ἔστι δ' ὅπερ ἐν διανοίᾳ κατάφασις καὶ ἀπόφασις, τοῦτ' ἐν ὀρέξει δῖωξις καὶ φυγή. Eud. Eth. v. 2. Desire or repulsion of an object is therefore affirmation or denial of its presence in consciousness, as part of our consciousness or world; affirmation or denial of its existence generally; as opposed to affirming or denying one object of another, both being existent or objects of consciousness. It is true that this denial in repulsion does not remove from consciousness or from existence altogether, i. e. does not annihilate, the thing denied; that this affirmation in desire does

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not produce or create the thing affirmed; any more than affirmation or denial properly so called, affirming or denying one thing of another in consciousness, or predication as commonly understood, imports into or removes from existence or consciousness the things affirmed or denied of other things. But the effect is to distinguish two worlds, two consciousnesses, an Ego and a True Ego as I have called it in "Time and Space" § 64. All that is desired is affirmed to belong, all that is repelled is denied to belong, to the True Ego, or the man as he wishes to be; it is the distinction between Seyn generally and that part of Seyn which is Sollen. And it is precisely the same with ordinary predication, namely, that it makes two great categories of truths; all positive, affirmative, propositions fall on one side, all negative propositions fall on the other. All real knowledge consists in or is expressed by affirmative propositions; negative propositions serve to give distinctness to these; they are the record of errors; but truth itself is entirely affirmative.

4. In desire and repulsion, then, is laid the foundation for the thought or conception of the End of man, of a limitation of a portion of the field of his objects or states of consciousness from the rest, as good and as true; good because they are desired, true because they are affirmed of himself, which affirmation distinguishes his true self. Yet this is but the groundwork of which the reflective modes of desire and repulsion are the completion. For it is only in reflection that the man attains for himself the insight that his desire and repulsion have this force, and consequently only in reflection that he can judge, criticise, and correct them. It is proper however to

give their significance here, where they have their origin, in the direct emotions of hope and fear; for at this point we are at the very springs of action, and it is here if at all that action can be properly analysed. Every state of consciousness consists of a formal and a material element; every emotion consists of a representational framework and its pervading emotion; every desire contains the feeling of some degree of certainty in addition to the emotion; and the total of these two elements, when balanced against the same two elements in another desire, determines the choice of the one desire, or desired object, as a thing to be done or possessed in preference to the other. Every step just described is a cognition as well as a feeling; it is a cognition in virtue of its formal element and its representational framework; and the connection between representations is cognition, and capable of expression in propositions. Desire, choice, volition, repulsion, are expressed in propositions the terms of which, their subject and predicate, lie respectively in consciousness on one side and the objects of consciousness on the other; the predicates of the affirmative propositions are taken up into consciousness, those of the negative are excluded, and thus form severally two modes or domains of consciousness, the True Ego and its opposite. Again, all action is included and described in this analysis; there is nothing left outside for action to be; there is no residuary Ding-an-sich of action; form and matter, thought and feeling, representation and emotion, constitute the whole of existence and of consciousness. It is action itself which is thus analysed. When in consequence of a desire I act, what happens is, that a presentation

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or a new representation follows upon the representation which is desire; "following" however is juxtaposition in time. This sequence is action, and the action is capable of exhaustive analysis into form and matter, thought and feeling; and the different modes of these, whether separately or in combination, are different modes of action, such as, for instance, reasoning, volition, muscular movement for a purpose, attention. Again, I may act blindly or without choice, without any balancing of desires against each other; this is spontaneous action, as opposed to voluntary, a mere continuation of the chain of states of consciousness; and this spontaneous action is obviously capable of analysis into the same elements, with the exception of those constituting choice and comparison. Regarded as a cognitive movement expressed by a proposition, action, whether spontaneous or voluntary, is affirmative between objects the terms of which, their subject and predicate, lie where those of desire lie, namely, in consciousness already existing on the one side and in possible objects of consciousness on the other. The action adds one more state of consciousness to those already belonging to it; it is an added moment of conscious life; what it omits to do or to think or to feel it excludes, and thereby impliedly denies. All action is affirmation of a new object belonging to the Ego; whether or not to the True Ego can only be determined by reflective action afterwards. There is then no opposite to action taken simply, as repulsion is opposite to desire; the opposite of action is omission; hence the only implied character of its negative. Its negations, being mere omissions, are all non-existent. Spontaneous action is the forward movement of con-

sciousness simply, voluntary action its forward movement on one road chosen out of several.

5. Some degree of uncertainty is requisite to hope and fear; when imagination is exercised on past events which have been pleasureable or painful, but of which we know not only that they have been, but also how they have been decided, the resulting emotions are very different. For instance, when we remember the past as it has actually been, and imagine at the same time what it might have been, we feel either grief, joy, aversion, or fondness, but not as carried up into either hope or fear. In the known past these feelings become the counterparts of hope and fear which are in the unknown past or in the future; and may be called congratulation and regret. If the actual past remembered is better than the image we compare it with, we congratulate ourselves and rejoice; if worse, we regret it. The pleasures and pains of the four emotions, hope, fear, congratulation, regret, like those of the four which they have combined with them, joy, grief, fondness, aversion, are pleasures and pains of enjoyment not of admiration. Regret and congratulation have also, like the rest, their reflective modes.

§ 21. 1. It remains to examine that group of emotions which are the different modes of wonder and of mirth when carried up into imagination. Mirth itself, it has been seen, is founded on wonder, and therefore includes comparison. When comparison is made between any objects for the mere sake of the pleasure of comparing them, new points of resemblance and difference being sought for in them, or when a new representation is sought in order to compare it with an old one, the movement of thought

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is called Fancy ; and fancy is therefore the common parent of all modes of imaginative mirth. The pleasure or interest of fancy lies solely in itself, and it is in this respect similar to poetry, for all poetry is “ dedicated to joy,” and has no purpose beyond itself, does not aim at proving or inculcating anything, but is an energy or *ἐξίς* whose end is in itself and in its own movement. This circumstance being common to fancy and poetry, it happens that the best instances of fancy will be found in poetry. Fancy has been distinguished from poetical imagination by both Wordsworth and Coleridge ; its characteristics are that it arbitrarily connects the most dissimilar and disjoins the most similar images, is sportive, discursive, inventive ; and secondly, that it is intellectual in respect of the mode of its passing from one image to another, comparison and analogy being its means. Its purpose is not, like that of poetical imagination, to find and express emotional truth, but, under the stimulus of any emotion, to exercise the faculty of comparison of images, which will certainly thus be coloured by emotion, but will not be its adequate expression. For instance, under the stimulus of love, Romeo says of Juliet at her window at night,

“ Two of the fairest stars in all the heaven,
Having some business, do entreat her eyes
To twinkle in their spheres till they return ;”

a fancy which shows the activity and the kind of activity of Romeo’s mind, but does not express his real thought. Again, in *A Midsummer-Night’s Dream*,

Lysander. How now, my love ! why is your cheek so pale ?
How chance the roses there do fade so fast ?
Hermia. Belike for want of rain, which I could well
Beteem them from the tempest of my eyes.

Again, under the stimulus of grief, Arthur to Hubert in King John,

“Ah, none but in this iron would do it!
The iron of itself, though heat red-hot,
Approaching near these eyes, would drink my tears,
And quench his fiery indignation
Even in the matter of my innocence;
Nay, after that, consume away in rust,
But for containing fire to harm mine eye.”

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The beauty of these and similar passages must not mislead us to set them down as instances of poetical imagination. The emotion under which they are spoken gives them interest. But it is one thing for words to be prompted by emotion, another to express and describe that emotion themselves. Emotion prompts utterances of all kinds; it prompts, as will be shown, humour and irony to become sarcasm and invective; it prompts wit, which is fancy become antithetical. The intensity of the feeling stimulates the activity of the intellectual or comparing powers, but the shapes which these comparisons assume are modes of fancy not of poetical imagination. Another form of fancy is the simile. For instance, in King John again,

Salisbury. The colour of the king doth come and go
Between his purpose and his conscience,
Like heralds 'twixt two dreadful battles set:
His passion is so ripe, it needs must break.

Personification again is usually a mode of fancy, for instance in Richard III.,

“Grim-visaged war hath smooth'd his wrinkled front.”

2. Fancy, then, is the exercise of intellect in comparing images when there is no other motive be-

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sides the pleasure in the comparison itself; although founded on some interest of emotion which determines the general kind of images which are brought into the comparison. It is active curiosity, but active in invention not in discovery, or rather in the discovery of what is possible to thought not what is true in fact. It creates new views of things for the pleasure of creating them. When the emotion under which fancy is stimulated is mirth, that is, when the pleasure of creating is a pleasure in the ludicrous, the fancy becomes wit. Wit is that kind of fancy which consists in making incongruities apparent, and this is done by bringing them into juxtaposition under one image common to both, for then only is there apparent incongruity between different images when they are in some respect the same image, or held together by the same general term. Hence all wit is antithetical; the uniting of incongruities which are not serious but matter of fancy. But the prompter or motive of wit may be, like that of fancy, an emotion of some sort; wit is then applied to a purpose beyond itself, beyond its own purpose which is laughter. When the personal defects, misfortunes, or faults of others are made the matter of wit, this does not affect its character as wit, but adds a character of quite another kind to it. The person ridiculed becomes himself the joke or piece of wit laughed at, that is, he is the object which holds together the incongruities in juxtaposition; and his surprise at finding himself so exhibited unexpectedly is an additional incongruity, and therefore an additional subject of laughter. The famous "Déjà" attributed to Talleyrand is an instance. Wit then becomes the vehicle of repartee, abuse, ridicule, or sarcasm; but

by itself it is, like fancy, purely intellectual and stingless.

3. Instances of this kind of wit are by far the most numerous, as they are also the most popular, having the pungency of personality. I shall however confine myself to wit proper. The best mode of discriminating the different kinds of pure wit is by reference to the way in which the formal element is involved in it, or by the mode of its logical statement. Either two propositions are made, the latter of which annihilates the meaning of the former without in terms contradicting it, or a single word is shown to involve contradictory meanings. In the first case propositions are opposed to each other, in the second terms. Instances of the first kind are, "The king himself has followed her,—When she has walked before;" and "She never slumbered in her pew,—But when she shut her eyes." Another instance is the Highgate oath, which bound you never to do one thing when you could do something better of the same kind, but with the condition "unless you like it best." So also Beatrice in *Much Ado about Nothing*, "With a good leg and a good foot, uncle, and money enough in his purse, such a man would win any woman in the world, if 'a could get her goodwill." Examples of the latter kind are where a word or a phrase has two or more meanings, which is the case with all metaphors. Arguments as well as bodies may "fall to the ground;" a man may be "lame" in his excuses as well as in his legs. A good instance of this use of metaphor is one sometimes attributed to a distinguished Prelate. Some one at a public meeting was urging that he saw no difference between a Bench and a Board, both were equally

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unreasonable. "Oh no," said the Bishop, "there is all the difference in the world; a Board is a Bench that hasn't a leg to stand upon." Where the double meaning of a word or phrase is accidental and not metaphorical, the result is a pun or a riddle; and of course the more startling the incongruity the better the pun. Other examples of this second mode of wit is where a phrase is taken in two senses, either strictly or conventionally. For instance, in *Hamlet*,

King. Now, *Hamlet*, where's *Polonius*?

Hamlet. At supper.

King. At supper! Where?

Hamlet. Not where he eats, but where he is eaten.

The two rules for being infallible in criticism, in Goldsmith's *Vicar of Wakefield*, are one an instance of wit, the other of humour. To observe "that the picture would have been better if the painter had taken more pains" is wit, of the first of the two kinds mentioned; but "to praise the works of *Pietro Perugino*" is humour, since the infallibility consists in being in accordance with the current cry; the canon is infallible and yet worthless, admirable and contemptible at once. It is to be observed that this would not be a joke at all if it stood by itself; of the two matters contrasted in it, one is given by association with the former canon; the purpose is to be always right,—well then repeat the judgment of the crowd; and the absurdity of this is shown by the parallel absurdity or meaninglessness of the former infallible canon; the immediate inference being—it is equally infallible and equally meaningless.

4. Very different from the mere addition of personal feeling to wit, the mere making use of wit as

a vehicle for personal contempt or ridicule, is that combination of emotion with wit, that differentiation of wit by emotion, which constitutes humour. Fancy and its completion wit constitute only a metaphysical division, a metaphysical half, of any instance in which they appear; they relate to and are modes of the representational framework alone in the total objects or images contrasted. No actual joke but contains both elements, wit and humour; the preponderating element it is which gives the name to the whole. Humour then includes wit together with the emotions belonging to the contrasted images, and it is the contrast of the emotional content of the images which constitutes the movement of thought humorous. An instance of almost pure humour may be given from the History of John Bull, Part iii. Chap. iii. "He invented a way of coming into a room backward, which, he said, showed more humility, and less affectation." "And less affectation"—here is the humour, because precisely the opposite of the impression which would inevitably be produced by the sight of the man coming into the room backward. And the power of the humorist consists in insight into the precise nature of the obvious impression, and skill to indicate it by the contrast of its exact opposite. The contrast of emotional elements in humour may be described generally, its various kinds included in a general description, as the contrast of trivial with weighty, or of low with noble, emotion. Hence humour falls into two distinct kinds, serious or grave and gay or jocose humour. Both kinds have the same matter and the same contrast; the difference between them consists in the interest or the prevailing mood which governs the

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use made of the contrast. If the interest or mood is one of serious or solemn feeling, we have, as modes of the first kind of humour, grave irony and sarcasm, or bitter jests at oneself or the world, as for instance Hamlet's "Thrift, thrift, Horatio." This kind of humour is well described by Schopenhauer in *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, Vol. ii. Chap. viii. "Näher betrachtet, beruht der Humor auf einer subjektiven, aber ernsten und erhabenen Stimmung, welche unwillkürlich in Konflikt geräth mit einer ihr sehr heterogenen, gemeinen Aussenwelt, der sie weder ausweichen, noch sich selbst aufgeben kann; daher sie, zur Vermittelung, versucht, ihre eigene Ansicht und jene Aussenwelt durch die selben Begriffe zu denken, welche hiedurch eine doppelte, bald auf dieser bald auf der andern Seite liegende Inkongruenz zu dem dadurch gedachten Realen erhalten, wodurch der Eindruck des absichtlich Lächerlichen, also des Scherzes entsteht, hinter welchem jedoch der tiefste Ernst versteckt ist und durchscheint."

5. The playful humour on the other hand rests on the interest of mirth. It makes men and things ridiculous by bringing out the trivial side of their character, or involving them in mean positions and circumstances. It succeeds in that kind of comedy of which Aristophanes is the great master; its proper name is Fun. A higher grade is that humour of which Charles Lamb's writings supply so many splendid instances. The humorist in this kind must have a deep insight into the noble and serious, as well as into the trivial side of the contrast, otherwise he cannot feel or express the latter. Bombastic and high-flown expressions are one great instrument of

this kind of humour; they are the counterpart of irony in grave humour. The ironist pretends to trifle, to make light of matters which are weighty; the bombastic humorist pretends to make much of trifles. Charles Lamb's *Complaint of the Decay of Beggars* and his *Dissertation upon Roast Pig* are notable examples. "Behold him, while he is 'doing'—it seemeth rather a refreshing warmth than a scorching heat, that he is so passive to. How equably he twirleth round the string!" A more subtil form of humorous irony is that which consists in pretending to discover merits of a high order in things which are not merely unmeritorious but even terrible, but merits quite beside the purpose of the matter in hand. De Quincey's paper "On Murder considered as one of the Fine Arts" is a magnificent piece of humour in this vein. For instance, "Many a man has dated his ruin from some murder or other that perhaps he thought little of at the time." What can be more subtil; and at the same time what can show more clearly the power of abstraction which the mind has, "to bind, on apt suggestion, or unbind," and the sufficingness of the pleasure of pure abstract fancy as end or motive of its own activity? Assumed naiveté is another form of this humour. Naiveté itself is unintended, involuntary, humour; it is a statement or an expression which reveals a true, unconsciously operating, cause of action, opinion, or feeling, which the person expressing it thinks to be caused by quite different and self-chosen grounds or causes. The suddenly revealed incongruity between what a man really is and what he thinks himself to be is the source of humour in naiveté real or assumed; as, for instance, "I sometimes wish I had

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been that Bank clerk," in Charles Lamb's Complaint above quoted. There is almost infinite naiveté in the world. It is natural to children to be naive; and perhaps, to a spectator raised sufficiently high in knowledge and insight above them, all the sayings and doings of men might appear so, a thought which is sometimes expressed by poets and seems implied in the words of Goethe's Mephistopheles,

"Der kleine Gott der Welt bleibt stets von gleichem Schlag,
Und ist so wunderbar als wie am ersten Tag."

6. But humour as well as wit may be employed under the influence of some emotion, and then it becomes very difficult to distinguish the emotion prompting and stimulating the representations from that contained in the representations prompted, which latter alone is properly humorous. Humour as well as wit may become invective, repartee, or abuse; and irony and sarcasm may thus be combined with wit in the same flow of images and language. Prof. K. Fischer in his Lecture "Schiller als Komiker" has pointed out the close connection between the feeling of indignation and humorous wit, instancing in Hotspur's first speech in Act i. Scene iii. Henry IV. Part i. The strongest and gravest feelings become thus combined with the most trivial and ludicrous, pathos with absurdity; the source of pain and grief becomes the source of mirth and laughter, and the pain is relieved by this expression of it. The proverb 'there is but a step from the sublime to the ridiculous' is usually understood as meaning that what one man thinks sublime, another, not under the dominion of the same feelings, thinks ridiculous. But in the cases before us the same person passes

from one to the other purposely; it is not what he appears to others to be, but what he chooses to represent to himself, which contains the contrast and the passage. Passion expresses itself in biting satire, or in derision which makes ridiculous and contemptible the persons or the things which appear to it either as its opponents or as its natural contraries.

7. The emotions now examined complete the series of the direct emotions, and in humour we have anticipated greatly on the reflective group, for the greater number of instances of humour have reference to men and to their feelings and relations towards each other. It seemed better, however, to examine humour altogether in this place, in its usual connection with wit, and where its earliest or simplest instances are manifested, namely in objects of direct emotion, remembering only that the greater part of it lies on the other side of the line. Subjoined is a tabular view of the Direct Emotions.

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TABLE OF DIRECT EMOTIONS.

A

1. Emotions which arise from the matter of the object represented, with pleasures or pains of enjoyment.

Joy.	Grief.
Fondness.	Aversion.

2. Emotions which arise from the form of the object represented, with pleasures or pains of admiration.

The æsthetic emotions, or sense of Beauty in sights and sounds; with the corresponding sense of ugliness or deformity.

3. Emotions which arise in comparison of two or more complete objects represented, with pleasures or pains partly of enjoyment, partly of admiration.

Wonder. Surprise. Astonishment.

Terror or Dread. Eeriness.

Joyful Surprise. Mirth.

Curiosity or Logical Instinct.

Ennui, emotional and intellectual.

B

IMAGINATIVE AND DIRECT EMOTIONS.

1. Emotions of 1st class with addition of desire or passion.

Hope. Fear.

Congratulation. Regret.

2. Emotions which arise in imagination of feelings of the 2nd and 3rd class.

Fancy. Wit. Humour, Grave and Gay. Fun.
Irony. Sarcasm. Naiveté.

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PART IV. THE REFLECTIVE EMOTIONS.

Sie nahen, sie kommen
Die Himmlischen alle,
Mit Göttern erfüllt sich
Die irdische Halle.

Schiller.

§ 22. 1. THE reflective emotions are so named because they depend upon a previous state of reflective perception. An analysis of reflective perception has been already offered in "Time and Space" § 21. In that §, read together with § 12, it was described as the perception of two things, 1st, of the difference between consciousness in the abstract and the various particular states of consciousness, that is, the distinction between the Subject or Pure Ego and all its objects or moments, whether visible and tangible sensations or other feelings, which together constitute the Empirical Ego, and 2nd, of the difference between that part of the world of objects or feelings, or of the Empirical Ego, which is circumscribed by the body of the reflecting observer, or the Subject, and all other parts of the same world which lie beyond the body, or, in other words, the distinction

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between the living body as the abode of feeling, the man or mind himself, and all objects which are not included in that sentient body, that is, between the mind and its objects. Now on these perceptions it is that all the reflective emotions depend; if these perceptions did not exist, neither could those emotions, since their frameworks would be altered. The combination of these perceptions with these emotions is a part of the analysis, meaning, or content, of the emotions; just as, on any psychological theory, the previous existence of the objects of these perceptions would be among their causes or conditions of existence.

2. Now all emotions arise in representation of objects of sensation; and the foregoing remarks will help us to discover in what kind of these objects the emotions of the kind now in question arise. They arise only in those objects in which we perceive or infer traces of a personality or self, either our own or like our own, which we have already learnt to distinguish in reflection. When we stand by other men, we infer from their actions, from the changes of their appearance in sight or sound or other sensation, that they feel and think and reflect as we do, that their bodies are the abodes of consciousness just as our own are; and it is not only the more obvious among external actions or changes, such as gesture and speech, which lead us to infer this, but countless minute actions which arise from emotions of the more delicate and impalpable kinds; and this is the only mode I can think of in which we become aware of the existence of other minds or persons; it is a process of reasoning and inference from the second of the two distinctions mentioned above, that be-

tween the mind and its objects. But just as this distinction itself can be explained only by the facts of which it consists being thrown into the crucible, and the discovery by that process of the first distinction, namely, of that between the Subject and its objects generally, so also the explanation of the connection between the second distinction and the inference of other sentient beings drawn from it can only be given by showing a parallel inference drawn from the first distinction, that between the Subject and its objects, the inference, namely, of the existence of the mind inhabiting the body of the observer himself, as distinguished from the whole, of which it is a part, the empirical ego. In other words, we infer, first, that other minds exist, secondly, what they are, from comparison with similar phenomena in our own case, the phenomena which constitute our own mind or person.

3. Although there should be no object in which we inferred the existence of a consciousness like our own, although there should be no mind included among the objects of our own mind, this would not entirely exclude personality from our world of objects; because the remaining objects would all of them be objects of our own reflecting mind, all of them parts of ourself, the objective aspect of our own Subject, which in reflection is itself a person. The existence of separate minds in the world is no more an ultimate fact in consciousness than is the existence of separate tangible and visible remote objects distinct from our own mind. Neither of them are ultimate facts of consciousness, although it seems that psychology starts with the assumption of the one as well as of the other. The bane of philosophy,

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the stumbling block which is always the most difficult to avoid everywhere and for all, is the habit of taking things as matters of course. Both these facts and that of our own existence as a mind are facts capable of further analysis, and that analysis a metaphysical one; just as the taking them for ultimate facts incapable of analysis, and for matters of course which need no analysis, is a metaphysical error or error in metaphysic; so impossible is it to avoid adopting a metaphysical theory either true or false.

4. The source of our comprehending the feelings and the thoughts of other minds is the fact that these feelings and thoughts, which we infer to exist by outward sensational signs, are literally speaking parts of ourselves, parts of the objective aspect of our own Subject. We comprehend them because they are our own, and only what is our own do we comprehend in them. Here, then, in this fact is the ultimate explanation of, that is, the analysis which reduces to its simplest terms, the phenomenon of sympathy and antipathy in all its branches, of the intercourse and intercommunion existing between separate minds; each sees and feels in the other its own perceptions, feelings, and thoughts; each is a continuation of the other; each responds to the other. These terms are themselves only expressions, more familiar but less analytic, of the literal fact which I endeavour to exhibit by saying Objects of one Subject. The phenomenon is called sympathy when it is pleasureable, and antipathy when it is painful; for a sympathy in pain is pleasureable from its sympathy though painful by itself, the sympathy is its alleviation; but the comprehension which lies at the root

of both sympathy and antipathy is founded in the fact that all objects whatever are the objects of one Subject. To every man the feelings of other men are parts of himself, parts of himself which he may either love and wish to intensify, or abhor and wish to annihilate; but in this fact is the ground of his feeling an interest in them at all. ὦ Καλλίκλεις, εἴ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δὲ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλὰ τις ἡμῶν ἰδίον τι ἔπασχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥᾶδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἐτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. Plato, Gorgias. 481 c.

§ 23. 1. Two things then are effected by this fact, 1st, the whole world is made kin, 2nd, the whole world is made comprehensible; 1st, the whole world is made continuous in time and space, 2nd, the whole world is analysed into the same elements. But what is the specific effect due to the second distinction in the phenomenon of reflection, the distinction between the mind and its objects, and to its consequence, the distinction of other minds among these objects? What is added by the fact that there are other minds in the world as well as non-sentient objects? This, that without this circumstance the mind of the observer, which would then exist alone or as the only mind in the world, would have no experience of those emotions which include or depend on sympathy and antipathy. He would feel all the direct emotions and those of the reflective which depend only on his feelings towards himself and their idealisation, such as pride, shame, good conscience, remorse, or at least some emotions analogous to these; but this would constitute the entire world of his emotions. He would not feel any emotion which requires for its arising the representation of an ob-

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ject in which dwells, as its subjective centre, a world like his own, an object which feels sensations and thinks thoughts as he himself feels and thinks them. An object which is at once a subject would be lacking to him; the object or circumstance of feeling as opposed to quality, of consciousness as opposed to objects of consciousness; a feeling or a consciousness which, though to him a quality, was to itself a feeling. The subjective aspect of objects would not be an object to him except in the one widest generalisation which his own mind would offer; it would not become a particular object with a character, or second intention, derived from comparison with other particular objects of the same kind. He would thus lose all the sympathetic and antipathetic emotions, such as love, hate, benevolence, malevolence, pity, gratitude, revenge, justice towards others, truth towards others, envy, jealousy, indignation, emulation; and with them he would lose also the means of judging of his own mind in the emotions which would still remain to it, a criterion for himself, a tribunal, a critic, a supporter, an impugner, of his own judgments. For the different minds become so many mirrors each partially reflecting the others and the mind of the observer himself; and in them he finds the means of analysing and judging his own mind.

2. The problem then in analysing the reflective emotions is twofold, 1st, to understand how they arise from the addition of self-consciousness to the direct emotions, 2nd, to understand how they are carried over into the second kind of self-consciousness from the first, that is, how the distinction between the Subject and its objects influences the emotions as they appear to exist between different

minds, or are felt by one mind towards others. Let the thoughts be fixed for a few moments on the state of the individual consciousness when reflection or self-consciousness, in the shape of a distinction between the Subject and its objects, first arises in it. In this state all its objects are its own or parts of itself, all have interest for it, all are or contain feelings which are either pleasureable or painful; but there is a certain group among them which is always present, always closely connected with the Subject both in time and space; this group is the body and the feelings which arise in it; this group it is impossible to escape from, and it possesses on this account the greatest interest. The circumstances which give it this greatest interest are its close connection and its inherent pleasure and pain. Lessen either of these characters, that is, loosen the connection or diminish the inherent pleasure and pain, and the interest would diminish; increase or intensify them, and the interest would increase. This is the same phenomenon, in kind, as that which has already been observed in § 20, in the case of desires and motives, the two elements of which are the certainty and the interest in kind and degree. The same holds good of all objects of the Subject, since all are connected with it and all are or contain pleasure or pain. Lessen these characters in the case of any of these objects, and their interest is lessened; increase them, and their interest is increased. Now this phenomenon it is which is often obscured and calumniated by the popular title of self-love. It is better expressed by the term Unity of interest in self-consciousness, a fact which underlies or accompanies all consciousness where pleasure or pain exist. If consciousness

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is one, so also must be self-consciousness, and so also must be the feeling of interest which is but a part of consciousness. This fact, the unity of interest in self-consciousness, the analysis of which has now been given, is incapable of being explained by saying that we feel an interest in objects or persons because we consider them to be in relation to ourselves, that is, it cannot be explained by referring it to a so called self-love; because self-love itself, the interest which we feel in self, requires explanation and analysis, and this analysis consists in the fact of unity of interest increasing and decreasing according as the connection of the objects in question with the Subject, that is, their constancy in consciousness, and the intensity of their pleasure or pain, are increased or diminished. The explanation which assumes a Self is only a popular mode of explanation, describing in other terms the very phenomenon which is to be explained; and these other terms only appear to be an explanation of it, because, being more familiar, they refer the phenomena to the familiar ultimate distinction in psychology, that between the Mind and its objects.

3. It is common in popular parlance to oppose self-love to benevolence, or to unselfish sympathy with others; in these phrases the distinction between one mind and other minds is adopted as ultimate and inexplicable because familiar; and there are two distinct schools of moralists who, equally starting from this basis, endeavour, the one to explain benevolence by or deduce it from self-love, the other to show that benevolence or sympathy is as original and independent an emotion as self-love. But the unity of interest in self-consciousness is the phenomenon which underlies or is common to both these empirical

phenomena, self-love and benevolence as commonly understood, and is requisite to analyse and explain both one and the other; and the results of this, in reference to the theories of the two schools mentioned, will be clearly shown by the sequel. The perception of the distinction, then, between the Subject and its objects contains under it, as a further distinction or differentiation arising in one of its terms, the objects, the perception of several minds; and the relations in which the Subject stands to any of these minds, and to its own among them, are modes or specifications of the general relation in which it stands to its objects, as proper objects of the Subject.

§ 24. 1. The Subject has before it in reflection, according to what has been said, two objects, other minds and its own; and the representations of these in their different modes and in their relations to each other are the frameworks of the reflective emotions. The first question, then, which arises in proceeding to analyse these emotions is this, with which of the two objects to begin, with the emotions which arise in the representation of the Subject's own mind alone, or with those which arise in the representation of the relations between that and other minds. It might seem natural at first sight to begin with the former, on the ground that a knowledge of oneself was the necessary preliminary to that of other minds, or of the effect they produce in relation to oneself; and that this is the way proper and even, on its own principles, necessary to metaphysic, and yet that it is a way fruitless and bewildering, is the substance of an objection often urged against metaphysic. But the latter way is the true one, and at the same time the way proper to metaphysic, which follows in the

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track of actual history, the history of the actual development both of individuals and of mankind at large. The justification of this method on metaphysical principles can easily be given. Let us consider first what the actual course of development must have been. The Subject, let it be supposed, has now distinguished its two objects, other minds and its own, at the first dawning of reflection; but this distinction by no means includes a knowledge of what emotions arise in contemplating each of these objects respectively, it is but the first step towards such a knowledge. The emotions of the Subject's own mind, from his knowledge of which he infers the nature of the emotions of other minds, are still entirely subjective, a mass of feelings unanalysed and unclassified, arising confusedly on occasion of presentations and representations of all kinds. Other minds make part of these presentations and representations. The total mass of emotions, and the total mass of their frameworks, can only be arranged and analysed *pari passu*. The emotions of the Subject arising from, or felt towards, other minds must first be distinguished from this mass; in doing which the Subject learns by degrees to treat the subjective emotions of his own mind objectively, as if they belonged to another mind, or as if they were inferred from outward signs instead of being subjectively experienced. Not till both these processes have been gone through is the Subject capable of drawing a clear distinction between emotions felt towards other minds and emotions felt solely towards his own. It certainly is not a distinction with which the mind begins its career; but rather the discovery of the relations of the Subject's mind to other minds is the first step in the

process of completely analysing and classifying the emotions of the Subject. The first glimpse attained by mankind that there was still this further work before them, namely, to analyse the mind itself, after analysing the relation of the mind to its environment and to other minds therein, was expressed, at least in Grecian development, in the famous inscription at Delphi *Γνῶθι σεαυτὸν*.

2. But if this is the course of the actual development of reflection, it is absurd to demand that metaphysic should deviate from it in order to begin with the conception of a Self or a Mind ready analysed and established, with distinctions ready drawn between the emotions which arise solely in contemplation of itself and those which arise in contemplation of other minds, since these are distinctions which are not obvious from the first but are discovered gradually by a long course of reflection. Such a method would be more consonant to an ontological psychology, the principle of which is to treat the Self or the Mind as a single determinate being, marked out from the first as different from its objects, instead of being an object discovered by much, but now long-forgotten, thought and observation. But metaphysic is itself in its present shape but the continuation of, though it is also the investigation into, these very processes of self-analysis and self-classification. The whole history of metaphysic is continuous, its earliest and latest enquiries are parts of one unbroken chain, in which the distinctions drawn, the insights won, and the classifications established, serve as the basis, the instrument, the logic, of further discoveries, discoveries which only differ from the earlier ones in being performed with a greater degree of self-con-

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sciousness. And thus we may expect, in analysing the emotions, to find a certain logical filiation between their frameworks. As a matter of fact, however, there is no doubt that some of the earliest reflective emotions, both in the case of individuals and of mankind at large, are emotions which arise in the intercourse between persons, between mind and mind; of which therefore those other persons are the representational frameworks in the mind of the Subject, though of course without his making the further observation that this framework is necessary to the emotions which he experiences. This apparently is an earlier stage in reflective development than that to which belong reflective emotions entirely self-regarding. It is therefore proper to begin by examining emotions felt towards other persons, or in other words, emotions which are relations between mind and mind.

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§ 25. 1. The first group accordingly is that of the sympathetic emotions. The simple feeling of fondness for any object, when that object is a person, is benevolence or goodwill, Aristotle's *εὐνοία*, which he calls *ἀεχρή φιλίας*; see the whole Chapter, Eth. Nic. ix. 5. This emotion passes over into love or friendship, *φιλία*, when the fondness which we feel is represented as reciprocated by the person towards whom we feel it. This new object, so constituted, is the framework of the emotion of love; and in all cases of love it will be found that there is this element, namely, the reciprocation of fondness. The emotional difference between goodwill and love is affection; affection, Aristotle's *φίλησις*, is the common emotional element in all cases of love or friendship; and the test of this feeling, an invariable mark distinguishing

it from goodwill, is the feeling of longing, *πρόθος*, in the absence of the beloved person. * It is singular that this feeling should be entertained towards inanimate objects, when they have become habitual to us or associated with our history; but it is impossible to mistake the sameness of the feeling, the ground-feeling of affection, towards home and objects familiar as home, and of the longing for them in absence; but it must be observed that in all these cases there is personification of the beloved objects in imagination, and they always form a groundwork of poetical feeling in the person who experiences them. For instance, the most beautiful expression of this feeling for home is also one of the most beautiful passages in poetry, I mean the lines of Catullus beginning *Pæne insularum, Sirmio*. Another form of the same feeling is that towards the soil and ground of our native country, a feeling somewhat different from patriotism though contained in it, a feeling expressed by Wordsworth in the lines,

“O joy when the girdle of England appears;
What moment of life is so conscious of love,
Of love in the heart, made more happy by tears?”

Although these forms of affection are imaginative and the groundwork of poetry, they do not by themselves belong to the imaginative section of the reflective emotions; because the imagination is not in the reflection but in the object, or rather in the previous reflection constituting the object, not in subsequent reflection upon it. When the reflective emotions are themselves imagined, then only are they themselves poetry or poetical imagination. The representation constituting objects of reflective emotion

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always includes imagination, or is imaginative representation not simply remembrance.

2. The next highest kind and degree of affection is that which we feel towards animals, the horse, the dog, and so on. Always when there is affection, as distinguished from fondness, there will be found also the representation of fondness reciprocated by its object. As the intensity and the intelligence, represented as belonging to the reciprocated fondness, increase, so also do the affections rise in dignity and in intensity. Compare the two cases of affection of parents for their children, and of children for their parents; the affection rises in both cases as the children grow up, but in the former case because the objects of the representation, the children, develop so as to permit the emotion in the parents to reach its full limits, and in the latter case because the development of the children causes their emotion to rise to the full height of its represented objects, the parents. The reason why children love their parents with less intensity than parents their children is partly that given by Aristotle, that the children are loved as the *ἐργον* of the parents, and every one loves, by an additional title, what he has himself produced; but partly also this, that parents have their affection more concentrated upon their children, and that these make a larger portion of their world of desires and hopes and fears, than parents of their children's. Hence those men who are much absorbed in business or public affairs fix less of their attention on their children, and the affection they feel towards them is apt to be directed, not to the children themselves, but to their prospects in life, as a continuation and support of the status of the parents and the

family. Hence too it is to be observed that, as men grow older, their affection towards their dead parents increases, for it becomes both more intelligent and more concentrated on those its objects. And generally death increases affection, because not only do we understand more of the dead from seeing their life as a whole, but the little daily hindrances of affection have entirely ceased to operate. Again, the difference of a mother's affection for her children from a father's is explicable as Aristotle explains it, namely, that they are more her *ἔργον* and have cost her more pain; but also because her view is more concentrated upon them, and external objects are a less portion of her world; she will therefore be more inclined to love them for themselves alone, and less for what they are esteemed by others, because they are but parts of herself; she loses herself in them; she will love them whether honoured or disgraced, the father less certainly so; her love is purer, that is, with less admixture of fondness for qualities which are not strictly contained in the object of her love.

3. The different kinds of objects of fondness as a direct emotion give rise each of them to a different kind of affection, when carried up into reflection or appearing in a person. The representation of a different sex in the object of love gives an entirely peculiar character to the affection. The mode and the degree of intensity with which the sexual appetite is combined with the affection of love constitute the different kinds of the emotion in which they occur. In the lowest stage the appetite is almost the whole; even the preferences are comparatively slight or indifferent; when however the æsthetic emotions are combined in a considerable degree with

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the object of desire, the fondness which they excite governs and directs the preference. Why these two kinds of emotion should be so habitually combined together is a question which has not yet been carefully enough considered, I mean this particular appetite and the æsthetic admiration of beauty and grace, both in form and speech; it is certainly absurd to deduce one from the other; and yet why are just these and no others so closely combined? Beauty, then, combined with some degree of sexual appetite, but a degree which may vary almost indefinitely, is one of the two constituents of love, which in this sense should be called Eros. The other constituent is the representation or imagination of reciprocated fondness. The resulting Eros will be felt in strength proportioned to the combined intensity of these two constituents; but the two may vary in proportion to each other without any variation in their sum, and consequently without any variation in the intensity of the eros which is their emotional aspect. This is a repetition of the same phenomenon which was observed in § 20, in objects of desire generally; it is the representation of reciprocated fondness in this case which contains the element of certainty or uncertainty. When eros becomes a passion, or when considered as a passion, then the probability of success in obtaining possession in marriage, as well as that of winning the affections themselves, is a new circumstance which again corresponds to the certainty in the former cases. Simultaneously with the introduction of the æsthetic emotions begins the narrowing of the field of objects of love, ending with the restriction of it to, and the concentration of the emotion upon, a single object or person. From this

point onwards the only modifications introduced are those which arise from the perception or representation of reflective emotions in the beloved object, of moral qualities as they are called; but always, as these increase more and more in number and importance, the proportion which the original appetite and sense of beauty bear to them is diminished, and finally in some cases perhaps entirely suppressed, so that the loss of these elements, by the natural course of life, in old age, has no effect in lessening the affection. The moral and spiritual excellences, hopes, and aims, shared and enjoyed together, become then the main components of the emotion, the lower elements being consumed or refined away; and this emotion is perhaps the crown of earthly happiness, the best and noblest of all the emotions that are yet entangled in the representation of a visible and tangible framework.

4. As to the different kind of love which is felt by each sex for the other, it seems to be a true remark of Coleridge that the man's desire is for the woman, but the woman's rarely anything else than desire for the desire of the man. This seems a parallel case with what has been already remarked of the affection of mothers and of fathers for their children, and to rest on similar grounds. Perhaps then it may be better expressed thus, that the man desires to possess the woman wholly, including her love, the woman on the other hand to be possessed by the man, that is, to be the object of one part of his faculties, that is, of his love. A man's love, as distinguished from one element of it, the original admiration, is won by his persuading himself that the woman will love him in return; admiration alone

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attracts but does not keep. Hence so many cases where love comes after marriage. A woman's love is won by exciting her admiration, where the man she admires shows her delicate respect. Her imagination, for she does not critically compare, makes her diamond the finest in the world, and she is occupied with it alone. Here admiration alone both attracts and keeps, for the horizon is limited, and the self therefore easily identified with the horizon. Love is the whole world of a woman, but only a part of the world of a man. It may be added that a man marries for a harbour, for rest, for refreshment; a woman for a voyage, for delight, for activity. I leave untouched the question, how far the existing differences between the love of men and of women are due to fundamental differences in the character of the sexes, how far to circumstances such as education and the course of development of modern societies.

5. The influence of sex is very subtil and extends far more widely than to what is commonly called love between the sexes. It colours the relations of brothers and sisters, parents and children; sons feel a peculiar affection for their mother, and daughters a peculiar admiration for their father; men who have been brought up in the society of women as well as of men, and women who have been much thrown into the society of their father, or have been educated by him, show differences, generally excellences, of character and habit which are often clearly traceable to these sources.

6. Friendship in all its various kinds, Aristotle's *φιλία*, is distinguished from eros, or love between the sexes, by the absence of the traits derived from

the appetite which lies at the basis of that emotion. The instances however in which those traits are very weak approach on that account closely to friendship, and make a kind of debateable ground between them. Friendship can exist everywhere where eros can, but it cannot, generally speaking, be carried up to the same intensity, not because it lacks the element of appetite, but because persons of the opposite sexes are the only persons between whom rivalry can be entirely abolished. This annihilation of rivalry is a circumstance common to the love between persons of opposite sex with only one other kind of love or personal relation, namely, with love to God, or religion, the object of which is an Ideal, as will appear in its place. But wherever the feeling of rivalry can be diminished, there and in that proportion will the love or friendship between different persons be purer and closer; and in these cases friendship proper, or affection between persons of the same sex, will be capable of very great intensity. Such cases will arise between teacher and pupil, patron and client, and generally between older and younger persons; between equals chiefly when their careers are different. Alliances between individuals and between bodies of men are often the beginning of friendship, but they are not friendship itself; there is originally no affection, but the alliance is made for some extraneous purpose; these are cases of Aristotle's *φιλία* founded on the *χρήσιμον*. Alliances of every kind, such as between buyer and seller, and makers of any contract, and between citizens of the same state, or between two states, have their own kind or mode of emotion, sympathetic but in the lowest degree; the emotion is some kind or other

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of goodwill, and in these forms too it is the first step to friendship or love.

§ 26. Before completing this group by the examination of the subordinate or allied emotions, it will be well to turn to the antipathetic group. The direct emotion of aversion becomes, when its object is a person, personal dislike or illwill, the opposite of goodwill or benevolence. When this dislike is represented as reciprocated, the emotion is hate, which of course admits of many degrees, among which we may distinguish, perhaps, bitterness and malice, although we usually employ the word only for great degrees of it. Founded on a small or transient degree of hate is anger, which is hate of any action prompted by dislike. It arises when the mind attributes to another a feeling of dislike which has led it to do something towards the destruction or injury of the object of its dislike. Attributing such an act from such a motive to any person, the mind feels anger towards that person on account of its act; hence anger can be appeased by renouncing or expressing sorrow for the act; not so dislike itself. Revenge is indurated, that is, prolonged and cherished anger. Illwill, bitterness, hate, malice, anger, revenge,—these are the antipathetic emotions which are the opposites of goodwill, love, friendship, and to those subordinates or derivatives of them which are now to be mentioned. Malice seems to stand to the antipathetic emotions as affection stands to the sympathetic. Malice and affection are perhaps the most purely emotional terms in the language, indicating an emotional element with least suggestion of a framework. The readiness of disposition to affection or to malice which makes these emotions seem to prompt the imagina-

tion to supply a framework, to create their own objects of love or hate, rather than to arise from the representation of such objects, is what is commonly meant by the phrases a good or a bad heart.

§ 27. 1. Opposed to anger and revenge are two degrees of gratitude; the first might perhaps be called a burst of gratitude for any particular kindness; the second prolonged and indurated gratitude. The object of both of them is the representation of acts prompted by goodwill, love, or friendship. Wherever it is said that acts are the object of emotions, it will always be found that the feeling or emotion prompting, and manifesting itself in, those acts, and of which they are the representational framework, is the real object of the emotion in question. An act is always capable of analysis into its elements of feeling and form, of emotion and cognition; and the act, as it is called, is but the objective representation of these cognitions and emotions as mental qualities, or, in other terms, the embodiment of them. In every case it is an emotion that we hate or love; when we say we hate or love a man, or an action, it is the emotion that makes the man or his action what they are; it is the emotion, which we represent the man as feeling, that gives him his character in our eyes. We represent him as a person at all only by representing him as self-conscious, and the mode of his self-consciousness is what we either love or hate.

2. When good or ill fortune happens to persons whom we love or whom we hate, we feel the derivative emotions of pity or compassion when those we love are injured or unfortunate, of joy and congratulation for them when they are fortunate or

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benefited; the reverse is the case with those we hate, and at their ill fortune we feel joy or congratulation, a feeling which becomes *ἐπιχαιρεκακία*, or general rejoicing at ill, when there is a tendency to regard most men as enemies, a feeling which allies this group of antipathetic emotions with those of envy and jealousy; and on the other hand their good fortune inspires us with regret and vexation. Pity does not directly depend upon the imagination that the evil might happen to oneself; the connection with self is given already in the circumstance that the person whom we pity is the object of a sympathetic emotion, is already a friend or ally. In other words, the emotion of pity is not derived from self-love, or from an imagination of the same case being possibly one's own, as distinguished from others', as if only what pleased or pained self, in this sense, was of interest to us. Aristotle seems to leave this question open in the words, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸς προσδοκῆσειεν ἂν παθεῖν, ἢ τῶν αὐτοῦ τινα. Rhet. ii. 8. But his undecided opinion is soon after decided by the words, Διὸ οὔτε οἱ παντελῶς ἀπολωλότες ἐλεοῦσιν· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔτι παθεῖν οἴονται· πεπόνθασι γάρ· οὔτε οἱ ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἴομενοι, ἀλλ' ὑβρίζουσιν. The truth is that, wherever there is any feeling of alliance or friendship left, there is place for pity. The impossibility of oneself suffering in one's own person does not destroy this. For instance, Dives, in the parable, felt pity for his brethren on earth, he himself being in torment; and the saints and angels of the Christian church are always imagined as feeling pity, although certainly they must also be imagined as ὑπερευδαιμονεῖν οἴομενοι.

§ 28. 1. I turn now to the passions which arise in and belong to these emotions, and which are in-

deed usually left undistinguished from them. Thus Hume, following his psychological theory and using his Lockian terminology, says, "Ideas are the causes of Passions." Kant however in my opinion saw more clearly when he defined passion by desire in his *Anthropologie*, Part i. Book ii. § 59 et seq. Passion is the sense of effort or tension, arising in an emotion, and carried up into a desire or volition; the sense of effort must have some distinct content of its own, and this is furnished by the emotion in which it arises; it is a desire or volition to attain to a greater degree of that emotion when it is pleasureable, and to a less degree of it when it is painful. The passion proper to each emotion is accordingly not desire for any object indifferently which may happen to be combined with or included in the representational framework of the emotion, but desire for the increase or decrease of the emotion itself as a whole. The cognitional modification of the framework, corresponding to the passion which is an emotional modification, is the perception of a discrepancy between an old and a new image of the same kind, or between a present state and a pleasanter future state; and the kind of the pleasure is given by the emotion in which the passion arises.

2. Keeping hold of the definitions of the different emotions as they have now been given, which point them out as steps in a series, each defined by the addition of some trait in its representational framework to the framework of the previous emotion, it will now be found that the passions, which have also a framework of their own, a modification of the framework of the previous emotion, form the transitions from one step to another, the genesis of each

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emotion in its turn from the one before it. For they arise in the emotions, and are processes from greater to less or from less to greater degrees of intensity of these emotions, the term 'passion' meaning the emotional element in the representational framework of a desire or volition for a represented future degree, either greater or less, of the emotion in which it arises. In all cases, both in passion and in emotion, the representational framework bound up with the feeling is the only means we have of knowing and describing the emotional element pervading it, the passion or emotion itself; for this alone contains the formal element, the condition and substance of cognition; on this alone we mark and measure off the kinds and degrees of emotion and passion, and of all feeling generally. This is, I think, the truer way of stating what is commonly expressed by saying of emotions or passions, that they are always emotions or passions of or for something, or always have an object,—phrases which, however well meant, nevertheless lead back to the very error against which they would guard, by keeping the emotion or passion distinct from their objects, imagining them as separately existent and only called forth by, or directed towards, their objects, instead of being inseparable elements with them of single states of consciousness.

3. With this logic in our hands let us see how passion carries over one emotion into another of the same series; though this leads us for a moment into a part of the subject only to be treated fully in the following Chapter. Suppose goodwill or benevolence to be increased in energy by our becoming aware of it as pleasureable, and desiring to feel it more in-

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tensely; this stimulates the representative powers, and we represent the object of goodwill in glowing colours; we imagine him to ourselves as himself doing kindness and reciprocating fondness, and the increase of our goodwill is an increase in tension, effort, or energy of the emotion. This tension has made us imagine a new framework, but while we are imagining the new framework the tension is being itself changed into volition or determinate desire, and we are feeling the passion of goodwill or benevolence. The passion of benevolence is therefore the emotion of love. The same remarks are applicable to all cases of increasing intensity in the emotion of love itself, and also to the production of its derivatives. In all cases the representations are stimulated by the passion, but the form which they will take is determined by the kind of object or person represented. Thus, where the person beloved is a superior or older person, the emotion which the addition of passion will produce will probably be one of gratitude, since the representation will be stimulated, but stimulated in accordance with the previous representational framework. We shall then take pleasure in imagining benefits conferred, and feel the corresponding emotion of gratitude, both of which will have come from an intensity in the original emotion of love.

4. Although we break up these complex phenomena into their moments, and speak of the effort producing or causing a new representation, and this representation again producing or causing a new emotion, and generally of passions being the genesis of emotions, it must be remembered that in fact, that is, as actually experienced, they form one continuous many-coloured stream of redintegration, now emotion,

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now passion, but always and in either case having its emotion or passion embodied in some imagery which is its representational framework. Image and emotion, image and passion, are the simultaneous elements or aspects of each and every state of consciousness which takes its place in the stream of redintegration. In this view emotions may just as well be called the genesis of passions as passions of emotions. The physiological causes of these phenomena of consciousness will be found to underlie all alike, and they are the only phenomena which can properly be considered causes of any phenomena of consciousness, whether these latter are taken collectively in their whole chain of sequence or separately and in detail.

5. The passions which form the transitions between the antipathetic emotions are among those which were classed by the Greeks under *θυμός*, which answers to our term courage, spirit, or high-spirited activity. The first classification of the faculties of the mind, which was Plato's, opposed *τὸ θυμοειδές* to *τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν*, and both to *τὸ διανοητικόν*, an exhaustive division. At first then we see that the passions, in both kinds, were more prominent than the emotions which were their terms, or between which they were the transitions. The emotions, *πάθη*, were first brought into prominence by Aristotle, who refers the different qualities, virtues and vices, to them as their ground and explanation, as for instance in the present case, *ἀνδρεία μεσότης περὶ φόβους καὶ θάραξιν*. See *Eth. Nic.* iii. 6. et seq. Still his analysis was chiefly directed towards a classification of qualities, virtues and vices, and not of the emotions and passions themselves; a course which was at that time the right one, as it certainly was the most obvious, as is shown by the

great number of terms for different modes or shades of courageous and cowardly characters and qualities, as compared with those for the emotions on which they are founded, namely, hope and fear only; a circumstance which is the same in our days as it was in Aristotle's; we have for instance a long list of words for different kinds of courage, boldness, bravery, manliness, rashness, audacity, confidence, daring, impetuosity, fearlessness; and perhaps others might be given. Our task however is to analyse the emotions; qualities, habits, and characters, must be reduced to the emotions and passions, acts of reintegration, which are their sources; and every such act must have its inseparable framework or object, by which we may define and describe it. Now there is no single class of objects or frameworks appropriated to the acts, emotions or passions, which are denoted by the term courage or spirit. Those objects are of the most various kinds, and the feelings of the courageous man, constituting his acts courageous acts, may be analysed into a high degree of activity or energy, together with a high degree of hope, or with the absence of fear. Courage or high spirit therefore is not an ultimate emotion or group of emotions, but a composite quality distinguishing a class of men; it is a distinction between characters, not between ultimate modes of emotion. To come nearer to particulars, we may perhaps distinguish three kinds of courage; there is 1st, the cool imperturbable man who despises danger; 2nd, the sanguine man who does not see danger; 3rd, the adventurous man who courts danger. In all three alike there is the same groundwork, energy and love of action, to which is added in the first case some object of great interest which

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fills the mind and eclipses all other considerations; in the second case, a vivid sense of hope and a disposition to see the bright side of things; in the third case, an inaccessibility to fear which leaves the adventurous spirit uncontrolled.

6. Now if we were to assume that the mind was composed of, or could be analysed into, faculties, such as are the cognitive, the conative, and the faculty of feeling, then, assuming the conative faculty to be one of these, courage might, perhaps rightly, be considered as a sub-faculty or mode of the faculty of conation. But it has been shown already that such a view is untenable, since activity is never found pure, but is always coloured by some feeling or by some object, by which alone it can be defined. The distinction of faculties therefore being abandoned, no ground remains for considering the term courage as making a separate group of emotions, passions, or actions, irreducible into others more elementary. The phenomena to which the name is given must be distributed under the heads of other emotions, acts, or objects. And following the distinctions already made, the phenomena of courage may be properly divided into such as are directed against physical dangers or difficulties, forces of nature, and impersonal circumstances, and those directed against persons and the opposition which they may offer. It is courage against persons which we have to do with here, the other kind of courage finding its place under the direct emotions of hope and fear; and the antipathetic emotions are those of which the acts and feelings of courage against persons are modifications, and between which they form the transitions; for in every case where we resist the will of another person, or assert our-

selves against him, some degree of hostility or illwill, though it may be very small, and even though we may struggle against it, is invariably included. Add energy to illwill, or infuse energy into resisting the will of another person, and the effect is the same, namely, a certain increase in antipathetic emotion. Suppose this energy of self-assertion greatly increased, and the illwill becomes a passion, anger is intensified into rage. At the same time the object of this emotion has assumed a different appearance; he has increased in the intensity of his represented hatefulness, and in the number of hateful traits imagined or represented to belong to him.

§ 29. 1. It is next in order to examine a group of emotions which depend upon a more complete division and more complex relations between the mind of the Subject and other minds, and upon the consequent comparison of the two by the Subject. These may be called emotions of comparison, to distinguish them from the simply sympathetic and antipathetic. They include and suppose a representation of the feelings of the other mind in view of the comparison which is drawn between the two, and which is known by both, or is an image common to both. These emotions fall into two great classes, according as the comparison is drawn between the possessions and external advantages of the two minds, or between their natural qualities and powers. The first kind of comparison may be called the comparison of Having, the second that of Being; and they give rise to quite distinct sets of emotions. The first mentioned kind seems to arise first in historical order. When we compare our own possessions, clothing, attendants, dignities, titles, and the respect paid to us by

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others, with those of another person, and find ourselves come short in contrast with him, and also figure to ourselves that he is also aware of the same contrast, favourable to him but unfavourable to us, the emotions which we feel may be described under the general name of ashamedness towards ourselves and of admiration of externals towards him; when the contrast is equally great but the advantage is on our side, we feel some mode of vanity towards ourselves and some kind of contempt towards him. There are no appropriate single names for the two emotions first mentioned, probably because, being painful, they do not become passions, and thus are not so much noticed. Vanity however and contempt, which arise from the favourable comparison and are therefore pleasant, are indulged and thus become passions, for which reason they are most prominent and their names current. Yet passion and emotion always go hand in hand, and there is no passion which is not founded in some emotion, nor any emotion which does not give rise to some passion, though if the emotion is painful the passion will not be the simple completion of the emotion; in this case the passion is the irritable desire not to increase but to lessen or escape from the emotion in which it arises; and in the case of the two emotions first mentioned, ashamedness and admiration of externals, it will assume some form of antipathetic emotion, illwill, or hate, towards the person in contrast with ourselves. Vanity has been defined as the desire of pleasing; it is rather the desire of exciting the emotion of comparison favourable to ourselves in matters of external show and advantage; the desire of pleasing is an euphemism; there is no goodwill in vanity except

incidentally, from being pleased with oneself; the pleasure of others is never its purpose. It is true that vanity is a social quality, since it depends upon the verdict of others as much as upon one's own, and indeed arises only in the representation of what others will think of the comparison which both alike must draw. It thus becomes a motive of endeavours to excel, and is indirectly beneficial to society; just in the same way as discontent is a benefit, both to oneself and others, in its effects, though uneasy and painful by itself.

2. Vanity and contempt, then, are names for these emotions of comparison in their character of passions; or rather the same names serve for them in both characters. Their opposites, ashamedness and admiration of externals, have no single current names as emotions, for being painful they have no passions in indulgence, and as passions have escaped notice altogether. But the passions which arise from them are envy and jealousy, forms of illwill or hate, as already remarked. Of these, envy refers to the past and present, being without fear of future encroachments; jealousy includes fear of such encroachments of the powers or possessions of others, and refers rather to the future; it is a guarding, watchful, passion, while envy is a brooding one.

3. The emotions of the second kind of comparison, that of Being, are also four in number, but arise in comparison of the nature and natural qualities rather than of possessions and dignities; which latter however may always be regarded as results of the former, and cannot always be separated from them; for instance, a man may *possess* the knowledge of many languages, and eo ipso he *is* a linguist; but in such

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cases we always distinguish whether he has used or misused his opportunities, and, if it appears that he had this acquirement forced upon him without any or with little energy of his own, we set it down as a possession, while, if it has been the creation of his own energy and ability, we consider it as part of the man himself; in the former case we are inclined to envy him, in the latter to admire him sincerely. Cases like this show at once the difficulty of distinguishing what a man is from what he has, but also at the same time the necessity for drawing the distinction as a fundamental one in analysis, since it is always drawn, though tacitly, in practice, and, though varying with each case, and with the mood of each person who draws it, is always permanent as a distinction; and we always justify our envy or our admiration by drawing it in the cases where we feel these emotions. Personal beauty, high birth, eloquence, grace of demeanour, polished manners, strength, courage, and so on, and also the opposite qualities to these, although not acquired by merit or effort, are yet so bound up with our representations of the persons in question, that we cannot separate them and consider these qualities as their mere possessions. Wealth however alone, inherited or even acquired, or peculiar good fortune, can be separated in representation, and these accordingly are considered possessions. It is always the representation that decides; that which cannot be sundered in representation cannot in emotion. No abstract considerations of merit or effort, founded on theories of the will, are of weight here; the laws of representation decide the question of what is part of the nature, and what part of the possessions.

4. Whenever, then, the mind draws a comparison between itself and others in respect of qualities which it considers at the time as personal and inseparable, belonging to nature and not to possession, it feels, if the balance is unfavourable to itself, humility towards itself and some form of admiration of essentials towards the other mind; if the balance is favourable to itself, it feels some kind of self-complacency towards itself and some kind of scorn towards the other person. These at least are the general terms of which there are many degrees and many modifications. A similar remark as to passions is applicable here as in the former division, namely, that self-complacency and scorn are commonly thought of as indulged, that is, as passions, while the painful emotions are considered emotions alone. The passion which proceeds from these uneasy emotions of comparison of being, the desire to equalise the balance or turn it the other way, is emulation, ζῆλος. This passion is not akin to illwill or any of the antipathetic emotions; its essence consists in wishing the opposite person to be fully as good and noble as he is, in order that our own character may come up to his; it does not aim at lowering another, because the excellence is represented as part of his nature, and that representation is fixed. As little as possible, no doubt, is admitted into the representation of what the man is, in view of this comparison; but when once that image is fixed, emulation can only be gratified by reaching and surpassing not by lowering it. The mind would not be satisfied with a victory in externals, when promising itself a contest in essentials; hence emulation, the emulation proper to this second division of emotions of comparison, is chival-

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rous, a contest of honour; the mind with its fixed representation must be satisfied.

5. Nothing shows more plainly than this group of emotions the importance in analysis of the cognitive framework or representational image, which is the object of the emotion. For here it is seen that, when we speak of 'the man himself,' we mean our image of the man; and a change in the image is likewise a change in the emotion. When we speak of our image of the man, and say that it may be or even must be erroneous or imperfect, and that 'the man himself' must be different from it, we still mean by 'the man himself' another image equal in fulness and correctness to every test that can be imagined, including the subjective feelings attributed to the image itself. Accordingly, strictly speaking, we do not love a man for his qualities or hate him for his qualities, but we love or hate those qualities themselves, as they appear in the combination, or in the image, which we call a man. From our image of what the man is there is no escape, and this is the reason why, in emulation, the rivalry is of a chivalrous character. The superiority of our rival can no longer be ascribed to his circumstances or his fortune, which are already excluded by the representation, and, since the mind itself has formed that image, the mind itself also must witness our equalling or surpassing it, and cannot take refuge in a superiority of externals or in the verdict of any judgment except its own. In whatever characteristics it is that our rival is the mind of another person, stripped of accessories and fixed by our own representation, in those no victory is satisfactory which does not put our own mind on a level or on a higher point than

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his; the murder of a noble rival, for instance, would not be a victory over him in the characteristics in which we are rivals; it would be a mere victory in externals, and would probably also seal for ever our defeat in essentials. All true emulation is this chivalrous rivalry, the foundation of one of the great kinds of Honour.

6. Looking back now to the whole group of emotions of comparison, four have been mentioned under the head of comparison of Having, namely,

Ashamedness	Admiration of externals
Vanity	Contempt,

which produce the further passions of Envy and Jealousy. And four have been mentioned under the head of comparison of Being, namely,

Humility	Admiration of essentials
Self-complacency	Scorn,

which produce the further passion of Emulation. It is clear that there is hardly any emotion, or indeed any feeling whatever, which does not supply matter for one of these comparisons; in other words, the emotions which rest upon these comparisons refer to or arise upon any other feelings whatever, and pervade the whole of life. The eight heads under which they are here exhibited cannot be anything like a sufficient classification of the countless modifications of which they must be susceptible, and in which they appear in daily experience. But language is a chaos out of which we must be content if we can lay hold of and keep a stray word or two, to serve us in fixing the footsteps of thought which we have made good; and the eight terms here em-

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ployed for this purpose are intended only to mark general divisions, under which the rest may fall as names of some of the countless modifications of the phenomena. Under the head Ashamedness, for instance, may fall the terms diffidence, shyness, modesty; and under its opposite, Admiration of externals, those of reverence for rank and wealth, "which needs no learning," as Mrs. Browning tells us, subservience, complaisance, which, when they are without envy or jealousy, are virtues, but the virtues of an inferior. Under Vanity may fall ostentation, vainglory, pretension, love of praise, and conceit, which is a kind of indurated vanity; under Contempt, arrogance, and haughtiness. It is impossible to name moods, characters, habits, virtues or vices, without thereby naming feelings; the habits, ἔξεις, have mostly been named as being most obvious, but the moments of which they consist, the feelings, πάθη, have not been named for themselves, but only as characterising the habits. Under the four heads of the second kind of comparison may perhaps be brought abasement, lowliness, meekness,—veneration, reverence, awe,—self-confidence, self-reliance, self-assertion,—studied neglect.

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§ 30. 1. Shame and pride, which are usually connected with the foregoing group, are properly emotions which arise in a somewhat different mode of reflection; at least these names seem the best adapted to be set apart to denote the emotions now to be analysed. It is only when the mind reflects upon itself alone, abstracting from other minds, yet with the knowledge gained by these previous modes of reflection, that those modes of emotion arise which fall under the general titles of shame and pride; and

these appear to be the only two kinds of emotion which are peculiar to this mode of reflection, or arise in the representation of its peculiar object. When the different organs of the body and the different bodily and mental functions are compared with each other, we feel shame in contemplating some and pride in contemplating others, and are prompted to conceal and forget the one, to display and dwell upon the others. This in its earliest shape is the first moral judgment that we pass upon ourselves; and the shame which in this way takes its origin, so far from becoming outworn in the progress of reflection, is deepened and its sphere extended; in other words, we become more sensitive and more refined, and a greater number of things are classed among *tacenda*. The acts which minister directly to the health and nourishment of the body and the gratification of the sensations, and of some of the emotions, and the instruments of these, weaknesses of body and of mind, some kinds of ignorance and want of capacity for mental enjoyments, whatever betrays a low grade of endowment, we cover with a wise dissimulation, as “ills that flesh is heir to.” The French term *pudeur* seems exactly to express the feeling which is called out painfully or wounded by any lifting of the veil of the *tacenda*. A certain kind of dissimulation appears to be the very condition of escaping from the burthen of these ills, which is only lightened by being forgotten. When however this forgetfulness is not a purposed dissimulation, but the powers and endowments which are its counterpoise are dwelt on as if they were alone the whole nature, then there arises the opposite emotion, pride, an overweening estimate of self. If we do not forget but purposely

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repress the thought of what causes us to feel shame, so as to insist only on the comely and on the honourable, then we may be said to feel proper pride, as it is popularly called ; and pride in this sense is better expressed by the name Self-respect, reserving the name pride for the overweening estimate of self, and for the further development of it now to be described.

2. If we suppose this emotion or passion of pride, for indulged emotion is passion, to be combined with the scorn for others of the foregoing group, there will arise the emotion which is most properly to be called Pride, a haughty isolation of self from all other beings, a refusal to admit them as equals, or even as objects of the antipathetic, still more of the sympathetic, emotions ; a self-complacency and a self-sufficiency which is its own law, its own tribunal, its own motive, its own end ; the opposite of whatever emotion tends to bind men together, the opposite at once of love and of vanity. It is only the root or first beginning of this pride that is the opposite of shame ; in its development it is rather the completion of the scorn of the foregoing group, completing it however by carrying it up into a new mode of reflection, one that makes abstraction of the persons who in the former were necessary to the emotion. Here, who and what they are is matter of indifference. The proud man is "himself alone." Pride is, as it has been shown, founded on a delusion, the real forgetfulness of human weakness ; it forgets also the laws of nature which bind man to man, not only by the mutual rendering of necessary services, but by the emotions which men feel for one another. The isolated man is then at discord with himself,

even by his attempted self-sufficiency. This is the condemnation of pride. But it is not without virtues. Its special virtue is honour. By the law of its being it is only qualities represented as noble which belong to pride, since everything that could possibly belong to shame is excluded at the origin. The law which the proud man is to himself is a law of honour. But as pride itself differs from scorn, so does the honour of pride differ from the honour of emulation; it is not chivalry, but it is adherence to the representation which any one has formed of himself; to fall short of this would be to him defeat and disgrace; he is his own rival and his own standard of rivalry. Whatever this standard consists in, whatever constitutes his image of himself, to that he is bound by the law of his being to conform. Hence the different kinds of characters which may be equally and alike proud; whatever consists with his standard of honour, and with his forgetfulness of circumstances of shame, may be included in the nature of the proud man. It is indifferent to many virtues and to many vices; noble characters and mean characters, as others judge them, may be proud; Milton's Satan and Shakespeare's Iago would both belong to the category. Lastly, pride in one or other of its two shapes, that is, either as pride strictly, or as self-respect, is the most intimate and ineradicable of the emotions, ἀναγκαιότατον πάθος, it ceases only with life; every one must have something to take pride in, some adytum of reflection, some sanctuary of refuge "when in disgrace with fortune and men's eyes." Good or bad, he retires into himself. Driven from one point, he takes refuge in another; the thief says 'at least I am not a liar;' the liar 'at

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least I am not a thief.' Every one erects thus from time to time some theory of his life, some standard of attainment, which he can believe that he fulfils. Pride is the Proteus of the emotions; there is no shape which it cannot assume, no quality to which it cannot attach itself. At the same time, the emotion which arises in reflection on self alone, whether it takes the shape of self-respect, honour, pride, or their modifications, is the most deeply rooted of all the reflective emotions; the staple and basis of the character, the stem upon which all others may be conceived as engrafted, or out of which they may be conceived as growing.

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§ 31. 1. In all the reflective emotions hitherto examined the pleasures and the pains appertaining to the emotions themselves, in their entirety, have been pleasures and pains of enjoyment. Or if they have arisen in comparison of two or more objects, as in the case of the emotions of comparison, they have not arisen directly from the comparison itself; or, in other words, the comparison has been not the object but the antecedent of an emotion, the object of which consisted in the persons compared, to which emotion the pleasure or the pain was attached, as in vanity or contempt, ashamedness or admiration of externals. But now comes for consideration the case of the comparison itself, the relation between the persons compared, being the object of an emotion with its peculiar pleasure or pain. The case is parallel to that of surprise and wonder containing the logical instinct, in the direct emotions. (See § 19. 2.) The contrast or resemblance of the two persons and their emotions is itself the object or framework of the emotion now to be examined; and

there will be as many kinds of this emotion as there are distinct kinds of pairs of objects compared or contrasted. The comparison of emotions in this way will be the objective framework of the emotion of Justice or Injustice, just as, in the direct emotions, the parallel comparison was the framework of the congruity aimed at, the incongruity avoided, by the logical instinct arising in the emotion of wonder.

2. Hitherto we have not met with the sense of justice, or with the sense of right and wrong, among the emotions. This is not because the emotions hitherto analysed are not always in experience bound up with these perceptions; for we may always, for instance, feel justified or right in loving and in expecting love, in retaliating injuries and expecting retaliation; but because we have hitherto attended only to those qualities in the concrete phenomena which were indicated by the name of the whole. But now it is necessary to attend to this other element in the emotions, and to endeavour to point out its origin and primal source. Justice and the sense of right and wrong are in their origin the same, and have their ground in the same thing, namely, comparison. The difference or resemblance of two objects of reflective emotion, as different or similar, is the object or framework, the emotion pervading which is justice or injustice, right or wrong.

3. It is clear, in the first place, that the sense or perception of justice and of injustice is not a mere repetition of the emotions hitherto analysed. The difference in their nature is a proof of some differentiation in their source. And the purpose of statical analysis is not to point out the moment of development, in the history of mankind or in that of the

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individual, at which a certain new sense or new emotion first arises; which could only be done by showing on the combination of what previously existing feelings the new feeling appeared as the result of their combination; but its purpose is to point out to what elements in those combined feelings the new feeling, the result of their combination, is to be referred; upon which being done, the new feeling will appear to be or to represent those elements in the new compound. For instance, it is not statical metaphysical analysis when a lawyer gives the famous definition of the right of property as "adverse possession ripened by prescription;" for the time occupied by the prescription may indeed be the time during which the sense of right grew up and became attached to the sense of possession, by a process of strengthening the association, in the minds of other persons and of oneself, between the thing possessed and its possessor; but it does not account for this strengthened association ending in the peculiar sense of right, in the right of property. The analysis is carried quite far enough for the purposes of the philosophy of Law, but not far enough for those of the philosophy of consciousness generally.

4. Ever since the conceptions of Form and Matter, the *τίεας* and *ἀπειρον* of Plato, were dropped out of use in speculation, philosophers have had no other logic to apply to the analysis of such phenomena as the present but that of the various combination of feelings already named and supposed to be fully known, and of the loosening or strengthening of these feelings, simple and compound, by habit or association. For instance, Mr. J. S. Mill in his "Utilitarianism" Chap. v. offers an analysis of justice which

falls under this description. "Justice," he says at page 88, "is a name for certain classes of moral rules, which concern the essentials of human well-being more nearly, and are therefore of more absolute obligation, than any other rules for the guidance of life; and the notion which we have found to be of the essence of the idea of justice, that of a right residing in an individual, implies and testifies to this more binding obligation." In other words, while Mr. Mill insists upon the peculiar validity, moral obligation, and binding power, implied in the words, duty, law, rule of conduct, justice, right and wrong, he yet finds no other source for these feelings or conceptions than the "desire to repel or retaliate a hurt or damage to oneself or to those with whom one sympathizes, widened so as to include all persons, by the human capacity of enlarged sympathy, and the human conception of intelligent self-interest. From the latter elements the feeling derives its morality; from the former its peculiar impressiveness and energy of self-assertion." p. 79. Mr. Mill's conception, then, is that time and experience are sufficient to ripen retaliation and sympathy into right and justice, to ripen the acts which embody them into a rule, and the sentiments which accompany the acts into a sanction. The importance or intensity of the interests at stake are, in his view, sufficient to make us invest them with the character of moral validity; he holds this to be a case where a difference in degree is so great as to become a difference in kind; just as, in the case of the right of property quoted above, long possession ripened into right. Admirably as Mr. Mill has put his case, I must confess that neither this explanation, nor one

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founded on a supposed "innate idea" or special moral sense "given" for the purpose, appears to me satisfactory. The latter is not a real explanation, the former is not a sufficiently searching one; it leaves the gist of the matter, the peculiar sense of right and wrong, just and unjust, untouched; we want to have the particular elements pointed out, in phenomena like those of resentment and sympathy, on which these notions of just and right depend, not to have resentment and sympathy alleged in the gross, or unanalysed, while experience is to mould them into something, or educe something out of them, namely, the perceptions of justice, of right and wrong, which was never observed in them at the beginning. If, however, it should be sought, in default of another explanation, to fall back upon the conception of power or force, and explain the peculiar validity of right and justice by referring them to positive law, the commands of a superior or sovereign power, still here again the same question recurs, namely, what is the source of right and wrong, of just and unjust, in law itself? How came we to think the commands of a superior right and just? How came he to think so himself? Mere power, however great or however uniform, is equally strange to the conceptions or the feelings of right and wrong, just and unjust, as are interests such as those of resentment, and sympathy. The question is, how, or why, or in virtue of their containing what elements, is the ripening either of power, or of self-interest, or of sympathy and resentment, into justice possible?

5. If any phenomenon could betray an origin in the formal element, as the source of whatever was characteristic in it, one would have expected it to

be the phenomenon of justice and injustice, of right and wrong. The equality or inequality, the similarity or dissimilarity, the harmony or discordance, of the two objects of a comparison, not the particular quality or importance of the emotions involved, are the point or circumstance in the framework, or total object of representation, which the emotion of justice or of injustice, of right or of wrong, inseparably accompanies. As novelty and strangeness in objects of direct emotions are inseparably accompanied by the emotion of surprise or wonder, so in objects of reflective emotions, in persons, agreement or disagreement about circumstances in which they have a common interest is accompanied inseparably by the differentiation of the pervading emotions by a newly arising emotion, the sense of justice or injustice. The total object of the Subject consists in the representation of two persons, himself and another, having each views and feelings about something in which they have a common interest; it consists, then, in two persons and an object between them which they may represent to themselves either in the same or in different ways. The harmony of their two representations is justice, the discordance injustice. Harmony between the two persons is therefore one characteristic at least of justice. But this harmony is only to be effected by bringing their representations of the object between them, in which they have a common interest, to sameness. Here is the special part played by the formal element, which enables the representations to be measured against each other, both in gross and in detail, and proof to be given of error in one or both of them. Justice has its own pleasure, injustice its own pain; and of

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these the one is the pleasure of regularity or conformity to rule, for its own sake, the pleasure of minimising effort, of resting in a stable equilibrium; the other is the pain of restlessness in unequal measures and balances. This pleasure and pain is the constraining force in the perception of justice, the motive which makes men love it, and the charm which makes it irresistible when appealed to; and beyond this I believe it is impossible to go; though it may well be that the love of justice has received additional strength from the perception of the manifold and great utilities which flow from its observance. The ultimate or simplest form of regularity is equality, when the eye or the thought passes from one moment to another of the same object, quality, or feeling, and finds no difference between them but in number or time of being aware of them. The immutability of justice, which makes it the eternal and immutable parent of right and law, of equity and order, is this immutability of the formal element in consciousness, of equation in time and space. Justice is ultimate Law, because it consists in those equations which are ultimate Form. Hence is explained why we always feel justified in demanding punishment for transgressions of justice; which, as Mr. Mill says in the work above quoted, p. 72-4, is the distinguishing characteristic of justice, morality, and duty, from expediency or worthiness; it is because we can be certain about justice; it can be proved to be just and right, and its dictates to be duties, something "which may be *exacted* from a person, as one exacts a debt;" it is because there is no room for doubt, and therefore the transgressor himself must admit the justice of his punishment,

if he fairly weighs the facts, since it is a matter of comparison, measurement, and proof, founded on that part of the mental constitution in which all men are alike, the formal element of consciousness. And not only in matters of justice and injustice, but also in matters æsthetical, a similar effect is produced by a similar prominence of the formal element. For it is an old observation, that in matters of beauty, strictly so called, we expect and demand that others shall see as we see, whereas in pleasures of enjoyment not of admiration we admit that tastes must differ. The kinship therefore of just and unjust, right and wrong, appears to be with those feelings and emotions which are founded on, and take their special character from, the formal element in consciousness.

6. This, then, is the answer to the question What is Justice: the equations or equalities perceived alike by two or more persons in an object of common interest to both or all of them. In examining into the justice of such an object, whether it be a thought, or a material possession, an act, or a transaction, which is the common object of the representations of the two persons, the effort always is to reduce the equalities discernible in it to their simplest and lowest terms, for then they become most manifest; in proportion to those equalities is the degree of justice in the action, and in proportion to our perception of them is our sense or perception of the justice. In whatever emotions the act may consist, or by whatever emotions it may be prompted, there will always be a tendency to reduce it to the rule of equality. For instance, when revenge was thought good, being pleasureable and uncorrected by nobler feelings, the love of equality asserted its claim, and

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the justice of revenge was "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." When a common purpose was perceived as guiding any line of conduct and supreme as its end or τέλος, for instance, the common weal in a state, or victory in an army, then the justice of this conduct consisted in giving "the tools to him that could handle them," or, as Homer says of the armour,

ἔσθλα μὲν ἔσθλος ἔδυνε, χέρηα δὲ χείρονι δόσκεν.

And thus to every kind of emotion, and every kind of action, and also in every stage of the progress of man and of society, there was its own justice; but every form and stage of justice consisted in importing regularity and equality into the actions in which it arose; this was its common characteristic as justice. When for instance in a state the rights of property have become sacred, and the common benefit of its security perceived, the communist doctrine of "the tools to him that can handle them" cannot be applied in its severity, but must be applied only to modify the equal and antagonist principle of private property; upon which the doctrine arose of each individual being bound to act as a steward of his goods for the general advantage, and of property having duties commensurate with rights, burthens commensurate with enjoyments. But in this form again the justice consists in the equality of the proportion, the evidence of the justice is the convincing beauty, τὸ καλὸν, of the arrangement, not the advantages which may be proved to result from it. In rewarding and punishing again, when the good of the whole society, including both the offender and the offended, has been perceived to be the purpose

of punishment by law, and revenge has thus been forbidden in the interests of society by law, as well as by the moral code in the interests of morality, there is always, governed by this general purpose, an attempt to apportion the kind as well as the degree of penalty to the kind of the crime as well as to the degree of its mischief to society. (Bentham, *Principles of Morals and Legislation*, Ch. xvii. and elsewhere.)

§ 32. 1. But, leaving these general considerations, it is time to turn to the analysis of the feelings of justice and right as they appear in the emotions, and to show in the first place how the sense or emotion of justice arises in the individual, and in the second how it is corrected, and made more accurate and more truly just, by examination and comparison with the opposite views of others, for which the same object or representative framework is the common ground of argument. It will be best perhaps to distinguish two branches of Justice; the first where acts and transactions are considered as such, that is, in movement or dynamically, the second where objects are considered statically, as things which can be possessed or shared, whether they are tangible or intangible; that is to say, the justice or the right inherent in certain actions, and the justice or the right to the enjoyment of certain property; and let us begin with the justice of actions. And here it must be remarked that, for metaphysical analysis, the perception and examination of justice requires the previous perception and examination of injustice; because justice is the normal condition, the regular sequence, which attracts no notice until it has been disturbed. The parallel case is wonder; but wonder

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is the parallel not of justice but of injustice, the abrupt break in the chain of the familiar, as injustice is in the chain of the regular; when wonder is equalised by additional knowledge, and the gulf between the old and the new bridged, then arises the admiration which is the parallel of justice; in other words, justice is not perceived to be what it is, for it is a second intention, or a characteristic of other objects, until it is contrasted with its opposite. Let us begin with an instance from the sympathetic emotions, an instance of goodwill or simple alliance between two persons. A seller contracts to sell goods for a certain price; in his mind there is now a framework or image consisting of his buyer, feeling similar goodwill to him evidenced by his contract to buy at such a price; he sends the goods, and then finds that his buyer refuses to send the money. The image which he had in his mind is now changed into one the emotion of which is some form of dislike or hate; the change of the image with its new emotion from the old shape of it with its old emotion, this incongruity between them, is the element or part in the total image which is the corresponding object or framework of that portion of the emotion which is sense of wrong or injustice; for I suppose it will be granted that there will be sense of wrong in the present case. The shock of deceived expectation (see Bentham, *Principles of the Civil Code*, Part i. Chapters viii. and xvii.) in finding the view of his buyer in collision with his own, in a matter where he has accurate knowledge of the detail of the facts, and knows besides that his buyer has the same knowledge with himself,—this is what makes him feel the action to be unjust as well as detrimental, which

adds injury to the harm inflicted on him. Let us take another instance: a parent treats his child with affectionate care and love; his love to his child is the emotion pervading an image of the child growing up and comprehending and returning his affection; the child falsifies this image and turns out loveless and worthless; the sting of the parent's grief will be in the unmerited wrong, the injustice, of this conduct, and the injustice will consist in the contrast of his old and new emotion in the old and in the new image; for in matters of affection it is thanklessness, ingratitude, that is the injustice, and not any resulting desertion or neglect. Take lastly an antipathetic emotion, anger; we have an image of a harm purposely done to us by another, anger rises in us and pervades the whole image as we think of it; suppose, however, that we think over the matter more accurately, and discover that it was not done with the will, but against the will, of the person we thought guilty of it; our framework changes, our anger changes its object or ceases, and we recognise that our anger has been unjust.

2. These cases may suffice to show in what feature of the phenomenon it is that the injustice resides, or what feature of it is the framework of the emotion of injustice. But the question now occurs, who or what is to blame for this revulsion of feeling, who or what is the cause of it, or, in other words, which is the unjust person. In the two first instances, it was the Subject who suffered the injustice; in the last it was the Subject who committed it by being angry. This question can only arise in metaphysic, not in practice, because here we treat of both sides or persons as parts of the represented world of the

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Subject; and in this case the decision rests on the distinction between the order of cognition and the order of existence. When the changes which precede and cause the change of image and emotion, which is injustice, belong solely to the order of cognition, as when further reflection or additional knowledge of a former state of fact changes the image and its emotion, making us for instance give up our anger, then the injustice, lying with the cause of change, lies with the person who has further reflection or knowledge; when, on the contrary, this cause of change lies in the sequence of facts as well as in the Subject's knowledge of them, in the history of the image itself, then the injustice lies with the person who is represented by that image, as in the two former instances. The discrimination of the person to blame for the injustice is part of the general discrimination which the Subject institutes between his own and other minds. Hence there is no justice or injustice arising in emotions of shame or of pride, because there is no difference between the order of cognition and the order of existence; whatever exists is known when it exists, and its being known is its existence. For the same reason there is no justice or injustice in emotions of comparison of being; because what the person whom we emulate is it is the Subject's own representation that determines, and no room is left for further discovery of fact, or for changes of fact not at first discovered. The emotions however of comparison of having are the field of justice and injustice in possession or property of every kind, that is, for the second of the two branches of justice above distinguished.

3. It will more clearly appear that the above is

the true account of injustice in actions, when we consider the answer which is always made to the accusation of injustice of this kind. It is always in substance this: "You might have known I should do so and so," or "You could not have expected me to do so and so;" thus shifting the blame of the change from the order of existence to the order of cognition. And in cases like that of unjust anger, our self-justification is always endeavoured in this way: "How could I know he did not will the injury?" "How was I to know that?" and so on. The Subject means to say, though the injury has not been inflicted by the person I was angry with, yet I am not unjust, for my knowledge was caused by impersonal conditions, which may be hard but cannot be unjust, being impersonal. And this referring the change to impersonal causes is a mode of escape common to the self-justifying Subject, in foro conscientiæ, and to the pleading defendant in a court of law. Again, when two persons discuss a grievance, either between themselves or by reference to a third person, the objective framework of the emotion of injustice, the facts of the case, are common ground to both; the defendant, or person accused of injustice, endeavours to show either that the true cause of the injury was an impersonal one, or not belonging to his person, or else that the accuser had no grounds to expect him to act otherwise than he did act, for that, if he dealt with him with his eyes open, he could not complain of what he foresaw. This reasoning applies to all cases where both the persons are free to have dealings or not. But where one of them is compelled to deal with a person whom he knows to be thoroughly untrustworthy, and suffers an in-

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jury which he expected, he has no sense of injustice, because he has no sense of being deceived. The act, it is true, is one which is classified as unjust, and the man is worthless, but the impression of injustice on the sufferer is not produced, except in reflection upon the act and reference of it to its class. For the progress of experience classifies actions under certain heads, such as just and unjust actions ; men also in the same way, as just and unjust men ; but all this classification is, for our present purpose, set on one side, that is, no knowledge drawn from it is to be intermixed with our examination into the origin of those conceptions which precede the classification itself. Now, in the case supposed, when a man suffers an injury which he expected, from a person whom he knew to be thoroughly worthless, his knowledge of the nature of the injury and of its agent, a knowledge drawn from, and expressed in terms of, this later classification, is not a part of his state of mind due solely to the action and agent themselves. And, this being premised, it will be found I think as stated, that where he is not deceived, that is, surprised by a person's conduct turning out contrary to his former image or expectation, there he has no sense of injustice, but only of a necessary impersonal calamity.

4. The essential foundation of injustice, then, is falsified expectation. But now suppose that the expectation is falsified for the better, that we expect to be paid pence and are paid pounds, or that we treat a person coldly, supposing him hostile, and find him friendly, or that a child who has been neglected by his parents yet loves and honours them in return. Here, it is true, expectation is deceived ; there is inequality, incongruity, revulsion of feeling ; but it is

not injustice because the pleasureable quality of the new image and emotion has imposed names on them of its own, obliterated the fact of incongruity, and withdrawn them from the category of evil. Free gift, free grace, bounty, magnanimity, return of good for evil, undeserved favour, such are the names of the incongruity that replaces an old image by a better than was expected. The shock of falsified expectation no longer sets the two persons at variance but unites them, there is no balance to be struck, no measurement to be made; the surprised person accepts the other's view of the matter at once; and thus this kind of falsified expectation, so far from being injustice, is a more abundant justice, for the contrast between the two persons' views of the same matter is destroyed as soon as revealed, and by the same circumstance which revealed it. This class of cases therefore furnishes no argument against the view of justice and injustice here taken; but the definition of injustice must in consequence of it be restricted to embrace only cases of expectation deceived for the worse, or injuries that are unlooked for. It is no doubt this character which has led so many writers to lay harm at the basis of injustice, and benefit at the basis of justice; upon which as the genus they then seek to import the differentia which makes harm unjust, and benefit just. The reverse in my opinion is the true method; contrast between two persons' views of the same matter, whether disclosed by words or by action, the shock of deceived expectation, is the generic notion, and the qualities of the feelings involved supply the differentia. Upon this basis, as the first disturbance of equality or harmony, is built the gradual return to

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equality, by the equations discovered in the object-matter of controversy; and the possibility of exact measurement of this object-matter is the possibility of justice; the restoration of agreement as to the details of the matter in dispute, making one view common to both persons, is the condition of restoration of the harmony between the persons. In fact, there are in justice two equations, one between the persons, and one between the different parts of the object-matter between them; the rupture of the first consists in the discovery of the rupture of the second, and the restoration of the second is therefore the only way to the restoration of the first. This, however, is only possible by measurement and reasoning, the exactitude of which depends on the presence of the formal element in the representations which are the object-matter of controversy. And this seems the only way in which we can account for the origin of the peculiar perception or sense of right, of justice, or of law, with its peculiar validity, which is so distinct on the one hand from what is simply pleasureable, beneficial, or good, and on the other hand from what is imposed or enforced by mere superior power.

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§ 33. 1. Let us now turn to the second great branch of justice, the right of possession or property. It is common to deduce this from the right which every man has to the fruit or product of his own labour or skill, and this again from the right to exert his faculties and powers, and this again from the fact of his mere existence and of the existence of his faculties and powers, expressed in the axiom, so called, that whatever exists has a right to exist. But the question is, how comes the notion of right

to be added to that of existence? Is it not clear that this deduction of right to exist from existence itself is a later growth, a reflection upon the fact of existence, and a reference of the two categories, right and existence, to each other, when each has been formed and is ready to hand? The purpose of metaphysical analysis, however, is to show the origin, the first nature, of the notion of right, not to take it up ready formed, as if implied in the notion of existence. The very assertion, that existence is a right, shows that the two terms have a meaning of their own before they are connected in a proposition. Before you can predicate food of bread, you must have a meaning in the term food as well as in the term bread. And this applies to all cases where the terms are not in all possible respects coextensive, or where the proposition is not what is called an identical one.

2. The first origin of the notion of just and right, in this as in the previous case, comes from the shock of deceived expectation in suffering the unjust and the wrong. A hunter kills or traps game, a new settler encloses and digs a field, in the expectation of enjoying them; another person steps in and takes away his game or tramples down his corn; the abrupt break between his expectation and the actual result, caused by a person, is his emotion of injustice and wrong, not because he refers the act to the violation of a supposed law of right or just, which would imply that he had either an "innate idea" or a previously formed notion of right or justice, but because he distinguishes the circumstance of shock to expectation from the quality, the hurtfulness to him, of the act. The incongruity between expectation and fulfilment is, then, at first the sole content

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of the emotion or perception of injustice; and, on the converse, the congruity between them is the sole content of justice. From this beginning the whole body of doctrine as to what is just and unjust, what a man has a right to and what he has no right to, is gradually developed by way of controversy between persons who entertain opposite expectations about the same objects of possession. For instance, suppose the person who trampled the corn to say, on the complaint of the settler, 'You have enclosed a piece of ground which I had before marked out for myself; did you not see my brand on the trees? You have thwarted my expectations, rather than I yours.' The facts of the case, which are the common ground of both claimants, are then examined, and the true state of these facts decides the claim; the defeated party being forced to admit that the change has not been in the facts but in his knowledge of them, and that the claim or expectation of his opponent is and was grounded in the facts of the case as they are and were. In this way principles and rules generally applicable are agreed upon, and tribunals or arbitrators appointed to enforce and apply them in disputed cases.

3. The same analysis applies to all cases of possession, or desire of possession, ambition, or vanity, to everything in short which is an object of emotions of comparison of having. It makes no difference that here the possessions lie in the opinion of third parties, or of the public, or of posterity, and that these confer the possession instead of its being acquired by the sole energy of the person feeling the emotion. Suppose public admiration is the possession desired; one man is conscious to himself of qualities

which he both admires himself and expects to find admired by others, but he finds on the contrary that some other person, who does not appear to him admirable, or not so in this respect, is more admired by others than he is himself; the injustice of the public who cannot discern true merit will be his complaint. When the estimate of the public is brought up to a level with his own, or his own brought down, by self-examination and comparison of others, to the level of theirs, the result is justice in the apportionment of admiration. The same holds also with the distribution of public rewards, offices, and honours; and each case acquires in course of time its own standard or *τέλος*, as the admitted test of the justice of apportionment; as, for example, the test of fitness for the performance of the duties in the appointment to offices, instead of the test of past services alone, the proper reward of which is honour and affluence.

§ 34. 1. There is one kind of justice distinguished by the object-matter to which it relates, which requires special treatment; I mean Veracity. Taking the useful division of the world into things, thoughts, and expressions, veracity has to do with the last only; but the three are inseparable, since expressions are expressions of thoughts, and thoughts images of things. Veracity is the agreement between the expression for others and the thought, which it expresses, for oneself; and intentional veracity is the endeavour to express a thought in such a way as to produce the same impression on the hearer as we receive from the thought ourselves. There are endless distinctions and ramifications which proceed from the difficulty of adjusting two persons' minds by an expression

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uttered on one side and heard on the other, and of knowing when they are so adjusted; which however do not concern the present purpose. That which gives to Veracity its peculiar immediate validity, that which makes it felt to 'be in itself right, as distinct from beneficial, is the same circumstance which constitutes justice just and right, the perceived congruity between the two moments, thought and expression, which are contained in every voluntary utterance. When any person makes a conscious voluntary statement, he is conscious both of the thought before he speaks and of the renewal of this thought in speaking, or associated with his words. If these two images are the same, agree in every point, being only different in point of number or in point of time, the statement is veracious, at least intentionally, and the charm of it, to the speaker, immediate and intense; not dependent on any judgment of others, nor on the perception of benefits resulting from it, nor on the other hand from an "innate idea" that statements ought to be true.

2. Veracity accordingly is a special kind of Truth, and properly distinguished by this title from truth proper, which is the accordance of thought with fact, still to keep to the former threefold distinction. On the philosophical distinction of subjective and objective aspects of the world, we are driven to have recourse to another criterion; and then the distinction between veracity and truth of conception is drawn in this way, that veracity is always immediately and solely dependent on volition at the moment, for you can always speak what you think to be the fact, say you doubt if you doubt, or that you do not know if you do not know; while truth of conception depends

on many other circumstances, external to the will, and is only tested and arrived at by repeated examination. Volition is the criterion distinctive of the truth of veracity from the truth of conception. In statements that are not true, the discrepancy between the images in the former kind of truth is produced or permitted by volition, while in the latter kind it is the compulsory discrepancy of ignorance.

3. Although the generic characteristic of veracity is the same as that of justice, yet there are very important differences between them, besides those of entire dependence on volition, and the object-matter being confined to expression and thought, the same circumstances in which veracity differs also from truth. In one sense indeed this confinement to expression and thought is no restriction at all, since these are aspects of the entire world, and thus veracity is universal in its domain. The most important difference between veracity and justice lies in the circumstance that the test of the congruity and incongruity of the two images is, in veracity, contained in the Subject alone, and not, as in the case of justice, applied by controversy between two persons. The Subject alone can intuitively and immediately know whether he is veracious or not; others can only infer his veracity or unveracity. Again, the two images are not divided as present and future, expectation and fulfilment, but are both present, and their agreement or disagreement therefore immediately certain. Hence there is no discovery or development of veracity, no making it out in its true form from its first and apparent form, in its agreed upon form from the opposed conceptions of adversaries; but veracity is either attained or not attained

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at once, and once for all. Hence veracity or un-veracity may arise in emotions which are dependent only on changes in the order of cognition, as well as in those which depend also on changes in that of existence ; that is, in emotions of the comparison of being and in those of shame and pride. Everything without exception can be imaged in thought, and expressed in words, signs, or gestures.

4. One circumstance connected with veracity remains to be mentioned. It has been shown to have immediate self-evident validity ; but it does not follow from this that it may not be in conflict with other acts which are themselves equally valid, or the validity of which, though derivative and not immediate, is yet more intense and weighty. It may happen that veracity is in conflict with other forms of justice, or it may be with conduct commanded by the necessities of benevolence or love. That we are not bound to utter what is true merely because we know it, seems to be shown not only by the absence of any such notion from the cases where the congruity of truth is most self-evident, but also by the emotion of shame, which, as already pointed out, prompts us to conceal, pass over in silence, and even forget many kinds of facts and circumstances. But it has often been doubted, whether, if we speak at all, or express fact at all by look, gesture, or even silence, we are not in that case bound, by the immediate validity or right of veracity, to speak precisely what we know and all we know. Yet this is a distinction which is of no avail in many cases. Who, to take an often remarked instance, does not hold Desdemona's lie,

“ Nobody ; I myself,”

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to be an act of the purest and most heroic virtue? The law of veracity therefore is in some cases subordinate to the law of love. Again, there is a wide difference between different instances of departure from veracity. Dissimulation is as much a departure from veracity as simulation; yet it is not always equally culpable. In Walter Savage Landor's *Pericles and Aspasia*, CC. is this passage: "He plainly told Pericles that he could learn little from him except dissimulation. 'Even that,' replied Pericles, is useful and necessary: it proceeds from self-command. Simulation, on the contrary, is falsehood, and easily acquired by the meanest intellect.'" In naming self-command Landor seems to have put his finger upon the circumstance which is most commonly, as well as I think most truly, felt to distinguish culpable from non-culpable departures from veracity. Unveracity is the vice of the weak, veracity the virtue of the strong; not strong relatively to others but in self-command over themselves. And unveracity can only be a virtue when it is commanded by, or involved in, some otherwise virtuous emotion, and enforced in opposition to inclination.

§ 35. 1. Equity is rightly described in the Eudemian Ethics iv. 8. as *ἐπ' ἀνόρθωμα νομίσμου δίκαιου*. And Aristotle gives several characteristics of it in the Rhetoric i. 13. from which it appears that he included what we call Mercy in equity. The two, however, are capable of a more accurate distinction. Equity may be distinguished with him as the regard for the spirit not the letter of the law, and again for the intention of the person not for the act alone, and again for his general conduct and character and not for the particular act under consideration only. All

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this makes equity a more strict justice than can be contained in any law or set of laws ; equity added to law and correcting it will exhaust justice and reach its full limits ; but in this way equity is not opposed to justice, but is justice itself opposed to law. Law, which is founded on and aims at effectuating justice, will always have equity beyond it, as its ideal, and will be constantly incorporating with itself principles and maxims which before belonged only to equity ; as we see has been the case with our English law, where there is a system of equity as strict and defined in its minutiae as the original or Common law itself, where in fact what once was equity is now law, and has a further equity beyond it yet to reach.

2. But Mercy goes beyond not law only but equity also ; it is not however on this account more just than justice, but it is justice of the highest kind. When Aristotle adds the characteristics of remembering past benefits rather than injuries against the opponent, and of being willing to endure injustice at his hands, he speaks of what belongs to mercy rather than to equity. But how is this to be explained ; what is mercy ; and how can it be said to be justice of the highest kind ? It has been shown that there is a justice in three kinds of emotion, in those of sympathy, antipathy, and of the comparison of having. Now equity does not travel beyond the kind of emotion to which the action originally belongs ; for instance, if the parties are allies, as buyer and seller, or if they are enemies, or if they are friends. Each relation has its own justice, and the corresponding equity consists in taking all the circumstances of the relationship into account, and exhausting or completing the justice arising out of

that relationship. But mercy consists in the injured party, for it is not possible to the other, carrying up the kind of equity or of justice into the next higher kind, and treating the enemy as if he were an ally, the ally as if he were a friend. The highest and greatest mercy is the justice of Love; and mercy does not cease to be justice, nor is it opposed to justice simply, but to the justice of a lower relationship. It follows that there is no tribunal which can enforce or command mercy; but mercy is commanded and enforced solely by the moral and spiritual law, the law of conscience. The enforcement of supposed acts of mercy or of love would be to destroy the very character which gives them their validity. If a superior tribunal could enforce them, a superior tribunal could destroy them. Their supreme validity consists in their being themselves supreme, a free gift not enforced. The condemnation which we pass on those who are not merciful consists in this, that their hearts are not open to the charm of love under circumstances which are most powerful to call forth that feeling. Hence the guilt of the servant in the parable: "O thou wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt, because thou desiredst me: Shouldst not thou also have had compassion on thy fellow-servant, even as I had pity on thee?" And the servant is not punished for refusing to show mercy, but is dealt with in that relationship of justice in which he himself had chosen to stand.

§ 36. Justice is combined with love in the manner which has been shown; but from its combination with anger there arises an emotion of a special kind, Indignation, the *νέμεσις* of Aristotle, Rhet. ii. 9. Indignation is the justice of anger, and arises when

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we see or experience injustice, or injury that is not merited; and again, in emotions of the comparison of having, when we see any one enjoying honour or goodfortune which is not deserved by him, or not suitable to his real nature or qualities, and also on the other hand when we see any one deprived, or are deprived ourselves, of the honour or fortune which we think is our just due. Aristotle distinguishes *νέμεσις* from *φθόνος*, and Plato had already declared of of God, in the *Timæus*, xxix. E, — *ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῷ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδένος οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος*, but among the Greeks *Νέμεσις* was the constant attendant on the Gods. This side of justice, its combination with anger, was most constantly in their minds as a divine attribute. With Christianity, however, became more prevalent the representation of God by the other mode of combination of justice, namely with love, the result of which is mercy. The two attributes need not be conceived as equally essential to the nature of God, but indignation will last so long as injustice, mercy so long as love. If all injustice were abolished, so also would be indignation; and then, in an ideal state, we may conceive that only the highest kind of justice, that of love, will remain.

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Sense.

§ 37. 1. No part of ethical enquiry has received more attention, in modern times, than Conscience or the Moral Sense; it has been the pivot upon which everything turned, at once the starting point and the goal of investigation. It has seemed that, if this were known and analysed, the whole theory of the matter would be clear. It has been to modern ethic what the conception of End, *τέλος*, the completion or goal of which was Happiness, *εὐδαιμονία*, the Summum Bonum, was to ancient ethic. The difference between

the two central conceptions comprised several points; 1st, the new conception involved a change from an objective to a subjective point of view, from habits, *εξέτις*, characters, and circumstances gratifying them, to emotions and thoughts, thus making the agent himself the inappealable tribunal of action; 2nd, it involved a conception of Duty or obligation compelling or binding, instead of a Happiness attracting, the will; 3rd, it placed the criterion of goodness at the beginning instead of at the end of action, making the judgment intuitive instead of tentative; and 4th, it rested on an analysis which took account of newly discovered facts of consciousness, facts at any rate not attended to before as of so much importance, and so figuratively speaking deeper, as if evolved from a greater depth. The last point contained the cause of the passing from the one view to the other. Certain emotions had received a new intensity for some minds, and in their lower degrees of intensity had become sensible to a greater number of minds; the terms expressing them had become current, and questions connected with them had become more widely interesting. These emotions belonged to the domain of religion; and the relations of man to the unseen world of religious objects had become more clear and more complicated, coordinately and simultaneously with the intensifying the corresponding emotions. Hence an entire Theology arose, the nature and functions of the actors in which were conceived by analogy with, and described in terms drawn from, the temporal sovereignty and its ministers, in their administrative and judicial functions. The emotions of remorse and of self-approval, when supposed to be ratified by an all-seeing and all-powerful judge, of

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whose verdict these emotions themselves were but the echo in the human heart, became of an interest far greater than any state of happiness, not depending on these, that could be pictured, however reasonable or complete. That might be dispensed with ; these were inevitable, and inevitable the misery or the blessedness which they involved. It seemed trifling to be occupied with the interests of a life even of virtue and of intellectual pleasures, and with questions as to what constituted or would secure them, when eternity with its infinities of bliss or of agony, and of physical as the consequence of mental suffering or delight, had commingled with time, and taken up the brief period of mortal life into its bosom, as a pool upon the shore is mingled with the waters of a measureless ocean.

2. Such is a very brief history of the course of thought which effected the change from the old conception to the new, abstracting, as it will be seen, from the various events, classes of men, and schools of thought, which were the organs or instruments of the change ; the reconciliation of which conceptions, and their incorporation into a single system, is one of the chief problems of ethic at the present time. Let us see, therefore, what is the analysis of the Moral Sense. The means and materials are at hand in the analysis which has been conducted up to the present point. Justice is the emotion which depends upon the congruity of two moments or objects in comparison, as compared ; it arises, then, from the formal element in consciousness ; but all possible moments or objects of comparison have also qualities for feeling, a material element which in all its kinds has pleasure or pain of enjoyment. The emotions be-

longing to the four great groups examined previously to justice are named from and consist of this material element; but every one of these emotions is concrete, empirical, or complete; that is, it consists of qualities with pleasure or pain of enjoyment, and of congruities or incongruities which are always pleasures or pains of admiration, and mostly of that marked kind which is the pleasure of justice, the pain of injustice. Now it is of such concrete emotions that the moral sense is the perception; a perception of comparison, or a judgment, which perceives its object to be either morally right or morally wrong; if it perceives it to be indifferent, the reason is that to that extent it lacks perception, is blunt or blind, in comparison with the minuteness, subtilty, or complication, of the character of the object perceived. No object whatever is of a nature to escape the moral sense, for every object stands in some discovered or discoverable relation to reflective emotion, and every reflective emotion is a concrete object, containing emotion of matter and emotion of form, of matter so far as it belongs to one of the four first groups, and of form so far as it belongs to justice, or is capable of equation and measurement such as give justice its validity. But it is in justice alone that the formal element is sufficiently prominent to be at once perceived as having a validity of its own, or as being the ground of a rule of right.

3. Justice is the perception of congruities and incongruities in objects, the moral sense is the perception of the moral character of those objects as wholes, the perception of justice in the concrete. It has no special kind of object which it perceives, but all objects alike. Like the perception of justice it is

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immediately valid, and there is no appeal from its perception. Much needless confusion has arisen from the fact that it perceives all objects alike, and perceives them at one time as right, at another as wrong, the judgment varying with every change of circumstance, knowledge, feeling, or stage of development, so that what a man at one time condemns, at another time he approves, and what one generation or one nation finds the highest virtue another judges as the lowest depravity. The appeal is not from the moral sense to another sense or another rule, but from the moral sense to itself; the moral sense alone reverses or confirms its own decisions. The confusion is between the nature of the moral sense and its history, between its general character as a moral sense and the particular characters which it assumes from time to time, all agreeing in the same general characteristic. The validity of its judgment from time to time is supreme; what it says *now* is the criterion of goodness and the law of conduct for the Subject who perceives and acts. This validity is not impaired by its progressiveness; at all stages of development, and whatever may be the other content of the object or act perceived as right or as wrong, the validity of the perception is the same, being immediate. All content is indifferent to it; if the content were particular, the validity would be transient with the content.

4. Now in what does this validity consist, or whence is it derived? It is a repetition of the perception of justice. Whatever whole or concrete object is perceived to contain a just, equal, or congruous, arrangement of moments or of parts, that object is perceived as morally right, and its opposite as morally wrong. Validity is derived solely from

the formal element in consciousness; and the perception of the right, or moral goodness, in any object, the emotional aspect of which framework is the moral sense, is a judgment passed upon the total object in virtue of the congruity which it contains or includes. The moral sense thus takes into account the two elements formal and material; its objects consist of both; and in this respect it differs from the emotion of justice which is indifferent to the material element, the emotion, in which the congruity is displayed. This gives the difference of character between justice and the moral sense, although the validity of the latter is derived solely from, or is a repetition of, the former. There is a perception of quality of emotion, and quality of pleasure and pain of enjoyment, in the doubly reflective emotion of the moral sense; it is not merely a judgment of right and wrong, but a qualitative emotion as well. It is a love of right, an emotional feeling towards it, or rather towards the objects which contain it, when they are pleasureable in their own quality. The material emotional element in objects perceived as morally good is some kind of pleasure of enjoyment, in objects perceived as morally bad some kind of pain of the same class. The additional emotional element in the moral sense, over and above that contained in justice, is due to this pleasure and this pain of its objects. Pleasures which are just are the objects of the emotion of moral goodness, excluding pleasures which are unjust; and pains which are unjust are objects of the emotion of moral badness, excluding pains which are just. The pleasure of moral goodness is double, consisting of a pleasure of enjoyment and a pleasure of admiration. The justice of emotions is in this

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respect the negative condition, the condition *sine qua non*, of the emotion of moral sense being felt towards any object or arising in any framework. This double character of the emotion of moral sense has enabled writers to be misled either into attributing its validity to the qualitative element, the pleasure of enjoyment, or into cutting down its nature to its formal character alone. Both characters are proper to it, in inseparable union. It is the whole man, the focus to which all his feelings converge, and in which they are fused; every feeling and every object in the whole empirical ego stands in some relation to it, and undergoes its judgment as means or as end, as intermediate means or ultimate end. It is the union of emotion arising from form and emotion arising from matter.

5. Let us dwell for a little upon the operation of this emotion of moral sense. Its form is justice or injustice, its matter the other emotions. But in operation, as set in motion by desire or by the passion of morality, as the will to be more and more good and right, it must follow some certain course of development and progress. All pleasureable emotions will be desired; its aim will be to include all that are pleasureable, and to exclude all that are painful. Its accompanying condition, under which alone they can be so included or excluded, is justice, the harmony or congruity of the Subject's mind with the minds of other persons, together with the applications and deductions from this principle, as will appear farther on. The formal element in consciousness, which was shown in "Time and Space" to be the ground of all logical pursuit of truth, or truth of reasoning, is here also, as the source of justice,

the ground of all practical pursuit of truth, or of all volition, all action, for the attainment of good moral purposes, and, as included in them, of all purposes whatever that are good. All pleasures will be candidates for admission into the kingdom of morality; those only will be admitted which are in accordance with justice. How profound and true then appears the insight of Plato, who laid the corner stone of his Republic, and of the inner Republic of each individual, in the conception of justice. If the moral sense in each of its particular acts or perceptions is the moment which admits each thought and each feeling into citizenship in the True Ego of morality, the complete assemblage and cooperation of those that are admitted and abide is the realisation of perfect justice; if the moral sense in each particular act is the modern counterpart of the bare conception of a *τέλος*, or end of action, the completed harmony of these acts in their entirety must be the counterpart of the completion of the *τέλος*, that is to say, of *εὐδαιμονία*, the Summum Bonum, Happiness.

6. Now the moral sense when it looks forward in time, to the next moment or act, judging what act, thought, or feeling, shall be admitted through itself into the True Ego, looks to a *τέλος*, or end, near or remote; the looking forward in time is looking to an end. In this respect it is the same as the ancient mode, and its standard or ultimate end is happiness, in the future. But when it looks backward in time, and judges its past acts, thoughts, or feelings, then two modes of the moral sense arise, which have been brought into prominence chiefly in modern times; the two modes are those of self-approval and self-condemnation, which are appro-

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priately named from their emotional element Good Conscience and Remorse. There is no appeal, the judgment passed upon self by the moral sense is final. The acts, thoughts, or feelings, so judged, are what they are felt to be, morally good or morally bad. If the former, they must be persevered in and enforced; if the latter, they must be repented of and forsaken. The whole man is judged of by whether he does or does not so persevere and so repent; and, if he does so, then acts of perseverance and repentance, being continuations of his life forwards in time, take place and entrance, through the gate of the moral sense, among the acts, thoughts, and feelings, which together constitute the completed End of Happiness. The present act of perseverance or repentance looks both ways, backwards and forwards; and at every present moment the moral sense is the Janus of a new life.

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§ 38. 1. The analysis here given of the moral sense applies to it at every stage of its development, both in the individual and in the race. But at every stage it will have a different content, will combine with different emotions, commanding, forbidding, and otherwise arranging them. Let us take a brief view of this its historical course, and of the method which it has pursued up to that stage of development which is the one reached at the present day in modern Europe. In the first place comes the question, How does the moral sense command or forbid an emotion or an action? The moral sense in that branch of it which approves, that is, the emotion of moral right, commands any action or feeling with which it combines either inseparably and inevitably, which is Kant's Categorical Imperative, or separably, that is,

under condition of certain circumstances only; for instance, it is always right to love your enemies, but it is only sometimes right to feel anger, which is then indignation, and sometimes also to kill, but not under the title of enemies. It is only emotions and passions that can be inseparably and inevitably commanded; all external, or muscular, actions, and all sensations, can only be conditionally commanded. The moral sense forbids emotions and feelings in the same way, by refusing to combine with them on any terms, or on some terms only. There arises thus a hierarchy of feelings, sensations, emotions, passions, and actions, according to their degrees of inseparability from the moral sense, or emotion of moral right. These relations of feelings and actions to the moral sense have varied from time to time in history, and consequently their relations to each other have varied, for the moral sense is, as it were, the centre round which they arrange themselves. The increase of our knowledge respecting the frameworks of feeling has been the great cause of these changes; just as a knowledge of the true circumstances in any case in justice alters the conceptions which a person entertains of his rights regarding it. To take a humble instance, the acquired knowledge of an unwholesome quality in a favourite dish alters the relation in which the pleasure of eating it stands to the moral sense; before it was a permissible, but now a forbidden pleasure. To carry these principles at once to their ultimate conclusion, it is clear that a perfect state of the hierarchy of things commanded, permitted, and forbidden, by the moral sense supposes a perfect state of our knowledge respecting them; the moral sense can only command with perfect or ulti-

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mate truth, when the frameworks of all emotions, and the emotions themselves in their reciprocal relations, are known with perfect truth; otherwise its dictates would be overturned by an increase in knowledge. Increasing or developing knowledge is therefore a condition or an element of developing morality, and ideally perfect knowledge of ideally perfect morality.

2. All command is emotional, that is, belongs to the emotional element, not to its framework; command when adopted is volition; but all commands are not equally valid; those only are immediately valid which have a framework which is just. The emotion of justice is the felt validity of the moral law. Hence every emotion may be said to command its own framework; but with respect to other frameworks and their emotions, it commands, or combines with, the emotional element in those frameworks, commanding this immediately, and their frameworks mediately through them. The source of all morally valid command is the emotion and its framework of justice; the command consists in the combination of this emotion with others, which can only be when their frameworks are just. All such concrete cases of commanded emotions are parts of the moral sense, which in virtue of the command or combination is not only a sense but a law.

3. There are thus two factors in moral development,—knowledge, which is the arrangement of the objects or images which are the frameworks of feelings, and emotion, which commands this arrangement in a certain hierarchy. The two factors are inseparable, as has been seen; but this does not imply a confusion of properties belonging to each.

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Knowledge is commanded by emotion, as a means to truth in emotion as well as to truth in knowledge; but the greater part of new knowledge comes entirely unsought, not even always as a consequence of associations set on foot for other purposes, but by means of involuntary experience. The growth of knowledge is, however, in all cases, whether the seeking is commanded or not, the growth of what was unforeseen. We can command that knowledge shall be sought, but not what that knowledge shall be. Nothing can be commanded that cannot be anticipated; otherwise the thing done is not the thing commanded. Now all knowledge in acquisition is new; it is distinctive of knowledge to be unforeseen; we cannot anticipate or guide future knowledge, but must be guided by it when it arises. It guides by changing the frameworks of feelings, and their relations to other feelings; a new framework contains a new feeling. The other factor, emotion, on the other hand, is entirely anticipatory when it commands. It is founded on present knowledge, already known frameworks, and commands their increase or diminution, enforcement or destruction, with a view to the increase or diminution of already known emotions. When emotion so looks forward and commands, and in so doing fixes its attention on the furthest possible point, it is forming ideas or ideals; reflective emotion reflective, and the moral sense moral ideas or ideals. And all these ideas and ideals are emotions with a merely provisional framework; a framework not provisional would be an anticipation of knowledge as well as of emotion. Emotion becomes ideal by an increase in its intensity, and the emotions of the whole man or moral sense can only

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become so by an increase in their justice, and in the harmony of one with the other, and of each with all.

4. Yet even in knowledge there is a part or an element which is fixed beforehand, just as the emotions are which are commanded as ideals. Otherwise it could not be commanded at all; we must know that it is knowledge which we seek. This fixed element is the logical or formal element in knowledge; and it is in virtue of this element that we command the seeking of new knowledge, or knowledge which is yet future. We know that when it appears it will be logical. This logical element furnishes the provisional framework for the ideal emotions commanded by the moral sense. The content of that framework is as yet only the ideal emotion.

5. So much by way of prologue, or answer to the preliminary question, How emotion commands. Let us now turn to the actual development or history of the moral sense, and its lieges, the senses and other emotions. It is not necessary to suppose that man at the present day in Europe has entirely lost any of the feelings and frameworks which he originally had, or that he has gained any of which originally he had no trace. The brief period of history open to our observation or enquiry does not show any such gain or loss. All the changes are apparently changes of modification and of relation; but these are very important. We must suppose that the moral sense was originally very undeveloped, both as being faint in intensity and restricted in sphere. There seem to be two chief ways in which moral progress is effected, and both of them are derived from the formal principle of order, and produce a hierarchy among the feelings. The first is that

which depends upon the feelings as pleasures or pains of enjoyment, and upon the distinction of finer and grosser quality in them. It harmonises the whole series so that one pleasure shall not interfere with another, but be enjoyed in its proper place and degree, and in cases of conflict that the finer shall be preferred to the grosser. This may be called the mode or law of Expediency. Under it the senses are made subordinate to the direct emotions, and the direct emotions to the reflective. It is not only an enforcement of the perception of quantity in pleasures of enjoyment, but also of quality. It does not permit the entire destruction of any pleasure, whether of sense or emotion, but aims at regulating it so completely that it shall not interfere with but promote the more perfect enjoyment of the rest. The mere intensity of a feeling is not considered as decisive in this arrangement; for instance, hunger and the love of a mother for her child are often equally intense, as measured by result in action; but the quality of the latter feeling is perceived to be far higher or more refined than that of the former. The moral sense combines with the latter and not with the former in cases where they conflict; and, if the intensity of the former proves great enough to determine the action, its victory will be over the moral sense as well as over the other feeling. Compare the terrible impression produced by Dante's picture of Ugolino.

6. The motive power of all this harmonising and subordination of feelings one to another in expediency is the immediate pleasure in reflecting on the harmony itself, and on its results in securing a greater and a higher kind of enjoyment; and this prudence

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includes in its purview pleasures and pains which we experience at the hands of other persons, or as the result of their opinions, feelings, and actions, as well as those which arise from our own self-government and immanent acts. Expediency covers the whole ground of feeling, and is as extensive as the moral sense itself, of one half of which, from beginning to end, it is in fact the expression. All pleasures and pains of enjoyment belong to expediency. Its results at the present day will certainly be admitted to be the entire subordination of the senses to the direct emotions, and of the direct to the reflective; and also, by most moralists, I am inclined to think, of the other reflective emotions to those of Love in its purest shapes, and to the Justice which belongs to it. Upon this point however it cannot be sufficient to assume an agreement; time and history in the future will decide it; but until that is the case, no judgment of expediency can be final, because all such judgments are decisions as to the quality of enjoyments, and there is no universally admitted criterion of judgment, in case one person prefers one quality of enjoyment to another; it is a question of what may perhaps be called moral taste, and we can get no farther than to Aristotle's umpire—*ὡς ὁ ἀγαθὸς κρίσειε*. Ambition, or that form of it which is the love of fame "that last infirmity of noble mind," or honour in personal character and action, or perhaps even pride in its most refined shapes, may with different persons dispute the palm.

7. But the case is very different when we look to the second method of harmonising and subordinating feelings, which is founded upon the emotion of justice, the second half of the moral sense. Side

by side with the qualities of feeling, upon which the pleasures and pains of enjoyment depend, there exists the perception of their justice or injustice; and this attaches to every feeling in its character of means to an end, or of its suitability or unsuitability to promote reflective emotions which are themselves just or unjust. For instance, the unrestrained indulgence of appetites is not only incompatible with the enjoyment of more refined pleasures, but is a hindrance in the way of our being just to other persons, by urging us to withhold what is their due, or take what is in their possession. But justice, besides this, sets up a standard which all must admit to be a valid criterion, by which to judge the relative value of reflective emotions. Pride, for instance, as defined above, is condemned entirely by the perception of justice, for it consists in ignoring other persons and their rights, and in acting as if they had no relation to us. It is besides an uneasy emotion, being out of harmony with facts and an involuntary forgetting of them. There is in short no emotion but that of Love, in its best and noblest shapes, in which justice is secure from violation. Love alone "is the fulfilling of the law." And the other emotions which are in themselves pleasureable are all more or less uneasy, from the imperfect nature of the justice which they contain, and from their offering no guarantee for its continuance. The emotions of the comparison of having are rather hindrances to justice than otherwise, though in many respects beneficial to it, as vanity which defers to public opinion, for instance. But they require to be kept in subordination. Emulation is admissible only so far as it is consistent with love and honour. Honour itself is uneasy and is

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closely akin to pride. The goodwill of allies has often its foundation in self-interest, and, where otherwise, is yet a feeble sentiment, without guarantee for justice in difficult circumstances. Anger can only be admitted in the form of indignation, which is its justice, and is but a partial and temporary emotion, depending upon the existence of injustice. Love, then, in the sense of the Charity of the New Testament, is the only emotion in which justice can be completely and permanently realised. It is capable of all degrees of intensity; and to produce it in high intensity, and to make it generally felt by all men and towards all men, is the command of justice. To this end justice commands that all the other emotions and sensations shall be made subordinate; it is the constitutional sovereign of the hierarchy of emotions, the constitution being the moral sense, of which justice is the informing principle. While therefore conscience or the moral sense must be defined generally, that is, in any of the stages of its history, as the perception of justice in the concrete, without distinguishing any kinds or modes of justice, or any kinds of objects or acts in which justice may appear, it may also be defined, in the highest stage of development we can at present perceive, as the perception, in the concrete, of justice in its highest shape, that is, the justice of love, or, in other words, analysed into the two elements of love and justice.

TABLE OF REFLECTIVE EMOTIONS.

A. Arising from the Matter.

1. The sympathetic group:

Goodwill. Affection. Eros. Love. Friendship.
Gratitude. Pity. Rejoicing in good.

2. The antipathetic group:

Illwill. Hate. Anger. Bitterness. Revenge.
Rejoicing in evils. Malice.

3. Passions belonging to both groups:

Passion of benevolence, of affection; High spirit; Rage;
Courage, Rashness, Audacity.

4. Emotions of the comparison of Having:

Ashamedness. Admiration of externals.
Vanity. Contempt.

Passions: Envy. Jealousy.

5. Emotions of the comparison of Being:

Humility. Admiration of essentials.
Self-complacency. Scorn.

Passions: Emulation. Honour.

6. Emotions of Reflection on Self alone:

Shame. Self-respect. Pride.

B. Arising from the Form.

1. Justice and Injustice: Veracity. Equity. Mercy. Indignation.

C. Arising from Matter and Form together.

1. The Emotion of Moral Sense:

Good Conscience; Remorse.

Modes: Expediency; Duty or Moral Right.

CHAPTER II.

PART V. THE REFLECTIVE AND IMAGINATIVE EMOTIONS.

The spirit and the power,
Which wedding Nature to us gives in dower
A new Earth and new Heaven.

Coleridge.

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§ 39.
The inner
nature of the
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§ 39. 1. No sooner have we formed empirical and remote objects in consciousness than we ask ourselves what they *mean*, what the whole scene of existence, as it unfolds itself before us, *means*. It has been shown in "Time and Space," how, out of the formal element occupied by each set of qualities, we imagine a substance, an essence, or a force, underlying, evolving, producing, and then supporting these qualities, and exerting itself, expressing its own nature, in the actions, movements, or effects of these upon other sets of qualities, and upon the substances, essences, or forces similarly imagined as underlying them. It is of such objects, consisting of substance and attribute, that we then proceed to ask ourselves the meaning or significance. The purpose of our question is to discover the nature of the substance, essence, or force, underlying the qualities; to discover it apart from the qualities in which it manifests itself, that is,

to discover what it would be if it existed alone, free to produce other qualities, as we imagine it did exist before it produced the actual qualities out of its nature. We wish to dive and penetrate, as it were, into the nature, the hidden nature, of the Ding-an-sich, the Transcendental Object, substance, essence, or force. This is the scope of the question as to the meaning of things, as it is at first conceived. (See Jouffroy, *Cours d'Esthétique*, Leçon xviii.).

2. Now this penetration into the nature of things, though mistaken as to its object being of a transcendental nature, a Ding-an-sich, is nevertheless a real effort to reach some further knowledge. Its preconceived notion as to the nature of the object it investigates is not essential to its existence as an effort to penetrate farther than before; and we can now see what it really is, and what it really does while imagining that it investigates the Ding-an-sich. It is, while penetrating into the nature of things, at the same time also a penetration into the nature of our own consciousness; and for this reason, that we can examine only what is known, or so far as it is a mode of consciousness. The process backward or downward, behind or below the surface of phenomena objectively, is also a process in the opposite direction, backward or downward, behind or below the surface of phenomena subjectively; just as the apparent movement of an object into the depth of apparent space behind a mirror, as we look into it, is, corresponds to, or is the reflection of, the real movement of the object itself into the depth of real space away from the front of the mirroring surface. Each corresponding movement is real, each of the corresponding objects is precisely the same, equally real and true;

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one is the opposite aspect of the other, subjective and objective aspects of the same thing. The objective aspect, however, is the imagined counterpart of the subjective; the subjective is the immediately certain counterpart of the objective, the cause of knowing it. The subjective is known, the objective is known to exist. The only difference or advantage which the objective has over the subjective is its bare existence, and this is an imagination in the subjective aspect; its nature in all its parts or qualities is entirely exhausted by the subjective aspect. We go into the depths of our mind by developing, combining, and analysing representations; and the new modes of consciousness, which arise for us there, we attribute to the objects which we are examining, with the imagined substances, essences, or powers, underlying them. The new class of conscious phenomena which arises in representation is that of the emotions. The meaning of things therefore consists in our emotions when we dwell upon them.

3. But what is this "bare existence" in which the prerogative of the objective aspect over the subjective consists? For we cannot say that it is an unreality, merely because it is "imagined" by the subjective aspect. Existence is a second intention, a predication about the phenomena of the subjective aspect. The objective aspect is those phenomena plus the reflection, the particular subjective reflection, that they are phenomena. In this way the bare existence, which in the preceding paragraph was said to be the peculiar prerogative of the objective aspect, loses that prerogative as its peculiar property, by having its subjective aspect found. The transcendentalism of the objects imagined as tran-

scendental is in this way destroyed, for its subjective counterpart is discovered. It makes little difference whether we call, with Hegel, this thoroughly equated pair of relatives, the objective and subjective aspects of phenomena, taken together, by the name of The Absolute, or not. The Absolute seems to me a name expressing the imagination of the "bare existence" belonging to both alike and both together. That we do always imagine them as "existing" is certain; and that this existence is imagined is but one mode of the complete relateness, or equatedness, of the two aspects. A great deal however depends upon the way in which the equation between subject and object is worked out; and in this respect, it is needless to say, the way here taken is essentially different from Hegel's. The emotions, and among them the reflective emotions ending with the moral sense, have hitherto been our means of penetrating into the inner nature of the objective world. The framework of these emotions is the world as we represent it to ourselves in all respects; for as object of the senses it is visible, tangible, audible, and so on, and as object of the emotions it has certain characters, or moral qualities, in the several objects of sense, personal objects being among them, which it consists of. As a whole it has a complicated moral character, and the people who inhabit it are but different repetitions of the different emotions variously combined of the Subject himself, like the different leaves of one tree.

4. At the beginning of Part ii. of this Chapter, in § 13, it was said that the entrance upon the world of representations was usually imagined as the entrance upon a subjective world, as opposed to the

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objective world of sensations; and then, in this subjective world, the frameworks of representation were distinguished, as being inferences of reasoning, from the emotional element pervading them, and this latter imagined as more subjective still. But now this entire subjective world is shown to be reflected back upon the objective world of sensations, out of which it sprang by the process of redintegration and representation spontaneous and voluntary; and its entire nature, its two aspects, emotion and framework, are made objective by reflection upon them. The objective world is this world of objects of emotion such as we have found it by subjective analysis. The entire range of emotions and their frameworks exists; they are the deeper, latest evolved, character of the tangible, visible, and otherwise sensible world. They belong to that world and are produced out of it; in short they are "real" in precisely the same sense of the term. The world which was so made as to give us the impressions of sense, and the objects which are sometimes called absolute, or always real, is now found to be so made as to give us the impressions of emotions, which equally deserve the same titles.

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§ 40. We are now entering on the imaginative emotions of reflection. In the hitherto examined reflective emotions there has arisen no question as to the reality or truth of their objective frameworks. But imagination is usually opposed to reality in the sense of truth of fact; the imagined to the real or true. Yet imagination is as much a part of our intellectual and emotional nature as is remembrance without imagination, or as remembrance without reasoning; and reasoning itself, inferring the unknown from the known, is a mode of imagination and in-

volves it; the object to be inferred must first be imagined. It is not therefore every case of imagination that can be opposed to truth. Where lies the distinction? So far as imagination is a voluntary and not a spontaneous process, the distinction must lie in the end or *τέλος* of the volition; and it is only with voluntary imagination that we have here to do, the end being always present to thought, and consisting in the desire to increase the pleasureable, and decrease the painful, emotions which we already experience. This end of the volition is twofold; it may be either the pleasure of imagining and combining in imagination reflective emotions, in new shapes, and under new laws derived from the formal element, or the pleasure of continuing the process of combination, already entered on by the memory, so as to anticipate in imagination the truth of nature and of history. In other words, the end may lie either in the exercise of imagination without any further purpose than the pleasure derived from the exercise itself, an exercise which is a law, end, or scope, by itself, or it may lie in an exercise of imagination which is governed by the actual laws of the images and emotions reproduced, and is only pleasureable so far as it is imagined to be true. In the first case there arises a world of ideal imagination, in the second of ideal and true imagination; the first is the perfection of art, the second the perfection of nature; the first is Poetry, the second Religion. It follows that there are countless modes of the first for every individual person, but only one mode of the second; of the first there will be the separate modes that depend upon the materials in which the imagination is represented, such as stone, marble,

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canvass and colour, sound, words and metre; there will be modes depending on the different emotions, such as love, hate, revenge; and there will be the different modes of the serious, the comic, the tragic. But of the second there can possibly be but one mode for each individual, and for each nation or class of men who have attained the same degree of insight. Since truth is the end of religion, the progress which religious insight makes will be slow, and will depend upon the general intellectual insight of the individual or of the race, and upon the sharpness of the distinction drawn from time to time between religion and its accessories, as well as upon that which is its main condition and groundwork, the intensity of the religious emotions themselves, and the desire to feel them and to live in them more and more.

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§ 41. 1. From the brief account of poetry already given it is clear that it is the completion of the æsthetic emotions in the domain of the reflective; that it carries up the æsthetic emotions which are pleasureable into emotions of reflection, and makes these also æsthetic. Fancy, wit, and humour, as well as the æsthetic emotions of beauty in colours, figures, and sounds, become, when combined with reflective emotions, so many modes of poetical imagination, or poetical emotion its counterpart. The formal element of these completed modes is a certain justice, or harmony, of combination, a harmony determined by the purpose of the whole, which is the pleasure of poetical emotion. This is the law to which poetical imagination is subject; a law not depending on truth of representation, the correctness or accuracy of the imitation, or, as it may be expressed, on the proba-

bility of the action described or imitated. It is true that the laws of harmony in poetry are the same in kind as those of science and nature; but they supply only limits to the poetical imagination; whatever *can* be brought together in poetry, that *may* be brought together, provided the pleasure of poetry is secured thereby; the pleasure depends in no degree on the probability or closeness to facts already known; but the limit is set in this way,—the laws of nature have already determined the constitution of the mind which feels or is to feel the pleasure, and so indirectly have determined the kind of pleasure itself which is the law of art. The poetic artist has nothing to do with probabilities; he has only to judge whether the poem or picture gives him poetic pleasure. For instance, to defend the dramatic “unities” on the ground of the improbability of a change in time and place while the play is being represented is absurd; for this is an improbability which the imagination does not feel, but which it takes upon itself in the mere volition to see or hear a drama at all, just as it takes upon itself all other means of representing the play, for instance, the most startling improbability of all, the use of verse in the dialogue. But as for the improbabilities which belong not to the means of representing a play or a poem, but to the plot, to the events which take place and the characters of the actors, it is not probability or improbability that is the principle to be regarded, but consistency, the consistency of the plot, and of each character, with itself. “*Servetur ad imum Qualis ab incepto processerit, et sibi constet.*” Even the rule “*Nec Deus intersit*” is grounded in the rule of consistency, not of probability. And the exception

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“ nisi dignus vindice nodus Inciderit” shows that this consistency depends upon the importance and depth of the emotion involved; thus being an example of the principle, that a greater strain upon the intellect is borne, when there is a proportionate strain upon the emotion, under which principle will probably fall the somewhat analogous cases of betting and judicial verdicts, mentioned in § 20.

2. But any degree of improbability may be borne in poetry when notice is given of the intention, so that consistency of the poem with itself may be preserved. The actual happening of the events, and actual existence of the characters, is entirely abstracted from. Hence fact and fiction are entirely indifferent to poetry. The moment an interest is sought in the actual existence of the persons, or occurrence of the facts, that moment an interest alien to poetry is introduced. Several of Shakespeare’s masterpieces are improbable from beginning to end, but he always gives due notice, and is always consistent with himself. For instance, the plays of Hamlet, Macbeth, The Tempest, and A Midsummer-Night’s Dream. The appearance of the Ghost in Julius Cæsar falls under the principle “Nec Deus intersit” and is justified by it. It is a blot on the purely poetic interest of Dante’s Divina Commedia and Milton’s Paradise Lost, that the subjects are such as to compel us to take an interest in their actual existence, and an interest which rivals that which is purely poetic. These poems stand in this respect at the head of didactic poetry, poetry which incorporates an alien purpose with its own; which is indeed a noble mode of mental activity, but one which characterises and constitutes the prophet and

the statesman as much as, or more than, the poet. To justify this, let it only be remembered that Dante pronounces a real judgment upon real persons, and Milton avows his aim to be

“That to the height of this great argument
I may assert Eternal Providence,
And justify the ways of God to men.”

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This adoption of an admixture of actual fact and theory into these poems renders dubious and displeasing the introduction of mythological personages and stories, which otherwise would have been quite permissible; and we are always driven to the question whether Dante or Milton believed in the existence of those persons and their histories, as well as in the other histories which they describe; but all such questioning is destructive of, as well as alien to, poetic emotion and interest.

3. Consistency, then, is an indispensable rule, the formal principle, in poetry; it is what justice is in real life, the congruity of expectation and fulfilment; and is properly therefore entitled poetical justice. The pleasure of poetry includes this justice as its formal element, or law. And that which is commonly called poetical justice, the apportioning reward and punishment to the actors in a poem, is but a single case of this law. The justice to be satisfied is in the mind of the poet and his audience; it does not follow that the villain of the piece must be hanged or the hero knighted; but solely that the villain shall be made to seem a villain to poet and audience, and the hero a hero. The contempt or hatred, the admiration or love, attached to each picture by poet and audience shall be distinctly marked

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and clearly justified to them. They are the tribunal; their frame of mind is the judgment; their pleasure is the purpose of the whole exhibition. And the rewards and punishments which are part of the story are justifiable, in that character, only under the title of means to this end.

4. Another branch of this abstraction from actual existence is the cause which enables us to take pleasure in the representation of pain, making tragedy in all its shapes a poetic pleasure. The fact is common and familiar, but it is not sufficiently explained by saying 'O, we know that it is all a fiction, or at any rate a thing of the past,' without assigning the mode in which this is possible. For the representation of a pain cannot but be in itself, or as such, painful. How is this pain counteracted? All pain is interesting in representation, on the principle "*Humani nihil alienum*." But this is not enough; it must be pleasureable as well as interesting, otherwise it could not enter into poetry. The reason is partly, but only partly, assigned in the lines of Lucretius,

"Non quia vexari quenquam est jucunda voluptas,
Sed quibus ipse malis careas quia cernere suave est."

The first or enabling condition both for the production and enjoyment of poetry is a mind comparatively at ease. Then, by the very fact of abstraction from actual existence, in proportion to the pain of the image is the strength of the impression that it is over and gone; the pain works its own counteraction; you see not only how painful it is, but also how much pain and what you and others have escaped, "*quibus malis careas*." This is quite consistent with the fact that some of the most beautiful

poetry has been wrung forth by suffering ; for it has been written in the intervals of suffering, and the exercise of poetical imagination on it has been itself one of its alleviations. The poets who have so written have not only held their grief at arm's length, as it were, but have counteracted the pain inherent in it, even when so held, by the pleasure of exercising the energy of imagination. This is true also when applied to acute pleasures. They do not become poetical until they are held at arm's length, and pierced through and through with imaginative thought. Here then we come to the complete account of the matter. This union of thought with emotion is poetical imagination on one side, and poetical emotion on the other ; and the energy, which works the fusion and expresses it, has a pleasure as energy, distinct from the interest of the objects and emotions themselves. The absence of the immediate pressure of mental pain, and of the immediate excitement of mental pleasure, is indeed the enabling cause of poetical or imaginative pleasure ; enabling us, that is, to take pleasure in the poetic energy of representing actions, events, and circumstances, which may have been either intensely pleasureable or intensely painful, either to ourselves or others ; actions and circumstances which we then regard as displays of character, or of the skill and power of the agents in fighting the battle, or playing the game, of life. But the positive or active cause of the pleasure lies in the exercise of the imaginative energy itself ; and that this is the true account of the matter seems to be shown by the circumstance, that persons who have not, or do not exercise, this imaginative energy take no pleasure in the poetry of profound emotion either pleasureable or tragic,

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and that subjects of this kind seem to them, as they say, too grave and serious for poetry, which is suited only to things light and cheerful. In other words, where the positive source of pleasure, the imaginative energy, is absent, there the greater intensities both of pleasure and of pain are wearisome and overpowering, and, being in this way painful, are thought unfit for poetry.

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§ 42. 1. All poetry, then, in its strict sense is poetical imagination, and poetical imagination is the representative framework of poetical emotion, which pervades it as in other cases of emotion. This state of consciousness is the fountain-head of all poetry, the completion of the æsthetic emotions, whether expressed or embodied in words and metre, or in the sounds of music, or in forms visible and tangible, as in sculpture, painting, and architecture. Poetical imagination, poetical emotion,—two aspects of one phenomenon or one state of consciousness,—how can we descend from this fountain-head, and, truly distinguishing its streams, follow them to their issue in works of art? The framework and its emotion are inseparable; they grow or lessen hand in hand; change *pari passu*. And, as in all the foregoing cases, so also in this, it is the framework of images which offers the object of analysis and the means of analysing. The connection between images or parts of images is association or redintegration, and this process being in this case voluntary, not spontaneous, is a process of reasoning; and this its nature is not altered by the circumstance that pleasure in the redintegration itself is its law, end, or scope. The ultimate kinds or modes of poetry therefore must be reducible to general kinds or modes of reasoning;

the explanation of their ultimate kinds as poetry must consist in their being cases of some general kinds of reasoning. Now there are two great modes of all reasoning, clearly distinguishable from each other, but inseparably interdependent, analysis and synthesis. Every train of reasoning redintegration contains both; but when you take a point in the train of reasoning to start from, the process from that point onwards may be either synthetic alone or synthetic and analytic together, because, in the first case, the analysis may lie before the point of starting. So if you take as a starting point the point reached by a previous reasoning, and the object which is its result at that point, your onward process is an analysis of that object, a going back over the previous synthesis. To express it by a simile, the gathering of clouds in a clear sky is a synthesis, the analysis or separation of the clouds from other clouds beyond the horizon, or from fine vapour overhead, has taken place previous to the beginning of overclouding the clear sky.. The changes which take place in these clouds themselves when gathered is both synthetic and analytic at once; and the disappearance of them from the sky so as to leave it clear again would be analysis alone, the corresponding synthesis taking place out of view. The process is precisely similar when, in poetry, we take a starting point and bring together images for the first time; and the poetry is then synthetic or constructive; or when we take an object or set of images, with their emotions, already known to us, examine it and remodify it; the poetry is then analytic or descriptive. Constructive and descriptive are terms which are properly and usually applicable to poetry, and will be admitted, I think,

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to express the most general modes into which it is possible to distinguish it. Out of these most general modes it can be shown that the less general distinctions flow, such as those of epic, dramatic, and lyrical poetry. But let us first apply these principles to the several poetical arts, as distinguished by the natural organs or instruments proper to each.

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2. Music, the instrument and material of which is sound only, supplies the purest instance of synthetic or constructive imagination; it does not imitate but produce. Before however entering on this point, it will be advisable to continue the analysis of music from the point at which it was left in § 18. It was there remarked that modern music is founded chiefly upon the relations of colours to each other, and upon their combination into chords governed by the tonic coloured note, whereas the ancient music was built upon the relations of pitch; and that consequently, while melody is common to both, the melody of the moderns is rich in sequences and combinations of chords or colour harmony, which has to a great extent replaced the elaboration of pitch harmony alone, which characterised ancient melody. Not however that the sounds in ancient music were destitute of colour, but that the profound musical significance of their colour was not perceived. Two causes contributed to the change from the ancient to the modern system; the first was the continued elaboration of the old system itself, through counterpoint and part-singing, which compelled the perception of the consonance of chords with each other when heard simultaneously; and this may be called the purely æsthetic cause of the change; the second was the peculiarly emotional effect attached to colours when

combined in chords, the interest of which emotional element in chords fixed increased attention upon them. The framework of modern music, then, can be analysed into precisely the same elements as that of ancient, namely, melody, harmony of pitch, and harmony of colour; but to the extent that combination of colours is employed or made the chief staple of music, to that extent the music contains or chiefly consists of emotional effect, in contradistinction to the purely æsthetical beauty of its framework of sounds. A part of the music little noticed in ancient musical art, namely, the emotion peculiarly attached to colour in sound, was now in modern music brought into prominence, and, without destroying, gave an entirely new character to the æsthetic beauty attaching to combinations of pitch, which had been before the predominant feature. The sense of æsthetic beauty and the peculiar emotions attaching to colour harmonies are the subjective aspect of the beauty which we conceive objectively as inherent in a piece of music. The emotion attaching to colour harmony is that which constitutes the poetry of music, the material out of which the great masters form their spirit-stirring creations.

3. It will help to show more clearly the bearing of the foregoing remarks, if we take the melody as that element in a piece of music which is common to both styles, ancient and modern. The melody is the movement of the sounds in time; and their succession may be more or less rapid, and longer or shorter intervals of time, of pitch, of intensity, may be interposed between them; this belongs solely to the melody. But when we take the sounds themselves and consider the relations which they bear to

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each other, apart from such movement, we shall find that the melody may be a succession either of comparatively simple sounds, in which the relation of pitch is dominant, or of more complex sounds, chords, or of several of such complex sounds together, in which the relation of colour is dominant. In each of these two very different cases, the melody will assume an entirely different character, in addition to the character which it has of itself, or as melody simply, as a rapid or slow, lightly or strongly marked, movement. The special character of the melody itself as such is more easily perceived by the untrained ear than anything else in the music; hence the beginning of music in nations, and in such individuals as have not a naturally acute ear for harmony, is to take pleasure in tune. And even in some of the most beautiful works of the modern music of harmony, the element of tune is important, only that it is of a more refined and subtil character, so as in some instances to escape the notice of an untrained or unmusical ear. The effect too, or, as I prefer to call it, the subjective aspect, of the melody is emotional, being then indistinguishably combined with the effect due to the colour harmony. To the nature of colour harmony, its different kinds, and the emotions pervading it, I now return.

4. And first as to the point from which we digressed, namely, that music is not imitative but productive, not critical or descriptive but constructive. This in other words means, that its pleasure is not derived from its calling up objects into representation to which pleasure is attached, that is, from its association with such objects. Whenever such pleasure is felt in music, as, for instance, in the peculiar

patriotic emotion which an Englishman feels in hearing Rule Britannia, or a Frenchman the Marseillaise, this is a pleasure not strictly musical. The same may be said, *mutatis mutandis*, of all words sung to music; for instance, the addition of the words "He was despised and rejected of men" to the sounds which accompany them in Handel's Messiah serves indeed to give definiteness to the peculiar plaintive emotion which belongs properly to the sounds, but the additional definite emotion introduced by the association, that is, by the meaning of the words in their special application, is separable by analysis from the strictly musical emotion and pleasure of the sounds themselves. The attempt to explain musical pleasure from association seems to me to rest upon an entire misconception of what musical pleasure by itself is. The question is, what is that pleasure, that emotion, which belongs to the sound alone; to explain this by association of the sound with some other objects is to deny that there is any pleasure or emotion which belongs to the sound alone. The attempt is analogous to the attempts to derive emotion from sensation, which were examined in § 14. The emotions of cheerfulness or melancholy, with all the varieties or shades of mental tone belonging to them, from despair to triumph, which are attached to different melodies according as they are quick or slow, strongly or weakly accentuated, seem to be attached to, or to arise in, those varieties of sound movement by quite as direct and original a title as to the movements of any other objects, such as leaves, or waves, or clouds, or living beings, to which it might be possible to refer them through the means of an association of these with the melodies in ques-

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tion. And as to the emotions which arise in the harmony of colour, it is true that the occasion of their being first perceived and afterwards reproduced may be found in the association between certain colour harmonies of the human voice and the emotions which we know are expressed by them, as, for instance, in the voices of passion, tenderness, rage, grief, complaint, menace, terror, and so on; yet even this, I think, will be found insufficient to account for the vast variety and subtilty of musical emotions arising from colour harmony, to which no one has ever heard anything corresponding in the emotional tones of actual life. Although therefore it is probable that the observation of such emotional tones of voice gave the first impulse to observe the emotional effect of colours and chords, and to use them as expressions of similar emotions; and that the origin of coloured music was in this way, and to this extent, imitative and due to association; yet it must be held also, in the second place, that the elaboration of the system of coloured music took an independent course, and produced combinations which, having no prototypes in the natural language or tones of passion, depended for their emotional element upon the natural structure and function, first of the nerves of hearing, and secondly and chiefly of that part of the nervous organism into which the sounds are finally transmitted by the ear, the cerebral hemispheres. In other words, the emotions attached to the elaborate colour harmonies of music are called forth directly by such and such parts of the cerebrum being stimulated, and in such and such ways, by the nerves of hearing, and not indirectly by the sounds calling up the image of the cause which

prompts similar sounds in one kind of instrument, that is, the image of the emotion which prompts the human voice to speak in tones of passion. Whatever may have been the case at the beginning, the emotional element of colour harmonies in the subtil music of modern times must be due directly to the organ which perceives them, and not to our connecting or associating them with the known emotions of persons uttering similar sounds.

5. This hypothesis of the source of the emotional element in colour harmony, namely, that it is due to the direct operation of the sounds upon the brain, and not to an indirect operation of them, by their calling up the representation of the emotions under which a person gives utterance to similar sounds, agrees perfectly with a fact parallel to that which it would establish, with the fact of the æsthetic pleasure taken directly by the ear in the harmony of pitches, a pleasure which certainly cannot be attributed to association. We seem to have, then, in the ear and brain an organ which is perfectly competent to perceive the emotion and pleasure of colour harmony directly, without aid from association; and it is obvious to suppose that, just as the pleasure of pitch harmony was directly perceived, so also that of colour harmony, which is only a more elaborately combined harmony of pitch, should arise directly also, and be of a shape or kind determined by the functions of the organ into which the harmonies are transmitted, the cerebral hemispheres, which, as will be seen in the following Chapter, must be or at least contain organs of emotion.

6. One great problem of musical science is to make out, as far as possible, what colour harmonies

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are pervaded by what emotions, and for what reasons, that is, in virtue of containing what component parts, from the analysis of the chords and colours themselves. I will here only venture to take a single step, and that in dependence, as everywhere in what I have said about music, upon Prof. Helmholtz in the work already quoted. Like the emotions which belong to melody, those which belong to colour harmony are of two great kinds; they are some modification either of cheerfulness or joy, or else of melancholy or grief. Exquisitely subtil as are the shades of emotion within each of these divisions, there is yet no nameable, definitely known, emotion to which they may each be referred. There is no distinctness in them, no naming them, other than this—to play or sing again the notes which are their framework. The piece of music itself, the sounds which compose it, perform a double function; they are at once the framework and the language or expression of the emotion. We must suppose, therefore, not that these frameworks of sound are carried up in redintegration into separate portions of the cerebral hemispheres appropriated to the several emotions, if any such portions there be, but that, being capable of transmission into all parts, they produce, now in one part, now in another, movements and shades of emotion, modified with infinite variety and minuteness, according to the modes of the movements transmitting or supporting them. The modifications of movement and framework of sound, common to, or under which, may be grouped, all the specific kinds of emotion, correspond to the modes of cheerfulness and melancholy which are general modes of emotion; and the specific emotions which are called up by specific

frameworks of harmony have a blunt, indefinite, or softened character, when compared to similarly specific emotions called up by means of words or pictures. They are nevertheless, at the same time, equally or even more profound, subtil, and minutely variable; and this their whole character, indefiniteness with subtilty, softness with depth, is what distinguishes them from the emotions of the other poetical arts, which live and move, as it were, in the definite and clear light of common day. Taking, then, the two general heads of cheerfulness and melancholy under which to group whatever more special musical emotions may be afterwards discriminated, we find that there are two general modes of framework, or of the combination of musical sounds, which correspond to them; and these are the Major and the Minor modes, in one or other of which all musical compositions are written. And Prof. Helmholtz has shown that the different character borne by the fundamental chord of the Minor mode, C Es G, as compared with the fundamental chord of the Major mode, C E G, is referable to the comparative deficiency of concord in its colour harmony, which again depends upon the discords in partial-tones or harmonics of its notes taken together with each other. Abschnitt 12. p. 325-8. The difference in emotional character therefore of the major and minor modes depends upon the different degrees of perfection of their colour concord.

7. If we could have singing without any words being heard, or attention strained to catch them, as is often the case in part-singing by a choir of voices, we should have music as pure as instrumental music alone is. The organ of voice is a musical instru-

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ment of great variability; and, so long as it is not employed to utter words that have definite meanings, vocal music is but one kind of instrumental. But whenever songs are set to music, or verses are delivered in recitative, or even when a title is given to a piece of instrumental music, so as to name the subject which it is intended to illustrate, a non-musical element is at once introduced. Instrumental harmony is the pure reasoning of music; the thoroughly trained lover of music not only does not require but rejects more than this as intrusive and destructive. Yet it is not unpermitted to descend from these heights of abstract music, and enjoy its combination with other kinds of poetry, the poetry of words as in the Oratorio, or words assisted by visible scenery as in the Opera. The Oratorio seems to have taken the place of the Greek tragedy, the Opera for the most part of their comedy. Both alike however reverse the position which the music held to the words in ancient times; for it will be admitted, I think, that both in modern Oratorio and Opera the music is the chief or dominant interest, while the words are employed to define and enforce the otherwise purely musical emotions. If the words and their poetry were the chief interest, to which the music was subordinate, it would be requisite that the metre and rhythm of the words should be followed by the melody, which is the metre and rhythm of music; which there is reason to believe was the case in the Greek drama, when music had not attained to harmonic maturity; whereas in the present day, as may be tested constantly, the words are divided, repeated, omitted, not so as to insist upon their beauty or force, but so as to fall in with the independently written melody

and harmony of the music. There are however instances in modern times of music being employed to illustrate poetry, and of both words and music being gainers. Such an instance is Beethoven's setting of Goethe's words "Kennst du das Land," in which equal honour is paid to words and to music. But it may be doubted whether such an alliance on equal terms between music and words is any longer possible on a large scale, such as an Opera or an Oratorio would be. The truth perhaps is, that the mind cannot be attending at one and the same time to the perfection of word poetry and the perfection of sound poetry. The development of music in modern times has given it this profound and engrossing character, placing it in an equal rank with word poetry, and for ever forbidding its combination with poetry on the same terms as in the ancient drama. For we no longer enjoy that kind of music which could be employed, at its best, to enforce and accompany without destroying the rhythm and meaning of words. If the two are combined at the present day, it must therefore be on the condition of complete subordination of one of them; and then the mind can take pleasure in the combination. The case of music being subordinated to the words and the action, in the drama at least, is of so little importance that it hardly needs mention. The employment of music in certain parts of religious services, as in chanting, intoning, and singing hymns, is more noticeable; but this is in strictness beyond the domain of poetical art. But where the music is made the dominant element of the combination, it will not be a purely musical pleasure that will be afforded; the mere fact of combination shows that the spectators require something

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more than pure music, namely, the enforcement of the purely musical emotions by dialogue, action, and scenery, in an Opera, by words descriptive of well known and interesting histories in an Oratorio. On these terms only can modern music, with its richness of colour harmony, be enjoyed, namely, either alone in purely instrumental music, or, if in combination with words and action, only on condition of these being completely subordinated to the music.

Architecture.

8. Architecture is also synthetic or constructive, but not freely. It is the lowest of the fine arts, because it is always subordinate to a use or purpose which is not only external to itself, but also often not poetical or emotional. Its poetical character rises in proportion to the purpose of the building in which it is displayed. Monuments to the dead and temples for religious worship are the kind of buildings in which the greatest scope is allowed for the emotional character of architecture to display itself freely. But so far as architecture is allowed scope, its method is that of constructive and not descriptive imagination: Solemnity, grandeur, majesty, endurance, awe, are the kinds of emotion which it is then capable of expressing, in addition to the æsthetic emotions of elegance and beauty of proportion. It impresses on its buildings, or rather expresses in them, a character or personification similar to that which mountains, trees, or landscapes, inspire us with; it is in constructive imagination what landscape painting is in descriptive; it is a creation of new visible objects in space, as music is of sounds in time. The impression made on us by noble buildings is that they have a character and personality of their own; the architect has no doubt learnt the art of impressing this per-

sonality upon them from the observation of the effect of natural objects, such as mountains and woods, on himself; this is to him what the observation of the human voice is to the constructive musician. Before either can create he must have observed and interpreted.

9. Landscape painting, historical painting, and portraiture, are all modes of analytic or descriptive imagination; they interpret nature like a commentary; the reproduction of nature is so managed as to bring out and render clear the emotion which it inspires in the artist. He gives prominence, or otherwise draws our attention, to the features in the landscape, historical event, or human figure, which have been to him the framework of some subtil emotion, often too vague for words to reproduce; and thus makes it strike the spectator in the same way. It is requisite that the spectator should have the same capacity and interest, though not the same productive power, as the artist, in order to take pleasure in such features and such emotions.

10. Constructive painting is seen in such works as Raphael's *Madonna di San Sisto*; less purely in works which border on the historical, or contain landscape, such as Titian's *Bacchus and Ariadne*. Paul Veronese stands closer still to the historical; for instance, in his *Alexander and the Family of Darius* in the National Gallery, and in his *Marriage at Cana* in the Dresden Gallery. The glory and pomp of life is however an emotion which he usually contrives to impart to his pictures; they become like a play of Shakespeare frozen into *cauvas*; and this imparting of emotion from the painter himself gives them a certain constructive character.

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Sculpture.

11. Sculpture also has both modes, constructive and descriptive; but its peculiar field is marked out for it, and distinguished from that of painting, by the nature of its material and the æsthetic laws determined by that material, as pointed out in § 18. It is in the representation of solid form, and the sense of æsthetic beauty connected with it, that sculpture differs from painting. The peculiar poetry of sculpture, therefore, the domain proper to its achievements, consists in the combination of æsthetic beauty of solid form with imitation or invention of figures and actions which depend on, or owe their poetical significance to, that special kind of beauty. The distinction, then, between the subjects proper to figure painting and to sculpture is very subtil and fine. The Dying Gladiator and the portrait statue of Demosthenes in the Vatican may be taken as instances of descriptive sculpture, the Apollo Belvedere and the Venus of the Capitol of constructive. Where sculpture attempts to imitate minutely natural or artificial objects, it enters on a field where painting can do the same work both better and at less expense of time and labour. The sculpture of drapery accordingly must be made entirely expressive of grace or majesty in movement or form, or else avoided altogether.

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language.

§ 43. 1. Poetry in its restricted and usual sense of poetical language, whether prose or verse, is the most general of all the fine arts, and covers the same ground as they do, in virtue of its instrument, language, which is the general medium of expression for everything; for instance, it covers the field of landscape painting in such verses as these, quoted by Southey from Henry More,

"Vast plains with lowly cottages forlorn,
Rounded about with the low-wavering sky,"

and Dante's

"Dolce color d' oriental zaffiro."

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In these cases of covering the same field with other arts, it has its own methods and rules, which Lessing has well distinguished in his *Laocoon*, with special reference to painting and sculpture. Yet, just as each of the other arts has a peculiar field, and can reach certain modes of emotion which no other can, so poetry also has a special field, and a very wide one, where none of the others can follow it. Wherever there is a history of definite images involved, relations of causes and consequences, trains of emotions with definite connection in their frameworks; the imagery distinguishing it from music, and the evolution in time from painting, sculpture, and architecture; there is the special domain of poetry, the art in which imaginative reasoning and emotion go hand in hand. The mind "glances from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven," and combines into one image things distant in time and space; and in its synthetic or constructive mode it is accurately described in the same passage as "bodying forth the forms of things unknown, and giving to airy nothing a local habitation and a name." None of the other arts, for instance, could produce the same effect as Hamlet's speech "To be or not to be," or as Arthur's speech to Guinevere in the *Idylls of the King*.

2. Poetry in virtue of its instrument, language, has two elements, sound and sense, the musical and the logical, inseparably combined, not separably as in Operas and Oratorios, since every word is necessarily both at once; and hence the importance of

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rhythm, metre, and verse, in poetry, because it is in these alone that the full weight can be given to emphasis and tone. All language is intended to be heard; reading and writing are in order to speaking and hearing. Tone, cadence, emphasis, rhythm, accent, are essential to all poetical language; and metre and verse besides to the greater part of it. But, of the two elements, the musical is always subordinate to the logical; and poetry is in this respect the converse of those kinds of music, Operas and Oratorios, for instance, which unite the two.

3. Poetry, like reasoning itself, contains both modes, analytic and synthetic. It depends on the starting point whether any particular piece of poetry is the one or the other, or whether it contains both at once. There is in this way a gradation in poetry from one mode to the other, through modes in which synthesis and analysis are combined in equal proportion. Three kinds of poetry are thus distinguished; first, narrative or descriptive poetry, which is analytic; second, dramatic poetry, which combines synthesis and analysis; third, lyrical poetry, which is the most completely synthetic or constructive.

4. It is in analytic or descriptive poetry that the transition from fancy to poetical imagination is most clearly traceable. The criterion distinctive of poetical imagination is the pleasure of dwelling on a reflective emotion. And this imagination in descriptive poetry works by a kind of personification, either direct personification of the object described, or description of the poet's feeling towards another person or towards such a personified object, yet very different from the personification of fancy. For instance, Byron describes Venice, in direct personification,

“Rising with her tiara of proud towers,
At airy distance, with majestic motion,
A ruler of the waters and their powers.”

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Such also are the following beautiful, though poetically venturesome, lines of Giordano Bruno, where he recalls his youth :

“Sic quondam puero mihi, Mons peramœne Cicadæ,
Cum gremium geniale tuum primæva foveret
Viscera, blandiri tua lumina sancta recordor.”

Such too is Wordsworth’s description of sleep,

“When the soft hand of sleep had closed the latch
On the tired household of corporeal sense.”

All poetical imagination is the expression of an image and an emotion together ; hence a single epithet is often sufficient to express imagination. “Plucking the *harmless* wildflower on the hill ;” “An *unsubstantial* fairy place ;” and Mrs. Barrett Browning’s “in those *devouring* mirrors,” are instances. So also is

ἐχθροῖς ἀφέντες
τὰν βαθυχθον’ αἶαν,

in the Seven against Thebes, where the cadence is equally expressive with the sense of the heartfelt fondness for the native soil. The more scope is given to the emotion derived from a previous mood of mind in describing an object, and the less attention is given to the characteristics of this object itself, the wider is the step in gradation from analytic to synthetic imagination, and the nearer we approach to the latter. An instance of predominance of such emotion is perhaps to be found in Keat’s lines,

“Charm’d magic casements, opening on the foam
Of perilous seas, in faery lands forlorn.”

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As we leave the guidance of the object itself, and modify it more and more by a previous state of emotion, we transform description either into imaginative fiction or into poetical rhetoric, and allow scope for various modes of combining the images, modes prompted by the previous emotion.

5. Three passages may be selected as instances of poetical imagination modifying the subjects treated of under the influence of a previously felt emotion. In the first we have the least change introduced into the objects described ; it stands nearest to pure description ; Prospero's words in the *Tempest* :

"be cheerful, sir.

Our revels now are ended. These our actors,
As I foretold you, were all spirits and
Are melted into air, into thin air:
And, like the baseless fabric of this vision,
The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve
And, like this unsubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a rack behind. We are such stuff
As dreams are made on, and our little life
Is rounded with a sleep."

The mild emotion of melancholy prompts the imaginative description of the world, rising in a climax from "the cloud-capp'd towers" to the "yea, all which it inherit," but interferes not with the calm intellectual vision which distinguishes and describes its features, and itself finds direct expression only at the completion of the picture. The next is from Wordsworth's *Ode to Duty*, which he thus addresses :

"Stern Lawgiver ! yet thou dost wear
The Godhead's most benignant grace ;
Nor know we any thing so fair
As is the smile upon thy face ;

Flowers laugh before thee on their beds,
 And fragrance in thy footing treads ; *
 Thou dost preserve the stars from wrong ;
 And the most ancient heavens, through Thee, are fresh
 and strong."

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Here the order and beauty of the universe are attributed to the obedience which it pays to the commands of duty imagined as a divine person. Notwithstanding that the truth of fact is preserved under the figurative expressions, notwithstanding, in other words, that the imagination is analytic or descriptive of what the poet believes to be true, namely, of the nature and effect of obedience to divine laws, it is yet penetrated through and through with emotion ; which is only done in, or by means of, the modification of natural phenomena and their laws by the emotion, that is to say, by their being represented as persons ; and the truth of essential fact is not otherwise altered than by this clothing of them in the poetical dress of personification.

The third passage is from Mr. Tennyson's *Maud* :

"There is none like her, none.
 Nor will be when our summers have deceased.
 O, art thou sighing for Lebanon
 In the long breeze that streams to thy delicious East,
 Sighing for Lebanon,
 Dark cedar, tho' thy limbs have here increased,
 Upon a pastoral slope as fair,
 And looking to the South, and fed
 With honey'd rain and delicate air,
 And haunted by the starry head
 Of her whose gentle will has changed my fate,
 And made my life a perfumed altar-flame ;
 And over whom thy darkness must have spread
 With such delight as theirs of old, thy great
 Forefathers of the thornless garden, there
 Shadowing the snow-limb'd Eve from whom she came."

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The guiding emotion is expressed in the two first lines ; and then, in the description of the tree, each image, perfect in itself, is evolved out of the one preceding it, like the coiling of a serpent as he moves, in majestic procession. Greater modification is introduced into the natural things described than even in the passage from Wordsworth ; the cedar, for instance, and the breeze are not described, in personification, as the poet really supposes them to be in truth, but only as they are for the time alone, so long as he is under the influence of that emotion. In other words, we have in these three passages a transition from almost pure description of phenomena, through a description which attempts to analyse their inmost nature, to one which is almost purely synthetical, that is, expressive of emotion in an order of redintegration not derived from the objects described, but governed by the emotion itself. In the first the imagination is redditive, giving back but slightly altered the objects as they are perceived ; in the second it is critical, penetrating into their supposed true nature, and personifying them in that ; in the third it is inventive, moulding the objects themselves, as well as personifying them, in obedience to the flow of thought stimulated by the emotion. And these differences, it must be remarked, depend upon the intensity of the emotion itself and its comparative force relatively to the purely intellectual energy combined with it ; in the first case, the emotion stimulates the perception to group the phenomena, in the second to reason about their nature, in the third to change their action ; and accordingly the first passage is the least, the third the most like the pure constructions of music, that is to say,

the first stands nearest to prose narration, the third to pure lyrical expression of emotion.

6. Descriptive poetry contains a vast group of poems which, when classed according to the magnitude or importance of their object-matter, culminate in Epic poetry. Narrative, reflective, didactic, satirical, poetry is chiefly analytic; objects or events are taken up as they are supposed to have existed or happened in actual history. Occasional pieces are for the most part to be classified with these, as, for instance, the smaller poems of Catullus, Goethe, and Landor. The epic poem, at the upper end of the scale, is poetry interpretative of the true but latent significance and grandeur of the history which it relates. Magnificence or grandeur, moral or emotional sublimity, are the characteristics of epic poetry; for instance, Virgil's

“ Veniet lustris labentibus ætas,
Quum domus Assaraci Phthiam clarasque Mycenæ
Servitio premet, ac victis dominabitur Argis.”

And

“ His ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono;
Imperium sine fine dedi.”

And this characteristic is found even in the representation of the smallest incidents by a poet who has the true epic spirit, for instance, Virgil's Circe

“ Urit odoratam nocturna in lumina cedrum,”

a most magnificent image. Among our modern prose literary writers, none, I think, has had so keen a sense for epic magnificence as De Quincey; at least, what I intend to convey by this term will be perhaps best understood by referring to his *Selections* Grave and Gay, Vol. i. Chap. iii. *Infant Literature*. But

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whenever personal character and personal history are the objects described, and yet the interest is purely poetical, it is almost impossible to avoid the dramatic form, almost necessary to allow the person to speak for himself. Mr. Browning's Paracelsus and his Historical Dramas are essentially descriptive and analytic; but since personal character, feelings, and history, are their object, they take a dramatic form. Where these are described *ab extra* by the poet himself, the interest will generally be found to be not purely poetic, but in great measure moral or didactic; for instance, the Books of Wordsworth's Excursion containing The Churchyard among the Mountains. In epic poems it is the speeches which are the chief instrument of developing the character; the Achilles of the Iliad, for instance. What narrative could give the insight into this sublime character as a line or two does which he utters himself:

Ἄλλὰ, φίλος, θάνε καὶ σύ. τίη ὀλοφύρεαι οὕτως; κατλ.

and again in the same speech:

Ἔσσεται ἢ ἡὼς, ἢ δαίλη, ἢ μέσον ἡμαρ,

Ὅππότε τις καὶ ἐμεῖο ἄρει ἐκ θυμὸν ἔλῃται.

7. Dramatic poetry is a still more complete mixture of the synthetic mode with the analytic, and this in two ways. First, the conception of the characters, and events in which they take part, is fixed in the poet's mind, and becomes to him an object to be described and interpreted as much as if it were a true history or a piece of natural scenery; but the mode in which this is effected is entirely synthetic, by letting the persons of the drama speak for themselves and inferring the action from their words. Secondly, description is not entirely excluded by this

method; the speakers describe and analyse, though the poet does not. The same speaker passes immediately, and often in the same speech, from the pure lyrical expression of his own feelings to description of events, and vice versa. The longer speeches in a play, therefore, belong for the most part to the intermediate gradations of imagination, and are modes of poetical rhetoric. This complete impersonation of many characters at once, and the necessity for exhibiting them as entire or complete persons, constituting the staple of the poem itself, and not merely coming forward to express their views or feelings on particular occasions, as in epic poetry, is what renders dramatic poetry the most arduous of all; at the same time it is the most perfect of all, since it enables the poet either to sink into pure description, or to rise into pure lyrical expression, according to his desire.

8. Where synthesis has finally won the predominance over analysis, there arises the lyrical mode of poetry. The law of succession of images is entirely derived from a previous state of emotion, which lends its warmth and colour to the objects described or introduced in the lyrical flow. But among the poems usually classed as lyrical many are very imperfectly so; most of Horace's Odes, for instance, are narrative or occasional poems. Pure synthesis is nothing but the expression of emotion, and hence the musical element is most important in lyrical poetry. Hence repetitions characterise it, as in Hebrew poetry; for instance, in the Psalms and the Song of Deborah. The emotion of the poet bursts out in vocal sound and tone, and creates images in his thought which it stimulates; and the language employed is the utterance of both at once. This is what I suppose Mr.

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Arnold to mean by the "lyrical cry." Lyrical poetry is more than music, it is the fusion of images and sounds to express a previous emotion. It is the poetry of passion, as descriptive is of emotion; but it contains all kinds as well as all degrees of passion. Command and entreaty, reproach and fury, hope, despair, and frenzy, and the passion of love, are among its burdens. Shelley is at his best in the synthetic mode; for instance, in his *Adonais* and *Epipsychidion*; though these perhaps would not usually be called lyrical, owing to the metre in which they are written. Yet they are essentially expressive of passion, as well as synthetic or constructive in their mode of redintegration; and since poems are now no longer set to music, we are at liberty, as it seems to me, to adopt the term in a new sense depending on a new distinction. The metre determines nothing. For instance, the Second Part of Mr. Arnold's *Tristram and Iseult*, beginning

"Raise the light, my page, that I may see her,"

is purely lyrical; but the discourse of Empedocles, in the same poet's *Empedocles on Etna*, is not lyrical but analytic and descriptive, while at the same time it is most beautiful and imaginative poetry. No more beautiful instance of purely lyrical poetry can, I think, be given than is offered by the closing scene of Mr. Swinburne's *Atalanta in Calydon*, e.g.:

Chorus.

O thy luminous face,
Thine imperious eyes!
O the grief, O the grace,
As of day when it dies!

Who is this bending over thee, lord, with tears and suppression
of sighs?

Meleager.

Is a bride so fair?

Is a maid so meek?

With unchapleted hair,

With unfileted cheek,

Atalanta, the pure among women, whose name is as blessing to speak.

Atalanta.

I would that with feet

Unsandalled, unshod,

Overbold, overfleet,

I had swum not nor trod

From Arcadia to Calydon northward, a blast of the envy of God.

But a fragment can give no notion of the beauty of the whole scene, still less of the whole drama to which it belongs. In dramatic dialogue the constructive, or lyrical, mode usually comes out in comparatively short bursts, as, for instance, King Lear's "I tax not you, ye elements, with unkindness," &c.; or in that passage of the *Choephoræ* of Æschylus, in which Electra, taking up the words of the Chorus, urges on Orestes the sacredness of revenge for his father's murder, a passage the intense power of which is due perhaps equally to the rhythm and cadence of the words as to the simplicity and terror of their meaning:

Chorus. τοιαῦτ' ἀκούων ἐν φρεσὶν γράφου —

Electra. Δι' ὧτων δὲ συν-
τέτραινε μῦθον ἡσύχῃ φρενῶν βάσει.
τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἔχει,
τὰ δ' αὐτὸς ὀργῇ μαθεῖν.
πρέπει δ' ἀκάμπτῳ μένει καθήκειν.

9. What is more specially called Pathos is an approach which lyrical and passionate poetry makes to reflective or descriptive. It is a certain resigna-

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tion to an universal and inevitable law, combined with pity for the special case described, that is expressed in the pathetic. For instance, Pindar's

ἀλλά τοι
ἤρατο τῶν ἀπεόντων· οἷα καὶ πολλοὶ πάθον.

And though the thought of a general law is not often found so clearly expressed as here, yet the pathetic lies always in making an appeal to a sorrow felt as universally incident to humanity; for instance, Mr. Arnold's

“Mown them down, *far from home* :”

and again Milton's

“For Lycidas is dead, dead ere his prime,
Young Lycidas, and hath not left his peer.”

10. The three well-known kinds of poetry, then, descriptive, lyrical, and dramatic, are founded, according to what has been said, upon the predominance either of analytic or of synthetic modes of redintegration, or on the union of both in equal measure. They are not the spontaneous production of a supposed lyrical, descriptive, or dramatic “faculty” in poets, but require, like other phenomena, to be accounted for, to be analysed as well as enumerated. The process of imagination itself, which has been here distinguished as either synthetic or analytic, constructive or descriptive, will need however a further analysis, which can only be given when the operations or modes of working of the mind have been analysed as functions, that is, dynamically as well as statically. The foregoing examination therefore must not be considered as finally closed. (§ 73, 1-10.)

11. I have said nothing hitherto of poetry in

prose, nor yet of the larger class of general literature. Prose may be the vehicle of poetry as well as verse, but it is very seldom that the only, or even the principal, purpose of prose literature is to be poetical; and when this is its main purpose, it is easy to apply to it what has been already said of poetry in verse. General prose literature, however, requires distinguishing from poetry on the one side, and from scientific literature on the other. Horace did not distinguish poetry from this general literature; the well-known lines,

“Aut prodesse volunt aut delectare poetæ,
Aut simul et jucunda et idonea dicere vitæ,”

give a correct picture of the scope of general literature, not of poetry in its strict sense, defined, as above, by the imagination of reflective emotion for the sole pleasure of imagining it. General literature is a great field which, while receiving daily new acquisitions from culture and discovery within its own limits, is also daily suffering encroachments from the different branches of science, as one subject after another becomes the object of accurate, methodical, investigation and verification; these are however restored again to literature when their scientific treatment is completed. Literature accordingly is distinguished from science partly by aiming at entertainment or amusement, partly by its want of a strict method of investigation and proof. It aims either at entertainment alone, or at combining it with a certain moral instruction and profit. Philosophical, political, historical, satirical, and critical essays, speeches, sermons, written dialogues, novels, and tales, compose the greater part of it. For in-

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stance, at the very head of our English literature, the beauty of their language considered, stand the Imaginary Conversations of Walter Savage Landor. Novels sometimes rise into poetry; but their aiming at amusement in the first place, which determines both what incidents are to be described and in what way, renders them essentially inferior to the greater part of poetry written in verse. To expect the finer kinds of poetry, or much of any kind of it, from novels is like expecting to get as beautiful a statue from freestone as from marble; and this not merely because they are written in prose, but also because, aiming chiefly at amusement, they are adapted not to call out the imaginative powers of the reader, but to entertain him with little call on his own mental exertion. The minute description of character and action in the best novels renders them more akin to philosophy than to poetry. Yet there are some which have a distinctly poetical effect; I should name *Wuthering Heights* as an instance. In Book II. we shall have to enumerate the little group of sciences, relating to the ways and works of man, which have been won from the field once occupied merely by general literature. But while the scientific and literary methods of treating any subject may be distinguished pretty accurately from each other, there are a number of works of different authors which it is impossible to class wholly under the one or the other category; works, for instance, which explain scientific conceptions to the general public, or which mix scientific conceptions and accurate research, in one part of their subject, with purely literary treatment of other portions of it. There are also compositions in verse which yet belong rather to literature than

to poetry. Literature holds a middle position; it cannot indeed pretend to the rank* either of pure poetry or pure science; but on the one side it is moulded by principles of Art, on the other it is the expression of the Opinion of powerful minds, that is, of an opinion which is the pioneer of science. As aiming at entertainment it is art, at truth it is knowledge; and it is to the labourers in the field of general literature that is committed the maintenance and advancement of the general or non-technical culture and education of the community.

§ 44. 1. It has been shown in § 38, that the moral sense in its operation subordinates all feelings, and all objects whatever, to two emotions which mutually sustain and interpenetrate each other, love and justice; and that it forms of these an ideal which governs the whole of life. The effecting of this subordination in thought and in act may be called the passion of morality. When this moral ideal has been formed, there arises in it another desire, the desire of feeling it in its greatest intensity, both for the sake of the feeling itself and also in order thereby to effect the subordination of feeling and action, the moral government of life, more thoroughly and securely. These two passions or desires, the one of governing life, the other of intensifying the perception of the governing ideal itself, are inseparable and mutually supporting. This latter passion is Religion; or Religion is the passion of the ideal of the moral sense; and, far from being, as sometimes thought, a mere sentiment, it is a passion which commands action and insists on perfect obedience to its law. But the intensifying of any feeling is also the attentive analysis or knowledge of that feeling; the desire of

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greater intensity can only be gratified by closer knowledge of its framework. There arises therefore a knowledge of the framework of the ideal, at the same time as the passion for it. It becomes necessary for us, then, to follow this analysis, and see what it is, and how its object is related to the Subject, whose object it is and who feels the passion for it. It is clear that this process is a mode of imagination.

2. It is not here the place to prove that every feeling or conception is real, while it exists as a feeling or conception; that the mere fact of having a particular feeling or notion is the existence of that feeling or notion as an object there and then; this has been done in "Time and Space." The question here is as to the truth of such a conception or imagination; in this case, of the ideal of the moral sense, the object of religion; that is to say, whether this ideal is necessarily permanent in consciousness, so as to arise in all cases where there is a moral sense at all, and in different shapes according to the degree or mode of development of the moral sense. The remarks in the preceding paragraph sufficiently show that some such ideal is a necessary consequence or accompanying feature of a moral sense; those which follow will be an attempt to show that the moral sense, as above described and analysed, must have an ideal of the kind now to be exhibited however feebly and imperfectly.

3. The term Revealed Religion is, as Coleridge truly said, a pleonasm; all religion is revealed. The term revelation means having become self-evident, or evident and incapable of proof. In this sense every immediate feeling, and time and space in all feelings,

are revealed. Religion is nothing else than those ultimately ideal moral facts, objects, truths, or feelings, which are revealed in this sense of the term. This may be shown from the common point of view very simply. Ask any person what he means by revelation, and he will tell you that he understands it to mean facts, objects, or truths, revealed, i. e. made known or told to us by God. That is, that there must be an author of the revelation, a particular person distinct from the thing which he makes known to us. But he cannot rest here; for ask him farther, how the existence of God, the author of the revelation, is made known to us, and he will answer—by revelation. How so, you reply, when revelation requires an author as well as a thing revealed? O, he will say, God reveals Himself to us; He is author and revelation at once. This is precisely what is meant above. The terms, That which reveals itself, or, He who reveals himself, are precisely equivalent to the term self-evident. In revealed religion, therefore, as well as in revelation generally, the thing revealed is not distinct from the author of the revelation, except as we afterwards distinguish these two parts or elements in the total object. And therefore, when it is said that things revealed are certain because they are revealed by God, this means that they are certain because they form part of a self-evident object. This object, however, in reflective emotion, is a Person.

4. The Subject, at its very entrance upon the two ways described in the first paragraph of this §, finds its religious ideal distinguished from its moral ideal, and in this way: the moral ideal consists in the perfect government of its world of thought and feeling by its emotions of love and justice; these emo-

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tions are bound to, or are bound up with, a world of actual feelings, thoughts, and actions, which together constitute the mind and its objects; but the religious ideal, consisting in the perfection, imagined as attained, of this government, consists in an image of which nothing is known but the two emotions of love and justice in an intensity of which there has been no other experience than this anticipatory one. The world or body of these two emotions is entirely provisional, because there is no limit to the changes which may be wrought by an infinite perseverance towards the attainment of the moral ideal. The "body prepared" for the religious ideal is entirely unknown. Hence, while each of the two ideals are objects of the same Subject, they are at an infinite distance from each other; the most ideally perfect man at an infinite distance from God; and yet God is, as an ideal, in the heart of the humblest man. The two ideals are like two roads running in the same direction, and towards the same goal, one of which ends at a certain point, the other continues out of sight; or like a railway and a telegraph, which travel together to the sea, which only the telegraph crosses. The religious ideal forms a part of the Empirical Ego, since it is an object of its Subject, but it is on the extreme verge of its horizon, the ideal completion of that part of it which I have ventured to name the True Ego. This sameness of the Subject of both ideals is the condition or ground of the communion of the soul with God, the act realising which communion is Prayer; the provisional character of the religious ideal is the unsearchability of God; its ideal perfection the awe-inspiring difference between God and man.

5. Let us now examine the emotions which arise in the Subject in the formation of the religious ideal. They will fall naturally under two heads, those which are felt towards the ideal itself, and those which are felt towards the mind of the Subject in comparison with, or relation to, the religious ideal. God, who is the religious ideal, is the framework of the emotions which are felt, as it is said, towards him. In respect of his love we must feel love ; as it is said by St. John, "We love Him, because He first loved us." In respect of his justice we must feel a certain intense admiration, for that is the name of emotion which is excited by beauty or equity of form. Love and admiration when combined together are the complex emotion of Worship. The emotions felt towards our own mind in contemplation of, or relation to, God are intensifications of those of the moral sense itself ; they are two, and both refer to past actions or to the present state of the mind ; the first is Sin, the intensification of remorse ; the second the sense of justification or approval in God's sight, which is the intensification of good conscience.

6. The emotions just described, worship, sense of sin, sense of justification, I will call the primary religious emotions ; they are emotions which arise in the framework of the religious ideal, in our contemplation of God. But when we reflect farther upon the relation in which we stand to God, upon the consequences to be drawn from these emotions, as now exhibited, we necessarily arrange them in somewhat varying ways, and experience emotions correspondingly various. The reasonings which we enter on about these primary emotions exhibit aspects of the framework which have their corresponding emo-

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tional elements. And these emotional elements and their frameworks are the attributes of God, being second intentions of the primary qualities and emotions which are his essence or nature. In the first place, referring the emotions of love and justice to their second intentions or categories, we find them to be respectively the perfections of feeling and knowledge; but these perfections in combination are perfect power; for perfect power is known only by its modes of exertion in time, in the succession or combination of objects or of images. We characterise God, therefore, as the union of the perfections of Feeling, Knowledge, and Power; these being all second intentions, and the third having existence only in the combination of the other two. See on these points "Time and Space" § 71. In the next place we imagine God as taking account of ourselves, that is, of our minds, and of our thoughts and feelings as well as actions. His knowledge of us is necessarily imagined as more perfect than our own knowledge of ourselves. Hence we cannot, and as a fact never do, expect to escape his knowledge. To think we could would be to think we could escape ourselves. And in exact proportion to our self-knowledge is the inevitable power of our own conscience. Again, his love towards us is the love of a superior to an inferior; it is perfect, but it is mercy. When we reflect on our emotions towards him, as on his towards us, under the same general heads of knowledge, feeling, and power, the knowledge which we have of him, the intellectual part of our state of mind, or the subjective aspect of the framework of the religious ideal, is Faith; the emotional element remains the same as before and is worship; in which

however love is the element common to our feelings towards God and towards men; the emotion of which the perception of his power is the framework is Hope. The three distinctive religious virtues, faith, hope, and charity, thus flow directly from the contemplation of God as the Ideal Object of the religious emotions. Of these, faith, which, as just shown, is the intellectual or cognitive aspect of the emotion which we feel towards God, as love is its emotional aspect,—for every state of consciousness is or contains at once both form and matter, feeling and cognition,—is subject to an ambiguity in the term, so important as to require special notice. This, with similar ambiguities in the terms sanction and prayer, which will be noticed farther on, is the root of the greatest part of theological controversy, at least of such as turns on the deeper points of religion.

7. The term faith is often taken to mean belief on insufficient evidence of facts or statements not self-evident; and this is represented to be a religious duty. It is clear that it is not the same as the faith above described, which is the apprehension of a self-evident Ideal Object of perfect love and justice. But in truth it is neither a religious duty nor even a duty at all; and to make a duty of it introduces a contradiction into the very fontal conception of religion. That which is not matter of choice cannot be matter of duty, for the duty of doing or not doing anything supposes that we have the power of doing or omitting it. Now whatever rests on proof, whatever is of an intellectual character, whether it be regarded as the clothing or framework of an emotion or taken independently as a fact of history or doctrinal statement, is not open to choice; we may

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choose whether we will enquire into it farther than at present or not, but, in either case, the shape it assumes is forced upon us by the evidence which we have, and belief follows closely and inseparably upon the evidence, its firmness varying with the cogency of the evidence. To make an intellectual matter, therefore, a duty is to set human nature at variance with itself. It would indeed not be inconsistent or contradictory to suppose a duty to abstain from further enquiry; but this would not carry the duty to believe the doctrines already reached; it would let them be destroyed without replacing them, and land us in complete uncertainty. It would consequently be the most hopeless of tasks to show that there was a duty to abstain from further enquiry, which would, in religion, be equivalent to maintaining that God loved darkness rather than light. It follows that the evidence of a fact or statement being true, whether it is immediate or inferential evidence, is a negative or limiting condition of a duty to believe that fact or statement. Whatever it is a duty to believe must be evident and certain intellectually; whatever it is and always will be a duty to believe must be necessarily and permanently evident and certain. The duty itself of believing any fact or statement in religion springs solely from the emotion of which it is the framework, and lasts only so long as it is inseparably connected with that emotion. For instance, the belief in the existence of God himself is a religious duty only so long as it is self-evident as a fact and inseparable from the ideal religious emotions which have supreme moral validity. The duty to believe it arises not from its being evident, nor yet in spite of its want of evidence, but from the nature

of the emotions which it embodies. In other words, it is part of the source of duty itself, and is not a duty derived from any higher source.

8. The duties of religion, except so far as the religious emotions themselves are duties, or have validity of their own, are no others than those of morality. Religion, or the religious emotions, are both their own sanction and the sanction of the duties of morality; a sanction not by the imposition of rewards and punishments, but by the elevation and intensity of feeling. The so-called sanctions of law derive this name from the awe, or fear, or intensity of feeling, whether pleasureable or painful, which the connection of reward or punishment with any act attaches to that act in mental association, so as either to encourage or deter. As a term of law it is derived from religion, or from religious emotions, and must therefore not be allowed to lose its significance when imported back again from law to religion. It is a mistake to say that religion has no duties but those of morality which it enforces; the religious emotions are duties of themselves and are their own sanction; but they cannot be enforced by anything not themselves. It is true that in this respect morality differs from law, all laws being commands imposed by sovereigns and sanctioned by penalties separate from the commands themselves; but the logic of law is totally insufficient for application to the object-matter of morality, much more therefore of religion. The imagined pains of hell and pleasures of heaven can add no weight to the validity of the moral or religious law; and all such notions, when regarded in the light of sanctions, are entirely non-religious, foreign, and alien to its nature.

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9. Whenever we use the word God, it has some connotation, some meaning; for instance, when it is said that Christ is God, there must be a meaning in the term God, as well as in the term Christ. Many persons however use this term as if it had only a denotation, a designative force. Yet some connotation it must necessarily have. The question is, what connotation? The foregoing paragraphs of this § have been an attempt to show its true connotation. Those who like words in ism will probably call the result, being the Unity of a Personal God, Monotheism. The value of the doctrine of Monotheism has been but dimly seen. It is often supposed to rest on, and to be the expression of, the insight into the fundamental unity of the laws of physical nature, the interdependence of which required the assumption of a single principle of relation between them, and thus to be a doctrine capable of being reached by intellectual processes alone, and, in religion, the natural result or issue of polytheism. The Greeks, it may be said, developed their polytheism, by the aid of science and philosophy, into monotheism; and this is true so far as monotheism rests on a speculative or intellectual basis only; Stoicism was the reduction of moral laws under the same conception. But the emotional element in monotheism has been less attended to. Monotheism was a much earlier and more spontaneous product of the Hebrew people than of the Greek; and among the Hebrews it does not seem to rest upon the development of the intellectual but of the emotional element in their character. They had not a sort of "faculty" for monotheism; but their strong emotional nature, their interest occupied chiefly by the moral side of things, was the

fountain head from which flowed the conception of a single, personal, moral, creator and ruler of the world. Now the great value of monotheism for mankind consists not in the intellectual but in the moral unity which characterises it; it is the unity not of physical but of moral laws, not of laws of nature but laws of volition, which is its chief claim to our regard; the harmonising of the springs of action, of the various conflicting emotions and passions, by subordinating them, not to a mere law without, or with only a prudential, content, but to a supreme and absorbing emotion, the love of God. Henceforth emotion was not opposed with equal right to emotion, passion to passion, as under the Greek polytheism we may see to have been the case, as, for instance, the passions under the protection of Aphrodite to those under the protection of Artemis; see Euripides' Hippolytus; but the unity of man's emotional and passional nature was proclaimed as a duty, and its attainment made possible, by the bringing to light this one master passion, the love of God. It was a real and important advance, a new thing in human development, and at the same time one which was an evolution from, and a deeper discovery of, some hitherto secret springs of his nature. The Hebrew race indeed only gradually attained to conceive of this moral law as one springing from within, not imposed from without; as a law of liberty not a law of bondage; as spirit not as letter; as Gospel not as Law; as a law of love and not a law of terror; as the voice of conscience not a legal ordinance; as spiritual not as carnal; as a law of living faith not of dead works; all which terms are properly significative of one and the same great cardinal distinction.

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And it is only in this its true shape as a law of liberty that the moral law has valid and eternal dominion. This was the religion of Christianity as Jesus of Nazareth conceived and preached it; and this it is which makes that religion irreversibly true, the truest of all religions, namely, that in this characteristic it incorporated into its very essence the germ of an infinite development. We live at a time of reawakening; there is a shaking of many foundations; the dawn of a new era had been announced by poets and prophets long before its features could be even dimly seen by analysts; shall we have to pay,—in the new construction which must come,—shall we have to pay for past corruptions by the sweeping away with them of these conceptions of conscience and of God? Surely it is not possible.

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§ 45. 1. The two roads spoken of above have been hitherto represented as going in the same direction; but the sameness of direction is not a sameness in all respects. The direction is the same in this respect, that the end desired and tended towards is the same in kind of emotion and of framework. The direction is not necessarily the same in point of situation of its end objectively in time. Moral progress, the first of the two roads, is progress forwards in time both in order of existence, or actual history, and in order of cognition; but religious progress, the second of the two roads, being imaginative, is in this respect to be considered as progress only in order of cognition; its end or object may therefore lie objectively in the infinite distance of past as well as of future time, at the beginning as well as at the end of history. If we suppose, for a moment, the end of the first progress attained, by perfect actual union with

God, it may be supposed also then to turn out that we have attained union with what was from the very beginning, or existed in past time, as far back in time from the starting point as we should then have gone forwards from it. There is nothing in the nature of the case against this supposition; it is not contradictory, since the religious progress, so far as it is imaginative, is a progress only in order of cognition, and only its realisation is a progress in order of history as well. We shall presently enquire what conceptions or phenomena there are which bear out such a supposition as the present, namely, that the Ideal Object of religion is Eternal, or infinite in existence in time both a parte ante and a parte post, and the same in kind at both ends of the imagined progression, as far as we can reach by thought into infinity either way.

2. The Ideal Object, on such a supposition, would appear at the beginning of the time as the complex of causes out of which, and at the end of it as the complex of effects into which, the world was evolved; to the world it would be at once the ἀρχή and the τέλος τῆς κινήσεως, and, in both characters alike, the world itself, implicitly. Take on the other hand the world itself, the intermediary between these two ends, and it is those ends, which are the same end in kind, explicitly; but inasmuch as it moves only forwards in order of history, from beginning to end, and not at the same time backwards, from end to beginning, it exhibits only the progress towards, and not the progress from, the final goal. The progress from the final goal can only be imagined in that part of the order of history which is the order of cognition. In the order of cognition we who follow that

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order, and while we follow it, may conceive that a progress of evolution and disintegration, to speak figuratively, of the Ideal Object has taken place, into a perfect Chaos or what would seem so if we could imagine it; and that then out of this Chaos has been evolved, from a point which we may call creation, the world of history, up to the point at which we, the imagining observers, are standing. But inasmuch as we cannot imagine the world or the body of the Ideal Object in the infinite future, except by the mere provision that there must and will be such a world or such a body, so also, and a fortiori, in the past we are unable to imagine the steps of disintegration of such a world and such a body, steps by which it advanced to the perfect Chaos which was imagined as the point of reintegration or creation.

3. I have said that we can or may imagine such an evolution and resolution, disintegration and reintegration, as the above; that is, that there is no contradiction involved in it. The Alpha and Omega of the entire progress will be the same in point of nature and one in point of number; different only in point of time of appearing in the same shape. Yet there will and can be no repetition, no cycle of changes, recurring on itself; for this reason, that the movement both forwards and backwards, in both directions, is infinite; the term is taken only by us, the limit is imposed by our present capacities of knowing and feeling. Beyond the Ideal Object, as we at present conceive it, there does lie, as we cannot but think, an infinite time and an infinite progress of modes of consciousness; and however far we could reach, still this would be the case, for time is necessary to, or inseparable from, consciousness,

of which it is the form. How far soever we can go forwards, so far precisely we can go backwards, in time ; each stage or object in the one is the mirror of a counterpart in the other ; and in neither is there a beginning before or beyond time. All that is known lies between the two points, the Ideal Object in the future and the reflexion of that same Object in the past ; and whatever stage of development is contemplated, whether in the reintegration which is imagined as actual history, since the point of creation, or in the disintegration which is imagined to precede creation, that stage contains explicitly, in some mode of explication, the same Ideal Object ; and contains also implicitly whatever may lie beyond that Ideal Object in infinite time, either prior or posterior. For the Ideal Object has been so imagined and defined in the preceding § as to include in itself, by its very definition, all the forces and powers of the universe, both physical and conscious, by the elimination or transformation of some, and the subordination of others to the supreme motive principles of love and justice, so that there remains nothing that is not subservient to these principles either consciously as volition, or unconsciously as mechanism of physical nature ; the perfection of Power in the Ideal Object consists in, and can be imagined only by imagining, the perfection of this subordination.

4. Again I repeat that in all this I can see no contradiction ; it is possible to thought and imagination. But the question remains, what grounds there are for supposing that this imagination is a true mode of conceiving phenomena. I think that there are such grounds, and that they can be ex-

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hibited as follows. It is impossible to get rid of the conception of Design in nature ; for, whether it is conceived as imposed on the objects of sense by our minds, or as gathered by our minds from those objects as already theirs, it is equally in nature ; and if imposed by our minds, still our minds are a part of nature, and how came this to be the nature of our minds ? Now this conception of Design is applicable to every phenomenon without exception, to what are called inorganic as well as to organic phenomena, for all stand related to each other. But it is not only from the universality of the applicability of the conception that I shall argue, but from its analysis which shows the ground of that universality. In its nature and analysis, Design is nothing else than the statical mode of regarding phenomena ; and every phenomenon regarded statically, or as a whole, is organic, or exhibits design, reference of one part to another, and of the parts to the whole. Dynamically, phenomena exhibit succession and change, but no design ; design is found whenever a comparison is made or relation perceived of two or more points in the succession ; and this is to take the phenomena statically, or together. Time alone is the foundation of the dynamic mode of existence or consciousness ; space is the foundation of the static mode ; and a portion of time may be treated statically by marking it out from the rest of time by any two points in its content. A line of space has two ends ; a surface has at the least three sides ; a solid at the least four. All these exist only in reference to each other. The phenomena are organic or designed. The characteristic of design therefore is, that the beginning implies the end, though we may

not know in what the end will consist; the beginning is implied in the same way, if we know the end and treat it as a part of some whole, or statically. The same holds good of the very largest object we can conceive or imagine; for the static and dynamic modes of thought and imagination are founded in the formal element of consciousness itself, in time and in space, and we cannot transcend them. In regarding, therefore, the Ideal Object of religion in relation to the universe of thought, we necessarily treat the two together as statical, and this means mutually implying each other. At every point in the progression of consciousness and of history, which are existence, the End is implied; it is present at the beginning as at the end. But in what way we shall imagine this implicit presence to have realised itself in its explication, or in actual existence of history, this is a question comparatively, and for our present purpose entirely, immaterial and unimportant. I lay, therefore, no stress whatever upon the images I have employed above, the sameness of characteristics in the beginning and in the end, the disintegration into Chaos, and the reintegration out of Chaos again. I affirm only that the Ideal Object of religion is eternal; ever present in the universe, at every point of time and of space, when we regard the universe statically; and that the statical mode of regarding it is a necessity of consciousness.

§ 46. 1. The foregoing considerations tend to prove the compatibility of religion with philosophy and philosophy with religion; for they remove the difficulties which have hitherto beset the connection from a double source, first from a basis of belief in God having been sought in philosophy at all, and

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secondly, in a philosophy the ultimate logic of which consisted either in the imperfect notion of cause and effect, the contradictory one of a first or uncaused cause, or the illusory one of an ontological Substance, or Ding-an-sich, with its attributes or properties. But they do not base religion itself upon philosophy, or any of the forms of man's knowledge; they show, or attempt to show, that it is based, by nature or by God himself, upon the emotional nature of man. The philosophical forms which it may assume or combine with from time to time are like a dress which it may wear or put off as the state of our knowledge may compel; but the emotions of love and of justice are continual and imperative, and, so far as we can see, eternal. Men, even religious men, have usually, all but universally, sought to base religion in some supposedly true system of philosophy. One man finally and for ever, following in the steps and repeating the words of his predecessors, Hebrew prophets, of whom he himself was the greatest, took the opposite course,—Jesus of Nazareth. "In vain do they worship me, teaching for doctrines the commandments of men." In the scope and spirit of this denunciation are included not only practical and ceremonial observances, which were its immediate occasion, but all doctrines whatever so far as they bear an intellectual character. They are always non-religious, and, when they obscure religion, anti-religious. Religion is not philosophy but "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and all thy mind and all thy strength, and thy neighbour as thyself." "I will have mercy and not sacrifice;" therefore, not philosophy. This was the whole purpose, scope, and spirit, of his teaching. Not one

word did he utter in favour of the necessity of believing intellectually any doctrine* whatever. Yet no sooner was the great teacher laid in his grave, than there began to grow up, around him and around his teaching,—the impulse to which growth was the very love and admiration which his life and teaching had inspired,—a web of philosophy and theoretical doctrine, held as a necessary part of religion, and of a religion called by his name whose life had been devoted to clearing religion from similar webwork. To do him the more honour we have been undoing his work; in his own name we have been disobeying him.

2. When we reflect upon this we understand why it must have been so. The reason lies in the relation of the emotional to the cognitive element in consciousness, in the causes which make one comparatively unalterable, the other comparatively accrescent and progressive. This at first sight appears to conflict with the inseparability and complete correspondence of emotion and its framework; but it is not so. The intensity of religious emotion, as of all feelings, is not communicable to others so as to be felt by them; the quality corresponding to it in its framework is the vividness of the image; and it is the precise parallel to intensity or a high degree of intellectual power, the quality corresponding to which in the framework is clearness and distinctness of parts, or of their relation to other frameworks. Both kinds of intensity, the emotional and the intellectual, are alike incommunicable; both alike influence the disciples by inspiring affection and veneration for the master personally. But there is this difference, that the vividness in the one case has no

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separate framework or part of the framework appropriated to it, while the clearness and distinctness in the other case are changes in the framework, separate additions to it, which can be expressed in words, and the knowledge of them communicated to men of less intellectual power. Hence the progressiveness of knowledge, science, philosophy, in contrast to the non-progressiveness of intellectual power and emotional vigour, the work of knowledge being carried on by all workers who add each his own separate elaboration. To use Bacon's image, the disciples are dwarfs, but dwarfs standing on the shoulders of a giant. Now it is the framework of the emotion of the great Master of those who feel that his disciples have taken up and elaborated, but without its vividness; a framework founded in great part upon the very words of the master himself, since he necessarily used the images, shared the intellectual beliefs, and expressed them in the language, which were current in his day. His disciples think that in elaborating the framework they are obeying the commands of the master; but surely they misconceive him; it was not these images, this framework, this philosophy, for which he cared, but his aim was to set religion free from being trammelled by any framework whatever.

3. I am far from saying that there is no progress in emotion, moral and religious; but the great groups or kinds of emotion are to be compared to the great kinds of classes of science, such as those, for instance, which form Comte's hierarchy of the sciences. In both these cases the list of kinds is complete; further changes, the arising of new emotions in the one, of new sciences in the other, will be by compo-

sition and recomposition of sciences and of emotions which lie within the limits thus marked out, by more complete organisation of matters already comprehended generally or provisionally. This in the case of the emotions will be to render them more numerous, more complicated, and more subtil. Their greater vividness or intensity will remain, as hitherto, the prerogative of the great religious teachers, as intellectual power of the great scientific and philosophical leaders. History exhibits an illustrious series of Masters of either kind, majestic in their sublime isolation, like mountain summits unknown to the dwellers at their base, but communing with each other in mutual sympathy and comprehension. But while in the series of the great chiefs of intellect there is no strongly marked superiority of one over another, but all, so far as we can judge them, are equals in dignity and power, in that of religion and morality there is One, Jesus of Nazareth, to whom all the rest do homage, as their Master and Lord, in right of an immeasurable preeminence.

§ 47. 1. Let us now turn back to the consideration of the provisional nature of the embodiment of the Ideal Object of religion. Love and justice are personal qualities, but it is impossible for us to imagine these emotions alone as constituting by themselves an entire or complete person. Hence the immateriality and unsearchability of God, since the remaining qualities of his personality are, by his very definition, unknown to us, and are therefore completely provisional. When however we wish to realise him in thought and feeling, which is a process of imagination idealising truly, we are led by a natural tendency to supply in imagination some embodiment

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to complete the image. Dante and Milton have, as poets, taken the physical object Light to serve as this embodiment. Every such choice of object is confessedly poetical and arbitrary. But in the natural tendency to make the choice lies the connection between religion and mythology, poetry, idolatry, worship of heroes, ancestors, and departed friends; or, to express the same thing more generally, between religion itself and particular religious systems. It is not true to characterise all such worship and such imagination as irreligious, or even as non-religious. It has one basis in religion itself, that is, in the religious emotions as they are felt from time to time, or in those emotions which are from time to time felt as religion, and another in the tendency to realise, which is apparently ineradicable in man's nature. But all such imagination must be strictly criticised, in order not only that it may have its objects truly compatible with the true Ideal Object, but also that it may not substitute for that its own objects, but that, to use St. Paul's expression, "God may be all in all." Most, if not all, religious systems have split upon this rock; they have identified an Actual with an Ideal, and therefore involve a logical contradiction. But the selection of such an embodiment can be no arbitrary choice, no merely poetical imagination; it is the religious imagination which makes it, and the embodiment when selected becomes to the mind the manifestation of the Ideal Object of religion, that is, of God himself. If there is an arbitrary or merely poetical choice, the embodiment selected will not be to the mind the manifestation of God, and will not secure belief. The Christian Church has selected a single man, a real person in

history, as the manifestation of God; that man who was the founder of the Church, and who in his own person manifested to his disciples the combination of love and justice in their purest and intensest shape, so that the manifestation was to them originally, and is still to their successors, the revelation of a new life. It was the character of Jesus Christ, displayed in his ministry, which was the actually determinant cause, in history, of imprinting in the conscience of mankind the perception of justice and love as the essential characteristics of God; that is, it was the revelation of God to mankind in that character. And therefore it remains, so long as that perception shall last, its purest realisation and embodiment.

2. If the question is asked, as it is not only necessary but just that it should be, What are the characteristics which define or constitute for us at the present day the person of Jesus of Nazareth, the answer must be something like the following. It is he who gave the precepts known, in their collected form, as the Sermon on the Mount, together with many other of the precepts, exhortations, and parables, which are found in the three synoptic Gospels; whose life corresponded completely to his words; thinking no evil, forgiving, fearless, tender, desiring the love and tenderness of others; who in some form or other instituted the Lord's Supper; who finally suffered crucifixion as the consequence of his adhering to the law of his life; and these are all points which historical criticism, so far at least as I am acquainted with it, not only does not overthrow, but tends strongly to establish. We know in fact, from the testimony of Papias, preserved by Eusebius, that Matthew made a collection of λόγια, and that Mark

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wrote the things said and done by Christ; these are no doubt comprised in the two first Gospels as we read them at present; and to these Luke may have added other trustworthy notices. (See Prof. J. H. Scholten's work *Das älteste Evangelium*, translated into German by Dr. Redepenning.) And it must be remembered, that, whatever might be the difficulties in establishing such points as those mentioned above by a consideration of the Gospels alone, as we read them at present, owing to their many discrepancies, their close interweaving of the miraculous in the narrative, and the uncertainty of the dates of their composition, we are yet compelled to assume, as a fact preliminary to the criticism of these documents, that the person of whom they speak was not only an actual person in history, but also one of a most impressive moral and religious character, from the fact of the formation, in his name, of the closely united Church immediately after his death, and from the firmly held beliefs about him in that church, particularly the belief in his resurrection. But this very dependence on, or necessity of appealing to, actual history, and the evidence of particular facts, shows the essential difference between the adoption of this or any other embodiment of the great Ideal Object of religion and faith in, or worship of, that Ideal Object himself; for the latter excludes all inferential evidence, being immediately certain and self-evident. Still, whatever the embodiment, it becomes invested, in the eyes of those who have chosen it, and by the very fact of choice, with some of the attributes of divinity, that is, becomes an object of worship, of faith, and of prayer, a mediation or a mediator between God and the man who seeks to approach him

under this image. Some of these attributes are the consequence of the choice of the worshipper, some are inherent in the object chosen, and are the reason for the choice. The secret of the power which Jesus of Nazareth exerts over individual men lies in the nature of the love which he offers; they hold him to be divine because he offers a divine affection, that is, an affection unconditioned except by the condition of return; superior to every consideration of unworthiness, of disgrace, and even of self-condemnation and remorse; an affection as unmixed as that of a mother, yet not like that involuntary, or which will not hear of shame, but one that faces and overcomes shame in its own strength, knowingly, in order to annihilate it for ever. The moral grandeur of Jesus Christ in this respect is, so far as I know, entirely without a parallel in history; but it is a grandeur which the facile admission of his divinity tends to conceal, by leading us to regard it as a matter of course.

3. Prayer, it has been already said, is the volitional moment or act of communion between the worshipper and the person worshipped. As in the case of the term sanction, so, in that of prayer, the term includes two things, religious and non-religious prayer. It is only the latter which is used as a means of attaining some desired object. Whenever, and so far as, we prefer a request as a means of attaining what we wish for, we are not praying in the religious sense of the term. Yet religious prayer often takes the form of a request, "Give us our daily bread" for instance. The explanation of this is, that prayer is the expression of a strongly felt wish; but the expression of this wish is always combined, in

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religious prayer, with the feeling of resignation. The combination of the two images thus wrought in the mind of the worshipper is the end and purpose of prayer. In all strong feelings which are approved by the moral sense, religious prayer is the natural expression of them; in feelings of joy, of whatever kind, the prayer becomes thanksgiving,—the expression of gratitude; in doubt, or on the entering upon any hazardous undertaking, prayer becomes the expression of a wish with resignation; in grief, from whatever cause arising, it becomes an outpouring of complaint; but in all cases alike it is the drawing near in thought, the energetic reproduction in imagination, of the person prayed to, along with renewed dwelling on the objects which occupy our own feelings at the time. The answer to prayer consists in the increase of the joyful emotions, the decrease of the painful ones, either immediately or after an interval; and this is the end or purpose which the prayer itself desires; this and not the obtaining a request is the *τέλος* of the act. This answer is as certain to follow as the effect on its cause in any of the most certain successions of events in the physical world. It is one case among those which constitute the general law, that voluntary mental energy is accompanied by a certain general mode of pleasure which is its inseparable reward. It may be said that the whole of religion is contained in prayer.

4. It is a feature in religion that doubt and sorrow, whether for calamity from without, or for moral evil in ourselves, are much more readily the beginning of religion than is any form of joy. The call of the preacher is responded to most gladly by those who suffer and by those who repent. This by no means

proves that religion, even in its sublimest moods, is not suitable to, or the natural completion of, the joyful emotions. The reason why it is less frequent in them is this, that the effort of imagination requires a stimulus, and in most men a very powerful one, to exertion. Joy is of itself, when an object is enjoyed, a reason for resting in the same kind of satisfaction as that of the present moment. Neither the effort of thought in any shape, nor that of poetical imagination, is willingly made when we are in the full enjoyment of ease, wealth, and prosperity; a circumstance which must have immense weight in contributing to the decay of prosperous nations and societies. Again, continued or habitual solitude, the isolation from the usual intercourse of common life, so as to throw the mind back upon itself, is an almost necessary condition for really enjoying the most highly imaginative poetry; only in such a way can the mind bend itself to meet the poet on the imaginative heights which he treads, or obtain an insight into the emotional secrets which he describes. Again, sorrow and isolation and disgrace intensify the feeling of tenderness towards those friends whom we have, and the heart bounds towards them with eagerness. Shakespeare's well-known sonnet, .

“When in disgrace with fortune and men's eyes
I all alone beweepe my outcast state, &c.”

and many others which might be cited, is ample proof of this emotional law. The tenderness in religious love is increased by similar circumstances; and, where these are wanting, the effort to kindle it must be proportionately greater. Wherever this effort is made in such circumstances, not by artificial stimulants, but

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by continued reflection and watchfulness, the blessing is proportionate to the effort. That religion is the crown and completion of all emotions, joyful as well as painful, is shown by this, that religion alone of all the great passions is calm and peaceful; it is a passion, yet not uneasy.

§ 48.
Retrospect.

§ 48. 1. One word in retrospect over the whole subject of religion. No attempt has been made here to prove that religion is true, but only to analyse it and state the result. Religion, like sense, is immediate feeling, and every feeling has its own object or framework, as I have called it, inseparably combined. The truth of religion consists in the permanence of the feeling together with its own framework, under the clearest light that can be thrown on it by historical investigation and analysis, and by new experience in the future. The fact of its permanence must speak for itself. It is useless to try to prove that such and such an object *ought* to be the object of religion; the only question is this, what object *is* so. To discover this, it is requisite to analyse correctly religion as an emotion, for this analysis gives emotion and framework at one and the same time. There are no accidents, *συμβεβηκότα*, in religion. In this as in all cases, the connection between emotion and framework is necessary matter. If a different framework is substituted, on whatever grounds, a different emotion will be found pervading it. Everything depends on the emotion which is in view when religion is spoken of. Now it will be seen, perhaps objected, that I have gone to the Christian Scriptures, the writings of the New Testament, for the account of what religious emotion is. It is true that I have done so, and for this reason, that I find among them the expression of

feelings and of truths which, as Coleridge said, "find me," that is, approve themselves immediately to my mind as accurate and true, in a way which no other writings do, except such perhaps as have drawn their inspiration from the same source. For a precisely similar reason I go to Plato, Aristotle, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, for the expression of the profoundest insight into the truths of philosophy. I know no criterion of truth, such that it can infallibly decide *now* what will be true *hereafter*. We are all seekers of truth, workers towards truth; we take whatever immediately approves itself to our minds, and endeavour to harmonise it into a consistent whole. Of what will be true hereafter we can now say only this, that it will be a consistent whole, for that is part of the definition of what we are seeking; but whether this mass of facts, or that mass of facts, as we now hold them, will form part of that consistent whole which we anticipate,—of this there is no infallible criterion at hand.

2. Turning our view back upon the whole course of this Chapter, the question which I would suggest is this, does or does not the analysis performed in it bear out the view stated in § 39, that the meaning of this world which we inhabit consists in the feelings, and chiefly among them in the emotions; not in the formal part of existence or consciousness, or in the frameworks of the emotions? Purely speculative or logical objects, that is, objects which are defined by formal or logical relations, such as are τὸ εἶν, τὸ ὄν, force, power, substance, cause, first cause, all of which must be conceived as ontological or absolute objects, since they are the union of formal relations alone into some supposed empirical or complete object, cannot

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yield any satisfactory truth ; and for this reason, that whatever truth they possess is purely formal, and not formal and material in union. The material element in consciousness or existence is Feeling ; and of feeling there are two great kinds, sensation and emotion. While sensations alone, and not the form in which they appear, give the meaning, nature, or content, of the objects called from them objects of sense, the emotions on the other hand give the meaning, nature, or content, of objects of representation, so far as they are representations and not presentations.

TABLE OF REFLECTIVE AND IMAGINATIVE EMOTIONS.

Group 1. The poetical emotions.

Group 2. The religious emotions.

Primary : Worship, Sin, Sense of justification.

Secondary : Faith, Hope, Charity.

CHAPTER III.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

ANALYSIS OF ACTION, OR MOVEMENT OF FEELING.

Ὡς γὰρ ἐκάστῳ ἔχει κρᾶσις μελέων πολυκάμπτων,
τῶς νόος ἀνθρώποισι παρῆστηκεν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτό
ἔστιν ὅπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισι
καὶ πᾶσιν καὶ παντί· τὸ γὰρ πλεόν ἐστὶ νόημα.

Parmenides.

§ 49. 1. AFTER the analysis and classification of the various kinds of feeling, which is an enquiry into their nature, comes the enquiry into their origin and history, which is an analysis of their movement and action, and of their modes of combining with each other, together with an assignment of their causes; and this method of procedure is in accordance with the precept and practice of Auguste Comte, in making dynamical investigations always follow statical. This throws us back at once upon the physiology of the nervous organism, since the immediate cause both of feeling and changes in feeling is found in the nervous organism alone. Feelings are not the causes of

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feelings ; there is no causation between them ; the series of feelings which constitutes a life can be arranged in a classified order, but the former members of the series do not contain the cause of the later members. Neither do feelings react upon, or contain the causes of, subsequent states of the nervous organism upon which other feelings depend. The sequences and combinations of feelings form, as it were, a kind of mosaic picture, the separate stones of which both support the picture and keep each other in their places ; the stones are the states of the nervous organism, the colours on the stones the states of consciousness which are supported by the nerve states. The states of consciousness, the feelings, are effects of the nature, sequence, and combination, of the nerve states, without being themselves causes either of one another or of changes in the nerve states which support them. In enquiring, therefore, into the origin and laws of movement of feelings or states of consciousness, the nature and modes of action of the nervous organism and its various parts are the first object of investigation ; and the origin and laws of movement of feeling will be so far only explained as we may succeed in attaching them to their proper causes in the nature and working of the nervous organism. I have not now to argue the point, that the origin of consciousness is to be found only in the nervous organism ; that was done in "Time and Space," Chapter iii. But that all subsequent changes in consciousness are due only to changes in the nervous organism, so far as this is not a logical consequence or corollary of the former point, must be here assumed, as at any rate the only hypothesis in accordance with it, and must expect

its further confirmation from its application to the facts of consciousness, which application is the purpose of the present Chapter. (See the argument in § 57.)

2. It should not be thought surprising that causation is denied to states of consciousness. Causation exists, so far as scientific investigation has made out, only between objects of a single class, namely, objects or portions of matter which are visible and tangible. Atoms, molecules, and masses, which are such portions of visibility and tangibility combined, are the only things between which that action and reaction takes place which we call causation. Everything else is an effect of this action and reaction, without being in its turn a cause, or reacting upon it. Everything else is thought to be explained when it can be shown to be a case of the action and reaction of atoms, molecules, or masses. The various forces in nature are held to be cases of such action and reaction; the mechanical, the chemical, the physical, the vital, forces are all held to be modes of change in the relations of atoms, molecules, or masses, to each other. One kind of visible and tangible matter, nerve substance, which is one of the seats of vital forces, or the motions in which are some mode or modes of life, is also the seat of sensation or consciousness, and the motions in it are followed by consciousness. The more finely organised this nerve substance is, and the more minutely complex, interdependent, and individualised, its motions are, so much the more complex and organic is the system of states of consciousness which arises from them. And from our knowledge of this system we can reason back to the states of nerve substance upon which it depends; and it becomes in

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
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fact one kind of evidence or *causa cognoscendi* of the nature and working of nerve substance.

3. The relation, then, of nerve substance and its changes to consciousness and its changes is, that it is its *causa existendi*; while consciousness and its changes are the *causa cognoscendi* of the former. But consciousness is much more than this; it is the *causa cognoscendi* not only of nerve substance and its workings but of everything else, of all existing things. Let us suppose the whole world existing before consciousness arises in it; and then from the moment of consciousness arising we shall recognise in it, not a new existence, but the perception of the pre-existing world; the pre-existing world and no other, felt and known, that is, as it were, mirrored and reduplicated in a new character. There is no other content of consciousness but this pre-existing and simultaneously existing world. As consciousness becomes more complex, as we advance up the scale of conscious beings to man, and thence again to the most perfect cases of human intelligence, more and more of this pre-existing and simultaneously existing world is mirrored in consciousness, and that portion of it is mirrored also which intervenes between the first feeble origin of consciousness and the most perfect cases of human intelligence, that is to say, the portion containing the nervous organism itself, its working, and its development. If, then, we draw a distinction between consciousness and the world in which it arises, this distinction can be no other than that between the subjective and objective aspects of the world, or, what is the same thing, of consciousness; in other words, the whole series of causes, *causæ existendi*, is contained in the one, and

the whole series of evidences, *causæ cognoscendi*, in the other. The two aspects, the two series, are actually inseparable and only logically distinguishable; in the separation supposed at the beginning of this paragraph, the world supposed to exist before consciousness arises is, and must be, the same world that we know, distinguished from ourself in reflection, and imagined separate from our knowledge of it by logical abstraction; and it is so for this reason, that our reasoning about the two series or aspects, or about any part of them, is itself a portion of that series of states of consciousness which has been said to be nothing but a mirror or reduplication of the pre-existing and simultaneously existing world. We may figure to ourselves the development of the visible and tangible world with its qualities, beginning at simple movement of atoms and ending at nerve substance, by a line, which then doubles back on itself, and in the movement from this point of doubling back represents consciousness, the perception of the world figured by the first line. The moment of arising of consciousness is represented by the turning point between the two lines. What precisely it is which takes place at this point, where consciousness or feeling arises in nerve substance, is perhaps the most secret of all the secrets of science.

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The point marked Moment of reflection, in the line representing consciousness, represents the moment when we become conscious of the distinction of ob-

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ject and subject, or, in other words, the perception of the Moment of arising of consciousness having existed. And this moment of reflection arises in red-integration of direct perceptions. (§ 22.)

4. The moment of arising of consciousness is the most important break in the world of phenomena or nature taken as a whole; the phenomena above and the phenomena below it can never be reduced completely into each other; there is a certain heterogeneity between them. But this is not the only instance of such a heterogeneity. There is, for instance, heterogeneity between the form of Time and that of Space; in space itself, between curves and straight lines; in physical phenomena, between physical and vital forces, at least as usually supposed; and, until Mr. Darwin propounded his law of natural selection, it was supposed also between species of living organisms in physiology. Again in consciousness itself there is heterogeneity between the different special sensations and emotions. But all these are subordinate to the break between conscious and unconscious existence, which divides the whole of nature without residuum. The perception of this break of the two members and the distinction between them is objectively the object, subjectively the act, of Reflection. The perception in mere or direct consciousness, that is, at the moment of arising of consciousness in the diagram, includes no perception of the distinction between itself and its objects; this is given in reflection, or reflective perception; but reflective perception, self-consciousness, the perception of the two correlatives self and not-self, is, as an act, homogeneous with consciousness, and presupposes the direct mode of it. Then and then only is the nature

of the moment of consciousness perceived, namely, that it is a break in the world of phenomena.

5. It will perhaps be worth while briefly to compare this view with Spinoza's, criticised in § 15. Spinoza conceived the connection between mind and body as perception of the latter by the former, the distinction between them as that between perceiving and things perceived; a true and profound thought, and the same distinction which is now expressed as that between Subject and Object, or between the subjective and objective aspects. But Spinoza did not see that this new distinction was far more general than the old one, being applicable alike to both its members separately, both mind and body being objects of consciousness; that the new distinction, turning on a new feature, perception, had the things distinguished by it different, that is, that it did not coincide with the old distinction between mind and body, a supposed immaterial substance and the body inhabited by it; that consequently the new distinction could not replace, but was additional to, the old one. Accordingly he substituted the one for the other, and was thus led to confuse the object with the cause of consciousness, the whole world of qualities with that part of it which is visible and tangible only, that is, with body, and to make body with its movements and affections, which are the cause, not the cause but the object of consciousness. (§ 15, 4.) He thus scants both distinctions; the one by restricting the ultimate objects of perception to body and affections of body; the other by denying the causation of states of mind by states of body. The objects of mind are not visible and tangible qualities only, but all or any qualities whatever. These are the

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objects of perception in consciousness previous to reflection, but there undistinguished from the perceptions of them which are their subjective aspect. That we perceive bodies, as such, at all, that we distinguish them from the qualities inherent in them, and from the perceptions of these qualities, is the fruit of further experience and reasoning. Body and Mind are not, Perception and Quality are, ultimate categories of existence, or members of an ultimate and most general distinction. The two distinctions must therefore be referred, first, to different times, and secondly, since body and mind are both part of the objective world as perceived in reflection, to different modes of enquiry, namely, Subject and Object or Perception and Quality to statical and metaphysical, Mind and Body to dynamical and historical, analysis. While, therefore, I hold fast Spinoza's distinction between perceiving and things perceived, I place it historically at the moment of Reflection or Self-consciousness; perception itself, without the perception of this distinction, I place historically at the moment of arising of consciousness; and the distinction between body and mind I place historically later than Reflection, as one of its consequences, and also as the distinction which stands at the head of the empirical, historical, and psychological, branch of the whole enquiry. Yet, notwithstanding that the two distinctions are thus left standing each in its place, there is one thing which Spinoza must be held to have done, namely, to have shaken to its very foundations the old conception of one of the two members of the older distinction, the old conception of Mind as an immaterial substance inhabiting the body.

6. It follows also from what has been said, that,

when we are enquiring statically, or into the nature and analysis of any object, we are "interrogating consciousness, analysing one or more of the states of consciousness which form the series of evidences, or causæ cognoscendi; as for instance in all cases of actual inspection, such as observations with the microscope; for the objective and subjective aspects are obviously coincident in presentations, and in these the appeal to facts is always an appeal to the senses. And it follows on the other hand, that, when we enquire into the causes, the history, the origin, of anything, we are approaching it from the objective side, and are employed in examining it as a member of the series of causes, not of evidences. The series of evidences we are ourselves prolonging in the process of reasoning; the objects which fill our minds in that process are the objective aspects of the states of consciousness which compose it. To examine these on the subjective side would be to make them objects of reflection, to turn our thoughts away from the things we set out to examine, and fix them upon the course of thought we have just gone through about them. There is, then, this difference between the two cases, that we can never get rid of the subjective aspect in reasoning, though we may logically abstract from it, while in trying to fix upon the objective aspect only, for purposes of investigation into causes, we are in danger of substituting for it the subjective aspect (which is an objective aspect only in reflection) and thus reasoning about evidences when we intended to reason about causes. It has been already said that atoms, molecules, and masses, in motion are what is meant by causes; and that the changes in those atoms, molecules, and masses, which

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make up the nervous organism, are the causes of changes in consciousness. It is, then, these changes in the nervous organism which we must keep in view, abstracting from their subjective aspect, in which they are portions of space and time filled by feelings of sight and touch; and these changes it is which we must imagine as producing the changes or movements in those states of consciousness which have been analysed and classified in the preceding chapter. It is obvious, then, that the enquiry has two distinct branches, which must be pursued separately and then brought to bear upon each other; that only in their combination, after each has been separately pursued, is the result, the knowledge of the mode in which one causes the other, attainable; we must endeavour to ascertain and analyse each series separately, in order to determine what phenomena, what states, what movements, in the one series are the causing moments, the supporters of corresponding phenomena, in the other. Metaphysical analysis of states of consciousness, and processes of consciousness from state to state, must therefore not be disregarded, but go hand in hand with physiological analysis, the one supplying hints or hypotheses to the other, according as either happens to have made the greater progress. In the first place, then, I will turn to the nervous organism, and endeavour to exhibit as well as I can what I have been able to gather from the writings of physiologists as seemingly conducive to the purpose in view.

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§ 50. 1. The nervous organism contains two chief members, nerve cells and nerve tubes. A single cell in connection with a single tube, or a tube connecting two cells, would be the lowest form of the organ-

ism, and the highest is no more than an aggregation of this. Where there are a great number of cells gathered together, the appearance of the mass in which they are found is grey; where there is a mass of tubes, its appearance is white; hence grey substance is used sometimes to signify cellular substance, and white tubular. The tubes serve as conductors of movements to and from cells, that is, both from the cells in central organs to the nervous apparatus at the periphery of nerves of sense and muscular motion, and from the periphery to the cells in the central organs, and also between the cells in the central organs themselves. Every cell is furnished with one branch or more running out from it, which in some cases is continued so as to become a tube going towards the periphery, in others connects the cell with other cells; but in many cases the branch seems to stop short, and cannot be traced into any other cell or tube. Provision seems made here for growth and development of the nervous organism, especially of its masses of cells, by the completion of the communication between them by means of these branches from the cells. The branches running out from cells appear to be inchoate tubes, which may run in time from cell to cell or from cell to periphery.

2. The two kinds of effects produced (to describe them by words of consciousness), the two kinds of services performed, by this organism are perception and muscular motion. But for the present I will put aside all those kinds of perception and action which seem to depend upon the operation of cells upon cells in the central organs, and consider only those which require the activity of cells and tubes going to the periphery; that is to say, presentative

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perceptions and muscular motions. In other words, I will consider first only the nerves, in connection with their central cells and peripheral apparatus; and this is the first division of the nervous organism, which is generally described as consisting of nerves and brain.

3. In the first place, there appears to be no difference between the motor and sensor nerves in respect either of their composition or of the way in which the movements are propagated in them. When the movement begins at the periphery of any nerve and is propagated to the central cell or cells, there arises perception. When the movement begins at the central cell or cells and is propagated to the periphery, there, supposing the nerve to be distributed to a muscle, arises muscular motion. The movement in the nerve is the same in kind in both cases; the difference of the effect is due solely to the sensor nerves being exposed, by means of their peripheral apparatus, to receive certain stimuli from without, while the motor nerves are so distributed as to communicate to the muscle the stimulus which they receive from the central cells. But this very distribution of nerves to muscles appears to communicate a movement from muscle to centre, which produces perception, the perception namely of the tension of the muscle, which belongs to what we call the muscular sense. See on this point Prof. Brown-Séquard's *Phys. of Nervous System*, Lect. i. p. 9-10. Also on the subject of this whole paragraph Mr. G. H. Lewes' *Phys. of Common Life*, Chap. viii. All nerves therefore are sensor, and all would be motor also if they were distributed to muscles. Those distributed to muscles are those which go up into the spinal column

by the anterior roots. See on this doctrine, and the new support derived for it from Prof. Du Bois Reymond's "Negative Stromschwankung," Dr. Funke's *Lehrbuch der Phys.* § 162. vol. i. p. 841-4. 4th edit.

4. The differences between the several groups of perceptions, such as seeing, hearing, touch, systemic sensations, and so on, as well as the minor differences within each group, depend upon the mode of arrangement of the nervous apparatus or expansion at the peripheral extremity of the nerve, which in each case is adapted to receive a certain class of stimuli. Every nerve has in consequence its own specific group of perceptions; and the stimulus to which the peripheral apparatus of each nerve is adapted is called the adequate stimulus of that nerve; such are the ether undulations to the optic nerve, and the air undulations to the auditory nerve. Other stimuli than these applied to any nerve produce perceptions of the same specific kind as the adequate stimulus produces, but perceptions not capable of such minute modifications as those which belong to perceptions produced by the adequate stimulus. The nerve with its peripheral apparatus can act only in certain peculiar ways, and transmit only certain peculiar movements, whatever may be the stimulus applied to it; and the perceptions produced must be regarded as the result of the mode of movement proper to the nerve itself, combined with the action of the stimulus which sets that movement more or less perfectly on foot.

§ 51. 1. The questions which have the greatest interest in physiology when treated in connection with metaphysic are of two classes, those relating to the nature of the movements in nerve and brain

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which produce or support states of consciousness, and those relating to the assignment of the several portions of the nervous organism, and the several kinds of nerve movement, to the several groups of the phenomena of consciousness, groups which are distinguished by metaphysical analysis. As to the first of these classes of questions, we are able at present to speak only in the most general terms; the specific kinds of movement which take place in the nervous organism have not been determined as yet by physiologists. The most recent theory, that of Dr. Pflüger, may be read at the end of his "*Untersuchungen über die Physiologie des Electrotonus*." But without overstepping the modesty of the most general terms, we may distinguish, in accordance with what has been said at the end of the preceding §, two sources of movement in the processes which support perception and muscular motion; the first, of movement belonging to the nervous substance itself, the second, of that received by it from a stimulus. And the first movement, belonging to the nervous substance itself, must again be distinguished into movements of action and reaction of particles along its whole length; movements which exist prior to the reception of any stimulus, and which, on its reception, combine with it into a total movement which supports the perception or the muscular motion. The stimulus may come either from the central parts of the nervous organism, or from the forces acting upon the peripheral extremities of the nerves. In the first case the stimulus would itself be a nerve movement acting upon a motor or a sensor nerve, in consequence of some previous movements in the central organs; and this would include all cases of

what is called action of the Will, either on muscles, or in producing attention to sensations. In the second case the stimulus would be some physical movements of atoms or molecules, such as those of the ether atoms in light, the air particles in sound, which impinging on the peripheral apparatus of the nerve would set on foot movements of its particles. Both these movements, that of action and reaction in the nerve itself, and that combined with it on reception from the stimulus, must in combination reach a certain degree of energy—though possibly, within certain limits, a greater degree of energy in the one may compensate for a less degree in the other—in order to the production of a muscular movement or a perception. Below this degree of energy an effect would be produced upon the organism itself, an effect which if repeated might be of the greatest importance, but no muscular motion or perception would take place at the time. To this cause must be referred the phenomena sometimes called latent consciousness, sensations which can be proved by their effects to exist, but of which there is no consciousness as sensations. They are states of nerve movement below consciousness. Again, the retaining power of memory, storing up impressions which only rarely leap, as it were, from their hiding places, must be referred to the possibility of reawakening such movements, which have once taken place, in the brain. And if we disregarded the process of waste and repair which accompanies every such movement, we might suppose perhaps that these movements would become ultimately so faint as to be beyond the power of reawakening; whereupon the memory of the corresponding perceptions would

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be lost, and the fact once stored up in memory stored up now no longer. But, in speaking of nerve movements as the cause of conscious states, it must not be forgotten that every such movement takes place only at the expense of some waste of the living nervous substance, and that this waste is repaired by a new growth in which the habit of movement in the old way is strengthened, so that the oftener a movement has been repeated the more easily is it repeated again. Every movement which has once taken place becomes thus represented by a perhaps very minute change in the structure of the nervous substance, which grows with exercise; and every movement may thus, conceivably at least, be capable of re-awakening on the occurrence of an appropriate stimulus. (See Dr. Maudsley's *Phys. and Path. of the Mind*, p. 67.) Yet since this circumstance is common to all cases of nerve movement, and presumably affects all alike, I shall make no further mention of it in speaking of the nerve movements as causes of states of consciousness.

2. Obvious as this conception of two kinds of movements, the one belonging to the nerve itself, the other to the stimulus, may perhaps appear, it is far from depending solely on a priori grounds. If we admit the doctrine of Prof. Du Bois Reymond, which is the foundation of the greater part of the results obtained by modern investigation of nervous action, that the electric current in living nerve is a constant property of it, varying with its power of performing its normal functions, we have in that current the means of testing the presence of the former kind of movements by themselves, and of measuring their degree of vigour. In that case, the movements pro-

per to the nerve substance itself are no longer an hypothesis but a fact, and one concerning which, it may be added, no inconsiderable knowledge has been already acquired. We must then distinguish three states through which the nerve substance passes in the performance of its functions; the first, when it is the seat solely of the movements of action and reaction between its own particles, in which, since it is not engaged in producing either perception or muscular motion, it is said to be in a state of rest but stimulable, ruhend, erregbar; the second, when some stimulus, either from within or from without, combines with this state, so as to intensify its movements, which we may call the state of tension, erhöhte Erregbarkeit; and the third, when an additional or prolonged stimulus is combined with the movements of the state of tension, so as to set on foot those movements upon which follows actual perception or muscular motion, which may be called the state of activity of the nerve, its Erregungszustand. And each of these states can be examined separately, and its phenomena subjected to various electrical tests. Funke's Lehrbuch, 2nd Book, 1st Abschnitt, and more particularly § 139, 142; 146, 150; 155, 157. These enquiries however are not to our present purpose, which requires rather that we should apply the foregoing analysis of nerve movements to the corresponding phenomena in states of consciousness.

3. The chief application perhaps of this analysis is to explain the different degrees of vigour in perception and muscular action of different persons. The result of the state of activity of the nerve is perception or muscular action, and this result must vary in character according to the parts played respectively

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by the two contributors to that activity, the movements of the nerve itself and those of the stimulus. A nerve whose own movements of action and reaction are vigorous and elastic will not only, under the same stimulus, produce more vivid perceptions and stronger muscular motions than one less vigorous and elastic, but will react more forcibly upon the movements of the stimulus itself, so as to be less permanently affected by them. A weaker nerve will have less power of reacting upon the movements of the stimulus. The perceptions of the former, and the specific sensations of pain and pleasure which accompany them, will be more vivid, but also will be less important as bearing a less proportion to its total powers. Those of the latter will be less vivid, but it will have that general mode of pain more constant which consists in the feebleness of reaction; while the vigorous reaction of the former will be an additional and general mode of pleasure. In the vigour of reaction between the nerve's own movements and those of the stimulus lie the different degrees of pleasure or of pain which are general, or common to all states of consciousness alike; while the specific feelings of every kind, including their specific pleasures and pains, depend upon the vigour of these two movements added together. The weaker nerve will then receive less intense specific feelings than the stronger, from the same stimulus, and at the same time will be more exposed to general feelings of pain, less open to general feelings of pleasure, which depend on the degree of reactive vigour. By breaking up the combined movements of the active state of nerve into movements derived from the nerve itself and movements derived from the stimulus, we not

only explain why persons of feeble sensibility appear to suffer from their feelings so much more than those whose sensibilities show signs of being more acute, but we also obtain a physiological foundation for the distinction between general and specific pleasures, a distinction which, with its physiological foundation, the distinction between two separate kinds of nerve movements, will be found of importance in all departments of the present enquiry.

§ 52. 1. The presentative perceptions of sense have been sufficiently described in Chapter ii. Part i.; let us turn now to the organs appropriated to them, not however to describe minutely their structure or functions as organs of sense, but in order to distinguish them from the organs appropriated to the functions which, in metaphysical analysis, follow next in order upon presentative perceptions, by combining them into and with representations more or less complex. The peripheral extremity of every nerve of sense is like a hand stretched out by the central organ to grasp the peculiar impression which it receives from the world without, or from the part of the body to which it goes. It is requisite that its connection with its central organ should be kept up; and its peculiar effect, the impression received and imparted by it, is due to the changes which are wrought by stimuli in its peripheral apparatus acting upon the nerve in its entire length, including the cell or cells which are its central termination.

2. Apart from the nerves belonging to the sympathetic system, which need not I think be brought into our enquiry, all the nerves of sense and motion have the cells which form their central terminations embedded in portions of the nervous organism which

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lie below the cerebrum and cerebellum; that is to say, in the spinal cord, the medulla oblongata and parts immediately adjacent, the grey matter which forms the floor of the 4th ventricle, the optic thalami, and corpora striata. Of these nerves, the greater part of the nerves of touch and muscular motion, being distributed over the body, terminate in the spinal cord, while those of them which supply the head and face terminate in or above the medulla oblongata, in the same regions where the other nerves of special sense terminate. One exception to this statement may perhaps be found in the nerve of the first pair, the nerve of smell. If this is a nerve, it would be an important exception, since two of its three roots have been traced into the cerebral hemispheres. Mr. G. H. Lewes argues that it is not a nerve; *Phys. of Common Life*, Chap. x. But supposing it to be the nerve of smell, it would not invalidate the view here taken, since it has one root which enters into the same nervous mass with the rest, while its additional and peculiar connection with the cerebrum might perhaps furnish an explanation of the peculiar action of odours upon the memory, summoning up in an instant long past scenes with a vividness and a rapidity which belong to the perceptions of no other sense.

3. With the above exception, then, it may be said that the spinal cord and the mesocephalic group of organs, the highest members of which are the corpora striata and optic thalami, form a mass which is distinguished from the cerebrum and cerebellum by its containing the central terminations of all nerves of sense and muscular motion. The whole nervous organism falls thus into three divisions; 1st, the nerves from periphery to central termination; 2nd,

the spinal cord and mesocephalic group of organs which contain these central terminations; 3rd, the cerebrum and cerebellum. The second and third groups are farther distinguished from each other by the difference of relative position between the cellular and tubular substance which they contain; for while in the lower parts of the spinal cord the grey cellular substance is in the interior, surrounded by the white, in the medulla oblongata it begins to come to the surface, and in the upper portions of the mesocephalic group lies in masses at the surface, and interfused with the tubular in about equal proportions; in the cerebrum and cerebellum on the other hand the grey substance occupies the circumference, surrounding the white substance; the only other instance of a similar arrangement being offered by the corpora dentata in the olivary columns, the resemblance of which to that of the cerebellum is striking. If, therefore, different functions are attributed to the cellular and tubular substances, physiological as well as anatomical considerations will require a broad distinction to be made between the second and third groups of organs; though it should remain doubtful with which group the corpora dentata are to be classed.

4. The question now is, to what processes in consciousness these three groups are respectively appropriated. It is at this point that the metaphysical analysis of the phenomena of consciousness is applicable, and that a true analysis would be most valuable. Now we know the functions, in consciousness, of the first of the three groups, the nerves with their central terminations; they are the functions of producing and supporting, under appropriate stimuli,

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presentative perceptions, or, as they are commonly called, sensations, and, in the case of some nerves, of producing muscular motion. Let us take first the case of perceptions. The question then is, what are the groups of phenomena in consciousness which continue, or combine, the phenomena given in presentative perception, and how many of such groups are there? The phenomena in question must be distinguished into groups by distinctions in perception itself, otherwise the groups will not be homogeneous or continuous with the first group. Now there are two such groups and two only; 1st, the perception of remote objects, which consist of presentative combined with representative perceptions; and 2nd, purely representative perception, whether the redintegration employed in it is spontaneous or voluntary, direct or reflective. I refer for this classification to "Time and Space," Chapters iv. v., and to § 13 of the present work. Purely representative perception is the result of processes of redintegration or trains of association, including the emotions and passions, into which there enters no perception of external objects or of bodily sensation, where all that is present in consciousness is matter of memory or imagination, whether or not this includes volition, as in processes of reasoning, and whether or not it includes reflection or consciousness of our own states of thought and feeling as ours. But between the two extremes, pure presentation and pure representation, a third must be interposed consisting of representations combined with presentations; and this is perhaps the most important of the three, for to it belong all those objects which we call the external world, the objects of sight and touch with which we

are continually surrounded. The fact is most important, that those things which we call "objects" of perception are not perceived each separately and completely as an object in the first instance, but are compounded of several perceptions, each of which comes to us by a separate nerve of sensation. The visible and tangible "objects" which compose the familiar external world of daily life, such as houses, trees, land and sea, clouds, animals, furniture, &c. are compounds of several distinct perceptions of sight and touch; the other qualities which we attribute to them, such as heat and cold, sonorousness, odour, taste, wholesomeness or unwholesomeness, beauty or deformity, are all attributed to them by a process similar to that which in the first instance puts together their solid basis, the qualities of visibility and tangibility, a process which we disguise under the general characterising term, experience. It is experience which not only shows to us the qualities of such objects when formed, but also forms the objects themselves in the first instance, by putting qualities together. The distinction therefore between this group of perceptions and the purely presentative perceptions of each nerve is plain and important; that between this and the purely representative group is no less so, as is shown by the fact, that up to a very recent period in knowledge it was this class of "objects," or compound perceptions, which was thought to be immediately perceived by us, and was opposed, by itself, to the group of pure representations; indeed the fact, that these "objects" of the intermediate group are the common, ultimate, indecomposable "things" of the world of nature to every one not familiar with metaphysical specula-

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tions, shows of itself the same thing. Yet nothing is more certain than that, so far as our consciousness is concerned, these common and apparently ultimate "objects" or "things" are the result of a process of combination of several notices of several nerves of sense. If then we are required to point out three groups of phenomena of consciousness, three groups of perceptions, corresponding to and depending on the three groups already given of the nervous organism, and like them occupying the whole field of the phenomena to be distinguished, we must point to these three groups and no others. And since we know that the first of the three sections of the nervous organism, the nerve from periphery to central termination, supports the first of these groups, the purely presentative perceptions, there will be no difficulty in assigning the cerebrum and cerebellum to the group of pure representations, and in locating the group of mixed perceptions in the mesocephalic group of organs and the spinal cord.

5. It becomes necessary, therefore, to do for this second or intermediate group of mixed perceptions, or perceptions of remote objects, what has already been done in Chapter ii. Part i. for the presentations, by describing briefly its peculiarities and distinguishing them from the groups of pure presentations and pure representations. The remote objects of perception, which constitute this group, may be distinguished into two main sections, first, those which consist of the perceptions of two senses only, sight and touch, and secondly, those which, using these objects as their basis, import into them perceptions of other qualities derived from the other senses. The objects of sight and touch are bound together, in the

first instance, by the circumstance that these sensations alone are bound up with, or occupy, space as their form or formal element; they melt into single objects with the added element of depth, the third dimension of space, in the manner which it has been attempted to describe in "Time and Space" § 13; and in this process redintegration or memory is a requisite ingredient, since we must remember or redintegrate a former perception while we are receiving a presentative impression, in order to bind together the whole; for instance, I look at an orange which I hold in my hand, and thus have an impression of a yellow circular surface and of the tangible quality of this surface; but, before I can have the impression of its solidity and of its visibility all round (which belong to what I mean by an orange), I must have gone through some such process as this: I put my finger, suppose, upon part of the visible surface and turn the orange round, so that my finger and the part touched are no longer actually visible, and then redintegrate the visibility of the part now unseen, recognising it for the same part by the continued sensation of touch, so that I have its visibility all round, only partly presented and partly represented. In this way the orange is an object composed of representation as well as presentation, even while I am looking at and touching it.

6. Sight and touch are the only senses which originally have space for their form, and this circumstance not only enables their notices to coalesce as they do in the production of objects in three dimensions, but also enables these their objects, when formed, to serve as the groundwork or basis of qualities, which are the perceptions of the other senses,

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connected with these objects by experience. Sounds, for instance, are heard when some object of sight and touch is present, e.g. the ringing of a bell; tastes and odours are perceived in the same way; and not only so, but other bodily or systemic sensations are found to follow with constancy after the swallowing of drugs, and so on. All such perceptions are then referred to the visible and tangible objects which they accompany, as qualities of those objects. Nor is this only a popular mode of conceiving the phenomena; it has been carried up into philosophy and become the groundwork of the well-known theory of the primary and secondary qualities of matter, between which Sir W. Hamilton interposed a third, the secundo-primary qualities. The moment, however, that we begin to theorise about the connection between the qualities of any object, that moment the object ceases to be a remote object and becomes an object of pure representation; we have before us no longer an object seen and touched, but an object thought of, an object of voluntary and not spontaneous redintegration. This is the limit which divides the group of mixed perceptions from that of pure representations. It is a process of reasoning to break up remote objects into their physical constituents, and their combining laws; the remote objects themselves, as such, contain their qualities as perceptions. I represent a sound as in the musical instrument or in the air, I represent the taste as in the fruit, the odour as in the flower. Since however the object itself, the combination of presentations into a remote object, is not given us by presentation alone, but requires redintegration, it follows that a further redintegration may dissolve the combina-

tion; and if such combinations have been dissolved by reasoning redintegration, as they have been in the case of all qualities but those of touch and sight; the odour, for instance, separated from the flower, the heat from the fire, and so on; it is conceivable that the remote objects of perception themselves may obey these habitual representations of reasoning, and that we may not only perceive the remote objects denuded of all qualities but visibility and tangibility in combination, that is, as consisting only of solid matter in different modes of motion, but even dissolve this combination itself, thus breaking up solid matter, and space in three dimensions, into mere disjecta membra of metaphysical analysis. It is often said that science has dethroned the Sungod; will it not proceed to dethrone the Sun? The true way of regarding this group of remote objects, accordingly, is to consider it as fluctuating in respect of the particular objects belonging to it, each object being admitted into it after a reasoning process, and dismissed from it by a reasoning process again, but between these two points consisting of a collocation of qualities habitually associated together by spontaneous not voluntary redintegration.

7. If we consider that, in perceiving a remote object, we not only combine heterogeneous presentations, but combine also representations with presentations, it becomes evident that some nerve substance is employed in the process beyond what is usually requisite for presentations alone. A representation and a presentation of the same sensation take place simultaneously. This seems to require the supposition, that an additional portion of nerve substance is employed in representation, since how other-

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wise would the new presentation be distinguished from, and yet felt as a repetition of, the old one? Occupying the same portion of nerve, would not the new presentation obliterate, and not preserve in memory, the representation of its own former occurrence? We should require the hypothesis of an "Ego" or a "Mind" to explain the circumstance, unless we had recourse to the supposition of a new portion of nerve substance being employed. Probably therefore the nerve movement in representation takes place in a distinct portion of the organism from the movement in presentation; and, since the object resulting from the two movements is a single object, the two nerve movements must be going on simultaneously and in combination. We are thus led to the conception that there is a mass of nervous matter in immediate connection with the central terminations of the nerves of sensation, the movements in which combine with those in the nerves, and serve as a bond of union between them. These conditions appear to be fulfilled by the organs which we have called the organs of the second or intermediate group.

8. In the next place, the perception of remote objects must be distinguished from purely representative perception. It has been seen that redintegration is requisite in forming remote objects, since they partly consist of representations. Spontaneous redintegration at least is therefore common to these two groups of perception. But notwithstanding that redintegration is involved in them, the course of the formation of these perceptions, and their constitution when formed, are not governed by the laws of the redintegration of pure representations, but by the course and nature of the presentations out of which

they are formed. This is the circumstance which makes the broad line of demarcation between the perception of remote objects and purely representative perception; the former is governed by presentations, the latter by laws of an entirely different kind, those of spontaneous and voluntary redintegration, as will be seen in the following §§. These presentations, the immediate perceptions of the senses, are forced upon us; and in redintegrating them and holding them as representations we alter nothing in them except their vividness or intensity. Whatever we forget in them may be restored by a repetition of the presentation; we are entirely in the domain of facts of sense external and internal. The representations are liable to be corrected and made more vivid by their own presentations; against these they have no rights; their truth is entirely derivative. But the moment we pass into the domain of pure representations, there, instead of the dominion of presentation, is developed a new law out of the bosom of the representations themselves, which is independent and supreme. Presentations will last so long as their external causes are in presence, whether they are pleasureable or painful; bright sunlight will dazzle, ginger will be hot in the mouth, sharp racks will pinch and peel. There is no escape either from the pleasureable or painful effects of remote objects of perception; the pleasure and the pain are inseparable portions or elements of the perceptions themselves. But in pure representation the pleasure and the pain become the index of a new law of movement, of a new guidance among the movements which support the representations; the dominion of the external world diminishes, and a counter authority is set up,

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arising in the redintegrating movements which are evidenced by these modes of feeling. The nervous organ, then, which supports states of consciousness of this character, of this degree of independence on presentation, must, we may conclude, be separate physically from that which supports states of consciousness in which presentation is dominant of the course and sequence of the states of consciousness. There can be no other equally important division of the nervous organism beyond or above this; since the movement of this third group of organs arises from within itself, and is not imposed from without; though it reacts upon the portions below it, out of the states of consciousness transmitted from which its own states of consciousness are partly constructed. This third group of organs must therefore contain within it all further distinctions of faculties or groups of phenomena, such as reflection, imagination, passion, or emotional volition. Accordingly I ascribe to it the remaining portions of the brain, the cerebellum and the cerebral hemispheres, without for the present attempting to distinguish the functions of these from each other.

9. The foregoing general considerations appear sufficient to warrant the distinction of organs and corresponding groups of conscious states. There is however a phenomenon which adds a further probability to the distinction, the well-known phenomenon of ocular and auditory hallucinations. If we consider dreams and reveries as states consisting of pure representations, we shall find that hallucinations are distinguished from them by their greater vividness, so as to be entirely indistinguishable from presentations except by reasoning on them, notwith-

standing that we are awake and in the full possession of our mental faculties. I consider then that hallucinations find their peculiarities accounted for by being referred to the organs of the two first groups in conjunction. They are in fact presentations, completed into remote objects, without the external object usually requisite to produce presentation; they are to remote objects what dreams are to pure representations; produced and supported by a redintegrative process, but one which takes place in the organs which are governed by, and have the vividness of, presentations. (Compare, on the whole subject of the preceding paragraphs, Dr. Maudsley's valuable work *The Physiology and Pathology of the Mind*, Part i. Chapters ii. iv. v.)

10. It will be remembered that there is still a thread of the enquiry to follow to a conclusion, the case of motor nerves and the functions performed by the middle group of organs in relation to them. It is probable that the analogy of the phenomena of remote perception will give the right clue to these functions. There are in fact a multitude of actions, performed by means of muscles, which are not only done habitually and unconsciously, but which consist of a number of separate muscular movements organised or coordinated into groups which we call by a single name, such as walking, running, leaping, breathing, speaking, singing, acquired sleight of hand, and many others; actions which seem plainly done for a purpose, like the so called instinctive actions of animals, and yet are accompanied by no consciousness of the purpose of any of the several steps composing them, though we may be conscious of the acts themselves while we are doing them. The simplest

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cases of action of this kind, when we can trace a single stimulus to its result in a single muscular motion, are called reflex acts; but the most minutely coordinated habitual actions seem to be no more than organised groups of such reflex acts become habitual, and in habitual connection with each other. The movements which, starting from the central cells, traverse motor nerves and produce contraction of their muscles may be supposed to act upon the mass of grey matter contiguous to these cells, and thus to come into combination with movements similarly produced by similar cells both of motor and sensor nerves. The contraction of the muscle reacts also upon the nerve in its sensory character, and becomes itself the stimulus of its nervous action. The same provision is made for the combination of nerve movements which result in muscular action as for that of nerve movements which result in perception; the same central group of organs, or those parts of it which are adjacent to the termination of the motor nerves, seem appropriated to the production of either combination; and the combinations of presentations into objects of remote perception appear to have their parallel, in every particular, in the combined and organised groups of reflex actions; namely, in their being habitual, more or less indissoluble, and more or less unconscious and instinctive, corresponding in this latter point especially to the character of spontaneous redintegration observable in remote objects; while both phenomena may have owed their first origin, the first steps in their formation, to volition. If this analogy is correct, we should be led to place the motor division of the middle group in greater mass where the motor nerves are most numerous,

consequently along the whole of the spinal cord and medulla oblongata, while the upper parts of the middle group, the mesocephalic organs, lying near to the terminations of the nerves of special sense, would be most probably assigned chiefly to sensor functions; neither portion however excluding the other in any part of the entire organ. (See on the subject of this paragraph also Dr. Maudsley's work before cited, Part i. Chap. iii.)

§ 53. 1. The third group of organs consisting of the cerebrum and cerebellum remains to be examined, first, with regard to the nerve movements which take place in it, secondly, with regard to its sub-grouping of organs, and both in connection with the phenomena of consciousness which correspond to them, as in the former parts of the enquiry. I will enter upon the first of these questions, abstracting at present from the second. The phenomena of consciousness which have been determined to belong to this third group of organs are, statically considered, pure representations, the frameworks of emotions, and the emotions which they contain or which pervade them; considered dynamically, or as processes of consciousness, they are the redintegration of frameworks and the redintegration of emotions or passions; and in this redintegration there are two stages, first spontaneous, secondly voluntary redintegration. The first thing, then, to be examined is the process of spontaneous redintegration in connection with the nerve movements which produce or support it.

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2. The nerve movements to which representational frameworks of emotion are afterwards attached are sent up or contributed by the second group of organs. The third group, into which these are sent,

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must be supposed to have movements of its own, which are stimulated by and combined with those movements sent up from the second group. The relation between these two sets of movements must be judged of by analogy with those of the first group of organs, the nerves of presentative perception. Just as the movements of ether and air undulations stimulated the nerves of sight and hearing, and the peculiar character of these sensations depended upon the movements proper to these nerves combined with and stimulated by the movements coming from without, so in the third group the movements proper to it, stimulated by and combined with those which support representations coming from the second group, produce and support the states of consciousness which are proper to the third group, namely, the emotions with their representational frameworks. "The hemispherical cells," says Dr. Maudsley, at p. 137 of the work already quoted, "are confessedly not sensitive to *pain*; still they have a sensibility of their own to ideas, and the sensibility which thus declares the manner of their affection is what we call emotional."

3. The same analogy holds also with respect to the degrees of vigour displayed by the organs of the third group. The elasticity of these organs, consisting in the energy of the active and reactive movements of the whole movement proper to them, with which is combined the movement coming from below, which is their stimulus, determines whether or not an emotion and its framework shall be felt vividly, and whether its specific pleasure or pain shall be acute. (See § 51, 3.) It also determines the degree of rapidity in the change from one emotion and framework to another, that is, the rapidity of the

redintegrative process. If the elasticity is great, the feelings, including their specific pleasure and pain, will be acute; but, the rapidity of redintegration being great also, the general modes of pleasure will be great, and the total result on the whole pleasureable. If the elasticity is small, the feelings with their specific pleasure and pain will be less acute, but the rapidity of redintegration being small will cause the general modes of pleasure to be less, or even to pass into general modes of pain. In this case the total result will be less pleasureable or more painful than in the former case.

4. Let us now turn to the conscious side of the phenomena of spontaneous redintegration. In the first place, what is the distinction in terms of consciousness between specific and general modes of pleasure and of pain? It was found in §§ 8. 9. and other places of the present work, that there were certain feelings which were general or common to other more specific feelings, although they took their character from these, which they pervaded. The feelings in question may be thus enumerated: pleasure, pain; sense of effort greater or less; cheerfulness, gloom; energy, depression of energy. All these are general feelings with respect to the specific feelings in which they arise, or which they pervade; but pleasure and pain are such wide terms that they may be said to pervade all the rest in their turn, even the general feelings now enumerated, and to borrow from each of them a specific character, just as all alike borrow a specific character from the feelings still more specific. It becomes necessary therefore to distinguish in pleasure and pain themselves two modes, one general, the other specific, the specific being borrowed from

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the more specific feeling with which it is bound up. All presentative perceptions are, and all remote objects of perception consist of, such specific feelings. The emotions also and their frameworks bear a similar specific character. Each of these specific feelings is also, one more, one less, pleasureable or painful; and this pleasure and pain are inseparably bound up with the perception to which they belong, and take their character from it; for instance, the pleasure of a sweet, the pain of a sour taste; the pleasure of the emotion of benevolence or of anger; the pain of the emotion of fear or of wounded vanity. The pleasures and pains, being inseparable from the perceptions they belong to, must be conceived as depending upon the same nerve movements as the perceptions. But the general modes of pleasure and pain, which may be distinguished as pleasures of cheerfulness, energy, effort minimised or resistance overcome, and as pains of gloom, depression of energy, effort unsuccessful or resistance not overcome,—these, having no special representational framework, no special but a general feeling, to which they are attached, seem to depend upon the nerve movements themselves, and to vary according to the ease, vigour, or obstructed energy, of these movements.

5. There are then two kinds of pleasures and pains, general and specific, the general being the evidence and the measure of nerve activity, the specific being the evidence of the kind of states of consciousness which the redintegrative activity has the tendency to produce. But let us abstract for the present from the greater or less degrees of nerve energy, which nevertheless have a most important influence on redintegration, and endeavour to discover whether

there are any general facts, or laws, relating to the order in which the states of consciousness follow each other in all cases of redintegration. It must be remembered that in ordinary waking life states of purely spontaneous redintegration are of very brief duration; they are always preceded and followed by presentative perception and by voluntary redintegration, of which latter they form the basis, so that they are interwoven, as it were, with interruptions of presentation and volition. Dreams and reveries are the only phenomena in which spontaneous redintegration even apparently occurs in long uninterrupted sequences, and even in these we can seldom be sure that presentations do not interfere, in the shape of modifications sent up through the sympathetic system of nerves, or even through those of the cerebro-spinal system.

6. This being the case, an attempt to indicate general laws of purely spontaneous redintegration can be regarded only, in the present state of physiological knowledge, as hypothetical. If we look to the phenomena of dreams, in which the strangeness and variety of the images, and of the connections between them, are so immense, it seems as if the nerve movements worked in ceaseless activity in the production of images and feelings in which no traces of regularity, no succession of similar features by similar, were discoverable. But here we must again remember that we are not able to isolate the phenomena of purely spontaneous redintegration from the influences derived from or through the lower parts of the nervous organism. Consequently dreams offer the least sure ground for the special question before us. Waking dreams or reveries are a more certain field,

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because we are more likely to be aware of bodily or physical changes which may influence them; and these with the brief intervals of purely spontaneous redintegration in daily life must furnish us with indications for our hypothesis, and supply its justification. (See on the subject of dreams the Note at the end of this Chapter.)

7. With these explanations I am inclined to adopt the following view of the general laws of spontaneous redintegration, in place of the similar but imperfect analysis offered in "Time and Space," Chap. v. First as to the recurrence of images, in which term for brevity's sake I shall suppose included the feelings which pervade them: 1st, an image or a sequence of images tends to recur in proportion to its vividness; 2nd, an image or a sequence of images tends to recur in proportion to its previous frequency or habitualness; 3rd, an image or a sequence of images tends to recur, in a healthy state of the nervous organism, in proportion to the degree of specific pleasure which it possesses for us, and, in unhealthy states, in proportion to the degree of specific interest, which may be of a more or less painful kind. Here then are three variables, three tendencies of nerve movements, distinguished by the states of consciousness which they support, the resultant of which in combination will be the course actually taken by spontaneous redintegrations. The two first tendencies may be called the tendencies to fixity or sameness in sequences of redintegration, the third the tendency to change the order which they would establish. The mode of operation in which these three tendencies combine to produce the actual order of a sequence in redintegration may be thus conceived: A vivid image occupies

the mind, and the image which has been most habitually connected with it arises and accompanies it; now, were the movements evidenced by vividness and habit the only movements in redintegration, we should keep going backwards and forwards from one to the other, never leaving one train of images; the movements once set on foot would repeat themselves for ever, unless modified by new presentations; some movement causing change in the sequences must be present, counteracting those which tend to sameness, since it is clear that trains of purely representative redintegration show a great variety of direction, and are fertile in new images. I suppose therefore that these movements are those which are evidenced by some pleasure or interest in the images of the sequence, the interesting or pleasing images being thus brought into prominence, and those which were habitual or vivid made fainter. Yet no sooner have the movements upon which pleasing or interesting images depend deflected the opposite, and given a new turn to the combined, movements, than these opposite movements react, and bring into prominence an image which is either the most habitual companion of the pleasing one now present, or which makes up for a less degree of habitual connection by its own vividness. We must distinguish, therefore, in the order of redintegration the movements which support and are evidenced by specific pleasures and interests, whether these are in emotions or in their frameworks, as the instruments and exponents of change in a course of representations which would otherwise be governed by the vividness of particular images and by the habitualness of connection between them.

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8. That the movements which support the change in redintegrations are movements which are evidenced by specific pleasure or specific interest, is an hypothesis which the difficulty of isolating the phenomena in sufficient lengths forbids us to bring to a decisive test by observation. The difficulty of observing arises from the different elements which each image consists of, so that we are unable in a short sequence to say which of them is the determinant of the changes; for instance, a recurring image may be both vivid and pleasureable, or vivid and painful, or vivid with a painful interest; to which of these elements are we to attribute its greater liability to recurrence? For instance, suppose I have been beaten in an argument to which I attached great importance, I shall naturally dwell much upon the recollection of it, and find it constantly recurring to my thoughts; it seems to possess great interest for me, yet it certainly is not a pleasureable image. The question is, does it recur in virtue of its interest, though painful, or in virtue of the vividness with which it has been impressed, and in spite of the interest which I feel in forgetting it. Nevertheless the present hypothesis is quite in accordance with the phenomena of reveries and other instances of spontaneous redintegration in common life, so as not to be contradicted by any fact that I am aware of. Yet it is not the only, nor even perhaps the simplest, hypothesis which might be framed. For instance, we might suppose that the parts of an image which were less vivid than the rest died out of consciousness first, and that this alone caused the change to a new image, which was then governed by habit as before, without having recourse

to movements of pleasure or interest as the instruments of the change from one image to another. I have adopted the latter view because of some facts which seem to demand that the agency of change should be of the nature indicated. First, there is the fact that dreams, when the system is disordered, assume a shape characterised not merely by general modes of pain, but by images of a specifically painful character. The unhealthy character of the redintegrations reveals itself in the changed images themselves, as well as in the general sense of gloom or terror. How should the specific character of the images be altered, from specifically pleasureable to specifically painful, if the movements which supported these specific characters were not agents or instruments in directing the total movement? In the second place, the analogy of nerves of presentative perception is in favour of our hypothesis. A diseased state of nerve betrays itself by specific pain as well as by general uneasiness; for instance, cutting and burning in the nerves of touch; and in special senses, a diseased palate produces specifically unpleasant tastes. Specific pain and specific pleasure, as well as general, appear to be connected with the diseased or healthy action of nerve; and it is according to analogy to suppose that the healthy action of the organ of redintegration is marked by a tendency to reproduce specific pleasure, and its unhealthy action specific pain. And this requires us to suppose that the movements supporting both one and the other exercise an influence over, or enter into combination with, the course of the movements as a whole. A third reason is that, in reveries, the pleasureable character which usually distinguishes

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them seems most readily explicable by supposing that the movements of change from image to image are movements characterised by specific pleasure or interest; since those reveries which are the least interrupted and the longest are also those in which there is at once the most change of images, and the most pleasureable character in each image and in the whole sequence. The last reason for adopting the hypothesis is, that in voluntary redintegration, which we cannot but suppose has its foundations laid in spontaneous, so as to be but the intensifying of the movements there existing, the movements of specific pleasure and specific interest become undeniably the most prominent agents in directing the course of redintegrations. And it is difficult to see how this can be, unless the movements are really existent in spontaneous redintegration, in a less degree of potency. These reasons, but especially the last, lead me to enumerate the movements underlying specific pleasure and specific interest, side by side with those which support vividness and habit, as the active movements in spontaneous redintegration.

9. In illustration of this theory of spontaneous redintegration I copy from my note-book an instance which happened to myself, and which, as I also noted there, was written down immediately after its occurrence. "I was reading one evening in the *Mémoires du Cardinal de Retz*, Liv. ii. vol. i. p. 252, ed. 1777, the following passage: 'Je ménageai avec soin ces dispositions; j'échauffai M. de Longueville, et par moi-même, et par Varicarville, qui étoit son pensionnaire, et auquel il avoit avec raison une parfaite confiance.' Whether I actually took in the whole sentence I know not, but at or before the end of it

I found myself thinking of a person who had applied to me for pecuniary assistance, and with whose case I was much occupied. The train of my thoughts had passed entirely from the book I was reading to my own affairs. I started; here said I to myself is a clear case of spontaneous redintegration, let me examine it. I then remembered that I had dwelt upon the word *pensionnaire*, and had explained it to myself by saying that it meant a person who was in the receipt of money from his patron, M. de Longueville. From this point, this image, my mind, not being intently interested in the book I was reading, passed at once to the same circumstance which was at the time habitually or vividly occupying my thoughts; the single circumstance expressed by the word *pensionnaire* being common to the two sets or the two connections." Here it seems plain, that the specific interest attaching to the image, *pensionnaire*, was the determinant of its being retained alone out of its first set of connected images; and that the habit or vividness, for the time being, of the second set of connected images was the determinant of their being selected, out of all possible sets containing the same feature, to group themselves round it. In other words, the second set of images followed the first because of the specific interest of their common feature combined with the habitualness or vividness of the second set. This instance shows also how general characters such as similarity, contrast, and causation, came to be fixed upon as the determining laws of association, in the first theories that were formed of it.

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10. It remains to notice the combination of these redintegrative movements with the degrees of vigour

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or elasticity in the movements proper to the organs themselves. A high degree of vigour in these is favourable to the action of those movements which support specific pleasure and specific interest in representations, and the changes in the order of vividness and habit which depend upon them; and this in two ways. First, since the rapidity of redintegration is greater, the number of times at which the pleasure and interest movements come into operation is greater, the single order of vividness and habit is deflected more frequently, and new habits are added to the old. The number of habitual sequences acquired can only be increased at the expense of the tendency of any one of them to exclusive dominance. Secondly, since greater vigour gives greater intensity of specific feeling, a number of specific pleasures and interests, which would have no motive power in a mind of small vigour, acquire an intensity in a vigorous mind which enables them to become the starting points of new sequences; so that a greater number of specific pleasures and interests are enabled to take advantage of the increased number of opportunities offered by the increased rapidity of redintegration. The general difference between a vigorous mind and its opposite, in point of feeling, is that the vigorous mind, which is most keenly alive to specific pleasures and pains, is also most energetic in reaction against the painful ones, retains the longest and restores the soonest its active healthy tone in circumstances of distress and anxiety. The general modes of pleasure are also great in a mind of this kind, while in its opposite the general modes of pain will be greater and of pleasure less, the specific modes of both being small.

11. On the whole we must regard spontaneous redintegration as a process in which two forces are balanced against, or in conflict with, each other, the movements supporting vividness and habit of images and their sequences on one side, those supporting specific pleasures and interests on the other; the degree of vigour or elasticity in the movements of both sides being favourable to the first kind of movements if it is low, to the second if it is high. The conflict between these two kinds of movement is often nearly equally balanced, and then comes itself into consciousness, as a sense of effort or tension; a state of consciousness which is more or less painful. In using the term conflict of nerve movements, I must guard against being supposed to imply any particular mode of conflict in which they are balanced against each other, or to infer that it is any perception of their being in conflict which causes the resulting state of consciousness to be a sense of effort. It is we who characterise their state as one of balance or conflict; the conflict is not perceived at all at first, but only when the feelings on either side are strong and of nearly equal strength; it becomes then an element in their perception, not in the shape of a conception of their being in conflict, but in that of a sense of effort or tension. The moment this state of consciousness arises, the process in which it arises begins to pass into a process of voluntary redintegration. The same forces, the same images, are carried up into a new arena, with increased powers. The sense of effort is but the evidence of this increasing energy in the movements which are in conflict with each other. The next step in the enquiry, therefore, is the analysis of voluntary redintegration.

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12. Before however entirely quitting the present subject, it must be distinctly remarked, that redintegration both spontaneous and voluntary is redintegration of emotions and passions, no less than of images which are their frameworks; the pleasures and interests which are motives in their sequences are emotional no less than sensational; redintegration includes passion no less than thought. The changes of emotion through which we pass, the changes of passion which we experience, are accounted for by this analysis which places the motives of redintegration in specific pleasures and interests. This fact is concealed from common observation by the circumstance, that the expression of sequences of emotion and of passion, at any rate for purposes of analysis, for music is one mode of expressing them, is only possible by means of words, and words express immediately only the images which are their framework; and it consequently appears as if the process of redintegration was nothing more than an intellectual process, than what was formerly understood by the phrase Association of Ideas. The movement of emotions and passions is found delineated only in poetry, and chiefly in dramatic poetry, expressed chiefly in lyrical; in real life this movement is only expressed imperfectly and by fragments. And even in dramatic poetry, the greater part of the imagery employed to express the movement of passion is the invention of the poet, in the sense that he makes his characters speak not only much more than they would in real life, but also in imagery which only a poetical mind could invent; bare verisimilitude is departed from, in order to express more perfectly the real truth of na-

ture. The spontaneous redintegrations of the actors in a drama are thus clothed in language which is the result of the voluntary redintegration of the poet imagining their spontaneous redintegrations. They speak in the drama the language which they would speak in real life, had they the freedom and the wish to express the emotions which agitate them, added to the poet's facility in expressing the images which those emotions pervade. Hence it is to poetry that we must look for those instances of redintegration, both spontaneous and voluntary, and the one interwoven with the other, where the passions and emotions predominate over the framework, where the motives of change are strongly marked as of an emotional and not of a sensational nature. Transports of passion, enthusiastic emotions, are cases of extreme vividness of the emotional element in spontaneous redintegration.

§ 54. 1. We now enter on the examination of voluntary redintegration, the most important part of our subject for the purposes of Ethic, since it includes all actions for which the agent is said to be a responsible person. The link which connects spontaneous with voluntary redintegration is the sense of effort, and this depends upon a conflict between nerve movements which are seeking to become harmonised. The sense or perception of effort alone, without the perception of what the effort is for, that is, without the perception called wish, desire, purpose, or choice, is not volition; it will lead if continued to the perception of desire, were it only the desire to get rid of the sense of effort, but it is not a desire by itself. A volition is a compound feeling, one component of which is the sense of effort; it is the sense of effort for a purpose, that is, a wish, a desire, or a choice.

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The hypothesis of two kinds of movements opposed to each other, one evidenced by vividness and habit, the other by specific pleasure or interest, which we will now call the retentive and the reactive movements, gives us the clue to explain the mode in which spontaneous becomes voluntary redintegration. Desire is nothing else, to express it in terms of consciousness, than an increase in the vividness of specific pleasures or interests in contrast to the habitual feelings, or to the feelings which are vivid and painful, in antagonism to them. That is to say, in volition we feel both the contrast, which depends upon the nerve conflict, and the pleasureable side of one of the contrasted states, with greater vividness than before. The explanation is, that the reactive movements, evidenced by the specific pleasure or interest, are increased in energy. In terms of consciousness, desire, wish, sense of effort for a purpose, in one word, volition, is the greater intensity of pleasureable states in greater contrast with habitual states, or with states which are vivid without being pleasureable. In terms of nerve movement, the reactive movements, being themselves increased in energy, find also a greater resistance than before from the retentive movements. The sense of effort is the result and the evidence of the conflict between the two movements; the desire is the result and the evidence of the contrast between them in kind, one being a movement supporting a pleasure, the other supporting a comparative pain. The nature of the desire, consisting in the nature of the contrasted states, depends upon the nature of the movements supporting them; the effort in desiring depends upon the conflict between them.

2. All voluntary actions may be described generally as those in which we are conscious, not only of what we are doing while we are doing it, but of what we mean to do before we do it; in other words, as a constant application of means to ends, of doing something as a step to something else. Now in voluntary actions thus generally described it is clear that there are two main divisions, one which is an effort of attention or of reasoning, having no immediate effect beyond the mind, the other an effort of action by means of muscles upon the external world; the first may be called immanent, the second transeunt action; and these correspond respectively to the distinctions which we have traced in both the groups of organs below the third group, namely, the distinction between perception on one side and the muscular sense and motion on the other. This being a general description of voluntary action, let us now see how our analysis of voluntary redintegration harmonises with and explains it.

3. Let us take a case which includes both immanent and transeunt action; suppose that in spontaneous redintegration we have the image of the Paris Exhibition, and of the pleasure of going to Paris to see it. We are then conscious in the first place of a wish, desire, or choice, that is, of a representation of a kind which is pleasureable, and in contrast to representations painful or less pleasureable, which are those forced upon us by habit or vividness of perception, which form part of the same total state of representation; (and note here that we always identify *ourselves* with the desire or pleasure, and consider the antagonist representations as forced upon *us*, which is not the first origin of the perception of the Ego

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itself, but the ground or means of distinguishing from the Ego what I have called the True Ego;) in the next place we are conscious of the representation of circumstances or events which are means to the realisation or accomplishment of the pleasureable representation, its accomplishment meaning its being made more vivid than at present, and its disengagement from the painful or less pleasureable representations with which it is at present in conflict, conditions which are fulfilled by its actual presentation; thirdly, we are conscious of the motion of some muscle or set of muscles, and of the consequent presentative perceptions which contribute, as such means previously represented, to make the represented wish an actual enjoyment, and to liberate it from the contrasted representations, which are conceived in virtue of that forced connection as the obstacles to its realisation.

4. Now at every step of this process the motive, or conscious state evidencing the motive power, is an increased vividness in the pleasureable elements or moments of consciousness; in the first step of the process, the vividness of the pleasure in representation is plainly increased, but at the same time the feeling of effort arising from the contrasted representations is increased also, that is to say, we are *pari passu* aware more particularly of the obstacles to the realisation of the wish; at the second step, out of these connected representations, is developed a distinction between them; and some are perceived as forming a series leading up to the desired pleasure, for the connected representations on both sides increase in number as well as in minuteness of detail, being only limited by our habitual states of conscious-

ness, and the dwelling upon the pleasure and its connected and contrasted representations brings out into consciousness, in accordance with the law of habit in spontaneous redintegration, the whole panorama of our knowledge with reference to the one fixed representation of the desired pleasure. Out of these connected representations, then, is now developed the distinction of them into means and obstacles to the accomplishment of the desired end; and those parts which compose the series of means are, in that character and from the circumstance of their connection with the end, invested with a derivatively pleasureable character, even though by themselves they are painful or irksome. This state of redintegration shows the increasing energy in the movements supporting the pleasure, since the pleasure is spread into the antagonist's camp, and the means are adopted, though painful, because they have become derivatively pleasureable as being connected in representation with the source of pleasure, the represented pleasureable end. This is the crisis or decisive moment in the whole voluntary process; the question is, whether the reactive force, which supports the pleasure, is sufficient to overcome the retentive force, which supports the connected representations of obstacles and means, so far as to bring the means into distinct consciousness as such, and to replace the retentive force which supports them by the reactive force, which will be evidenced by the means themselves becoming objects of desire. At the third step, the actual muscular movements employed to realise the wish (in the case supposed, those necessary to take the journey to Paris) are stimulated, and their resistance overcome, at every stage of the

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series, by the reactive force supporting the representation of the desired pleasure. Here the reactive force spreads still wider than before, and not only keeps in abeyance the representations of pain and difficulty, but overcomes the irksomeness or fatigue of muscular movements in presentation or sensation, as it previously overcame the representations of them. The same reactive force is spread over and stimulates the efferent nerves distributed to the muscles.

5. The process now examined contains both transeunt and immanent actions. Immanent actions are those which are confined to action on the nervous organism, or in one or all of its three groups, and which consequently produce only modifications of perception. Transeunt actions are those which, being set on foot by immanent actions, are directed upon muscles, and produce consequently muscular movements. All cases of reasoning, and all its included operations, such as comparison, memory, judgment, analysis, synthesis, exclusion and inclusion, and so on, so far as they are voluntary, are cases of attention, a desire or choice insisted on; whatever else is included in them belongs to spontaneous redintegration. In reasoning we fix our attention on a contrast, and the comparison and consequent judgment are performed spontaneously. We are thus properly said to be masters of what we shall look at, but not of what we shall see; masters of the wish to reason, but not masters of the conclusions we shall draw; these depend upon our previous mental furniture. The concluding step in an immanent process of voluntary redintegration, when it consists in an image of ourself performing some bodily movement as a means to some represented end, is the first step in a trans-

eunt process which governs the action of the muscles in performing the whole series of bodily movements, until that represented end is realised in presentation. Transeunt voluntary movements, therefore, are intermediate between immanent voluntary movements and the movements of those organs of the second group which combine and coordinate into systems the movements of the nerves of muscular sense and motion, as described in § 52. These organs of the second group must send up movements into that part of the organs of the third group upon which transeunt action depends, and must in their turn receive movements from it which depend on the results of immanent action. The seat of transeunt action must be a seat of the combination of the movements from these two sources, namely, the organs of immanent action on the one side, and the organs of coordinated movements of nerves of muscular sense and motion on the other. Since, however, the line of distinction between immanent and transeunt voluntary action is so sharply drawn as we have seen it is, it is natural to suppose that the latter should have an organ clearly distinct, yet in close connection with the organs on either side of it; and accordingly I am inclined to adopt the hypothesis, that the cerebellum is the organ of transeunt voluntary action, the organ by means of which are combined those nerve movements, directed upon muscles, which have not as yet been brought into permanent and organised combination. This organ would then be the one appropriated to all such muscular actions as are performed *pro re nata*, or rather to those parts of them which are modifications of the systems of already coordinated actions belonging to the organs of the second group,

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or which combine these again into new systems, which may or may not be repeated so as to become habitual. Among such actions performed *pro re nata*, and in obedience to an image belonging to immanent action, may be enumerated the actions subsidiary to reasoning, drawing diagrams, taking observations, instituting experiments, skilled mechanical labour, the manual operations in painting and sculpture, choice of words in writing and in speaking, movements in hunting, shooting, fishing, travelling, rifle practice, military drill, gestures to express feelings,—all bodily movements in short which depend on, or involve as their condition, acquired systematic movements of muscles, and which modify these in turn, in dependence on a previously represented purpose.

6. It remains to examine the immanent actions of voluntary redintegration, depending on the nerve movements of the cerebral hemispheres, which we must now consider as their organ. The first question is, whether any thoroughgoing distinction can be discovered in these actions, which may serve to arrange them under different heads. The difference between the material and formal elements in redintegration, that is, between the feelings, emotions, and passions, contained in frameworks, on the one side, and the frameworks themselves and their connection, the images abstracting from the specific feelings which they contain, on the other, is the basis of the well-known and exhaustive distinction of Practical and Speculative reasoning. All intensely willed feelings and emotions, all judgments of the relative merits of feelings and emotions, their intensity, their pleasure and pain, their value, their validity, their moral good and evil, their moral beauty and deformity, all actual

choice, and all judgment about choosing, belong to the first head, and are instances of practical reasoning. All judgments about the connection of images, about facts, abstracting from the feelings of pleasure or pain with which they are accompanied for the reasoner at the time, although it is clear that feelings of pleasure or pain may be themselves objects of such judgments, are cases of speculative reasoning. Practical reasoning is having trains of feelings, speculative reasoning is having trains of thoughts. And it is volition itself which distinguishes between the two methods, since in the former it abstracts from the images and their connection, that is, disregards them as ends or motives in its procedure, and in the latter from the feelings contained in images as similar motives. Yet even in the purest speculative reasoning there is a pleasure always present as the motive power, the emotional pleasure of the logical instinct, as it was called in § 19, 2, the desire to know the order and truth of things; the pleasure which may be most properly called intellectual, because it arises in and belongs to all redintegration of the formal element in objects, whatever they may be, and consequently to all redintegration of the connection of images which are frameworks of emotion. The exercise of speculative reason therefore contains in itself its own motive power.

7. Speculative and practical reasoning, which as already shown exist separately only by virtue of a volition to abstract from one kind of motive and to be guided by another kind, are, besides this, also often interwoven with each other, following each other successively. Practical reasoning is the whole comparison of feelings, including the judgment about

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them as better or worse than one another, as well as the actual choice between them. These two branches of practical reasoning are both imperative of ends, both fix on a feeling or emotion as desirable, or as the object of wish. At this point the process of practical reasoning changes into one of speculative; the represented object fixed on becomes the starting point of a reasoning which redintegrates the images in connection with it as means and obstacles to its attainment, and every one of the means in its turn becomes an end commanded by the practical, discovered by the speculative reason. Again, the greater certainty or attainability of the means to some desired ends than that of the means to other ends, perhaps more desirable in themselves, causes the practical reason itself to reconsider its own verdict, by setting on foot a new process of practical reasoning, the starting point of which is the image resulting from the previous process of speculative reason. These two branches of immanent voluntary redintegration, speculative and practical reasoning, the latter of which falls again into two subordinate branches, actual feeling and judgment of feelings, seem to exhaust the whole remaining field of consciousness, and of the nervous organism on which it depends. For the sake of clearness I append a table of voluntary redintegration:

Voluntary Redintegration.	{ Transeunt Action.	
	{ Immanent Action.	{ Speculative Reasoning.
		{ Practical Reasoning. { Passion. Judgment.

It remains to analyse the processes of speculative and practical reasoning, and to show how, in all their

branches, they are but exemplifications of the mode of action already described at the beginning of the present §.

§ 55. 1. Putting the subsidiary processes of observation and experiment aside, all speculative reasoning is an exercise of memory ; critical generalisation, which consists in harmonising already given conceptions, is an exercise of memory simply, the object-matter being modified only by the logical instinct ; while acquisitive generalisation, which consists in the development of principles, either by applying an old analogy to new facts, or by arranging old facts by a new analogy, that is to say, by the methods either of deduction or induction, is an exercise of imaginative memory. (For the distinction of critical and acquisitive generalisation see "Time and Space" § 36.) We must distinguish the memory of spontaneous from that of voluntary redintegration. The former is where we remember without effort things which have once happened to us, or of which we have read, or which have been by a previous effort learned by heart ; the latter is where we recall at will things, names, persons, or events, which have at some time or other stood in connection with what is at present in our minds, from which we start. It is this latter kind of memory which is valuable, not only in and for itself, but also as being the foundation of the reasoning powers ; for without an ample supply of facts at command no wide exercise of the inductive process is possible, since it is impossible to have the facts supplied us *ab extra*, by observation or experiment, or even by reading notes, in sufficient abundance and with sufficient opportuneness. It is then the condition of excellence in inductive reasoning ;

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analytical power on the other hand does not require memory in the same degree. The reactive and retentive powers appear to be equally concerned in supporting this kind of memory, for we not only recall much, but we recall what is to the purpose, that is, we recall with reference to the central interest from which we start. But even in the memory of spontaneous redintegration we may distinguish two kinds, according as the retentive or the reactive movements predominate. In the first case we have what is called a mechanical memory for things in their actual order, or in what has been made their actual order in learning by heart. What is learned by heart is acquired originally by volition, exercised once for all, not springing from the interest of each verse, date, or name, as it is acquired and added to the series of things committed to memory ; although of course it is true that, the greater the interest attaching to the things learned, the less will be the effort required to learn them. The whole series is impressed on the memory, thenceforth belongs entirely to the retentive powers, and is brought forth again by a process of spontaneous redintegration when one of the things in the series is recalled, depending solely on the one factor, habit, and not on the other factor, interest. The other kind of memory in spontaneous redintegration is the foundation or source of the power of recalling at will, and, equally with this, rests on the equal strength of the reactive and retentive powers. This kind of memory is when a person recalls past events accurately and copiously, and with their points of interest in relief, as they were felt in fact at the time of their first occurring to him, or of his first reading them, the

points of interest forming the stepping stones to his redintegration of the entire picture. Vividness of perception and rapidity of change by means of pleasure or interest are here involved; such a mind is said to be lively and quick as well as retentive; and a mind which possesses this power in a high degree is sure to be able very easily to learn by heart things that interest him, since so much less effort will be required. How mistaken then, for the purpose at least of strengthening the memory, must be the practice of learning by heart; I do not say it may not be advisable for other purposes, such for instance as affording a supplement for an incurable deadness of interest in subjects which nevertheless it is important for us to keep in memory; but so far from strengthening the memory, it strengthens only that which is already perhaps too preponderant, the retentive power; it is the reactive power which most needs strengthening; and this may best be done by fostering the intellectual interests, and making them the starting points whence the interest may spread to connected subjects. The only memory that is of any intellectual value, the power of recalling at will, and that kind of spontaneous redintegration upon which it rests, may be strengthened by the indulgence of the natural intellectual tastes, and the gradual connection of them with allied subjects. For instance, an interest in plants or animals may be fostered into an interest in knowing the laws of the vegetable and animal kingdoms, and a memory for the entire range of facts which concern them.

2. Memory of the voluntary kind, Aristotle's *θῆξις*, or hunting for forgotten facts, is the groundwork of all speculative reasoning; the total com-

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plement of facts to be redintegrated is the same in both cases. And the mode in which the antagonism between the reactive and retentive powers is kept in play is the same in both, namely, that we know beforehand in a certain sense, in its second intention, what we want to find, and do not know it in another sense, in its first intention, since this knowledge is the very desideratum we are in search of. The pleasureable interest pervading the image of the present gap in our knowledge becoming filled is the thing supported by the reactive movement, which forces us to dwell upon the images which contain or bound the gap, so as to redintegrate them in all directions by their habitual connections, or images habitually connected with them, until we find the image which fills the gap. The pleasure and the habit are concentrated upon one set of images, which is pleasing so far as it consists of the imagined and desired filling up of the gap, painful or requiring effort so far as the gap is not yet filled. The redintegration by habit is entirely spontaneous; our only command over it is by the effort we make to keep the painful unfilled gap in consciousness, so as to make the images containing it redintegrate all their connected images in turn. This mode of operation is common to voluntary memory and reasoning; but the difference is, first, that the pleasure in simply remembering may be a specific pleasure in the object to be remembered, while in reasoning it is always a general mode of pleasure, consisting in the harmonious and complete coordination of images; and secondly, consequent on this, that reasoning adds to memory the function of comparing or judging the images which arise in the redintegra-

tions, testing their likeness and unlikeness, equality and inequality, and all the other minute relations of time and space which they bear to each other, so as to effect a proved and systematic connection between them. Memory aims at filling the gap with an image which has at some particular time filled it before, reasoning with one which bears certain time and space relations to the images before and after. The perception however of these relations, which is comparison or judgment, is not, taken by itself, an act of volition, but of simple or spontaneously representative perception.

3. There are three modes of speculative reasoning; the first is when we have already in consciousness all the facts or phenomena which are the object-matter of the reasoning, and seek a general conception to colligate them, which is done by arranging them in some classification among themselves, or by bringing them under some analogy to other sets of phenomena, e. g. Plato's colligation of the phenomena and functions of a republic by analogy with the phenomena and functions of an individual person. This I call a case of critical generalisation. Secondly, we may have already in consciousness some of the phenomena of the object-matter, and seek to complete them in number, so as to establish, out of the old and the new facts together, a conception or law of sequence and coexistence which will colligate them all. This is the process of induction, one of the modes of acquisitive generalisation. Thirdly, we may have already in our minds a general conception with the facts on which it rests and of which it is composed, and seek to deduce from it, and thus anticipate, new facts, in short to develop our principle or general conception.

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This is the mode of deduction, the second mode of acquisitive generalisation.

4. This division is at any rate exhaustive, for since the object-matter of all reasoning is primarily distinguishable into particular and general phenomena, facts and laws, particular phenomena and general conceptions of them, (which are all different ways of expressing the same primary distinction), it would seem that only three relations are possible between these two sides, namely, they are either equal, or one of them is greater or less than the other. In the first case we have the relation of equality; in the second, we have the phenomena greater than the conception; in the third, the conception greater than the phenomena. But here is not the place to enter upon any of the theories of reasoning, theories as to the general and ultimate conceptions which we make or ought to make our canons of induction or deduction, such for instance as the Uniformity of the Course of Nature; or as to the mode in which more special canons are to be brought under these; or as to the relation which the facts hold to the special or general canons. The facts which concern us here lie beyond these, and relate to the process of redintegration itself, of which all instances of reasoning are cases. It is only necessary to show that I am describing, and describing exhaustively, the processes of reasoning, in describing the processes of voluntary redintegration; and for this purpose I have adopted the above classification of reasoning processes, without meaning to affirm that this is the only or even, possibly, the best classification of them.

5. It remains to notice the completeness of the victory gained by the reactive movements over the

retentive in voluntary redintegration. A process of speculative reasoning is not completed without the entire subordination of the two movements, as they appeared in spontaneous redintegration, to the new movement which is the continuation of one of them, namely, of the reactive movement. There are two sources of pleasure or interest in speculative reasoning; one the pleasure of satisfying curiosity, or the logical instinct, of holding together a number of facts under a single law, the other the pleasure of minimising the effort necessary to do this, which is expressed by the logical law of *Parcimony*, a law for conation, as shown in "Time and Space" § 35. This double interest or pleasure is the motive, the exponent of the reactive movement, in speculative reasoning, and it is a pleasure attaching to the whole series of images which are offered by spontaneous redintegration. All the images of the series are seats of the retentive, all are seats of the reactive forces; the effort is no longer, as in spontaneous redintegration, to replace the painful images by pleasureable ones, but to hold fast the painful images, those containing the gap or missing link in our knowledge, which on that account are painful, till they have the gap filled and the missing link supplied, the anticipation of which is pleasureable. In proportion to the pleasure which we take in imagining the link found will be the intensity of the effort to retain the images containing the link missing. The very same set of images which is in itself painful, as being unharmonised and unconnected, is thus converted into the focus of the reactive movements, into the seat of the pleasureable interest of imagining the connection completed.

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6. Where, now, is the antagonist force which makes it painful, and demands effort, to keep this set of images in consciousness? Not in those images alone which were the exponents of the retentive force in spontaneous redintegration, but in the total of images, belonging to spontaneous redintegration, and now excluded from the series under investigation; that is to say, in spontaneous redintegration as a whole, with both its forces retentive and reactive, expressed by habit and interest, as opposed to the series of images picked out as the object of a voluntary redintegration. The moment the effort of attention, consisting in holding fast the unconnected images, is relaxed, that moment spontaneous redintegration, obeying its two laws of habit and interest, is restored, and we return to a state of idle dreaming instead of active reasoning. Spontaneous redintegration as a whole is the background or foundation of voluntary; its pleasureable movement is the antagonist of the reactive force in voluntary redintegration; for, in the volition of reasoning, that which is in itself painful has become pleasureable, and that which is in itself pleasureable, if it is not the pleasure chosen by the volition, is *eo ipso* painful to it. Spontaneous redintegration keeps bringing back into consciousness its trains of images once or at any time connected with the images fixed on by volition, and all those parts of them which will not combine with the fixed images, so as to fill up the missing link, are steadily rejected, so long as the volition or reactive force prevails, notwithstanding their character of specific pleasure, notwithstanding their habitual ease and familiarity, which they have as members of trains of spontaneous redintegration.

7. The process just described is the fundamental process of speculative reasoning.* Each image as it is offered by spontaneous redintegration is tested, or compared with the gap in the set of images which forms the starting or rallying point of the reasoning, and every one is rejected which does not aid in filling the gap. In critical generalisation, the whole phenomena to be colligated,—and the colligation itself is here the missing link or gap to be filled,—are passed in review and made to recall, by spontaneous redintegration, each feature belonging to them, each mode of connection with other images, each function which they can perform; likenesses and unlikenesses are observed, order in time of their features or functions noted, until the whole mass is analysed, thrown as it were into the crucible, and again put together in a more logical order. In inductive processes, those phenomena are picked out of the trains of spontaneous redintegration which bear a perceived analogy or resemblance to the images or parts of them fixed on by volition; the causes, the effects, the accompaniments, of these phenomena are noted by continual repetition of the redintegrations; until the whole series of phenomena which bear a resemblance to the old images of the starting point have been passed in review and combined with them, so as to become the object-matter for a critical generalisation. In deduction, the general law or principle which it is sought to develop is a provisional image with certain outlines only filled in, similar cases to which are sought for in the phenomena offered by spontaneous redintegration; these redintegrations being made to start from the salient features of the provisional image, and the phenomena offered by them being rejected

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if they do not show the same salient features as those fixed on as the starting point; while those which do so are subsumed as parallel cases, or corresponding instances of the application of the original principle.

8. Two circumstances in speculative reasoning, and indeed in voluntary redintegration generally, are important to notice; the first is, that volition has no power of calling up images, but only of rejecting and selecting from those offered by spontaneous redintegration. But the rapidity with which this selection is made, owing to the familiarity of the ways in which spontaneous redintegration runs, gives the process of reasoning the appearance of evoking images that are foreseen to be conformable to the purpose. There is no seeing them before they are offered; there is no summoning them before they are seen. The other circumstance is, that every kind of reasoning is nothing, in its simplest form, but attention. In reasoning which precedes transient action, we attend to the last in the series of means, which is the first in practice, and the muscular action follows of itself. In distinguishing means from obstacles, we attend to the means and their connection with the end, and the choice of them follows of itself. In speculative reasoning again, comparison or judgment is nothing but attention to two moments or states of consciousness, in connection with the image which has interest for us, and the rejection of the one, the choice of the other, follows of itself. The likeness or unlikeness, the greater quantity or the less quantity, of two images is perceived by itself, when once the two are put together in the clear light of attention. Volition is the intensity of the interest counterbalancing the tendency

which the images have to vanish or grow faint. Judgment is the perception of likenesses or difference between two images attended to. The act is the sense of effort in attention. And the same will be found to hold true in the cases of practical reasoning which yet remain to be examined.

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§ 56. 1. We are now at last entering on that part of the analysis in which we may expect, if anywhere, to discover the key to the Problem of Practice, the analysis namely of those processes in which motives determine choice and judgment on choice. In describing what the real problem in Ethic was, in § 2, it was said that the question of "ought" was a question of the nature of states of consciousness, whereas that of fact was a question of their history. We now come to the point where these two questions have their common source, the process of immanent practical volition; and the analysis of this process must disentangle the phenomena of the two questions, by showing what are the elements or moments in the process, the common source of both, from which each of the two streams flows. In § 54 it was shown that immanent voluntary redintegration had two branches, passion and judgment, corresponding to the two modes of spontaneous redintegration, the redintegration of feelings and that of images. Let us then first follow up the branch of judgment, which is properly called practical reasoning.

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2. Practical reasoning differs from speculative in the motives which determine its redintegrations. There the reactive movements, the preponderance of which over the retentive constituted the reasoning process, were those which were evidenced by the pleasure of satisfying curiosity, or the logical

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instinct, and the pleasure of minimising effort ; in other words, these pleasures were the motives of speculative reasoning. But in practical reasoning pleasures and interests of all kinds, both general and specific, and solely in their character of pleasures or interests, take the place of the single more or less specific pleasure of satisfying curiosity, while the general pleasure of minimising effort remains common to both, inasmuch as both are modes of reasoning, expressed by the law of parcimony ; but the one is the discovery of the truth of images, the other of the truth of feelings. Accordingly, practical reasoning abstracts from the images, the frameworks of emotions, except so far as they are requisite to embody clearly the emotions and feelings which are its own immediate object. The images are not the interest or the motive in practical reason, but the emotions and feelings, with their pleasures and interests, which pervade the images. Just however as we have found that pleasure of some kind or other is the evidence or exponent of the changing or reactive movements, so also is the case here. The reactive movements in practical reasoning are evidenced or expressed by pleasureable emotions and interests, with their images ; the retentive by emotions which are either habitual or vivid but not pleasureable, and by the images which contain them ; and the series of states of consciousness which form the redintegration is governed by the predominance, increased and sustained, of the reactive over the retentive movements.

3. The result of this distribution of the reactive and retentive movements, supposing this account of it to be correct, would be a continued comparison of pleasures and interests, as such ; that is, it would be

a process of practical reasoning. I do not profess that this analysis is final or capable of demonstration; it is an hypothetical analysis of the mode in which the familiar process known as practical reasoning may have been produced, of the nerve movements on which it may depend. That pleasures are balanced against pleasures in comparison, that they are judged of as better or worse in kind than each other, as well as more or less intense in degree, are well known facts; and in endeavouring to discover how and by what means the comparison is carried on, we must bring the states of consciousness belonging to it into a systematic connection with those of other similar groups, and the movements which underlie these into similar connection with those which underlie the corresponding groups.

4. Now we must not assume that the process of practical reasoning begins with a desire to know which is the greatest or the best of two or more pleasures; this would be to cut the knot we have to untie. We must show how and by what movements, already discovered in spontaneous redintegration, that state of consciousness arises which is a desire to know this; in other words, how the voluntary redintegration of practical reasoning is set on foot, as well as how, continuing the same movements, it reaches its conclusion. I suppose, therefore, that the movements supporting the pleasureable emotion, and those supporting the emotions which are habitual or vivid but not pleasureable, are increased in energy, and their conflict evidenced in consciousness by a sense of effort. The increased energy of the movements supporting the emotion which is pleasureable makes this emotion the fixed point in the redinte-

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gration, and the sense of effort becomes the desire to have this emotion intensified, the obstacles to which are the movements supporting the habitual or the vivid and not pleasureable emotions. Now, according to the intensity of the pleasure in the emotion which is the fixed point of the whole redintegration, will be the character of the redintegration itself. If this intensity is very great, no other emotions or habitual images will harmonise with it, but all will be rejected from the redintegration, except those which either as emotions increase its pleasure, or as images are perceived to stand in the relation of means to it. The redintegration is in this case a process of practical reasoning about the attainability of the pleasure which is the starting point of the redintegration. If however the intensity is less in this emotion which is the starting point, then the series of emotions and their images, offered by the retentive movements, sustain a more equal combat, and are perceived one by one in contrast with the one which is fixed, and their pleasures in contrast with its pleasure. Nor are they only perceived one by one, but each one is developed and brought out in all its parts, and connections with others, by redintegration; and the same with the fixed state of consciousness expressing the reactive movement; so that the various kinds and qualities, the various degrees of refinement and value, of emotion and emotional pleasure and pain, which belong to all these states, are brought into comparison with each other. And the energy in the conflicting movements is evidenced by the attention in perceiving the contrasts of the compared emotions. At every step in this process the fixed emotion and its image may become

modified by those which the retentive movements bring into comparison with it, and the pleasure of it thereby altered in character; and, wherever the greatest intensity of pleasure is found, there, in that emotion and that image, is the fixed point for the next continuance of the redintegration. Each step of the process is a judgment, that is, a perception of the comparative qualities of emotions and pleasures and the images which they pervade; and, since we have found in former cases that the intenser pleasure is the index of the stronger movement, we may now conclude that the stronger movement, described by the kind of emotion and pleasure which it supports, whatever that kind may be, has been accompanied in every particular instance by the intenser pleasure. We may conclude that the emotion, pleasure, and image, in which the redintegration ends as the last fixed point of its series, and the starting point for a future series, or which, in other words, is judged the best of all those which have been under consideration, is that which has at the time been the most pleasureable of them all. There is no judgment passed upon, no perception of, the comparative intensity of these pleasures; the intensity, on the contrary, is itself the judgment passed on their comparative worth; for it is assumed to accompany the actual course of redintegration, and to remain with the pleasure, emotion, and image, which the redintegration ends by leaving in consciousness. That which survives at the conclusion, whatever its analysis or nature may be, is inferred to have possessed the most intense pleasure.

5. If the foregoing is a true account of the process of practical reasoning, we have in it the key to

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the problem of Ethic mentioned above; for we have discovered united in one and the same process the ground both of the *de facto* and of the *de jure* supremacy which states of consciousness may possess. The *de jure* supremacy consists in the nature, known by analysis, of the state of consciousness itself which is judged better than those it has been compared with; its *de facto* supremacy consists in the circumstance that it has proved the strongest in maintaining its place in redintegration. The *de jure* supremacy is a fact, the *de facto* supremacy is a sequence of facts. Now it is not one state of consciousness, but all, which may become in turn *de facto* supreme, and consequently, for that turn, *de jure* supreme also. But since the *de jure* supremacy consists in the analysis or nature of a fact, and not in the circumstance that this fact occurs, therefore not only can the *de jure* supremacy of any state of consciousness be named and known as the same, when it occurs again, but it can be brought into connection and comparison with other states of consciousness, which may have been in their turn *de jure* and *de facto* supreme; and can be arranged in a series or in a system with those other states, by processes of practical reasoning in which the *de jure* supremacy of a state of consciousness is made the starting point of redintegration, and becomes the exponent of the reactive movements; and in which therefore a *de facto* supreme state of consciousness will be not only *de jure* supreme for a single turn, but for all cases of practical reasoning in which those other states of consciousness occur with which it has been already compared. For the *de jure* supremacy consists not in the changing degrees of the pleasure, but in the

fixed features of the analysis, of a state of consciousness; these constitute its permanent Right, those its temporary accessions to Power. The *de jure* supremacy therefore attains, in consequence of the exercise of practical reasoning, to a fixed abode in some particular state or states of consciousness, unattainable by partial, brief, or feeble exercises of it, such as may be supposed to occur frequently or easily; and to a validity which is unassailable by the fluctuations of such minor efforts. And since the Moral Law, for it is plain that this and nothing else can be intended by this all-embracing validity, in attaining to be what it is, must have passed through a long history in every man, and have been in many shapes and many reasonings *de facto* supreme, before becoming so in perfect completeness, it has therefore below it, and more or less at its command, many habits and many subordinate judgments, which not only enable it to maintain and enforce, through and over minor reasonings, its *de facto* supremacy, but to make advance itself to ever increasing perfection. And therefore, although the *de facto* supremacy of some brief and feeble effort of practical reasoning is also, while the effect of the reasoning lasts, a *de jure* supremacy also, yet it has no *de jure* supremacy at all, the moment it is remembered that a higher supremacy exists, with which the present is not in agreement.

6. Two modes of practical reasoning have now been analysed; one a reasoning about the attainability of pleasures, the other a comparison of the nature and value of pleasures. The latter is what is most properly called Teleology, a comparison of Ends. But the two modes may be interwoven, or follow each

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other alternately, in the same process of practical reasoning; and the greater attainability or certainty of any pleasure is by itself a circumstance which gives it value in comparison with others. This is the explanation of the instances brought forward in § 20, and of the well-known fact that disparate considerations combine into a single motive for a single line of conduct. For instance, in choice of strategical operations, a movement which will give the power of inflicting a greater loss on the enemy, after defeating him in a battle, will often be chosen in preference to one which would make his defeat in the battle more certain, but allow him to escape after it with less loss. This is a case where the greater value of one result counterbalances the greater attainability of a result of less value; and it is obvious that different leaders will judge differently in such cases; those that are cautious will lean to the side of attainability, those that are venturesome to the side of value; but the great general will be he who judges most accurately the precise means requisite to secure the less result, so as to apply all the other means at his disposal to attain the greater. These two modes of practical reasoning are very important to notice and to keep clearly distinguished. Since the reasoning on the attainability or certainty of any desired emotion is always a reasoning about means to an end, the result of the reasoning being an image of a means either to procure or to increase a desired emotion, this kind of practical reasoning stands very close to purely speculative reasoning, and forms as it were a link between speculation and teleology. I propose to name this kind of reasoning, the reasoning about the means to procure or increase a given

end, effective reasoning, in contradistinction to that which compares ends with each other, which I propose to call teleological reasoning; practical reasoning being thus exhaustively divisible into two branches. The complete table of reasoning processes will then stand thus:

Reasoning.	{	Speculative.	{ Critical.	{	Deductive.
			{ Acquisitive.		Inductive.
	{	Practical.	{ Judgment.	{	Teleological.
			{ Passion.		Effective.

7. But we come now to another kind of volition, at least to what seems another; but really one which will be shown to be a modification of what has been already analysed. Every one recognises the difference between actually choosing or willing a pleasure and judging the merits or values of pleasures chosen or to be chosen; the difference between doing what is right or wrong and knowing it; between being a good or bad character and knowing what characters are good or bad. It is the knowing or judging this which has been hitherto examined. Yet different as the two things are, the reintegrating process in both is the same, with slight modification. If in immanent voluntary reintegration the reactive and retentive movements are both energetic, their respective emotions both intense; that is, if both are in the state in which the reactive was described to be (in par. 4.), in giving rise to the reasoning on the attainability of a pleasure; an oscillation between these two movements and their respective emotions will arise, in which first one, then the other, will

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seem to be the strongest; each will redintegrate its habitually connected states, and, since each is a fixed point of redintegration, two whole trains of redintegrations will seem to be in conflict, reasons urged against reasons, pleasures against pleasures; and the final victory of one series over the other will be the final preponderance of one very energetic movement over another, that is, will appear as one intense effort overcoming another, rather than as a calm comparison of the emotions and images of the two trains of redintegration. In other words, we shall have willed and chosen an emotion rather than have reasoned about the merits of it. The difference in the conditions of the two cases of judging choice and of actually choosing is this, that not only the energy of the movements underlying the emotions, as compared to those underlying their images, is increased in the latter case, but the conflicting movements underlying two or more conflicting emotions are increased together; so that the sense of effort attaches to the two principal emotions in conflict, which remain in presence, and not to emotions or images in the redintegrations which they set on foot. This is the first occasion on which the former circumstance, namely, the increased energy in the movements supporting emotion as compared with those supporting its framework, comes to light. It is a new distinction in the nerve movements which must be assumed to account for, or correspond with, the well-known fact of emotion, when strong beyond a certain point, obliterating the features of the images which it pervades, while up to that point it has the effect of bringing them out into greater relief. A great predominance of the emotional or material element, over

the cognitive or formal, gives the boundary line between practical reasoning and voluntary action, choice, or passion; a great predominance of the cognitive over the emotional element gives that between speculative and practical reasoning; while practical reasoning itself occupies, as it were, the space between, depending on the presence of the two elements in more nearly equal proportion. The distinctions between reactive and retentive movements appear to be applicable to redintegrations where the emotional element predominates, as much as to those where it is equal or subordinate.

8. In the process of actual choosing or willing, as it is called, we seem to have the emotions and passions themselves in presence, we seem to *be* affected by them; while in that of judging we refer our judgment to cases where we have had, or may have again, the same emotions and passions in greater intensity, or, as we call it, the emotions and passions themselves; the two cases of emotion seem to stand to each other in the relation of representations to presentations, owing to the parallel difference in their vividness. Just however as, in the case of representations and presentations, the only difference in kind was the difference of vividness, while the difference in their order of sequence, the one being a repetition of the other, causes us to name them presentations and representations, so here, where there is no repetition of one by the other, the sole difference which remains is the difference of vividness depending on the difference of energy in the supporting movements.

9. According to the character, nature, or analysis, of the two conflicting emotions, and of that which is

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the victor in the conflict, is the character or nature of the process which ends in the victory of one of them. If the emotion on one side is characterised by the sense of moral goodness, and that on the other by some pleasure not so characterised, or, on the contrary, by the sense of moral evil, then the conflict is in its process a temptation, and on its issue either a yielding to, or a victory over, temptation; it is a struggle between duty and inclination. If one side is characterised both by moral goodness, and by difficulties or painful emotions accompanying it, the other by the pleasure of escaping these pains or difficulties, then the conflict is one between duty and the obstacles to performing it. If one side is characterised by pleasure and by difficulties or painful emotions accompanying it, the other by the pleasure of escaping these pains and difficulties, then the conflict is one between a wish and the obstacles to attaining it. Of whatever nature may be the emotions on either side, each will have its own pleasure; the determination of the conflict will be the choice of some pleasure or pleasures in preference to others. The vividness and force of habit on the retentive side of the balance will have as their pleasure the freedom from painful effort, which the resistance of the retentive movement itself fixes upon the pleasures which are supported by the reactive movement. We cannot then take the single case of temptation as a type of all cases of practical choice, nor oppose pleasure as a whole to duty as a whole; the moral law has pleasures of its own, which make it the exponent of the reactive force, and pains attached to it which make it liable to succumb before the representations of ease and pleasure of other kinds. Pleasures again

have pains attached to them in the same way, which make them succumb before representations of other pleasures. All choice is a balance and determination between pleasures; and only by its issue or event, and not before or otherwise, can we tell which pleasures have been greatest on the whole at the time in question. The moral law has always, from its analysis given in § 37, the *de jure* supremacy; but this does not show that its *de facto* supremacy is not owing to the intensity of the pleasures which are its own, any more than it shows the same of the admission of its *de jure* supremacy in particular cases of judgment. (parr. 4, 5.)

10. The processes of action and choice just described tend to grow into habits, and habits to coalesce into characters. When therefore we describe the process of action and choice as a conflict of retentive and reactive movements, we must distinguish two states in the whole progress, first, that of struggle or formation of character, secondly, that after its formation; and it is clear that the struggle ends in movements once reactive passing over to the retentive side and becoming habitual. In the first period, that of struggle and growth, the Ego or Self is always imagined on the side of the reactive movement. Only when this side is victorious in any particular choice do we say that *we* have been victorious; if the retentive side proves strongest we say that we have had to yield to difficulties or to pains. Yet we have chosen what was felt at the time as the least of two evils, or the greatest of two pleasures. The reactive movements thus become the basis of the True Ego, and the true character of a man consists in the kind of emotions which have been the most frequent

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exponents of the reactive movements in his redintegrations. When, however, the character has been formed, or rather in those matters in which it has been formed, the ego or self is imagined as on the retentive side, that is, as belonging to the same emotions as before, but which have now become habitual traits of his character.

11. The fundamental sameness of the two processes, choosing and judging choice, is shown by the fact that they succeed each other and pass into each other by imperceptible changes. A judgment passed often becomes an effort to realise itself in an actual choice, which is perhaps resisted by an increased vividness in the images of difficulties and pains attached to it. And an almost equal conflict of choice between emotions dies away into the redintegration of the images attendant on one of them, without any decision having been come to. In this fact of fundamental sameness lies the power which reflection has in deciding choice. Reflection is the practical reasoning which judges previous cases both of choice and of judgment on choice. Now, since each of the two conflicting emotions in choice sets on foot its own series of images and emotions, it furnishes many handles to reflection, that is, it leads to many images which we have previously judged as good or bad, pleasureable or painful, which judgments now come up with these images into consciousness. They are a new element in the decision of choice which we have not yet noticed. The very reflection that we are engaged in a conflict of choice leads to many other reflections which bear upon the conflict, and all together act as new elements or moments of it. The reflection that the True Ego must be on one

side or on the other is one among these reflections. What kind of judgments these will be, how numerous, how forcible, how ready to combine with the redintegration actually on foot, and on what side their weight will be thrown in any conflict of choice, depends upon the previous character and habitual tendencies of the individual person. The reflection, being an additional and superinduced motive in the decision of the conflict, in the numerous cases where it determines the decision, makes the determination of it appear as sole act and free will of the Self which is always the object of a reflection. What has really happened is, that the series of redintegration, starting from one or other of the emotions in conflict, has set on foot, by some previously established connection, a new representation or train of representations, which combine with and modify those already existing. But this is not possible without the energy or intensity in one or both of the originally conflicting emotions being either simultaneously or previously relaxed.

12. Finally a mode of immanent voluntary action must be noticed, different in degree of intensity both from reasoning and from actual choice, which consists in strong emotion or passion, the resistance to which is only just sufficient to make evident by a sense of effort the irresistible energy of the feeling. The passion is willed, but can hardly be said to be chosen, certainly not to be judged of. It is choice not militant but triumphant, at least for the moment. The movements supporting the emotional element are so energetic that all the imagery is coloured by them and seen only in their light. No emotion, no imagery, no reflections, contrary to the existing pas-

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sion are entertained, no suspicion of its justifiability, no fear for its results. This state will be understood sufficiently from those which have already been analysed. Of voluntary processes this is one extreme, opposed to the other extreme, speculative reasoning, or rather speculative reasoning on abstract form, as for instance in mathematical calculation; the one exhibiting the framework of emotion, the other emotion itself, in their purest or most abstract shape possible, so that they be complete or empirical states of consciousness at all.

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§ 57. 1. It is requisite here, after the analysis of the two kinds of redintegration, to apply this analysis in a more thorough examination of the doctrine stated at the outset of this Chapter, which has been the fundamental hypothesis throughout its course, the doctrine of the entire dependence of consciousness on nerve movements. Let us have no half-lights in Philosophy. That consciousness depends, both as a whole and in all its moments, upon states or movements of nerve, and that the states of consciousness do not in their turn react upon states or movements of nerve, are doctrines which require the most careful investigation, and to be accepted, if they are accepted, only after complete acquaintance with the entire series of conclusions which they involve. Some of these conclusions are so foreign to our usual ways of thought, and to the language which we all use in daily life, that it is difficult not only to bring them clearly before the mind, but to avoid thinking them unintelligible. Pain, for instance, must be held to be no warning to abstain from the thing which has caused pain; pleasure no motive to seek the thing which has caused pleasure; pain no check,

pleasure no spur, to action. The conception that they are such causes of action must be steadily and consistently banished from our interpretation of the phenomena of nerve action and of consciousness; which certainly will be no easy task, since even those who most succeed in banishing them must be always on the watch against the language they must employ, which everywhere supposes their truth. If however we decide to retain these conceptions, then there will be no consistent system possible, short of referring the phenomena of consciousness to a Soul or an Ego, as the cause of consciousness as a whole; whereby, to say nothing of the far greater difficulties of such theories, the attempt to effect a scientific unity of conception in philosophy must be given up.

2. There are two series of phenomena running parallel to each other, the series of nerve movements and that of states of consciousness. We have, or may have, knowledge of all the changes which take place in the latter series, and can discover general facts about their sequence and combination; we have on the other hand very small knowledge indeed of the changes which take place in the series of nerve movements, but, assuming that every change in the series of conscious states depends upon some change in the series of nerve movements, we characterise the latter by the former, and the whole series of states of consciousness becomes a series consisting of evidences of the changes in the series of nerve movements, on which each conscious state depends. The one series contains the *causæ cognoscendi* of the changes in the other; the other series contains the *causæ existendi*, or some of them, of the former. The first question then is, Does the series of states of

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consciousness contain in its earlier states *causæ existendi* of its later states, so becoming sharer with the series of nerve movements in the production and formation of later states of consciousness? The second question is, Does the series of states of consciousness contain *causæ existendi* of changes in the series of nerve movements, so as to react upon them, and through them upon subsequent states of consciousness? Or, on the contrary, does the series of states of consciousness remain entirely, from first to last, a series consisting solely of *causæ cognoscendi* of the nerve movements, and of objects generally? In "Time and Space," Chap. v. § 30, I gave an answer which I now think entirely erroneous. It was in effect a negative to the third of these questions, an affirmative to the two first of them; and that view ran through the analysis of spontaneous red-integration given in the same chapter. It is then the more incumbent upon me to justify the answer I am now led to give to these questions.

3. Common language leads us to assume that states of consciousness react upon nerve and brain; we say that pain is exhausting, and in preventing pain, as for instance in taking ether before undergoing a surgical operation, we think we prevent physical exhaustion. But pain itself is only prevented by acting upon the nerves or brain, as by inhaling ether, or by withdrawing attention from the operation, or by the excitement of action, as when wounds are received in battle without the pain being felt; and in all these cases a physical change is wrought in the nerves or brain, which supports the attention or the excitement; and this change in the states of nerve or brain may be the cause of the prevention

of physical exhaustion, and not the removal of pain which it produces. The physical change in nerve or brain may both support the removal of pain and cause the following physical state to be not one of exhaustion. So also in cases where we speak as if the imagination reacted on the physical state, as for instance where cures are wrought by imagination. The imagination is itself produced by producing changes of nerve or brain, which support the imagination; and it may be these changes, and not the imagination which characterises them, that cause the change in the nervous states beneficial to the diseased part of the body. There is no necessity, therefore, in cases similar to the above, to assume a reaction of states of consciousness on states of nerve or brain. But these are not cases of voluntary redintegration, and perhaps the difficulty there may be greater. It is there at any rate that arises the difficulty which I felt most strongly; for do we not see that voluntary actions are modified in proportion to the strength, and in accordance with the kind, of antecedent states of consciousness? To take, if I may be allowed, my own instance and my own argument, "Time and Space" § 30, page 280-3: "When the sun in June shines in at the window, I lift my hand and pull down the green blind. The sensation of heat is painful; representing this I feel an interest in obviating it; this is a purpose, or final cause, which as efficient produces the sensation of effort in lifting my hand and pulling down the blind, and a more agreeable state of sensation is the result. * * * * But it is impossible to explain the phenomena of voluntary action, as for instance the case just described, by the mere production of consciousness by the brain;

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for, unless a reaction of consciousness on the brain is introduced, the particular actions performed are meaningless, and no special cause for each or any of them can be assigned; for instance, what determines the brain to guide the muscles to pull down the blind? Can we conceive that just this phenomenon and no other would follow, if every other circumstance remained the same, except that the feeling of pain from the heat and representation of the means to avoid it were absent?"

4. To this reasoning I now reply, that the feeling of pain from the heat and representation of means to avoid it must, each of them, be regarded as states of consciousness dependent on some nerve or brain movements, and that, if these particular movements were there, and *only* the dependent states of consciousness absent, the same muscular movements of pulling down the blind would follow. Every modification of the succession of states of consciousness has its own modification of the succession of nerve movements causing it; and the various nerve movements are equally numerous, and modified as minutely, as the various states of consciousness which are their evidence. They have grown up together with them, have ramified and interramified, broken new channels or taken new directions, combined with or separated from each other, building up a nervous organism which bears in its organisation traces of all the various movements which have taken place within it; so that any state of consciousness, however complex, or however abstract and simplified by generalisation, it may be, rests upon a nerve movement which is equally complex or equally compendious, and which also leads up to, and leads away

from, those other nerve movements which support the states of consciousness connected by habit with, or disjoined by habit from, the state of consciousness of which that nerve movement is the support. If it were possible that the nerve movements could take place without their supported states of consciousness, their result, we must suppose, in muscular movement would be the same. But since, in cases of distinct volition, we have no knowledge of the nerve movements except by the states of consciousness which characterise them, we find it difficult to make this separation in thought, and when we abstract from the states of consciousness we abstract also, without noticing the unwarranted assumption, from the nerve movements which accompany them, thus leaving nothing which can be supposed to cause the muscular movement for which we seek to account. Yet there are cases which clearly show the possibility of complicated nerve movements taking place without being attended during their course by states of consciousness; for this is the case not only in reflex movements, but also in actions which, having been originally performed by efforts of volition, have since become habitual, and are now performed unconsciously and, as it is said, mechanically.

5. To apply these considerations to the case in question, the nerve movements which support the sensation of painful heat, and which when carried up into the organs of the third group combine with their movements to support the representations of the means to remove it, do not produce those representations because they support a painful sensation, but because the same nerve movements have previously been thrown into combinations similar to those which

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now support the representations in question. The intensity of the sensation of painful heat is the evidence and the measure of the energy of those nerve movements, and similarly the vividness of the representations and the rapidity with which they are formed are the evidence and measure of the energy and rapidity with which the nerve movements supporting them take place. And again, in descending from the representations to the movements of hand and arm which remove the cause of painful heat, those muscular movements are not performed because they are the movements which have been imaged in the representation, but because the movements of the nerves which act on the muscles have been previously habituated to be stimulated in that manner by the movements of the third group of organs which support the representations. These movements of the third group belong partly to the cerebrum, partly to the cerebellum, as I suppose (see § 54, 5); and the action is tentative, that is, performed by a rapid process of rejection of suggested movements until the right one is selected (see § 55, 8). The character, which the whole action has, of being done *pro re nata*, of being a new action, is accounted for by the conception of tentative selection in the nerve movements of the third group of organs. It is true that these muscular motions cease when the heat is removed, but this is because the nerve movement which supports the representation is no longer stimulated by the action of heat, and no longer in its turn stimulates the motor nerves. And this interpretation agrees with the fact, that a person who is not sure of the sufficiency of the means employed to remove a painful sensation will go on acting as the move-

ments supporting the representation direct, till the painful sensation has actually ceased, while one who is sure that the right means have been employed discontinues the movement before the sensation ceases; as, for instance, a child continues crying till the thing he cries for has been actually put into his hand, but a person who rings the bell for a servant rings once and waits; the cause of difference being, that in the latter case the movements supporting the representation are modified by those which support the knowledge that the right means have been employed. Nor should the novelty of voluntary actions, their being done on the spur of the moment, *pro re nata*, induce us to interpret them differently. If the actions are novel, so also may be the nerve movements on which they depend, without ceasing on that account to depend upon old habits of movement combined with a new stimulating movement; they need not be supposed to be exact repetitions of old movements any more than the actions or representations which they produce; and the nerve movements which support a representation of new means to procure or avoid a new object may be conceived as themselves the result of a new combination in nerve movement.

6. A burnt child dreads the fire; why? Because the movements supporting the sensation are continued into the movements supporting the emotion. A burnt child avoids the fire; why? Because the movements supporting the emotion are continued into the movements supporting the muscular action. It is a kind of sequence of physical facts, of which no further account can be given, any more than of the sequences of physical facts which constitute the phenomena of gravitation, or of growth in plants; a

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kind of sequence which at present cannot be analysed farther, or into more elementary facts, than those assigned or intended here; a kind of sequence also which cannot be explained, but only characterised, by the states of consciousness which it supports. Why not explained as well as characterised? Because the sequence of these states is equally inexplicable and ultimate. Why is the sensation of burning followed by the emotion of dread; why the emotion of dread by the image of means of avoiding burning; why the image of these means by the perception of muscular motion away from the fire? No answer can be given beyond the fact that it is so. If we said that this sequence was a case of final causation, of a desire of self-preservation, or of avoiding pain and procuring pleasure, of motives determining volition, or of volition simply, we should only have characterised the sequence of states of consciousness, not explained it. These sequences of states of consciousness are instances of final causation, just as the corresponding sequences of physical movements are instances of efficient causation; both terms sum up and characterise their phenomena, but do not explain them. It is impossible to understand how efficient causation produces final; it would be equally impossible to understand how final could produce efficient; and if it is impossible to understand how one physical movement causes another, it would be equally impossible to understand how one state of consciousness could cause another. Sequences are all which in either case, or between the two series themselves, we can arrive at. But while there is evidence to show that nerve movements are causes of states of consciousness, there is none, it is here maintained,

to show that states of consciousness are causes of nerve movements. Our greater familiarity with the sequences of consciousness, our habitual arrangement of them in systems of teleology or final causation, must not blind us to the fact, that of causation itself we know no more when it is final, than we do when it is efficient.

7. If it is said, that it is at least wonderful that physical movements should connect themselves into sequences and systems of sequences in such a way as to give rise to teleologic systems of conscious states, without any aid or guidance from these conscious states in so connecting themselves;—it is very wonderful, it may be replied, but not more so than analogy would lead us to expect, in a case where consciousness has been superinduced on an organised body so complex as that of man and of the higher animals; seeing that a similar teleologic system is observable in all organised matter, and especially in the vegetable kingdom. That pleasure should be connected with what is favourable to the health and growth of the organism, and pain with what is the reverse, are facts which are agreeable to the analogy between living bodies and living bodies which are sentient and conscious. The addition of consciousness to living bodies, and in greater complexity in proportion to the complexity of their organisation, affords no ground for supposing that consciousness has a causality of its own, or reacts upon the organism in which it appears. Had pain been connected with what was favourable to the health and growth of the organism, and pleasure with what was the reverse, sentient beings would have been born to misery, and our teleologic systems would have

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run counter to the order of nature, supposing nature to have aimed, as before, at health and growth; but we should have been without means of giving any efficacy to our desires of pleasure, for the more active and powerful we became the more miserable we should be; happiness would be a constantly receding vision, we should be always losing some even of its broken fragments, instead of, as now, hailing with hope its complete advent. Where in that case would have been the theory that states of consciousness contribute as causes to the production either of nerve movements or of each other? (See the admirable Chapter on Pleasures and Pains, and the connection of their phenomena with the general doctrine of Evolution, in Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Psychology*, §§ 122-128, edit. 1869.)

8. The analysis of voluntary redintegration leads us to the same conclusion, when we approach the question from the side of the moment of choice or decision itself. Just as the series of motives can be analysed into representations, and shown to depend on nerve movements, and the series of consequences the same, so also can the moment of will, which stands between these series, be referred to modes of action in the nerve movements which support the series of motives. The phenomenon of consciousness called *Willing*, or the exercise of volition, is the change of effort for a purpose (which is volition) into the purpose felt without effort, and consequently no longer as purposed but as attained. The moment of *Willing* is the moment of change, of sequence, occupying no duration of time by itself, but only as defined by its two moments, a quo and ad quem. Two or more conflicting representations contain the effort;

and the conflict of representations depends on the conflict of nerve movements. The victory of one of these nerve movements over the others is the decision of the conflict, and the cause of one representation remaining in consciousness without the sense of effort. The will is the decision, expressed in terms of consciousness; and when the representation which we call the True Ego, or which possesses the most permanent interest, is the one which is thus victorious, we say that the will is victorious, identifying our will with our interests; when the opposing representation is victorious, we say, identifying as before, that the will has succumbed. This use of language, which is incorrect because, in volition, it is always the will which is victorious, is the cause of a great part of the intricacies in which ethical questions are entangled. Every decision in voluntary redintegration is an exercise of volition, whether it is a decision which is pleasant, wise, praiseworthy, or the reverse. The criminal who mounts the scaffold exercises volition in his movements; he chooses to mount rather than to permit himself to be dragged by the main force of the executioner; yet we do not say that he goes willingly; he yields to representations which make it more desirable to him to mount of himself. In examining volition, therefore, we must take the word in its widest which is also its correct sense, the decision between conflicting representations abstracting from the nature of them; for this sense clearly includes the narrower sense within it; and all cases of volition for a purpose which is pleasureable, interesting, or praiseworthy, all cases, for instance, of a morally good will, are special cases included under volition in the abstract.

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9. The moment of choice or decision between representations is exhaustively described by the analysis which has been offered of the course of nerve movements in conflict. There is no feature in it which does not find a corresponding feature in the conflict of nerve movements to which it may be referred. Of course it is not professed that the movements, as they are here described, are the actual ones, but that, from the very generality of their description, such movements must be considered possible. That choice requires two representations, is accounted for by the supposition of two nerve movements, reactive and retentive. That it includes a sense of effort is accounted for by the conflict between these nerve movements; the vividness of the sense of effort by the intensity of nearly equal energies in the nerve movements; the balance and oscillation in choice by similarly named circumstances in the nerve movements; the final victory of one representation by the final victory of one nerve movement; the ceasing or lessening of the sense of effort by the ceasing or lessening of energy in one of the two nerve movements. There seems to be no point in all the process, when we combine it with the analysis of the content, where a state of consciousness, or an unknown cause not included in nerve movement, either can or need be supposed to take the initiative, or step in to determine a change in the series of representations. Between the two hypotheses, that of nerve movements is the simplest, and they are also at least known to be a *vera causa*. The state or moment of consciousness called Willing, or exercising volition, is according to this view an effect of

nerve movements, and not a source of causation, either original or derived.

10. If this view is accepted, it will at least furnish us with an explanation, that is, a further analysis, or an analysis pushed one step farther back, of the phenomena of redintegration. If however we hold to the view that pain and pleasure, or representations generally, are causes of subsequent states of consciousness and of subsequent nerve movements, this, though it were true, would be no explanation, no further step in analysis. We know from the first that man, as a whole unanalysed, is determined by pain and pleasure in voluntary redintegration. This is the general description of the phenomenon to be explained or analysed. Now the theory which makes perception of pain or pleasure a cause of representation, and representation a cause of movement, which are final causes become efficient, merely gives us back again, in separate pieces, the same phenomenon of determination by final causes which is familiar to us in human action before analysis. And the same may be said of the theories which would explain the phenomena by referring them to unknown agents, a Soul or an Ego, acting in and through the phenomena in question. So far as these are really unknown agents they are no explanation; and so far as they are known, they are merely the phenomena to be accounted for over again. Do I then deny the existence of a Soul? By no means; the soul is not indeed the cause of the phenomena of states of consciousness; it is those phenomena themselves.

11. When therefore language is used which speaks of a state of consciousness as a cause, it must be understood to include the nerve state or nerve move-

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ment of which it is the evidence. The two series are exactly parallel and correspondent, the physical series being the *causa existendi*, or efficient cause, of the conscious series in all its minuteness of division, and the conscious series being the *causa cognoscendi*, or evidence, of the physical series with equal minuteness. And, of each pair of corresponding states, the efficient cause or nerve state is always previous in time to its evidence, the conscious state; a circumstance in which this correspondence differs from that between the objective and subjective aspects of phenomena, which aspects are simultaneous; every state of consciousness corresponding to its previously existing efficient cause, the supporting nerve state or nerve movement, and to its simultaneously existing objective aspect, the object which it perceives or represents. The subjective aspect of an object when analysed was called in "Time and Space" § 60 the formal cause, or *causa essendi*, of that object, which analysis is expressed by its Definition. Final causes belong entirely to the conscious series, and consist in correspondences between different states of consciousness. The existence and the gradual elaboration of such correspondences, as those between means and ends, purposes and attainments, expectations and fulfilments, provisions and applications, evidence and inference, merit and reward, guilt and punishment, sin and sorrow, virtue and happiness, these and such as these constitute the world we live in a reasonable world, being the evidence of its physical constitution. It is therefore a misleading half truth to say, that there are nowhere found final causes in nature, without adding that they are found everywhere in the evidences of nature, where alone,

from their definition, it is possible to find them. Nature and consciousness are not two separate things, but one is the evidence of the other ; and therefore it is the same thing to say with Aristotle, "As the mind acts with design, so also does nature," and to say conversely, "As nature acts with design, so also does the mind ;" for that which is the cause of mind is one part of nature, and interdependent on all other parts of it.

12. We are now in a position to comprehend clearly the phenomenon known as free will, or more philosophically self-determination, and that phenomenon which is its consequent, moral responsibility. Final causes are images or feelings represented as desirable, and the terms have meaning only as words of consciousness, or as describing objects in their subjective aspect. Their efficiency or motive power consists in the represented pleasure, of whatever kind, which they contain. These images supported by nerve movements are compared in consciousness, and the conflict of the nerve movements supports their comparison in consciousness ; and the same organ, which with its nerve movements redintegrates and compares them, also in the same process decides between them. The same organ, the same process, the same series of representations, are in play ; in other words, the organ which is conscious determines the course of its own representations, by movements which are themselves a part of the course. This same organ is also the seat of self-consciousness, which is the reflection that conscious states belong to one and the same series, and thus binds them all up into one and the same personal identity. Whether therefore the trains of redintegration are of a direct

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or of a reflective character, they are equally instances of self-determination on the part of the whole train of consciousness in which they are contained, supported by the nerve movements of its organ. The perception of self-determination, or of the will determining itself, is nothing else than reflection or self-consciousness accompanying or supervening on a process of direct self-determination in the same organ.

13. The sense of moral responsibility is a particular case of reflective perception of self-determination. The distinguishing feature in this reflection is, that we know, at the moment of choice, that the pleasure which is now preponderant (being as it is the evidence of a preponderating nerve movement) may appear not preponderant to our own future and better judgment; and thus the moment of choice contains also in itself the moment of responsibility, that is, of being liable to correction on review. This review again is performed in the same organ, and with redintegration of the former nerve movements and their states of consciousness; in other words, we review our own acts; and it is accompanied by praise or blame of our former determination. We praise or blame ourselves for having been or not having been impressed with the stronger desire from what we now perceive as the greater or nobler pleasure. We do not blame or praise ourselves because we were free to be and were, but solely because we actually were, determined in such and such a way. The consideration of freedom to will or choose does not come in until we reason about our own once passed judgment of approval or disapproval, when we ask ourselves why we approved or disapproved

a particular act. We then apply a logic which familiar cases offer to us, namely, the logic of blaming or praising external actions of men, our judgments of which are governed by the consideration of their freedom from physical compulsion, or the reverse. But, applying this logic, we then often proceed by a false analogy to argue, that the self-determined immanent act of choice must have been free, or as it may perhaps be expressed, the better to hide from ourselves the defective analogy, essentially free, in order to be liable to a judgment of praise or blame. The freedom which we are justified in inferring from this analogy, the freedom which we truly have in the actions which we praise or blame, is the freedom of the representative redintegration from new presentations, the circumstance that it is only a series of representations, performed by the organs of the third group, which we judge. For it is freedom from external compulsion, in the case argued from, to which is analogous the freedom of redintegration from new presentations, in the case argued to. Nothing in the first case is affirmed as to the inner mechanism of the man's transeunt actions; and nothing can be inferred from its analogy, in the second case, as to the inner mechanism of self-determination in the immanent actions of redintegration.

14. Moral approval or disapproval and responsibility to conscience are phenomena attaching inseparably to self-determination, and we can no more escape from the one than from the other. We are our own determinants and our own judges, and the condemnation or acquittal which we pronounce is our own. Again, the judgment is a reality as much as the act which it judges, and, as being more en-

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lightened by experience, has presumably greater truth. And against such a judgment, whether of praise or blame, it is impossible to set up the plea, that the nerve movements follow and combat each other by natural fixed laws, which we did not make and cannot alter, and that in this way we are under compulsion, for it is these same nerve movements, in the same organ, and under the same laws, which now pronounce the judgment against which we would appeal; that is, which support those very states of consciousness which we call condemnation or acquittal. Necessity can no more be pleaded against the censure or punishments of conscience, than the same necessity against the judgments or punishments of law.

15. Approval or disapproval of past volitions is a judgment of the comparative character of states of consciousness, the series of which is a self-determined redintegration. Moral approval or disapproval of them is judgment of their comparative character in respect to the moral sense. And although it is requisite to both kinds of judgment that the objects of them should be self-determined series of states of consciousness, and although in such cases of self-determined action there may always be a sense of freedom, which consists in the perception of the balance of motives without knowing its issue, yet neither this sense of freedom, nor a supposed fact of freedom behind it, other than the fact of self-determination, is any part of the ground for passing judgments of approval or disapproval. The character of the conscious states themselves, not the character of the mechanism which moves them, is the object of all judgments of praise or blame, and of moral judg-

ments among them. Neither in fact, therefore, nor in logic is there an escape from the tribunal of conscience, when conceived as a mode of voluntary red-integration supported by nerve movements. There are not two orders of phenomena, acting and reacting on each other, or having the phenomena of the one alternating in one series with those of the other; nerve movements causing feelings, and these in turn causing nerve movements; but there is one order only, of nerve movements evidenced by states of consciousness; and these are at one time preferences, at another judgments on those preferences, both supported by the same series of nerve movements. The nerve movements make us choose; they also make us judge our choice; a phenomenon of consciousness equally real, and, it may be added, equally real with the nerve movements themselves.

16. The sense of freedom, as known to us by the reflective perception of self-determination, is the perception of the fact that we are self-determined, without the perception of the issue of the self-determination. Such is the analysis of what we perceive in perceiving that we are free, the analysis of the sense of freedom or of freedom itself. This brings us back to the moment indicated in § 2 as the moment of distinction between accomplished fact and practical action, the moment which is the turning point of ethical problems. It is the moment which is the junction, or the separation, of what is necessary and what is contingent in action. Necessity and contingency are terms which have meaning only subjectively; they refer to our knowledge of facts. Therefore, since in the moment of choice we know only the past and not the future, not the

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issue of the choice, no action that lies in choice is necessary. It cannot be known to be determined this way or that by particular causes, because the determining causes act only through the moment of choice, and the choice itself is the determination of the issue. The causes which determine it are nerve movements, the respective force of which is known only by the issue of their conflict. The physical laws of movement themselves thus produce, or evolve out of themselves, in supporting the phenomena of consciousness, the distinction between the necessary and the contingent, and place the limit between them at the point or moment of conscious action, the point or moment which separates the past from the future.

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§ 58. 1. There is a class of questions still remaining to complete the present branch of our enquiry, the questions relating to the physiological distribution of functions within the cerebral hemispheres, which have been already distinguished as the organ of immanent processes of redintegration of pure representations and of the emotions pervading them. Two orders of questions were distinguished in § 51, as of special interest to metaphysic, those relating to the nature of nerve movements, and those relating to the assignment of organs to distinct functions in consciousness. Questions of the first of these two orders, in respect of the cerebral hemispheres, have already been included, so far as our knowledge reached, in the analysis of the processes of redintegration spontaneous and voluntary. It remains to see whether any probable hypothesis is afforded by the results of that analysis, in regard to questions of the second order. In other words, Does the analysis of func-

tions and processes in the cerebral hemispheres suggest any hypothesis, and what, as to distinct portions of the organ being the seats of separate functions and processes?

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2. It is natural to suppose, in the first place, that a difference in function implies a difference in position of the organ appropriated to it, since the difference of function depends on a difference of nerve movements, and those nerve movements which are most fitted mutual action and reaction would, by frequency of repetition, tend to consolidate or group themselves together, and take gradually exclusive possession of the portion of nerve substance in which they arise; especially if we remember that such movements are only performed on condition of waste and reparation, by a new growth of nerve substance in place of the old. Increasing organisation seems on this ground to involve increasingly minute separation of parts locally in the organism. And this tendency would be probable independently of an original conformation of organs in the same direction; which conformation might, on the contrary, be itself in turn regarded as the result, hereditarily transmitted, of a previous action of such tendencies. At any rate, our hypothesis of location of organs must be based upon differences of function and process, since there is no original conformation which we can assume as a starting point, or known as contributing to determine differences in function and process.

3. The movements of representation of images received from below, and those which we must suppose original to the cerebral hemispheres themselves, on the meeting and stimulation of the latter by the former, combine into total movements which pro-

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duce or support the states of consciousness known as emotions and images or frameworks of emotion, emotion and framework being two elements of each of the conscious states. Volition in reasoning and volition in choice, which ends in passion, are cases of the same process, conflict of nerve movements, different from each other only as they are displayed in cases where either the emotional or the representational element predominates over the other. No state of consciousness however is exclusively emotional or exclusively representational; and therefore no state is exclusively one of passion, or exclusively one of reason. The combination of the movements from the two sources, from the cerebrum and from the organs of the first and second groups, is an universal fact, issuing in every instance in states of consciousness which combine both the elements, emotion and imagery.

4. But although there is this fusion between the two kinds of movement and between their products in consciousness, it does not follow that they are always mixed in the same proportion. It has been shown on the contrary, that either element may predominate to all but the exclusion of the other; and this in cases both of spontaneous and voluntary reintegration, and of both strong and feeble volition. So that no sooner is the fusion effected, in the cerebral processes, than a new dispersion and distinction of processes and their conscious states appears to begin.

5. If we look at the specific content of the different states in reintegration, there is a similar variability between their two elements. The question must have occurred to every one, during the analysis

in Chapter ii., since the emotions are declared not capable of analysis into represented sensations, what is the cause determining the combination of such and such an emotion with such and such a framework? Why, for instance, should the emotion of love be attached to the image of a person feeling fondness, or that of hate to the image of a person feeling aversion, towards the Subject of those emotions? Granted that there are emotions of these kinds naturally produced by the play of cerebral movements, why should this particular emotion be attached to this particular image? The psychological hypothesis, argued against in § 14, was, that represented sensations combined of themselves into emotions, by a kind of chemistry of consciousness; but the present Chapter has, I think, shown the conception on which this hypothesis originally rested to be untenable, the conception that states of consciousness as such act and react, and are reciprocally causes and effects of each other. Nevertheless it might still be maintained by psychologists that the movements supporting sensations become, when continued, movements supporting emotions, without requiring the cooperation of new movements, the consciousness in which is emotional originally; and thus their theory would account, supposing their analysis correct, for the connection of such and such sensations with such and such emotions. But if we reject the psychological theory, we are still in want of a theory of this connection; the question still remains, What is the cause of each particular combination between represented sensations and emotions? The complete answer could only be given by following up the processes of spontaneous and voluntary redintegration, not only in a single life but through

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the hereditary transmissions of generations, to a point of indetermination in the relations between emotion and imagery, which is, for the present at least, far beyond the reach of profitable speculation. Nevertheless, if a conjecture is admissible, I would suggest that, since it must be owing to some correspondence, or some similarity, between the nerve movements supporting the image and emotion which combine, it will most probably be a correspondence or similarity in that feature of the two movements which supports the specific pleasure or specific pain of each. Apart however from such conjectures, the mode in which the answer to the question is to be sought consists in applying the analysis of redintegration historically; though the starting point, the original constitution, determining the combination of movements, may perhaps never be discovered. If this view is correct, and if it is the fact that the present combinations of emotions and images are the result of redintegrations, we must infer that the specific emotions and specific images are so far free and independent of each other originally, as to be capable of the most variable combinations.

6. We need hardly however have recourse to this consideration in order merely to show the fact of the variable combination of emotion and imagery. No two persons are precisely alike in this respect, and the differences are sometimes enormous, as between persons of different countries, degrees of civilisation, and times of life. The same person differs from himself not only in fluctuating combinations from day to day, but in habitual combinations at different ages. The moral training of character, so far as it consists of immanent processes, that is, in its aims, its results,

and a great part of its means, is nothing but a modification of the relations between imagery and emotion. And all these changes must have been wrought, as we see that they are wrought where they fall under observation, in and through processes of redintegration.

7. The variable character of the combinations of emotion and imagery is therefore indisputable, and the general kinds of combinations into which they fall, and under which they group themselves, in processes of redintegration, are no less evident, although we are unable to trace the historical steps in their development; these groups being on the one hand those groups of emotions distinguished in Chapter ii., and on the other the groups of intellectual conceptions constituting the several physical sciences, which are not within the purpose of this work. The functions or operations, which have led and continue to lead up to the formation of these and similar groups, are those which have been distinguished and analysed in the present Chapter; and these fall under the two most general heads of redintegrations in which emotion, and redintegrations in which imagery, predominates, while they include operations in which now one now the other element is all but entirely excluded. Comparing these processes with these results, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the redintegrations, by which these results have been gradually attained, must have included, as a very important feature, processes of grouping together the movements supporting emotion, eliminating some of those supporting imagery, and vice versa. But the grouping together of movements, if repeated frequently in a modifiable organism, can only be ima-

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gined to result in a localisation of the combined movements in appropriated portions of it. And the sole circumstance of movements frequently made in combination, to the exclusion of others, tends to make the parts of the organism in which they take place an organic whole, even though these parts are separated from each other by portions of the organism devoted to other movements.

8. We have then three considerations to guide us to our hypothesis; first, that the separation of emotion and imagery is never complete; second, that the processes which end by becoming localised separately must be those which are distinguished as reasoning and passion; third, that these processes must commence, and consist throughout their course, in a certain partial separation between movements which support respectively emotions and images. Consequently the process of separation does not consist simply in localising images in one place and emotions in another, but in a separation of some of the elements which compose a fused state of consciousness consisting of emotion and image together. It is a separation of more elementary parts than those which are designated as emotion and image; for the images themselves consist of represented sensations, which have pleasure or pain attached to them as sensations; which represented sensations are pervaded, first by the direct emotions, secondly by the reflective; and on the other hand, the reflective emotions, as well as the direct, are always embodied in some image, though it may be vague and indistinct.

9. The only more elementary parts than image and emotion themselves, in a compound state which may be designated either as an image or as an emo-

tion, are those elements of all consciousness which have been distinguished in "Time and Space" as the formal and material elements; namely, time and space the formal, and feeling the material element. Accordingly, these elements it is which determine the processes in question, which must be conceived as processes which abstract more or less, but never entirely, from one or from the other of these elements. Redintegrations which turn on the formal element, or in which the time and space relations of the object in view are the motive interest, are processes of reasoning, or judgment; those which turn on the material element are processes of passion or choice; and between the extremes of these two modes of redintegration there will naturally arise an intermediate mode, in which the two elements combined in equal proportion are the motives of the process. The formal and material elements, which in presentative perception are so inextricably bound up together, thus become in redintegration of pure representations, which is the final and completing process of consciousness, developed and distinguished; the whole consciousness more specialised, and yet more organised, as it becomes more complex; and at the same time its unity of nature, its unity of principle of development, preserved from first to last.

10. Assuming in the next place, that the separate processes supporting separate modes of consciousness tend to a separate localisation, we shall be inclined to localise separately the phenomena or states of consciousness which are the accompaniments and results of the three processes of redintegration now distinguished. As accompaniments of the processes, or as the processes themselves described in terms of

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consciousness, these may be called the speculative, the contemplative, the affective, modes of redintegration; of which the contemplative is the intermediate, the combination of form and matter in equal proportions. Described as results, or, in other words, as states and not processes of consciousness, they are, first, systems of images bound together by correspondences of their time and space relations; theories and explanations of cause and effect, suitability, or final causes; calculations, measurements, analyses, syntheses; everything, in short, which constitutes what is called the purely intellectual world; and these are the objects or results of the speculative mode of redintegration. Those of the contemplative mode are those emotions and their objects which contain form and matter in equal proportion or equal strength of interest; which are, according to the analysis in Chapter ii., the moral sense, the æsthetic and poetic emotions, and religion. Those of the affective mode are the emotions and passions themselves, with their objects and frameworks, felt, chosen, and desired, rather than analysed, reasoned, and judged.

11. The three modes of redintegration, and the three groups of objects or states of consciousness belonging to them, may be considered as forming a series, in the several stages of which the proportion of the formal element increases as that of the material diminishes, and diminishes as that increases; and the same is true of the material element. Referring the series to the cerebrum, we shall be most nearly in accordance with the commonly received opinion, which in the main is likely to be true (see Dr. Maudsley's work before quoted, page 107), if we consider the anterior portions of the cerebrum to be devoted to

the speculative functions and their objects, the posterior to the affective, and the intermediate to the contemplative. Accordingly, we may place the most abstract images and reasonings, such as the mathematical, at the anterior extremity, the most abstract emotions and passions at the posterior; while the contemplative emotions will occupy the middle portion. Farther than this there seems no ground at present to venture, by attempting, for instance, to assign portions of the cerebral surface to particular emotions or particular images; although it may be true that the point at which we now stop is not destined to be the final limit of science in this direction.

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NOTE REFERRED TO AT § 53. 6.

There is a singular circumstance in dreams, which may be paralleled with the phenomenon of seeing things upright though the image of them is thrown inverted on the retina. There is an account of a dream given by M. Alfred Maury in his work *Le Sommeil et les Rêves*, p. 133, which I will quote at length. “ Mais un fait plus concluant pour la rapidité du songe, un fait qui établit à mes yeux qu’il suffit d’un instant pour faire un rêve étendu, est le suivant : J’étais un peu indisposé, et me trouvais couché dans ma chambre, ayant ma mère à mon chevet. Je rêve de la Terreur ; j’assiste à des scènes de massacre, je compare devant le tribunal révolutionnaire, je vois Robespierre, Marat, Fouquier-Tinville, toutes les plus vilaines figures de cette époque terrible ; je discute avec eux ; enfin, après bien des événements que je ne me rappelle qu’imparfaitement, je suis jugé, condamné à mort, conduit en charrette, au milieu d’un concours immense, sur la place de la Révolution ; je monte sur l’échafaud ; l’exécuteur me lie sur la planche fatale, il la fait basculer, le couperet tombe ; je sens ma tête se séparer de mon tronc ; je m’éveille en proie à la plus vive angoisse, et je me sens sur le cou la flèche de mon lit qui s’était subitement détachée, et était tombée sur mes vertèbres cervicales, à la façon

du couteau d'une guillotine. Cela avait eu lieu à l'instant, ainsi que ma mère le confirma, et cependant c'était cette sensation externe que j'avais prise, comme dans le cas cité plus haut, pour point du départ d'un rêve où tant de faits s'étaient succédé. Au moment où j'avais été frappé, le souvenir de la redoutable machine, dont la flèche de mon lit représentait si bien l'effet, avait éveillé toutes les images d'une époque dont la guillotine a été le symbole." M. Maury cites this instance chiefly to show the extreme rapidity of dreams. But must we not also conclude from it, that dreams, when suggested by external agency, and referred to past time, are suggested in inverted order of time, which is corrected and changed into the real order of history by a process harmonising them with the order of events in actual life? Just as we judge of the top and bottom of a visible image by associating it with sensations of touch, and as we arrange the events of ancient history in real historical order, though we reason back to them, retracing that order, from events which have been their effects, so in dreams we see the events in real historical order though they are suggested to us successively in that order precisely reversed. The image of death by the guillotine was the last thing in the apparent order of the dream; the movements supporting that image were the first things in the real order of suggestion. And we can hardly suppose, as M. Maury might seem to do from his concluding words, that the image of the guillotine called up the image of the Revolution generally, and that then this image developed itself into a special story or sequence of events, because, in the first place, the dream did not appear to begin but to end with the guillotine, and, in the second place, because this would give no reason for the person guillotined being the dreamer himself; the general image of the Revolution might just as well end with the execution of any one else, or without an execution at all. It seems that we must either suppose an inverse order of suggestion, or suppose what is at least unlikely, first, that the image of the guillotine should have immediately suggested the image of the Revolution generally or of prominent scenes in it, and secondly, that the story into which this image developed itself should have ended with the execution of the spectator himself.

CHAPTER IV.

COMBINATION OF FEELINGS AND FORMATION OF CHARACTER.

Fürwahr! es ist Homunculus.

Goethe.

§ 59. 1. THE statical analysis of feelings has been completed in Chapter ii., and their dynamical analysis, the analysis of redintegration, in Chapter iii. But the most difficult and complicated part of our task remains still before us, the analysis and classification of Character. Character may be defined, at least provisionally, as that combination of feelings and emotions, and that mode of redintegration of emotions and their frameworks, which together are dominant or preponderant in any individual person. The first question is this, What feelings and emotions are found usually in combination, or, What are the affinities of feelings? The second, What modes of redintegration are found usually in combination with each of those groups of feelings which are connected by affinity? The answer to both these questions together is the answer to the question, What

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are the chief kinds or classes of character. The problem consists, therefore, in combining the two analyses, statical and dynamical; and the result will be an analysis and a classification of individuals, of men as complete wholes; an analysis, because the character will be analysed into its favourite modes of working, and its favourite kinds of feeling; and a classification, because all kinds of characters will be grouped together under several heads, according to these affinities and modes. This double analysis and classification will complete the First Book, the analytical part, of the whole enquiry.

2. The character of any individual consists, strictly speaking, in the kind of his favourite representations and his favourite modes of reintegrating them. Of the three portions of the nervous organism, distinguished in § 52, supporting severally presentations, mixed representations, and pure representations, character attaches primarily and immediately to the last alone; for it is in these representations only that self-consciousness arises; and therefore it is the organ of these representations only which supports the character of the self-conscious individual. Sever the connection between this organ and the organs of sense and motion below it, and then, although these lower organs might continue to have sensations and mixed representations, and to produce movements and sounds, their perceptions would no longer be known as perceptions of, their movements would no longer be dependent as effects upon, the reflecting consciousness seated in the organ of pure representation. When we enquire into character, we mean the character of the self-conscious individual; no other than this can be the object of Ethic. But in prac-

tice and in life, this organ, its redintegrations, its representations and emotions, its self-consciousness, and its character, are not isolated from the other organs of the body; they are modified by and built up out of the perceptions and nervous influences coming from these; and these in their turn they modify and guide, in reaction upon the body and, through the muscles of the body, upon the external world. We have then to hold fast this distinction, namely, the character itself as the special object of analysis, on the one hand, and on the other the causes influencing the formation, and the effects produced by the reaction, of the character. But these three things must first be distinguished with greater minuteness.

3. First as to the character itself, and the representations and emotions constituting it. Few persons are aware of the enormous comparative importance of the domain of pure representations. Not only do the emotions which arise in them colour the whole of life, a circumstance which has been long observed, but the far greater part of the world in which we habitually live consists of representations and representations only. In consequence of our usual empirical method of thinking, we set down all representations of physical objects to presentative perception, under the title of objects of sense or material objects, on the tacit assumption that they might become presentations if we were within sight or hearing of them, or, as it is sometimes expressed, that they are material in their nature, though we have only their images in the mind. Metaphysically, however, every object is material, that is, contains feeling as well as form; and this circumstance is

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therefore not a distinction of any empirically separate class of objects. An object of representation does not become a presentation by being proved to exist; it remains a representation as completely as before; only if actually seen, i. e. verified by observation, does it become a presentation, and then only to the actual observer, and only at the moment of observation; for him afterwards, and for others always, it remains a fact of representation. To bring home to ourselves how important the domain of pure representation is, let us enumerate some of the groups of objects which form subdivisions of it. First, the conclusions and theories of the physical sciences with respect to the constitution of the visible and otherwise sensible world, with all its various Forces, light, heat, sound, electricity, magnetism, gravity. These sciences are perpetually building and rebuilding, modifying and remodifying, vast and complicated structures of pure representations, on the ground of the objects of presentation; airy palaces of thought, communicating or interfused; towering, transparent domes, which fill the heavens of speculation from zenith to nadir. Next, the same imagery may be employed to describe all those sciences, also of pure representations, which relate to the works and thoughts of man,—systems of law, of government, of morals, of religion; theories of man's history, his diversities of race, his relations with beings of unseen worlds; his infinite past and his infinite future; the laws of life of the vegetable and animal worlds, their connection with laws of physic, their connection with laws of consciousness; all this constitutes a vast body of purely representative thought and feeling, which forms an increasing portion of the whole world of

consciousness which we inhabit, increasing in correspondence to our advance in education and in civilisation. In law, for instance, what a vast body of representation is formed by the conceptions of Rights and Duties, and their various kinds and subdivisions; and what a new character is given to an act, in itself trivial, by its being brought under one of these subdivisions in representation. For instance, a man traces a few letters on a scrap of paper,—trivial act, object of presentation; but the scrap of paper is a cheque, the letters spell another man's name,—objects of representation; the trivial act is Forgery. In the history of modern Europe again, how immense has been the influence of the tradition of Imperialism, of the idea of a single Emperor ruling the whole inhabited world; in international law, of the Law of Nature and of Nations; in spiritual history, of a single Vicegerent of God and Head of the Church on earth; in industrial economy, of the belief that coined metal will be received in exchange for other commodities by buyers and sellers, a belief which is the effect of habit accumulated for centuries, starting from convenience in particular transactions, fortified by perception of resulting benefit, and finally recognised by positive law. A small nucleus of presentation is surrounded on all sides by an atmosphere infinitely deep of representation,—such is this world of ours. We may see this still plainer by considering what happens when we read books of travel. We then obtain accounts of other countries, scenery, men and manners, which are to us representations; but these are not without effect upon our representations of the objects which immediately surround us; rather we see these objects in a new light, as it is called,

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that is, our representations of them undergo a change, we estimate or interpret the characters of those about us differently in consequence, we give a new, greater or less, importance to old objects or events.

4. Besides the facts just noticed, it is most important to observe the effect of the emotional element pervading the representational or cognitive framework, as distinguished from that framework itself. It is to this emotional element that all the various theologically coloured theories of the origin and constitution of the universe, which have been thrown up at various epochs of speculation, and in various countries, such as, Gnosticism, Neo-platonism, Buddhism, Christian philosophies, Mohammedan philosophies, and so on, are to be traced in the last resort. This element alone gives them their interest, this alone is the motive for imagining them. The distinction, therefore, between the cognitive framework and its pervading emotion is the key to the true comprehension and criticism of these theories. Hitherto they have been criticised almost exclusively with respect to their cognitive framework, as if this was all that they contained; it has not been perceived that they were all instances of practical and teleological reasoning as distinguished from speculative; that is, of a kind of reasoning which finds its leverage, its willed or chosen *τέλος*, in the emotion and not in the object of the emotion, and busies itself with these objects and their concatenation in theories only so far as they contain these emotions, and so far as their concatenation supplies a ground for believing in the permanence and intensification of the emotions which give them their interest. None of these theories arise from the pure desire of knowing; all

arise from the desire of proving some kind of emotion to be the end and purpose of the cosmogony, the permanent character which it is constituted to preserve and increase, as its result and crown. Rest of body and peace of mind, for instance, are the *τέλος* of both Brahminism and Buddhism; moral and intellectual perfection the *τέλος* of Greek and Alexandrian philosophy; peace and love the *τέλος* of Christian philosophy.

5. But the perception of emotion as the *τέλος*, the knowledge that their *τέλος* was an emotion, was very imperfectly attained by any of these systems. Christianity, as religion, alone attained even so far as this, namely, to fix upon an emotion, Love, as its *τέλος*, without admixture of theory; but did not proceed to the further step of pointing out that this *τέλος* was an emotion and not a cognition. The Greek philosophies with which Christianity came into contact, and which finally succumbed before it, did not attain even to this. They one and all opposed vice and misery to knowledge, and represented knowledge as both the means of conquering or escaping vice and misery and the reward and result of that victory and escape. It is perfectly true that no emotion is without its framework, and consequently that all emotions are cognitive, capable of being taught, analysed, and arranged in systems. So far Plato's doctrine that virtue is an *ἐπιστήμη* is true. But this applies equally to vices; the lower *πάθη* as well as the higher have a cognitive side, and are capable of being taught, analysed, and arranged in systems. The reason why they are not so taught is, that the *πάθη* which they consist of have not the same interest as the higher *πάθη* of which virtue consists. The distinctive mark

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of Christian writings, distinctive of them from Greek philosophies, is that they oppose the lower *πάθη* not to knowledge but to the higher *πάθη*, an insight which is due to Jesus of Nazareth. He fixed upon the one all conquering, all absorbing, eternally permanent emotion, love, and made that alone the End of Man. The increasing knowledge of the nature of man, which has been and is still being attained by mankind, proves that this intuition was true. Man is in fact so constituted as he said. Now the early Christians added many theories to this fundamental fact; they had not like him the insight, that if you take care of the emotion the framework will take care of itself. Apparently, then, and superficially the Christian theories stood on a level with other philosophies; but only apparently; for they retained the one distinctive mark of their *τέλος* being love, an emotion, and not a mode of knowledge; of opposing lower emotions to this highest emotion, and not to any kind of intellectual insight. This is the gist or meaning of the Christian attachment to the Person of Jesus Christ, the reason why the New Testament writers insist upon faith in him, "the man Christ Jesus," as the distinguishing characteristic and essential trait of Christianity; as in the First Epistle of John iv. 15, "Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God," and 16, "God is love; and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him." The reason is, that intellectual powers and processes had been distinguished from the rest which constituted the whole man, and had been classed as faculties of the person, and as means to attain his purposes; but the emotional powers and processes had not been so distinguished

or classed, but remained undistinguishably involved in the personality; or, in other words, were and constituted the man himself as distinct from the faculties which he possessed. To cleave to the Person was therefore to cleave to the emotions which characterised that person; the personality and the emotion were for the early Christian writers the same thing, and opposed to the intellectual abstractions of philosophy, τὸ ὄν, τὸ ἐν, τὰγαθόν, and so on. When they opposed a person, the Person of Christ, to these abstractions, the Christian writers were really opposing an emotion, the emotion of love, to them.

6. This contrast between the two ways of conceiving the τέλος is very plain when we compare the writings of the New Testament with Greek philosophy, as in Plato or Plotinus. But it would be interesting to observe, if possible, the conflict between the two views actually in process; which might be done if we could find any writer propounding a theory in which he attempts to reconcile them. The conflict can plainly leave no trace of itself (for it was never conceived or criticised by the actors in it, or stated in such terms of second intention as we can now conceive and state it in) except in this way, namely, in a theory endeavouring to reconcile the two views; for a man would not write except he thought he could reconcile; either he must reconcile or be a disciple of one side only. Such a passage I think may be found in the Pæmander of Hermes, i. 19. κ.τ.λ. ed. Parthey. Καὶ ὁ ἀναγνωρίσας ἑαυτὸν ἐλήλυθεν εἰς τὸ περισούσιον ἀγαθόν, ὁ δὲ ἀγαπήσας τὸ ἐκ πλάνης ἔρωτος σῶμα, οὗτος μένει ἐν τῷ σκότει πλανώμενος, αἰσθητῶς πάσχων τὰ τοῦ θανάτου. Here is the opposition between intellectual insight and the lower πάθη.

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But now come the questions, How does ignorance condemn, and How does knowledge save? Ignorance condemns because the body and its πάθη have uncontrolled sway. Knowledge saves by showing man his true nature. So far all is pure Greek philosophy. But now come the further questions, Have not all men alike the same source of knowledge, νοῦς, and What determines one man and not another to attain this knowledge? Here come in the emotional requisites, i. 22, παραγίνομαι αὐτὸς ἐγὰρ ὁ νοῦς τοῖς ὁσίοις καὶ ἀγαθοῖς καὶ καθαροῖς καὶ ἐλεήμοσι, τοῖς εὖσεβῶς βιοῦσι. So that, while knowledge is still retained as the essential condition of virtue and happiness, the condition of acquiring this knowledge is placed in the previous acquisition of moral and emotional virtues; a view which apparently involves an alternation between the two principles, of knowledge and emotion, in infinite regress. Such an incomplete reconciliation however could manifestly serve only as a transition to the speedy victory of the view which placed the essential condition, at once and once for all, in the emotional and not in the cognitive element. And this accordingly is the view which mankind has since that time been engaged in working out, and with which it is even yet occupied.

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§ 60. 1. Let us consider in the next place what classes of circumstances are to be distinguished from the character itself, and regarded as influences operating upon it. We shall thus circumscribe our immediate object, the character, more closely; for our purpose is to examine its usually chosen representations, and its favourite modes of reintegrating them; that is, its modes of reaction upon such external influences, its selections from among them, and its

modes of dealing with them. We want to distinguish between the Man himself and the influences moulding him, and in the man himself to discover the various tendencies which determine his reaction upon the conditions to which he is exposed. It cannot be assumed that he is a *tabula rasa*, entirely moulded by or inscribed with characters from without; for all our enquiries hitherto have led us to the conclusion that the emotions arise *first* in representation, and depend upon the cerebral movements which support redintegration, that is, are natural to, or contributed by, the structure and movements of the cerebral organ, not derived by modification from the material element of the representations themselves conveyed to that organ by the nerves of sense. And this will hold good at whatever stage of historical development we consider mankind, even at the very earliest, since we must always assume some functions or other to be natural to the cerebral hemispheres. Still our present object is man as he exists at present; and therefore the different general modes of cerebral reaction, in selection and redintegration of representations, which are natural to man as we see him now, in a state of civilisation, are the immediate objects of our investigation. From these must be separated, 1st, the external causes imposing or enforcing different representations at different times, and 2nd, the causes which at remoter times may have contributed to make the general modes of cerebral reaction, as we see them at present, natural to him. To proceed otherwise than by drawing this distinction would be to launch into a psychological or historical enquiry, instead of a metaphysical one, into Anthropology instead of Ethic.

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2. The first class of influences upon character to be distinguished from the character itself consists itself of representations. They are those which belong to what may be called education, and which are exerted either by doctrines or precepts or expressions of praise and blame from those around us, more especially in childhood and youth, or by institutions of civil, domestic, and political life; two classes of influences upon the mind and character from which no one can escape, but upon which every one may react with various degrees of energy, and in various modes of redintegration. Together with the representations which belong to this education must of course be included the presentations of the objects which are the means of conveying and enforcing them, such as pictures, letters, punishments, occurrences in daily life, actions and words of companions, friends, and enemies, buildings, natural objects and their effects;—everything in short which being presented to the senses arouses or is connected with representations, which are thereby imposed upon the mind whether it will or no. These objects taken separately from their representations may be included under another head also; but it is no harm to enumerate them in two connections. This is an education which continues to operate during the whole life, its influence is unceasing; but by the period of middle life the character has usually taken so definite and hardened a mould, that we are tempted to distinguish it only by these two empirical periods, of character forming and character formed, and to put this empirical distinction in the place of the more philosophical one of natural tendencies and external influences. The empirical division into periods also

harmonises well with the other unphilosophical assumption of a *tabula rasa*, since the formed character of the second period appears to be the mere result of the external influences forming the character in the first period. But the untenability of this view is shown, I think, by the wide differences constantly met with between characters which have been subjected to very similar influences of educational circumstances, even when the physical organisation of the body is similar also. Yet we must remember that the analysis of character, in respect of the different effects produced in it by different external influences, is the most intricate of questions, and the necessary inductions very far from complete; indeed there has hitherto been no preliminary logic of the subject at hand, no scientific hypothetical framework, to serve as a guide in instituting such inductions.

3. The remaining classes of influences upon the character, which nevertheless cannot be all of them sharply distinguished from those now classed as educational, may be grouped under two heads, according as they include or do not include a redintegrating combination of sensations, as in perception of remote objects for instance. To the head of those which do not include redintegration belong:

1st, All modification of the nervous organism influencing the cerebral functions by means of the bodily organisation, or external circumstances acting upon and through it, but without itself immediately producing sensation. This includes the influences of the different temperaments, of climate, diet, regimen, difference of age, and difference of sex, except so far as will afterwards appear in § 74; all in short that is included in the "influence of the body on the mind;"

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a subject of immense importance, first treated systematically and philosophically, I believe, by Cabanis, in his *Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'Homme*.

2nd, The particular sensations or perceptions arising from time to time from particular causes in each group of the systemic sensations; e.g. states of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, melancholy, cheerfulness, sensations of the reproductive organs, pains of ache, lesion, and so on. Each sensation has its own specific character, and its own specific pleasure or pain; and these cannot be sundered from each other by any effort of imagination or volition.

3rd, The particular sensations or perceptions of the special senses, with their specific pleasures or pains; such as sweet and bitter tastes, soft and harsh sounds, bright and dim colours, and so on. The same remark as to fixity of each specific sensation and its pain or pleasure applies to these also.

To the head of those which include redintegration belong:

1st, The combinations of perceptions into complex fixed bundles, or remote objects of perception. But of these it is only the kernel of each that is proof against decomposition by efforts of redintegration; the kernel consisting of perceptions of sight and of touch combined together in space of three dimensions. Nevertheless other sensations are often the essential circumstance indicated by the names of objects, e.g. fire necessarily involves the sensation of heat, snow that of cold. Other qualities are not so necessarily involved in the objects, e.g. odour in flowers. But generally speaking names of objects denote remote objects of perception, and have a connotation which we accept as the constitution or na-

ture of those objects. The pleasures and pains of these remote objects are inseparable from the sensations which compose them, and therefore practically also from the objects themselves.

2nd, The combination of appetites with the representation of the objects which are accustomed or fitted to satisfy them; for instance, hunger with that of something to eat, thirst with that of something to drink, sexual appetite with that of a person of the opposite sex. It must be remarked that the appetite usually involves much more than the bare representation of the thing requisite to satisfy it. Hunger involves also the representation of delicate and pleasant dishes, thirst of agreeably tasting liquids. The converse holds good also; a pleasant or a favourite meat stimulates the appetite; and the less appetite there is, the more dainty must be the meat in order to rouse it. In other words, the connection between appetite and object extends itself into neighbouring provinces, that is, into the special sense of Taste. Since the two pleasures, that of satisfying hunger in systemic sensation, and that of gratifying taste in special sensation, are given in combination by a single object, the food, these two sensations are found to combine into one state of consciousness, in a manner analogous to that in which sensations combine to form remote objects. More remarkable still is the case of the sexual appetite. There the parallel to pleasures of taste in hunger is admiration of beauty or grace in parts of the object quite unconnected otherwise with the sexual appetite; but this is a pleasure of direct emotion, and not a pleasure of sense at all. Sometimes the combination extends to far more remote representations than these; for instance,

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to that of high birth. This appetite, then, in systemic sensation carries us up far into the region of pure representation; and the line of demarcation between character and influences on it will not in such cases run quite evenly, since it does not clearly, and for all men alike, coincide with the line between remote objects of perception and pure representations. In other words, the line is difficult to fix in detail, because different individuals will find different pure representations more or less separable, more or less inseparable, from the same remote objects of perception; and what are pure representations to one man are parts of remote objects of perception to another. Pure representations which are entirely inseparable from particular remote objects of perception, if any such there be, should be treated as parts of such objects, and included among the influences on character, not in the character itself.

4. These influences taken together, or some of them when exceptionally powerful in some individuals, or in the same individual at different times, often exert so potent a dominion over the character itself, that they seem to abolish its reaction altogether, and in fact to take its place and become the character. But this is not possible so long as there is activity in the cerebral hemispheres at all; it must always be upon and through the action of the cerebral hemispheres that these influences act, even when in the total result, the modes of thought and feeling of the individual in life, we can trace only such characters as are plainly due to these influences. A man, for instance, is never entirely the creature of his education; some features impressed upon him by parents, teachers, or experience of life, are omitted in the

rescript; of two contradictory features either one is dropped, or both are carried up into a wider one, and thus come out in the shape of new features or traits of character. In short they undergo a moulding in spontaneous and voluntary reintegration, and this remoulding must itself be of a certain character, in dependence on the constitution of the organ which displays it. The cerebral hemispheres cannot escape, any more than any other bodily or nervous organ, from the law of the influence of hereditary accumulations of endowment which are their constitution. These endowments and this constitution, thus become innate in them, cannot be neglected in estimating the ingredients or constituting elements of the total result, although they are never seen separate from that result; while the influences of education, bodily organisation, sensation, temperament, climate, and so on, are seen and classified apart from it. There is, then, reason enough to assure us of the existence of such a constitution in the cerebral hemispheres, the organ of character; and the impossibility of accounting for peculiarities in character, in most persons at least, solely from circumstances of education and the other influences which have been enumerated, is sufficient ground for warranting an attempt to analyse that constitution, and to classify the tendencies of it in different cases. And for this attempt the analysis and classification of the emotions, considered as products of the functions of this organ, supply the basis. The enquiry, then, is distinctly a metaphysical one; while that into the influences of education and the rest upon the character belongs to the physiologist and the psychological historian.

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5. Still it does not follow that we shall quite lose sight of the several influences which have been enumerated. When the several original tendencies of character are examined, it will be found that they harmonise with, and are more or less open to, some of these influences rather than others, so that they are promoted and fixed by exposure to them, while they are lessened by their contraries; which gives rise to conflicts in the one case, to one-sided developments in the other. Thus, for instance, a vigorous bodily and muscular organisation will combine with an energetic, reactive, cerebral tendency to make a great sportsman, explorer, or campaigner; if the cerebral tendency is sluggish, this bodily organisation will lead to no intellectual results at all, but will be even dangerous to the moral life. The particular affinities, however, between tendencies and influences must be left to be noticed, so far as it is possible to notice them at all, till the tendencies themselves are examined. There is also farther to be taken into account the modification of these influences themselves by the character; the changes effected in them by the person himself, in consequence of his perceiving their nature and results, and taking measures to avoid them if injurious, and to increase them if favourable. Whatever is voluntary, or even partly the effect of volition, must to that extent be set down to the score of character; as for instance in changing scene and climate for the sake of health; the choice made will depend partly upon the character, partly upon the circumstances, and the results upon health and future mental development will be due to both together.

§ 61. 1. We come now to the analysis of the

original tendencies of the character itself. Here it is necessary to go back to the most fundamental distinctions of all that are to be found in consciousness; for these alone can give us the great divisions to which others are subordinate. Accordingly, I find the first great division of characters founded in the distinction of the formal and material elements. If the formal element is that which is fixed on and red-integrated with the greatest pleasure and frequency, the character is intellectual; if the material, it is emotional. But how can these elements ever be separated from each other? It is not requisite that they should ever be completely separated. Every emotion must have some framework of representation, and this contains necessarily the formal element, time or time and space together; while if this framework is taken alone, and the time and space relations of its parts made the objects of interest, it will still have an emotional element, namely, emotions of wonder and curiosity, the desire of knowledge for its own sake, with their pleasure, that of gratifying the logical instinct. (§ 19, 2.) These may be called properly the intellectual emotions. The intellectual character, therefore, aims at exactness of measurement, of co-ordinate or subordinate arrangement of measured parts, at anticipation of relations between parts of its framework of representation. Completeness and precision are the qualities which are the objective aspect of its emotions, wonder and the logical instinct, when satisfied. Briefly stated, the framework itself is the object of interest to the intellectual character. The emotional character, on the other hand, finds the framework in itself indifferent; all its interest is concentrated on the emotions which pervade

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the framework ; these it holds fast, and accepts the represented objects which contain them as their condition. It cares not for definition, nor to enquire what frameworks will be those which contain its favourite emotions. Having these, such questions it rejects as merely speculative and useless. It clings, therefore, to those images which have been most frequently bound up with its emotions, and listens with distrust and dislike to proofs that these frameworks are inconsistent with other parts of knowledge, or contradictory in themselves. The only contradictions which it knows are those between incompatible emotions. Hence the power which emotions have of spreading over and pervading objects which, in themselves or as frameworks only, are of the most opposite character to that of the frameworks proper to the emotions. For instance, the command "Love your enemies" is often actually obeyed. The emotion of love spreads over and pervades those objects which are originally the objects of hate, whereby these objects cease to be regarded as enemies, and become the objects of a modification of love, not the same or so intense as that which is felt for old friends, but still a kind of love and not a kind of hate. Objects of the intellect alone, on the other hand, representations the emotion of which is already fixed as the logical instinct or desire of knowledge, these cannot be made the object or framework of love ; for they are already fixed, and abstraction made of all emotion but the intellectual ; and this is their essence. The gulf between the intellectual and emotional characters, therefore, is deeper than that between even the most contrary emotions, or tendencies within the bounds of the emotional character.

2. If we try to conceive what are the conditions of cerebral activity and organisation which we must suppose to underlie this separation between the intellectual and emotional tendencies, I think we must conceive them as twofold; first there must be a local separation more or less complete, between the parts of the organ appropriated respectively to the two tendencies; and secondly, the nerve movements which underlie the emotional element must be distinguishable from those which underlie the intellectual or reasoning element. We may picture to ourselves the emotions depending on movements arising from centres of their own, when the portion of brain containing such a centre is set in motion by a representation from below, and thence spreading into other portions, or being repressed by antagonistic emotional movements which have themselves arisen in a similar manner. The intellectual emotions, or modes of logical instinct, will arise in the same way, but will be confined to the local portion of the brain appropriated to the intellectual functions, within which they will also spread, and assist or repress each other, as the process of redintegration requires. In both cases, and in both portions of the cerebrum, the emotions and emotional nerve movements will form a bond linking the representations together, and a passage connecting them dynamically or in redintegration. But, since the intellectual processes aim at distinctness and coordination of parts of the framework in time and space relations, the subordinate divisions of the intellectual tendency will be given, not by the emotion, but by some characteristic of the framework; and the local subdivisions of its organ, if any such can be discovered, will be dis-

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tinguishable by their being devoted to those kinds of representational objects, and will receive their names from them. The contrary will be the case with the emotional part of the organ; emotions and not frameworks of emotion will furnish the distinctions in psychological analysis, and determine the names of the subordinate organs, if locally distinguishable. If this or any similar physiological view is accepted, it would furnish an additional argument for originally diverse tendencies in the character itself; since both its distinctions, that is, of movements and of localities, must be given in the original organisation of the cerebrum; and if so, it is difficult to suppose any two cerebral organs exactly alike in this respect.

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§ 62. 1. The distinction just drawn between the intellectual and emotional tendencies rests upon the statical view of the phenomena. The following distinction rests upon the dynamical view of them, and is applicable equally to both branches of the first distinction. Every character has its own degree of natural activity or quickness in redintegration; in spontaneous redintegration the two extremes may properly be called quickness and slowness of disposition; in voluntary redintegration the same dispositions appear as inventiveness and precision in reasoning on the one hand, and on the other as immoveability from already grasped principles, whether of emotion or thought, which may appear either as laudable firmness or as feeble obstinacy. True firmness, however, belongs to a disposition not slow but active in reasoning, which remains steadfast to its purpose only after having gone through all the possible objections or trains of reasoning which might invalidate it. The mind that is active in reasoning

combines both kinds of energy, is at once vivid in its perceptions, rapid and fertile in its redintegration of perceptions. But it does not follow that this kind of mind will also always be firm; firmness is a virtue of this kind of mind, which only the better minds of the class attain to, since it involves not only reasoning inventively and rapidly but also reasoning well, with sufficient knowledge and insight into the relative value of ends. In other words, firmness is in a great measure dependent on education, but can only be produced by education where the original disposition of character is an active or energetic one. But the disposition to energetic volition, whatever may be the objects or feelings willed, to which the volition is attached or in which it arises, is an original disposition of the character, depending, as shown in § 51, on the degree of energy and elasticity in nerve movement, distinguished from their specific nature as supporting particular emotions or particular frameworks. This energy or elasticity is evidenced by the general feeling of cheerfulness or power, both in spontaneous and voluntary redintegration; and in the latter is the ground of the cheerful self-satisfaction which we feel in all victory of volition over obstacles, of the reactive over the retentive movements, whatever may be the special feeling which is victorious, and in spite of this specific feeling being, as it often is, painful; as, for instance, in cases of self-control and self-denial, or preference of duty to pleasure. The feeling in question is not confined to cases where the moral sense triumphs over temptation, but is common to all cases of self-control, or victory of the reactive over the retentive movements. In the case of politeness, for instance, Pericles is made to say,

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in Landor's *Pericles and Aspasia*, lviii.: "I never say that a thing pleases me while it is yet undone or absent, lest I should give somebody the trouble of performing or producing it. As for what is displeasing, I really am insensible in general to matters of this nature; and when I am not so, I experience more of satisfaction in subduing my feeling than I ever felt of displeasure at the occurrence which excited it. Politeness is of itself a power, and takes away the weight and galling from every other we may exercise." If we could fix our chief attention, and stake our chief pleasure, upon the skill and energy with which we face the events of life, instead of on the nature of the aims attained, or of the occurrences which befall us, we should be great gainers in the general cheerfulness of our mental tone.

2. Spontaneous redintegration, it has been shown, supplies all the matter for voluntary, and underlies it in all its operations. The same dispositions of quickness or slowness belong therefore necessarily to both; but they can only be analysed and classified in the latter, since that only can be distinguished into different modes, those of transeunt action, practical and speculative reasoning, and their subordinates. An active disposition combining with an emotional tendency will reason chiefly in the practical mode; and this disposition is the natural groundwork alike for great contemplative philosophers and poets; such for instance as Plato, Dante, Milton, Coleridge. An active disposition combining with the intellectual tendency produces, under favourable circumstances, great men of science, as distinguished from philosophers, such, for instance, as Newton. If external circumstances, bodily organisation, or education, lead

the man into practical life, which is the normal case, the active disposition then reasons chiefly in the effective mode of practical reasoning, combined with transeunt action, and the man becomes a great soldier, lawyer, statesman, or politician. The emotions which are his *τέλη* are then taken chiefly from the class of emotions of comparison; and only the very highest minds make the emotions of sympathy, of justice, of moral sense, or religion in its true meaning, ultimate *τέλη* beyond these. These appear to all but the highest minds to be "unpractical," though they are in truth the objects of teleological reasoning, and must be so before they can become those of effective reasoning or of transeunt action; whereas all men at once understand the value of emotions of comparison, and these need no process of reasoning to set them in a clear light. The difference between the several classes of emotions, some being universally recognised, others only partially, by some men and not by all, marks the stage of development at which true civilisation has arrived better perhaps than any other kind of circumstance. Were all public men Washingtons in elevation of sentiment, how vast were our advance.

3. There is no special original tendency to the practical life; the only two original tendencies are the emotional and intellectual. All practical men, therefore, belong to one or the other of these two, and let their tendency shine through their practice, although of course they are more obviously and completely men of action than they are either men of emotion or of pure intellect. Contrast Napoleon on the one side, as the man of intellect, with our beloved Nelson on the other, as the man of emotion.

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Yet Napoleon was open to great ideas, and had, as Mrs. Browning well says of him, "the genius to be loved." Nelson's emotional nature was vivid but blind, nor can we admire his falsely patriotic antipathies. All the more however may these two great men serve as contrasting examples of the two tendencies which have the practical character as their common groundwork.

4. The more slow and sluggish the disposition, in spontaneous and in voluntary reintegration, the more easy prey it falls to physical temperament, bodily and muscular organisation, circumstances of education or experience; since it reacts less upon them by comparing their results and values in reintegration, and brings the differences of original cerebral tendency less into play to modify them. In natures of this kind early education is all-important, since the impressions thus received will with difficulty be effaced. If the original tendency is emotional, and the education good, the most excellent character may be formed, one that prizes above all things the moral virtues. If the original tendency is intellectual, education however good can only save from degeneracy, for the character will be cold emotionally without being intellectually vigorous. All that can be done will be to save it from being solely guided by the influences of the bodily organisation.

5. Here is the place to speak of a certain kind of emotional feelings which are general to some extent, that is, arise in and pervade some kinds of more specific emotions, according to the degree of volitional energy which accompanies them; the key to which lies, therefore, in the relation between energy and these specific emotions. I mean those feelings which

we call tenderness, softness of heart, or weakness in emotion. Prof. Bain has given great and deserved prominence to this kind of emotion; *The Emotions and the Will*, Chap. vi. 2nd edit. There are two points, however, in his exposition with which I am unable to agree; first, in explaining the connection of tenderness and mental pain as a case of association, the association namely of tenderness and inaction, if I rightly understand his meaning at p. 72; and secondly, I am inclined to doubt there being any connection whatever between tenderness and such emotions as self-complacency, self-gratulation, self-esteem, p. 37. Tenderness, however, is far from being confined to the class of sympathetic emotions; a feeling the same in kind pervades other classes of specific emotions also, though of course with modifications derived from each of them. Again, it is possible to have some of the sympathetic emotions, and not only the kinds of benevolence and general philanthropy, but also the more lively ones of love and friendship, without that peculiar feeling which we know as tenderness. This feeling therefore is not coextensive with the sympathetic emotions, nor inseparable from any of them; and on the other hand it sometimes attaches to other emotions besides them. The explanation which I venture to propose is this: when we have any emotion strongly, and yet neither strive by volition to increase it nor to resist or diminish it, but, so to speak, rest in or give ourselves up to it, then there arises in it the peculiar feeling which we call tenderness, softness, or weakness. This feeling cannot arise in the antipathetic emotions, nor in those of comparison, nor in those of pride and honour in the self-isolating group, nor

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in the emotion of justice, nor in the moral sense, because in all these the will is active either to increase or diminish the emotion, or to discover something about its framework; but it may arise in every mode of the sympathetic emotions, in humility and shame of the self-isolating group, in every kind of emotional grief or pain, and in the religious emotions; because in these we may have the emotional feelings very intense, and yet strive neither to increase or diminish them, nor to discover anything about their framework, that is, we may give ourselves up to them without volitional immanent action and without reasoning. The tenderness in the sympathetic and in the religious emotions, in love to men and to God, is of the same generic kind; it differs only as these specific emotions differ; and in both it seems to involve a giving way, and rejoicing in giving way, to a flood or wave of emotion which fills the soul without effort on our part. The moment we try to reason about it, or to intensify it ourselves, that moment it vanishes. Its greater intensities are as it were ecstasies of emotional contemplation. The same generic feeling arising in other kinds of specific emotion may be called by the general name of tenderness, softness, or weakness of resignation. Poverty, sorrow, disgrace, difficulty, which are all modes or causes of emotional grief, as well as extreme humility and self-abasement, when yielded to and accepted without resistance, are modes of resignation; and in the greater intensities of them there arises a feeling of softness or weakness, which seems to differ from the tenderness of love only in so far as these specific emotions differ from that; certainly a wide difference, but one which does not

touch the general feeling of tenderness. When the object which is regarded as the cause or the inflicter of these griefs is also regarded with love on other grounds, as in the case of regarding afflictions as sent by God, then the weakness or softness in resignation becomes, passes into, or coincides with, the tenderness of love; a phenomenon which seems to require the supposition of a common nature and origin. Similarly may be explained the phenomenon of feeling greater tenderness of pity for the sufferings of others when we have a vivid sense of sufferings of our own; a phenomenon which by no means requires, for explaining it, that we should have an accurate knowledge of the sufferings of others derived from our own experience, or that the sufferings which we pity should be similar in kind to those which we have suffered, or may expect to suffer, ourselves. It is not the reference, by similarity, to our own case which arouses tenderness or enables pity to become tender, but the actually existing feeling of tenderness combining itself with the representation of other sufferings.

§ 63. 1. Let us next examine the intellectual tendency and its subdivisions, together with its relations to the emotional tendency. There seem to be two subdivisions into which the purely intellectual tendency may fall, both of them original tendencies of character. The first is the constructive or organising tendency. Its marks are always to seize first on a whole, the scope, outline, and ultimate end, of any subject or question, and from this to descend to its particulars or details, arranging them subordinately to this most general conception. It forms theories or hypotheses in order by them to interpret old facts

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and discover new ones. It immediately pushes facts to their ultimate consequences, and from these anticipated consequences judges of the nature of the facts. Hence in practical reasoning it is always forming ideals; in speculative reasoning it is a kind of divination of general laws, which after discoveries are to verify or disprove; in practical reasoning it seeks the spirit of the institutions or acts in question, and is satisfied with no partial improvements, hand to mouth remedies, which do not go at once to the modification of the spirit and underlying nature of the customs or laws which are hostile to the spirit which it desires to promote. Its essence seems to be, that it cannot conceive anything without referring it to some complete, organic, whole, of which it is a part. It is the insisting before all things on the statical view of phenomena.

2. The second tendency is founded on the dynamical view of phenomena; it is satisfied with seeing their order of sequence and development. It may be called the accumulative tendency. In practical reasoning it strives to bring new facts under the old theory or the old ideal; its theory is always large enough for it, but appears to it always to want stricter and more detailed application. In speculative reasoning its instrument is induction rather than deduction, and it aims at discovery of new facts, new phenomena, and new relations between them, so as to rise from them, when the series is complete, to a general law which shall be a short-hand expression for them. In practical reasoning, measures of alleviation, temporary improvements, ends near at hand in the immediate future, the advantage of which is obvious, are its choice. The more fundamental im-

provements of the opposite tendency it calls change for change's sake, the larger *τέλος* not being within its horizon. Its favourite mode is effective not teleological reasoning.

3. In that portion of practical reasoning which includes the fine arts, and especially in poetry, the contrast between these two tendencies is very marked. The statical organising tendency is that which aims at the production of complete or perfect works of art, the characteristic of which is that the artistic harmony of the whole is the main purpose in view, the *conditio sine qua non* of the whole production. Parts, however beautiful in themselves, images however pleasing, the representation of emotions however interesting in themselves, are stedfastly rejected by artists of this order, unless they are capable of subordination to the scope of the whole work, so as to heighten its effect without obscuring it by their own brilliancy. This is what is sometimes known as the principle of the Classical school of art. On the other hand, the principle of the opposite school, sometimes called the Romantic, founded in the dynamical tendency, looks entirely to the interest of the separate images, and is satisfied with any thread of connection however slight. Hence the chief attention is paid by this school to the emotions, and not to their frameworks of representation; the matter is predominant with the romanticist, the form with the classicist. And, owing to this natural connection, the poetry of modern Europe, the chief part of which sprang directly from the need of expressing emotion, is naturally and originally romantic; and the classic element of artistic form is to it an acquired virtue.

4. The choice and combination of words, tones,

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looks, and gestures, to express feelings accurately, or to produce accurately those same feelings in others, are modes of effective practical reasoning combined with transeunt action, modes which exhibit these same two opposite tendencies. In aiming at rhetorical effect upon an audience, one man will study the connection and interdependence of the several parts of his speech, according to their importance and immediate or mediate bearing on the point he wishes to enforce, that is, he will appeal to the reason or at least to the good taste of his hearers; and this supposes a certain degree of cultivation in his audience. Another man will trust entirely to rousing their feelings by vivid pictures, by strong expressions, and by exhibiting himself as moved by the feelings he expresses, trusting to the audience themselves to supply the connection, or to their feelings to make up for the want of connection, between his premises and their desired conclusion.

5. The different directions which may be given to the intellectual tendencies, directions to certain subjects or branches of knowledge, depend upon education and circumstances of life, rather than upon differences of the character itself; except so far as some subjects may require for their satisfactory treatment the constructive tendency rather than the accumulative, or the accumulative rather than the constructive. I will not enter on the enquiry how far this influence is operative, and what branches of knowledge are favoured or furthered by each tendency. The different sciences and arts, however, are distinguished from each other by a natural grouping dependent on similarity in their object-matter, or on the grouping of their phenomena into natural wholes;

for instance, the mathematical sciences, chemistry, botany, philology, physiology, and so on. It is plain that the direction to any one of these may be given by education or by circumstances, while in different circumstances the same man might have taken up some other branch than that to which he was actually determined. Different predominant emotions also may give an interest to certain classes of phenomena in preference to others, in which case the course would be determined by the influence of one part of the character upon another. Yet of these sciences the mathematical, and especially pure mathematic, which is pure calculation, abstracting to the utmost possible from the matter of its objects, seems to hold a place apart, and almost to require the assumption of a separate tendency, and a separate local seat in the organ. It also appears to be a science which is peculiarly suitable to the constructive, statical, tendency; so that those who have the opposite tendency, and yet busy themselves with mathematic, would contribute but little to its advancement, and be unlikely to reach pre-eminence in its pursuit. It is the most purely intellectual of all the processes of reasoning. Its comparative value as a means of education or intellectual training is a different and a more difficult question.

§ 64. 1. In approaching the analysis of the several types of the emotional tendency, we approach the deepest and by far the most important field of differences of character. As the term tendency was employed for distinguishing emotion from intellect generally, and the term disposition for distinguishing between active and sluggish characters, so it will be well perhaps to employ the term type for the several

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differences of character which depend upon differences in the favourite or predominant emotions. It is the reflective emotions which furnish us with these types; the direct emotions are too immediately under the influence of the presentations to admit of the original tendency to any of them being observed with accuracy, apart from the representations which are their framework, and consequently apart from the influence of external circumstances. It is only when the cerebral organs begin to react upon their representations that these original tendencies become manifest, and this point coincides with that period of representational development which is accompanied with reflection. The direct emotions however are taken up into the reflective, and are, as it were, their first stage, so that, in analysing and classifying the latter, we are in fact analysing and classifying both of them. Grief, joy, aversion, fondness, are included in the sympathetic and antipathetic emotions, for instance; the æsthetic emotions in the poetical; hope and fear in all, where there is any uncertainty about the objects which interest us.

2. The emotions or passions which accompany action by means of muscles, speaking, singing, shouting, praying, rebuking, arguing; or writing, working with the hands, fighting, riding, walking, running, climbing; all feelings which accompany acts like these, which are to very many persons the most pleasureable feelings of all, are compound states of consciousness which, so far as they are emotions or passions, are modifications of some of the direct or reflective emotions enumerated in Chapter ii.; and, so far as the remaining element in them is concerned, consist of the sensations caused by the several bodily

organs which are set in motion or operation. In this latter respect they are purely sensational or presentative, and belong not to the character but to the influences upon it, which have been enumerated in § 60. As to their emotional element, which properly belongs to the character, the tendency to take pleasure in them, and the different degrees in which they are pleasureable, depend on the proportion between the active and sluggish dispositions of the cerebral organs, as distinguished in § 62; while the specific differences between them, by which one man takes pleasure in exercising the voice in singing, another in speaking, another in skill in shooting, another in riding, another in adventurous travelling, and so on, —all these, apart from their pleasures of sense or presentation, depend upon, and are modifications of, the several emotions which are ultimately or in themselves pleasureable. For instance, the pleasure of singing or speaking is a modification of æsthetic emotion; that of shooting and riding, of emotions of comparison between self and others, or of emotions purely self-regarding, as pride or shame; that of adventurous travelling, of the intellectual emotions of wonder and desire of knowledge. Apart from these and suchlike modifications of the emotions, and apart from the original tendency to action which belongs to the character, there is no active temperament, or active character, which produces men of action as distinguished from men of feeling and from men of thought. Activity of character is a disposition common to both tendencies, emotional and intellectual, and underlies them both. To classify characters as active, emotional, and intellectual, is to classify them empirically, by results or symptoms, not by differ-

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ences in structure and function. The differences of modification which emotions manifest when they are operative as the motives of external bodily action are however very important and interesting, and must be specially noticed in any complete enumeration of the emotional furniture of the mind.

3. It is clear, then, that we are to look to the reflective emotions of the several groups distinguished in Chapter ii. for the several types of character. But it is not a mere enumeration of these emotions that will suffice; it is not enough to point to the sympathetic or the affectionate emotions, for instance, as the ground of the benevolent or the affectionate character, to the antipathetic emotions as the ground of the irascible character, or simply to refer the vain, proud, shy, avaricious, ambitious, just, moral, religious, poetical, characters to the several particular emotions which these characters exhibit predominantly, and which in fact constitute them. There is a further problem before us, which is this, to discover the affinities and antagonisms between these emotions, and between the characters founded on them; to discover which among them are natural allies, whether as equals or as subordinate one to another, so that the subordinate may lead up to and be included in the superior, making the entire character a complete and consistent whole; to discover if possible, in the case of antagonist emotions, marks, either in the one or in the other, which indicate its contradictory and transient nature, so as to give place finally to the other which exhibits no such marks; to point out the accordance which some or all of these emotions have with the influences coming from bodily organisation or from external circumstances, so as to be

promoted or hindered by them, and on the other hand the various degrees of capability which they possess of being carried up into ideals, so as to have before them an ideal career of development, extension, and perfection. This development of some emotions and characters, including and subordinating others, while others again are either eliminated or repressed, constitutes the ground or basis of moral progress and improvement, as the extension and coordination of knowledge of the facts of physical science constitutes the ground or basis of intellectual progress, and both together the progress of mankind in civilisation. If we should find, as the result of our analysis, that those emotions and those characters which we now prize the most highly are also those which have the promise in themselves of the greatest permanence, extension, and development, by the subordination of others which are allied to them, and by the elimination of others which are too antagonistic to be subordinated, we shall have removed the sceptical doubts of the possibility of improvement and of the fundamental consistency of human nature, which are apt to arise from observing the fact of antagonism between emotions and characters, and the apparent want of any power or any tribunal which can decide between them, when they conflict with equal forces either in the same or in different individuals.

4. The task of ethic is to enquire, and, since our wishes are engaged to one conclusion in advance, the problem of ethic is to show, that the evil emotions and passions, such as lust, envy, revenge, avarice, and so on; which are called evil because they will on no terms combine with the moral sense or sense of duty, which latter carries its value and its charm

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in or as part of the specific emotion or quality of which it consists, just as sweetness of taste is pleasureable;—that these evil emotions, although pleasureable and seeming to carry their justification along with them in their pleasure, are nevertheless not of equal rank and value, in point of permanence and promise of development, with those emotions and passions which either constitute or will combine with the moral sense or sense of duty, or with those which are the imaginative or ideal perfection of these. The difficulty lies in the apparent self-justification inherent in every feeling that is pleasureable, which is apparently complete when these feelings are intense, and still more when so intense as to be absorbing or exclusive. The man who is occupied by one such feeling cannot even listen to or feel any antagonistic one, still less can he feel the antagonism between his own feeling and the moral sense or sense of duty. He feels at the moment completely justified by the interest of the feeling which is in possession of him. The value or interest of the moral sense also consists in a specific pleasureable feeling; and its superiority to the interest of the antagonistic feelings can be felt only when the two are compared, that is, in a reasoning process, a reflection upon feelings which have once been, but have ceased to be, violent. That the moral sense is of far higher interest when so judged by reflection, that its specific quality as an emotion is much better than other and antagonistic feelings, can only be felt by actual experience, and proved, or rather rendered verifiable, only by analysis of its representational framework, such as was offered in § 37. This analysis may be said to give the proof of its *de jure* supremacy, its superiority in specific

kind of feeling; and the case admits of proof because of the formal element involved in the framework of the emotion, just as in the case of the æsthetic emotions or sense of beauty. This *de jure* supremacy of the emotion would remain untouched, even should it be shown that the sense of duty was to last only for an hour longer, or that it was involved in a course of rapid and inevitable decay. But the problem now before us is to prove what may be called the *de facto* supremacy of the emotion, the *de jure* and *de facto* supremacy of the character founded upon it, by showing that both the emotion and the character have in themselves the promise of permanence and development, so as to assimilate and subordinate some, and eliminate other, emotions and passions, thereby unifying and harmonising the elements and types of character, and contributing to the total advancement and improvement both of the individual and of the race. The degree to which this improvement may be carried, how far the elimination of some emotions, the assimilation and combination of others, may proceed, in other words, the degree of perfectibility of the human character, is another question, and one which it is not necessary to discuss here, especially since it depends in a great, perhaps the greatest, measure upon the influences of bodily organisation and external circumstances operating on it. With these purposes in view, let us now proceed to consider the several groups of the reflective emotions with their representational frameworks.

§ 65. 1. Let us begin with the moral sense, since that is the central focus of all the emotions, the criterion of them all as good or bad, by combining or rejecting them from combination with itself. In it-

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self it is the ground of a special type of character; as will be readily admitted, since no class of men is more marked out from others than those who act in all cases and circumstances from a sense of duty, or in whom the predominant thought and desire is to do their duty "in scorn of consequence." The moral sense, when its emotion in greater intensity is made an object of desire, that is, when it becomes a passion, may be properly designated as the passion of duty, or the passionate desire to do one's duty. All moral sense is a command or law as well as an emotion, as its analysis in § 37 has shown. As a command it is duty, a debt or obligation, the validity of which is derived from justice, one of the two elements of the objects of moral sense, the other element being unfixed, consisting of any pleasureable feeling compatible or inseparably combined with justice, and therefore commanded or at least permitted by it. Those in whom the love or passion of duty is predominant are accordingly distinguished from those who are merely lukewarm servants of the moral law, by the importance they attribute to discovering the commands of the moral law, and to distinguishing these from what is merely permitted or not forbidden by it. It is their emotional *τέλος* that its commands shall be obeyed as perfectly as possible; hence they dwell upon them, and enforce them on themselves, and if possible on others. Whatever the other traits of their character may be, this trait will be predominant; but wherever it is strongly predominant, it involves a great force of character, firmness, and energy of volition. The active disposition alone is found to be the accompanying trait in the character of the man of duty; since much has to be rejected which is pleasureable, and much done

which is in itself painful, acquiring its motive pleasure in the one case, and losing its hindering pain in the other, from being taken up into or combined with the sense of justice or of right. Courage, high spirit, the Greek *θυμὸς*, and often rashness and audacity, are the accompanying characteristics. But the antipathetic emotions will lose all their elements which are incompatible with justice; hatred, anger, and revenge, will become indignation, *νέμεσις*, and the man himself, if originally inclined to these emotions and passions, will gradually lay them aside or change them into an impersonal sternness, and conceive himself as the minister of some high and holy law. The errors and the vices of such a character will be derived, not from the sense or love of duty, but from the antipathetic emotions often found in combination with it, through the medium of the passions of an active disposition, courage and audacity, which the sense of duty has not completely eliminated. Where the sympathetic emotions are combined with this character of the love of duty, there the character of the whole man is most loveable and admirable, strong, chivalrous, tender; where the poetically imaginative and religious feelings are added besides, there will arise a total character of the most completely heroic type which human nature can assume.

2. But since it may easily be conceived to happen that the active disposition itself, and still more the passionate emotion of duty which partly depends on it, may be transient and destined to grow weaker in consequence of changes in the cerebral organisation which lie beyond our ken, let us see whether this emotion has in itself any traits which promise it durability beyond others; traits which, being ob-

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jects of general desire, will tend to make up for such physical deterioration (if any such is to be feared) by implanting it as a habit of all cerebral processes whatever. If any activity or function of the brain may on this ground be expected to be permanent, it is this which underlies the love of duty; and for this reason, that it has always, as one of its constituent elements, justice, which is equality of the formal element, equality which is in itself a perpetual pleasure, and therefore a perpetual motive in producing the objects and emotions which involve it. So long therefore as there is any pleasure in equality and justice, so long there will be a moral sense and sense of duty, and that accompanied by an inherent pleasure and motive of continuance. The universality of this pleasure, since in everything there is form, gives the emotion or passion which it constitutes an immense advantage in what may be called, from Mr. Darwin, the struggle for existence. Its flexibility also, another form of its universality, since all pleasureable feelings, at least in some of their modifications, may possibly also be just, as, for instance, indignation a modification of anger, is another consideration in its favour. It is not absolutely or entirely hostile to any pleasureable feeling; it can make friends with part of it, and give a certain scope to the particular nervous energy which supports it; becoming thus the general transforming agent of the whole system, softening and assimilating all emotions into its own substance.

3. It is a doctrine already set forth in Chapter ii., that a certain degree of probability of success is requisite to every undertaking, a certain hope of permanence or increase to voluntary indulgence in every

emotion. The representation of this future course may be called the career of that emotion or desire. This career is the represented image of what is desired in all cases of volition, when the desired image is considered as possible, probable, improbable, or impossible. If the image of the career of an emotion either contains in itself a contradiction, or stands in contradiction with known facts or with stronger emotions, that career will not be entered on, or if entered soon abandoned, and the emotion not indulged. Those emotions which have a career assured to them have a great advantage over others; and such a career is supplied by justice; the justice of any emotion is its ultimate and complete compatibility with other permanent emotions. When we say that any feeling is just, we mean to say that we think it to be compatible with others already judged to be just, without diminution of its intensity. Justice, therefore, which is itself the equation of conflicting emotions, is one condition of the career of all emotions besides itself, no matter what may be the emotions to which this career is opened. And so long as a career is necessary where emotions are in conflict, so long will justice be necessary as an element of that career. The conscious and voluntary harmonising of emotions, so as to open a certain career for all, is an operation which must take place as long as there are conflicting emotions to be harmonised by reflecting reason. Inasmuch then as it is founded in justice as one of its elements, the moral sense, an emotion of which the sense of duty is the passion, is as permanent as the reasoning faculties themselves, containing, as it does, the essential condition of harmonising the conflicting emotions.

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§ 66. 1. The sympathetic emotions fall into two groups which are the foundations of two distinct yet allied types of character. There is in English but one name for them both, Love; we must have recourse to the Greek to distinguish them as *ἔρως* and *φιλία*, which I shall call eros and love. The lowest foundation or root of eros lies deep in the bodily organisation and in the sexual appetite. This combines with direct æsthetic emotions, those of beauty and grace; and these latter it is which, when seen or represented in a person whom we think may possibly feel eros for us, make up the complete and reflective emotion of eros, of which that person is the object. Eros is thus inseparable from anteros; in other words, eros is an emotion which must have a career represented as at least possible in order to be sustained; and this career is made possible by representing the eros as reciprocated, or as anteros in the person for whom the eros is felt. The equalisation of eros and anteros is the end of this career. The desire in eros for the equalisation of the anteros, for the undoubting conviction that the anteros is equal, which is a fact of representation, is what makes the emotion of eros a passion. Hence it is possible to feel the passion of eros intensely with the very smallest hope of return, or with the bare imagination of its being possible, to hope against hope as it is called; and the stronger the emotion the less the need of represented success, and conversely; this being a case falling under the general law stated in § 20. Eros cannot be considered to be an end in itself, since the end which its passion desires is not a greater intensity in the emotion itself, but the bringing up the anteros to an equal degree of intensity.

And this circumstance, together with the close dependence of eros upon direct æsthetic emotion, is what makes eros subordinate to, and capable of being taken up and included in, love proper, which is the foundation of the second of the two sympathetic types of character. Only very low degrees of eros can be felt for more than one person at once, and for this reason, that the anteros cannot be represented as felt by a person who should know that the eros was not concentrated on himself. Hence the passion also is only felt for a single person. The æsthetic admiration also is more easily restricted to a single person than the appetite; hence there is a growing concentration through the four stages upwards, namely, the appetite, eros as emotion, as passion, and love properly so called. But the representation of the appetite and its satisfaction may take place without being combined with the æsthetic emotion, and consequently without passing into eros, and without being the foundation of love; and in this case the natural appetite, innocent and at the very least indifferent in itself, becomes degraded into lust. Lust is the representation, either willed or permitted, of the satisfaction of the sexual appetite by itself and for its own sake. The degradation begins, not in the appetite, but in the representation of the circumstances attending its satisfaction, that is, in its unreasoning indulgence; an indulgence which is, I believe, in all cases felt, on reflection, to be incompatible with the moral sense. Here is applicable the distinction drawn, in § 60. 3, between the temperament or bodily organisation and the character. The mere representation, caused by and inseparable from the working of the bodily organi-

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sation, is not condemned by the moral sense; it is the repetition of this representation in voluntary reintegration, or in spontaneous reintegration not resisted by volition, that is the object of the judgment.

2. This case deserves an attentive consideration, for, if we ask ourselves the further question, Why this representation of the satisfaction of appetite will not combine with the moral sense, a difference is disclosed which divides into two different classes the things which must be held morally bad because they will not combine with the moral sense. One class contains the representations of satisfaction of appetites, with the actions which they engender, such as drunkenness and gluttony; the other contains representations which manifestly involve injustice. Now only the latter class is immediately and at first sight condemned by the moral sense, condemned because the objects of it are the direct contradictories of the sense of justice. But the objects of the former class, the appetites whose indulgence is condemned by the moral sense, are not in themselves unjust; and it seems therefore that, if they are condemned by the moral sense, the criterion and validity of the moral sense cannot consist, as here maintained, in the sense of justice, but must have some other source. This class of objects, then, has probably been the chief support of the theory of Utility, that the pleasurable or painful consequences of actions, weighed by prudence, constitute them morally right or wrong. They by no means however necessitate this conclusion; the moral badness of the acts and representations in question may flow ultimately but indirectly from the sense of justice; and this indirectness of derivation makes of the acts in question a separate

class, and, besides, a class which falls under the head of character not of emotions taken separately. The moral sense establishes a certain hierarchy of emotions, approves certain classes of habits, and commands a certain type of character. It is as destructive or injurious to these emotions, habits, and character, not to the moral sense or the sense of justice itself, that the indulgence of the appetites in question is condemned, when it is condemned, by the moral sense. In this way arise virtues and vices of character, consisting of emotions, representations, and habits, which are not in themselves separately perceivable as either just or unjust, but which are immediately and by themselves perceivable as compatible or not compatible with the habits composing the character commanded by the moral sense. The immediate source of deciding as to the morally good or bad character of this class of objects is the moral ideal; the ultimate source is the sense of justice. If a moral ideal was not produced and established upon the sense of justice, there would be no criterion by which to judge any habits, that is, virtues or vices of character, as morally good or morally bad. Hence also, if any other ideal besides the moral ideal were to be set up as equal or superior to it in validity, many habits of character might be approved or admitted which are now condemned, and vice versa. The importance of this will be seen when we come to treat of the poetical and religious types of character, since the most favourite alliance of poetical imagination is with the erotic type, and this again is closely bound up with representations of indulgence of appetite.

3. Eros is found to be stimulated artificially by

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caprice or coquetry in the object of it. To cause eros to represent the hoped for anteros sometimes as given, sometimes as refused, or as bestowed elsewhere, has the effect of irritating the eros. Again, acts and appearances which excite the æsthetic admiration excite the eros. Both of these things produce a state of irritation, in the person feeling eros, which is often indistinguishable from its naturally produced passion, which only arises legitimately from a very intense emotion. Other circumstances also may have the same effect as the caprice of the person for whom the eros is felt, such as separation, or admiration shown by others. The natural allies of eros are accordingly envy and jealousy of possible rivals; the state of eros is one peculiarly open to these passions, so that they can be excited in it even in persons of the least suspicious and most generous natures, witness Shakespeare's Othello. All the emotions which have been grouped together in Chapter ii. under the head of emotions of comparison are or may easily be stimulated in turn, by the course of events, in a person under the dominion of eros, or whose character is of that type. The counterbalancing force is to be found only in an emotion which is self-regarding, the better form of pride, proper pride as it is called, the expression or passion of which is one kind of Honour. This however is a general emotion, arising indifferently from several qualities and containing them as groundwork; we may place our pride in firmness, for instance, or in being superior to calamities from without of whatever kind they may be, or in the pursuit of a great public career, or in being devoted to religious contemplation. If we place our interest in any such ends as these, as a refuge from

the storms of eros, we may be said to take refuge in honour. For it is only in or as the representation of honour that they are opposed to eros with its envy and jealousy; they are not antagonistic to it in themselves, but only as props of self-sufficiency, which resists the torments of unsatisfied passion, unsatisfied because depending on the will or caprice of another.

4. Finally it becomes intelligible how eros may alternate with hate, towards the same person, and in rapidly consecutive moments; how the intensity of the one feeling may measure that of the other; and how both together in the retrospect, or even in actual experience, may produce a total impression almost indescribable by words, and even by the metrical language of poetry. All men of the erotic type of character do not feel and act in the same way under the influence of its passion. Some are willing slaves even to the most exaggerated form of caprice; some rebel, with alternate hatred, against its mildest manifestations; some become gloomy and melancholy, until an entire change of passion, or its entire transference to another person of more respondent humour, releases them from their tribulation.

§ 67. 1. The second type of character founded in the sympathetic group is that which finds its completion in love, properly so called. The series, of which it is the last member, consists of goodwill, benevolence, friendship, love. But, as already said, love can never reach its perfect development except between two persons of opposite sex, because only between them can rivalry ever be entirely abolished; except in cases where the difference in degree is immense or rather infinite, as in the love of God, which equally excludes rivalry and all antagonism of in-

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terest whatsoever. The three lower stages of this series may perhaps be considered as forming a type of character apart, since there are persons who may be capable of these lower degrees of sympathetic emotion only, and, possessing also the tendency to emotions of comparison, together with those of justice and the moral sense, may, from this combination, become good citizens, politicians, and men of business, as well as trustworthy and to a certain extent affectionate friends, but feel love only in a very faint and feeble degree of intensity, being rather allies than friends even of those most dear to them. Affection must be passion, an end desired as well as an emotion felt, in order to justify the name love being applied to this character. But it is better perhaps to consider this, not as a separate type, but only as the imperfect development of one, which reaches its completion in the passionate attachment of love, whether towards persons of the same or of the opposite sex, of which the latter case is the most perfect.

2. Love in this sense cannot exist between persons of opposite sex without a certain amount of eros and of sexual appetite being developed. Given the love, the other two feelings would follow as a consequence of the intimacy and familiarity of intercourse between the two persons; usually of course they precede it; but they are subordinated to it, and kept from degenerating into gross forms, as well as from becoming ends in themselves, since they are dominated by the desire for a complete union of interest in all modes of feeling and emotion, which modes would be weakened or destroyed by the preponderance of eros or of appetite. Love then may be combined with eros and appetite, which only then

perhaps are entirely pure and blameless, love purifying eros as eros appetite ; but both of these are distinct from love, which gives a new and special element to the combination. The great purpose which justifies the institution of marriage is this, to superinduce love upon eros, or to develop eros into love, by providing a condition of life in which both may be united. The historical causes which produced the institution of marriage are another matter ; as are also the minor advantages, which it secures, such as the founding and binding together the family group, and the education and support of the offspring. The institution of marriage lies at the very heart of civilisation ; even its minor advantages are of inestimable value. The admiration upon which love is founded, or which it includes, is an admiration for nobleness or beauty of character itself, not, like that of eros, for bodily excellences of personal beauty or grace. Hence it is impossible to love a person whom you regard as worthless ; except indeed it be said to be possible, in return for love manifested by him to you ; but then this very circumstance takes him, in your eyes, out of that category. The admiration in love is from its very origin a reflective admiration and emotion ; not a direct one, as the æsthetic admiration in eros. It may coexist and be coeval with the æsthetic admiration of eros towards the same person, just as love with eros itself. Observers often confound this case with that of eros alone ; but the compound feeling is of a much higher kind, as well as likely to be much more durable ; more durable, because the traits of character, which are the objects of the admiration of love, are capable of improvement

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and development by time, which is not the case with those of the admiration of eros.

3. In love as well as in eros the emotion must be represented as reciprocated; otherwise there is no career, and consequently no permanence and no increase. If it is not returned, the love remains only admiration of moral excellences, veneration, or esteem; but these may be very intense in degree. If in any measure returned, this will suffice to feed imagination and to sustain the love. But only when it is returned in the measure in which it is felt, does it spring up to its full height, and effect a perfect union between the two persons. Then follows a contest which of them shall love the other with most devotion; and this aim becomes an object of pride and honour in their best sense, one of the materials which feed or constitute them. Other emotions and other aims are not excluded; still less are benevolence and friendship towards other persons; still less the sense and love of justice and of duty; between which and love there is difference but no antagonism. The passion of love is a desire for an increased intensity of the same emotion, love, and also, like that of eros, for its being returned with greater intensity. It has no purpose except itself, and is therefore an end in itself; it has too a career before it which has no limit imposed by itself; for the equalisation of the love felt and returned is not such a limit, as it was in the case of eros; the passion goes on beyond, as the desire of greater intensity in the reciprocated emotion itself.

4. It has been mentioned above that Aristotle assigned longing, *πρόθος*, as the test of affection. There is also a test of love, which is applicable alike in

absence and in presence of the beloved person, and applicable both to the love felt and to the love represented as returned; it is the study and divination of the thoughts and feelings of the beloved person, for their own interest's sake alone and not for any ulterior purpose. In other words, the framework of the emotion of love will come out clearly, and will have an interest of its own, or rather the interest of increasing the love which pervades it. All love wishes to understand what it loves, watches it and studies it, as Keble says,

“The loving eye that watches thine
Close as the air that wraps thee round;”

and the result of the knowledge and communion so produced is that which Keble again describes in the words,

“When hearts are of each other sure.”

This is the test and this the result not of eros but of love.

§ 68. 1. The antipathetic emotions and passions, illwill, anger, revenge, ingratitude, hatred, malice, are the foundation of another type of character, as distinct from all other types as those founded on the sympathetic emotions, or those founded on the love of duty. It seems indispensable to assume for it a different centre and a different mode of movement, in the cerebral organisation and functions, radically and naturally different from those supporting the sympathetic types, which are equally organic and original. But there is no career for the antipathetic emotions at all equal to that which is open for the sympathetic, and this circumstance denies to them the promise which is given to the sympathetic, of

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permanence and development. The reason is partly this, that hatred and the rest are not ends in themselves; the passion is not a desire for the increase of the same emotion, but a desire for the suffering, injury, or total destruction, of the person hated. Thus, in the second place, the satisfaction of the passion removes the emotion, while the satisfaction of love increases it; new ground is given for love by loving; new ground is not given for hatred by hating. It is true that the natural tendency to the emotion of hatred is increased by its indulgence and activity, as all nerve actions are; but new grounds, new objects, for the emotion must be sought for, they are not supplied by the old acts or feelings. The factitious increase of the passion by interposing obstacles to its satisfaction, which produces irritation, is also a phenomenon common to hatred with eros and its passion; but in both cases the increase of the passion is factitious not natural, caused by circumstances which do not belong to the emotion itself and to its supporting cerebral movements, original to the organisation of the brain. To use the technical language then which has been here adopted, the emotion of hatred and its representational framework do not grow and develop together *pari passu*, but the emotional element, the passion, represents the destruction, injury, or suffering of its framework, which is the object of the emotion; its framework is necessary to its existence, and yet its continuance and increase involves the destruction of its framework, that is, involves the representation of the destruction of that which is represented as its object, and is its condition. In other words, the series of changes which it works in its framework are contradictory of each other;

and therefore the career of the emotion is limited to the time of that destruction being complete, and that contradiction worked out. This view seems in harmony with the fact, that we often see sudden reactions in anger and hatred when they are glutted by the complete humiliation or destruction of their object; see them not only ceasing but passing into some opposite emotion; the reason being, not that the blaze of passion has burnt out, or that sudden storms are short, but that the present representation of the humiliation of the object of hatred is so vivid as, with the emotion proper to it, suppose sorrow or compassion, to take the place of the former emotion, hatred, now no longer supported by its representation.

2. Love, on the contrary, develops its framework with the increase of its own intensity; its career has no limits set by itself. Hence love is an emotion which will combine with that mode of reasoning activity which has been here called constructive. So also will the love of duty. But hatred and the antipathetic emotions, having no career of their own, and denying themselves a career by their own nature, are incompatible with, and cannot be taken up into, any scheme or total which is organised with reference to an ultimate end. They can only be taken up into such a scheme when they are directed against such objects, or have such objects as framework, which are themselves hostile or incompatible with the scheme; that is to say, when they take the form of indignation, which is their justice. But even here, ideally or in an ideally perfect state, indignation will cease with the ceasing of injustice and wrong. The preponderance of the antipathetic emotions in the cha-

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racter of the individual, or in mankind collectively, would be the preponderance of disorder and disorganisation; their complete removal from human nature would be the removal of the last trace of moral evil. Their place would be well supplied by the gradual spreading of emotions which are capable of organisation, most properly perhaps by the sympathetic, which culminate in love; and this would have to be brought about through desuetude of the cerebral movements supporting the emotional element of hatred and the rest in the brain; whereby the representational frameworks which were once pervaded by the antipathetic emotions would be pervaded by the sympathetic, and the command "love your enemies" would be obeyed; for, as already remarked, we are not called upon to love our enemies *eo nomine*, which would be contradictory, but to love those persons as friends whom we once hated as enemies; that is, in changing the emotion to change the representation also.

3. The antipathetic emotions combine readily with the active disposition, since the gratification of them exposes us to injuries inflicted in return; and therefore whoever has not courage, boldness, and high-spirit, to defend himself in return for these attacks, will soon endeavour to restrain his antipathetic tendencies. Hence the natural combination of hatred and revenge, not only with courage and spirit, but also with bodily aptitude for endurance and activity. Intellectual ability also is requisite, and accordingly often found in company with these emotions; but it is, as might be expected, ability of the effective and accumulative modes of reasoning, not of the teleological or constructive. The adaptation

of means to mediate not ultimate ends will be its characteristic; and the combination of the two is effected by the redintegration of the means to the desired gratification being stimulated by dwelling on the passion and the image of its satisfaction, according to the law already explained. This is often found caricatured in lower animals than man. "The camel," says Mr. Palgrave, in his *Central Arabia*, vol. i. p. 40, "is a most stupid animal, but he has one strong passion—revenge; and accordingly in gratifying this he shows considerable astuteness."

4. This combination of antipathetic emotion with the active disposition of emotion and intellect is often an object of the better kind of pride and honour; and in this combination the antipathetic emotions may seem to have a career open to them, as well as that which they have in their form of indignation. Sometimes indeed we hear people praised as being "good haters;" but in all such cases it will, I think, be found that the active disposition, emotional, muscular, or intellectual, or the openness of avowal of antipathy, is really the object of pride, or honour, or praise, and not the antipathetic emotion itself. This may be seen from its combination with the opposite characteristics, with cowardice and sluggishness of disposition; for in this case the total combination is mean and sneaking, and, even if intellectually active, is developed only into what we call low cunning and craftiness. Men of these two combinations, antipathetic emotion with an emotionally active disposition on the one hand, and with an emotionally sluggish disposition on the other, the brave hater and the cowardly hater, commonly hate each other more than they hate any one else, even any one from

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whom they may have received greater injuries. The combination of the antipathetic emotions and their compounds, envy and jealousy, with that form of cowardice which is untruthfulness, simulation or dissimulation springing from fear, is the vice of insincerity or hypocrisy, the most generally hateful of all characters. This is perhaps meant by Achilles in the lines :

*ἔχθρὸς γάρ μοι κείνος ὁμῶς Ἀτρεΐδης πύλῃσιν,
ὅς χ' ἔτερον μὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ βάζῃ.*

Some writers indeed think that there is no moral evil but insincerity. This however seems to me an overstatement. The grossness of it in some cases, the evil which it inflicts, the insecurity which it causes, its complex nature, being a compound of many bad feelings, and above all its subtilty and penetration into all domains, so that there is no evil but readily allies itself with this, have rendered it the most obvious and conspicuous mark for moralists. It is not the only moral evil, but the worst of them. A peculiar form of malice, which when found is usually allied with cowardice, is the love of cruelty and torturing, seemingly for the sole pleasure of inflicting suffering. It seems, in point of nature, to belong to the type of character founded on the antipathetic emotions, and to be a remnant of some savage or rather brutal state of humanity, a remnant of habits fostered by the circumstances of a desperate and unceasing struggle for existence with other animals or with men in a similar condition.

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§ 69. 1. Another type of character seems to be founded on the two groups of emotions of comparison, the passions of which are envy and jealousy of the one group, and emulation of the other. Emu-

lation, which belongs to the comparison of being, is a noble passion; but there are no good passions of the comparison of having. The type of character seems to depend upon the tendency to compare oneself with others and the interest of the comparison itself, not upon the different emotions and differently combined representations which are their framework, which are the materials of the comparison. But whatever circumstances come forward in comparison of oneself with others, these are the objects which will compose the world of that person whose character is formed on this type. His tendency is to compare himself with others, in any or all circumstances, and to make the differences between the two his motives of action. Personal character, qualities, and powers, on the one hand, and external possessions and the opinion of mankind on the other, are the two general groups of objects which will occupy his attention. In one word his character may perhaps be best distinguished as ambitious. Ambition may be defined as any desire or passion which has a favourable comparison with other persons as its end or object. Intercourse with mankind at large, in business, sport, work, public affairs, scientific and literary pursuits, and so on, is the necessary and acceptable condition for gratifying ambition, and the field of activity for the ambitious character; in short, any kind of active public life is his field, in which he finds infinite opportunities open to him, whatever may be the direction in which his talents lie, or to which they may have been directed by minuter distinctions of organisation, or by education, or by other circumstances of life.

2. When we put the question, Whether ambition is

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an end in itself, and Whether it has a career opened to it by itself, it becomes requisite to distinguish it again into the two kinds founded on the two kinds of comparison, of having and of being. The direct emotion of avarice, the love of wealth for its own sake and the passion for increasing it, are taken up into the first group of emotions of comparison, and both are subject to the same laws. Wealth is one kind of possession among many, that kind which has value in exchange, and is with the rest an object in reference to which men compare themselves with each other. The end of the comparison is to find oneself, or to become, superior to others. The emotion therefore, the tendency to compare, in itself, does not aim at a greater degree of intensity of itself; its end is something not itself, namely, superiority to others in the comparison; and the greater the difference the more marked is the superiority. Like the antipathetic emotions, then, this kind of ambition has no career. Like them also it leads of itself to injustice, and is antagonistic to goodwill and the sympathetic emotions. Only so far as it is compatible with justice can it be taken up into any teleologic scheme of the constructive reason, and a career be opened for its emotion and passion. Like indignation, the desire of possession of wealth at least, when thus subordinated to justice, and not allowed to produce illwill to others, is a motive force of conduct which is not only very deeply rooted in the organisation, being founded first of all on the desire of satisfying the natural wants, but also is indispensable to the preservation of the race in existence and well being. We must have not only necessities but also luxuries before we can direct our attention to

the provision for moral and mental requirements. The same almost may be said of the desire of reputation, since the good opinion of others is of such enormous weight as a motive of action, witnessing thereby to the strength of the tendency to compare oneself with others, and fully justifying the view of Comte and others of the natural sociability of man; a sociability which is now found to have its roots in the original cerebral organisation, the organ of the character in the proper and strict sense of the term.

3. The emotions of the comparison of being with their passion, emulation, are not amenable in their own character to justice, as was shown in § 32, 2. They are, however, or contain a certain justice of their own, inasmuch as they endeavour to conform their estimate of their rival's character to truth, in order to compare themselves with him. Chivalrous, honourable, magnanimous, however, as these emotions and the ambition of excellence founded on them are, they do not contain their own ultimate end any more than the ambition founded on the other group. It is still the superiority, and not the interest of comparison itself, that is the purpose of the emotion. The ambitious man rejoices in the greatness of others only on condition that he knows himself superior, or has hopes of becoming so. Sometimes a man may appear to rejoice in the excellence of a person whom he has no hope of equalling; in this case he perhaps protects himself by secretly placing his pride or honour in another career; or perhaps he uses the superiority of one person to interpret to himself his own superiority to others; and it is a real pleasure to him to be convinced of the reality of superiority as

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a general fact, in order that he may ward off the subtil fear that he is deluding himself with a shadow in ambitioning superiority at all. Yet this kind of ambition is not destructive of its framework, as hatred is; nor is it the antagonist of the sympathetic emotions. It may have the sympathetic emotions as the very objects of its comparison, as seen in § 67. 3. But it combines in this way with them, or with any other emotion, not antipathetic, only at the cost of a portion of its own intensity. The emulation is made mild, and the haughtiness and bitterness of rivalry are suppressed. In this way ambition is prepared for admission into the teleologic scheme of the moral sense.

4. Many of the characters which are most commonly met with in the daily intercourse of life must be referred to the special predominance of some one or more of the emotions which belong to the general type of ambition. Most of the "Characters" of Theophrastus may be referred to this head; for instance, those of the dissembler, the flatterer, the rude and the polished man, the chatterer, the scandal-monger, the boaster, the officious man, the shabby and mean man, the miser, the suspicious man, the presumptuous, the vain, the conceited. I will mention some of the subordinate types of character belonging here, which are most commonly prominent. Selfishness is a general term for the desire of having the best of everything for oneself, the particular direction being given by circumstances of bodily organisation, or of course of life and experience. Covetousness is one form of selfishness, fondness for money and tangible possessions carried up into the reflective emotions of comparison. Conceit and vanity again are often found

predominant and make a strongly marked type of character, yet a type subordinate to the general type of ambition. The passion of chivalry and honourable emulation, when combined with the love of grace and politeness of demeanour, makes the character of the perfect gentleman. Some would deny the term gentleman to any one who does not also possess strongly marked traits of goodwill or benevolence; indeed would make the sympathetic emotions the root of this character. These persons are fond of saying, that only the true Christian can be a true gentleman; and they give St. Paul as an instance, who certainly was both in the highest sense. But, as commonly used and applied, the term gentleman includes only the justice of chivalrous emulation, and this is the foundation of the character; the other element is the fruit of good breeding and education, either given or self-acquired, and consists in good taste, polished manners, and courteousness, which are the fruit of one of the modes of emotion belonging to the comparison of having, as emulation belongs to the comparison of being. Compare on this subject what Montesquieu says of honour being the principle of action in monarchies, *De l'Esprit des Lois*, Liv. iii. 6, 7. Wherever there is a hierarchy of social or of social and political conditions in life, there it is one of the most constantly and powerfully operative motives with every one to keep himself and his family in the condition in which he was born, or to raise them above it. "*L'honneur, c'est-à-dire le préjugé de chaque personne et de chaque condition;*" and again, "*La nature de l'honneur est de demander des préférences et des distinctions;*" and again "*L'ambition est pernicieuse dans une république: elle a*

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des bons effets dans la monarchie; elle donne la vie à ce gouvernement." We are but too well acquainted, in England, with the excessive action of this principle; we know but too well the desire to be distinguished from the minutely different class below, and assimilated to the minutely different class above; we need a renovation, as of a genial spring restoring the wintry earth to life and warmth, a renovation which will relax the cankering gripe of this ambition, and restore, by the substitution of more natural aims, the sense and enjoyment of independence and brotherhood.

5. Passing to another subordinate type, humility is one of the emotions of comparison of being, and when the tendency to it is strongly marked produces a character very distinctly and obviously traced, that of the humble, meek, and lowly disposition. But this emotion has no passion founded on it, since its nature is to withdraw from rivalry and emulation rather than to court them. It combines readily with goodwill and love to others, and as such is itself amiable. It is from this combination that it acquires the title of a virtue, since a low estimate of oneself, if combined with illwill to others in consequence of that estimate, is hateful. The tendency to form a low estimate of self in comparison with others seems to belong to a low degree of mental activity, since it is to acquiesce in a judgment which derives its pleasure from the small amount of burden or task which it imposes. It enables the person to acquiesce in being guided by others; it aims at peace and rest, and avoids responsibility. Hence the humble character receives its colour from the other emotions with which it may be combined. Humility in com-

bination with love is the state of mind which is meant by the term humility as the name of a Christian virtue. It may seem strange to find humility classed under the head of ambition, being as it is rather a deterrent from rivalry, which is the soul of ambition. But it must be remembered that ambition is the character formed by the passions arising from emotions of comparison, not from these emotions themselves, which are opposites to each other; the passions are envy, jealousy, and emulation; when any of the emotions are predominant, they will form subordinate types of character which may be very different from those of the passions. The emotions on the side of the comparison unfavourable to self, that is, ashamedness, admiration of externals, humility, and admiration of essentials, as already said, have no passions; the passions spring from these emotions in combination with those on the other side of the balance, favourable to self; and yet these emotions may be strongly marked, so as to serve as foundations for distinct but subordinate types of character. And what is said of humility may be said also of other subordinate forms of these emotions, either alone or in combination with others, such as self-denial, unselfishness, complaisance, submissiveness. A comparison with other persons, their possessions and faculties, is essential to all these emotions and their modifications of character; but the comparison itself does not become a passion, unless the superiority of self over others is the object of desire; and this desire is ambition.

§ 70. 1. Another type of character is founded upon pride, one branch of the emotions which arise in reflection on self alone. Reserve is the charac-

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teristic of these; but the reserve of self-respect is modesty, that of pride is defiance. The emotions of reflection on self alone were described in § 30 as supposing two kinds of comparison to have taken place, first, comparison between oneself and other persons, secondly, comparison between the good and the bad features in one's own nature or history. Everything which can possibly be considered good in oneself or favourable to oneself may become material, object, or framework, for the emotion of pride. The comparison is then, in pride, given up by the unfavourable side of it being forgotten, not purposely but spontaneously, and the favourable side alone dwelt upon; only what is good in oneself is dwelt upon, the good in others and the bad in others are equally dropped out of view; and therewith all reciprocal obligations between oneself and others denied. This kind of pride, then, has no career before it, because it is founded, by its nature, in an error, in mistake of the facts of its representational framework. It requires a comparison to exist, and it tries to eliminate all comparison; it destroys the framework which is necessary to it. It might be pictured as lopping off the bough on which it is seated. It aims both at isolation from others and at isolation from portions and parcels of itself. Yet to effect this isolation it must keep producing and reproducing in thought the objects from which it would make abstraction. The future before it is only secured by the strengthening of the natural tendency which may be due to repeated acts of indulgence; the aim of the passion is not to intensify itself, but to intensify or complete the isolation which is one element of its object.

2. But although this kind of pride has no career, the case is different with that kind of it which is self-respect, attaching to an ideal of character formed of other elements, and comparing itself constantly with its own ideal; an emotion which is noble in proportion to the nobility of the character constituting the ideal, and which shares its career. When this ideal is noble, self-respect becomes one kind of Honour, which is an essential characteristic of all excellence; the other kind of Honour being that belonging to emulation (§ 69. 4). This kind of pride consists, then, in exclusive cultivation of one's own ideal; but that ideal may include the cultivation of every virtue. Towards others the conduct of the self-respecting man will be marked by a reserved benevolence, by scrupulous justice, by attentive delicacy and politeness. "There are proud men," says Landor, "of so much delicacy that it almost conceals their pride, and perfectly excuses it." Pericles and Aspasia, cxii. This kind of pride I should call self-respect. The two kinds of pride must therefore be carefully distinguished, and that only which is the passion of self-isolation denied entrance into the system of virtues.

3. The combination of the irascible emotions with the better kind of pride has been touched upon in § 68. 4; they will also combine with the worse kind of pride, the tendency to proud self-isolation. The resulting disposition is then morose, sullen, sulky, a disposition too well known by its name to require description. The framework of this compound emotion, which, since it is a compound one, is already a habit and disposition of character, is distinguished by the representation of some unwarranted intrusion

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or encroachment on the rights of the person feeling sullen; of some intrusion on his self-isolating position. Take away the self-isolation, or take away the irascibility, either of the two elements of the compound emotion, and the emotion loses its peculiar character which we call sullenness or sulkiness.

4. It was said in § 30. 2, ad fin. that the emotion which arises in reflection on self alone was the most deeply rooted of all the reflective emotions, the staple and basis of the character, upon which all others might be conceived as engrafted. Nothing is more true; unless this emotion is strong, there can be no strength of character; it is the fountain-head of moral, that is, of reflective life, the emotion which is inseparable from reflection on self or self-consciousness; the source of de facto energy, as justice is of de jure validity. But, as we have seen, it is parted immediately into two streams, pride and self-respect, with the honour which belongs to each, and which is again different from the honour of emulation. The two characters, based respectively upon pride and upon self-respect, or which draw their life from these opposite streams, may be considered as dividing the world of character between them. The proud man is self-centred, the man of self-respect submits to revolve, as it were, round the centre of the universe, and to live his life as a part in a vast whole. The opposition between the two is the opposition between self-will and willing submission to universal laws. The latter alone is fully compatible with habits founded on the sense of justice and the moral law.

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§ 71. Perhaps we ought not to omit a type or rather a class of characters which forms a prominent portion of mankind, but one not perhaps so numerous

as usually supposed, the pleasure-seekers as they are commonly called. The types already mentioned seem to exclude these, or at least to furnish no emotional foundation for them; and yet we have now gone through all the groups of reflective emotion, except those only which are imaginative as well as reflective. The fact seems to be that the class in question is a residuum; consisting of those persons who have no reflective emotion sufficiently strong to lead them into a special direction of energy, and mould their character into a special type. They are left, then, to the direction given by the preponderance of the direct emotions or of the bodily organisation, and of the pleasures which belong to their exercise or activity. They are both intellectually and emotionally sluggish; they require the stimulation of novelty in sights and sounds. They rest in wonder and curiosity, without the logical instinct. Good-tempered they often are, but incapable of lasting passion. Their characteristic is that they always want amusement; indeed amusement-seekers would be the best name for them as a class. Now we are all amusement-seekers at times; and those who never are so must have something morbid in their character; but never to want or seek anything else is a disease of a worse kind, a sort of original and incurable feebleness of mental constitution. It is clear that this type of character cannot claim any inherent promise of permanence from the interest which it has for desire, or as an object of volition, since its characteristic is, that volition does not rise to intensity in any of the objects or emotions which it embraces.

§ 72. 1. The classification of the types of character which are founded on the reflective emotions,

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not imaginative as well as reflective, being now complete, let us cast a glance back over them all generally, and consider in what way the emotions constituting these several types of character are subordinated to, and taken up into, the emotions of justice and the love of duty which constitute the highest and most central type. It is by no means an idle enquiry, what feelings and actions will combine with the moral sense, and what will not; as some might perhaps maintain, on the ground that all feelings are facts of consciousness, and have their causes and conditions in the physical functions of the organism, thus eliminating all strictly speaking *de jure* considerations from ethic, and leaving only *de facto* considerations. Yet even such persons, since they cannot overlook the facts of choice between pleasures, of procuring some in preference to others, of avoiding pains, and of instituting courses of conduct calculated for these ends, must in fact bring a certain kind of *de jure* considerations into the enquiry, only without including in them that particular pleasure which belongs to the moral sense; a pleasure which their mental analysis has either failed to reveal to them, or revealed as a sentiment founded solely on erroneous, perhaps theological, opinions, and destined to vanish with them. In this latter view the sense of moral right and wrong would appear to them as something "absolute" or ontological, and its claim to obedience as empty as its source fictitious. The most logical of such a school would therefore abstain from entering into any consideration of moral right or wrong; prudence or imprudence, certainly of a high order, as prudence for self or for others, is all that they would predicate

of any person or conduct. Even such praise and blame as this would be to them valid only as a fact, that is, because they are naturally impelled to give it or withhold it, just as they are naturally led to like and to dislike; and thus differences of judgment become ultimately, on this view, mere matters of taste, in which no man can judge for another. This view is incompatible with the discovery by analysis of a specific feeling founded on justice, the moral sense. All *de jure* considerations have their source in this specific feeling, which exists also *de facto*, as other feelings also do which either will or will not combine with it. This combination or non-combination with the moral sense is what makes actions and feelings morally right or wrong, and constitutes the meaning of the terms moral good and evil. If there is no moral good and no moral evil, there is no moral sense with its specific feeling of validity; but that there is such a specific feeling the analysis in Chapter ii. has sufficiently shown. The combination of other feelings with this is their moral justification. The question then is, in what way does this combination take place.

2. The process is one of redintegration, and consists in holding together, either spontaneously or voluntarily, the total emotion and its framework, so as to see whether the latter has that equality in its parts which is the object of the emotion of justice. If it has, then the same framework is common both to the emotion of justice and to that emotion which is in question. We may feel this spontaneously or habitually, and then we are said to entertain habitually just and right feelings; or we may test it voluntarily, and then the process is one of reasoning.

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The more intense an emotion is, the less are we able to analyse its framework to discover its justice or equality. The movement which supports it in the brain is then energetic or violent, and the lines of the framework faint. Its connection with other objects or frameworks also is faint by the same rule; that is, the movements which support the formal element are less strong than those which support the emotional. The emotion may in this case be just, but we cannot test its justice. Only with the gradual return to energy in the movement supporting the form or framework, can the equality or inequality be discerned, and the emotion of justice arise. Anger, eros, love, envy, jealousy, pride, emulation, covetousness, and so on, may all be so intense as to obliterate the framework, and prevent its justice or injustice from appearing in consciousness. The return to vividness of the framework, and the production of other objects in redintegration, as means or as consequences of the object in immediate view, can only proceed *pari passu* with the decrease in intensity of the emotion pervading this immediate object. This is the phenomenon of reasoning calming the passions; and the habit of reasoning, of increasing the energy of the movements supporting frameworks, in cases of strong emotion, may be strengthened by exercise, so as to make the emotions themselves suggest the desire for reasoning on them, and this desire increase into a volition sufficiently powerful to bring the framework into prominence at the expense of the emotion.

3. There are three ways which the reasoning may take on the overcoming or the subsidence of the emotion. If it proceeds to analysing the content of its

framework, it is a mode of teleological reasoning, and the first judgment which it passes is one of the justice or injustice, the goodness or badness of its object, as an object of the original emotion. Or it may take the direction of effective reasoning, in order to discover facts connected with the framework, either as means to procure or avoid it, or as consequences pleasant or unpleasant. The latter in both its branches is prudence or prudential reasoning; the former alone is moral, being employed to discover the ultimate nature of the emotion and its framework. Only that type of character which is founded on the love of duty will habitually and easily take the first road, or take it as the indispensable preliminary of the second, the mode of prudential reasoning. But this does not alter the fact that it is right to test emotion and conduct in this way, or that justice is the ground of moral goodness. The course is not right because it is taken by this type of character, but this type of character is good because it takes a course commanded by the love of duty. If either of the two other directions are taken, of reasoning to discover either means or consequences of a certain feeling or action, the question occurs again as to these, whether they are in accordance with justice and the moral sense; and it may happen that either the means or the consequences may be forbidden, while the action itself is permitted, by the moral sense, or that they may be permitted while the action is forbidden.

4. Three classes of elements contribute to the development of character, and combine to produce and govern it. These are, first, the external circumstances and events of life, the persons with whom one comes in contact, their feelings and actions, the

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customs and laws of society, and so on ; secondly, the physical changes owing to advancing age, the increase, culmination, and gradual decrease in intensity, of the movements supporting the emotional element in emotions and passions, and the corresponding changes in the redintegration of the frameworks of those emotions and passions, which tend towards the fixation of habits of thought and feeling as the time of life advances ; thirdly, the innate structure of the character itself, and the force of volition, the direction of which depends upon that structure, and which reacts upon the two former groups of contributing elements. The first group is infinitely various, and different for every individual ; its importance for him can hardly be overrated ; an accident as it is called may change not only his whole course of life,* but also the development of his character itself, so as to make him a very different man from what he would otherwise have been. The importance of this change in the individual, and generally of the individual himself, to the whole course of the world's affairs, and to the characters of those whom he may influence, is another thing ; and there are two much debated questions, first, as to the amount and importance of the influence which accidental changes in circumstances and events, and secondly, as to that which personal individual character and action, exert over the course of the world's history or over mankind at large. The second group is the same, in kind, for every man, the changes due to advancing age affect all men alike, though they are modified differently by the reaction of the individual and his physical structure. The third group we have already been employed in analysing. From

our present point of view, therefore, the second and third groups constitute the normal development of the character, while the first group, consisting of the variable circumstances of life, are the deflecting element or influence, which tends to make the life and the character different from what it would be if these circumstances flowed in an even tide, the same for all men and all periods of life. It is the normal development of character in advancing age with which we are immediately engaged, abstraction made from the deflecting influence of extraordinary circumstances and events.

5. Yet it is of course impossible to eliminate altogether the first group of contributing elements. All that we can do is to suppose them acting regularly and each in its turn upon the character, so that the individual has all his emotions called into play from time to time, and has experience of the joys and the sorrows which spring from each, either from their satisfaction or from their disappointment. All passions are painful when they are disappointed; for instance, love remaining while we feel the gradually increasing indifference towards us of the person loved; or anger and revenge when unsatisfied; the emotions and passions of comparison, when other persons triumph in our humiliation, as in insult and contumely; some passions are in a manner painful and uneasy even in their satisfaction, as anger and malice. Such joys and such sorrows as spring from the satisfaction or disappointment of emotions and passions are what is often meant by experience of life; and this we must suppose present in some full and regular measure, in order to imagine to ourselves the normal course of the development of character,

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such as it is produced by the advance of age in combination with the original cerebral structure of the individual.

6. Supposing thus everything to be normal, all the three groups of contributing elements to be active in a certain normal proportion, is there any general law discoverable, to which the course of development conforms, and which is the expression of it? The answer results from the foregoing analysis; there is such a law and such a course; and it depends upon the difference in action between the emotional element and its representational framework, and between the physical nerve movements which respectively support them. The emotions, supported by movements which have their well-springs or centres in different parts of the cerebrum (as we have been led to imagine them), change in degree of intensity, and in the amount of framework which they will pervade, in accordance with the energy of these nerve movements, which are under the immediate influence of age or time of life, first increasing then decreasing in intensity. They are fixed and intensified by indulgence and habit; but they do not change in kind except so far as they are modified, each in its own way, in accordance with the changes of the representational framework which they pervade in the course of reintegration. The representational framework on the contrary, though equally subject to the influence of the energy of the nerve movements which support it, changes in the kind of its content with the increase of knowledge and experience. Its changes constitute a continual elaboration of organically constructed imagery, which receives the pervading emotions into itself. The formal element of this frame-

work is the condition of its elaboration and organic construction. The framework constitutes what we may call man's knowledge, the emotion man's nature; to adopt a profound distinction of Mr. Ruskin's. Accordingly the changes in knowledge make a comparatively rapid, those in emotion a comparatively slow progress. The changes in knowledge, if for the better, that is, if they have the harmony which is truth, are never lost; but are preserved not only for the life of the individual but, by means of oral and written communication, for the life of the race. Those in emotion, except such slow modifications in it as are produced by the changes in knowledge, depend upon the physical or nerve development alone, so as to be directly subject to the influence of age during the life of the individual, and incapable of being communicated to others, or to succeeding generations. The slow development indeed of the cerebral organism, including its property of hereditary transmission, carries with it the development and the transmission of emotion as a part of itself; but the development of knowledge is enabled to outstrip both, by having its particular frameworks successively fixed and destroyed, each being the means by which, and the material out of which, a succeeding one is formed. Yet there is also, throughout this formation, a part or strain which is permanent, and of slow but permanent growth, corresponding to the hereditarily transmitted emotional nature, and itself capable of hereditary transmission; I mean the logical forms of reasoning itself, and the slowly developed system of general abstract conceptions which are applicable to any new or changing object-matter of knowledge. The degrees of energy again, both in

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external action and volition, follow the same law as the emotions. They depend upon the energy of the movements in the nervous organism, and not upon the stage of elaboration which has been attained in the knowledge. Every generation apparently begins life at the same point of development, both in emotion and strength of will, as the preceding generation. There is no doubt some difference, but it is so small as only to become visible when we include a long series of generations in our view; and even then perhaps it is visible only in respect of emotion, and not in respect of strength of will. This difference between emotion and framework, man's nature and man's knowledge, which is seen clearly in the field of history, has its source in every individual who contributes to make history, and is to be traced in him by a careful analysis.

7. This being the general and constant relation between emotion and framework, and between the modes of their development, it is clear that a great and constant influence must be exerted by the framework over the emotion, in consequence of its continually progressive elaboration of structure, by which it becomes more complete and more harmonious. The pleasure of harmonising its parts, of introducing equal correspondences between them, both statically and dynamically, of making means correspond to end, theory to practice, reward to merit, punishment to fault, harvest to labour, career to ambition, and so on, is the motive of all this structural elaboration of framework so far as it is voluntary and not spontaneous, and practical rather than speculative. The formal element which is contained in the framework of images, with the pleasure of equality, the pain of

inequality, which are inherent in it, is the ground of the organic harmony which is both spontaneously and voluntarily produced in its constantly growing structure. Hence, when we reflect upon past experience of life, the tendency always is to approve and cultivate those feelings which have a career before them, and those most the career of which is the longest, the most free from contradictions in itself, and the least exposed to obstacles from other feelings or external circumstances. A career is the imagined correspondence of the end to the beginning, the imagined completion and crown of a course of feeling, thought, or action. It has been shown in many instances how essential to continuance in any action is the imagination of such a career. Indeed we usually think any one senseless who perseveres in actions before which there is no career. Whenever a man does so, it is because he is either really senseless or else mastered for the time being by emotion or passion, a fact which entirely confirms our analysis.

8. Now we cannot teach or implant emotions not implanted by nature, but only cultivate what nature has implanted. Up to a certain point perhaps they may be increased in intensity by habit and indulgence, and by desuetude of other and particularly of the opposite emotions. To what extent this is possible is doubtful. But a natural deficiency in any of the cardinal emotions cannot be supplied, a natural redundance cannot be annihilated, by culture. Characters which are originally framed to feel very intensely either love, hatred, ambition or rivalry, pride or love of duty, will always strongly retain those tendencies. This is matter of daily experience. The explanation is, that these are emotional elements which

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depend on original cerebral structure and function. But the representational frameworks in which these are cast are moulded by self-education, and to some extent modify the emotional elements pervading them. According to its capacities for a career, every emotion can be taken up into justice with less loss of its distinguishing emotional feeling. The several capacities of the several emotions for a career have been given above. Love and the love of duty have alone an infinite career before them; they alone perfectly fulfil and more than fulfil the demands of justice. Hence, where they exist strongly by nature they need lose nothing of their intensity by education. But where they are deficient by nature they cannot be produced by education. The love of justice may be increased by culture, for this is an emotion attached directly to the formal element, and for that reason is the standard or rather the framework into which all other emotions must be cast or reduced. It grows in intensity by habit, like the rest, and its pleasure increases with its dominion; but it is very different from the love of duty and from love itself, and the education which makes us lovers of justice cannot give that special tinge of passionate ardour which their names connote. Similar is the case of the antipathetic emotions and passions, those of comparison, and that of pride. The tendency to these is original and cannot be either implanted or uprooted by culture, however much we may reflect upon the insufficiency, the contradictions, the necessary incompleteness, of these passions. All we can do, and this is what we do naturally, is to transmute them into those forms which are their justice, into indignation, chivalrous rivalry, personal honour. But if the emo-

tions are strong by nature, they will retain, even in their transformation, the passionate ardour of that special kind which they originally had.

9. The influence of age is twofold. Up to the prime of life, the increasing vigour of all physical movements both increases the intensity of the emotion and urges forward the construction of the framework; but the predominant emotion sets the end or purpose of the construction, and moulds it in accordance with its own nature. We reason vigorously, it is true, but, since the predominant emotion guides us, we reason speculatively and effectively, and act immanently and transeuntly, more than we reason teleologically. The predominant emotion with its desired scope and career is to us unquestioned, an absolute end; and the framework, with the reasoning powers which construct it, are to us as means, dominated by the emotion. But when the prime of life is passed, and the vigour of physical movements gradually decreases, the framework and the movements which support it assume by degrees a more important position towards the emotional element. The slow but continuous growth of knowledge, embodied in and depending on movements which are habitual, and from their interconnection with each other mutually supporting and promoting, becomes now a match for the passions and emotions, bound to physical movements which decrease in vigour without being consolidated by habit and interconnection. Hence declining life aids the process of transmuting all emotions and passions into the mould of justice, by softening their intensity; until at last upon the threshold of death in extreme old age the last spark of their fire is extinguished. The normal course of

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the development of character is therefore to subordinate the emotion to its framework, and, in so doing, to the law of that framework, which is harmony, equipoise, and justice.

“Poi nella quarta parte della vita
A Dio si rimarita,
Contemplando la fine che l’aspetta ;
E benedice li tempi passati.”

§ 73.

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§ 73. 1. There are two types of character still remaining to be examined, the poetic and the religious. I have postponed them to the enquiry into the normal course of development of character because, though original and implanted by nature in the cerebral structure and functions, they are also compound, springing from two natural sources not from one only, and therefore the knowledge of the course of development of character throws light upon their genesis. These types of character are the two branches of what may be called the imaginative tendency, which is never seen pure, but always appears as imagination of this or that object-matter. Now all imagination is imagination of a career, to idealise anything in imagination is to imagine an infinite career of perfection for it. Hence love and the love of duty, being the emotions which have an infinite career before them, are those which form one branch of reflective imagination; these original emotions are one source, and the naturally active disposition of intellect and emotion is the other, which in combination form the religious type of character. On the other hand, any emotion whatever may be combined with the imaginative disposition; and whatever emotion is so combined, without being so strong and absorbing as to hinder the free play of the in-

tellectual powers, becomes from that circumstance a mode of poetry. But the intellect must have no other end in view than its own satisfaction in this free play of its powers; otherwise their exercise is one of speculative or effective reasoning, not of teleological or poetical. Emotions so treated become æsthetic emotions, their beauty or sublimity is brought out in the proportions of the formal element which their frameworks contain. Hence all emotions generally and alike are the object-matter of poetry; and poetry is the completion by idealisation of these emotions, thus become æsthetic, and of their frameworks. Hence not only is this division into religion and poetry exhaustive of all ideal reflective imagination, but its line of division coincides with that between what is infinitely perfect and beautiful and what is also, in addition to this, infinitely and eternally true.

2. The poetical type of character admits of endless and most minute varieties; every shade of emotion has its corresponding poetry. Infinitely numerous degrees of intensity also, and infinitely numerous modes or proportions in the combination of intellect and feeling, are to be found in it. Two things however must here be carefully distinguished. Both religion and poetry have their false pretenders and simulators; the simulator of poetical imagination is sentimentalism. When an emotion is dwelt on for its own pleasure, as a pleasure of enjoyment and not of admiration, and imagination is occupied only in enforcing this pleasure of emotion, or in finding new situations and circumstances so as to enhance it by freshness or by contrast, then there is no activity of æsthetic emotion, and consequently no poetic ima-

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gination. Dreams and reveries usually constitute the pleasures of a character of this type, which is also then of a sluggish not of an active disposition, and is most properly distinguished from the imaginative character as one of dreamy sentiment. Poetical imagination on the contrary is active, æsthetic, consisting of intellect in equal proportion with emotion; and however soft may be the images in which most pleasure is taken, the character of the poet is masculine, intellectual, and vigorous. Sentimentalism is the effeminate luxury of emotion; poetic imagination one of its most bracing exercises.

3. Hardly any man is without poetic imagination of some kind and in some degree; but only those are usually called poets who devote themselves to the expression of this imagination by means of some form of art. All action springing from emotion has its shade of emotion peculiar to it, attached to the action itself, and differing somewhat from the emotion out of which the action springs. The expression of emotion or of emotion and thought together, when guided by volition, is transeunt action combined with effective reasoning; the reasoning is about the means for the perfect expression of the emotion, and for the attainment of the peculiar pleasure attached to the expression. Language offers the readiest and the most complete material or instrument of such expression; but gesture and muscular movements generally, visible objects, and audible sounds, alike furnish such materials or instruments. The differentiation of emotion in actions expressive of feeling is not confined to poetry, but extends to all cases of expression; for instance, striking a sudden blow, taking a sudden leap, greeting friends by shaking hands, drinking

healths, erecting triumphal arches, wearing holiday dresses, and so on. In all these cases the feeling expressed by the action is heightened and differentiated by the act, and at the moment of its completion. The emotion is, as it were, gathered up to a single point and enforced upon the actors by their action. The action by itself becomes in this way symbolic, symbolic of the feeling it expresses. The refrain in songs is of this nature, and so also is the act of singing itself, when it comes like that of Goethe's Harper,

“ Ich singe wie der Vogel singt
 Der in den Zweigen wohnt,
 Das Lied das aus der Kehle dringt
 Ist Lohn der reichlich lohnet.”

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So also are all public religious ceremonies, and religious acts, prayer for instance, and the celebration of the Lord's Supper among Christians. In all these the emotion is heightened and enforced in the expression of it. In religion these acts of expression constitute the cultus, the acts of worship and service; they are to the religious emotions what poetry is to poetical imagination and its emotions. Poetry as an art is nothing else than the systematic elaboration of such modes of expression for the poetic emotions; but, just as there may be a dead cultus in religion, if it is divorced from the emotions which are its spirit, so also in poetry all modes and forms of expression, however choice, are lifeless and cold, unless they spring fresh and glowing from the heart of the composer.

4. It must be remembered too that, like all reasoning processes which spring from emotion, the reasoning which determines the expression in poetry

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calms the emotion which it expresses. The nerve force which supported the emotion is converted into a force supporting the reintegration of the framework; as force supporting the emotional element it is exhausted, and, when it no longer exists as motive power of the reasoning, supporting the reintegration of the framework, there will follow a reaction, as it is called; that is, the emotion will be felt with less intensity than ordinary, and perhaps so much the less as the previous tension exceeded the ordinary limit.

5. It was the different kinds of poetry that were distinguished in § 43, and classified by their springing from two modes of poetical imagination, the synthetic and the analytic. The favourite employment of these two modes is also that which distinguishes the poetic character into two main types; and this must now be shown by applying that distinction of method on the large, as before on the small, scale, by considering the structure of poems as wholes, to whichever of the three kinds, descriptive, lyrical, or dramatic, they may belong. Not the working of the poet's mind in single passages, but his mode of treatment of a whole subject, in producing a whole poem, is now to be considered.

6. The synthetic and analytic movements, both in single passages and in whole poems, are the offspring respectively of the two intellectual tendencies distinguished in § 63, the accumulative and the constructive. For poetical emotion is the great end and mainspring of the art of poetry, common to all its kinds; and the mode in which this emotion is embodied and realised in composition depends, not on differences in the emotion itself, but on differences in

the intellectual processes in which it is involved and by which it is made apparent.

7. Poetical imagination is accordingly found to fall into two main channels; the one, founded on the synthetic and accumulative modes of reasoning, is the expression of emotion, and may perhaps be called profusive imagination; the other, founded on the analytic and constructive modes, is the exhibition of emotion, and may perhaps be called organic imagination. The first proceeds, in treating a whole subject, from the parts to a whole which they compose, the beauty of the whole being of less importance in its eyes than the impressiveness of the parts; the second proceeds from the whole to its parts, the impressiveness of which singly is of less importance than the beauty of the whole. The first evolves, the second organises, a poem. The consummate art of the first consists in producing a beautiful and organic whole by the method of evolution, as for instance in Shakespeare; that of the second in touching the chords of emotion in the details by the method of organisation, as in Æschylus.

8. The life of modern Europe is distinguished from that of ancient Greece and Rome by the greater distinctness with which we feel the import of the reflective emotions, especially those of eros, love, and religion; owing chiefly though not exclusively, in the first and second cases, to the greater freedom and equality between the sexes, in the third to Christianity. The personality of individuals, in all its newly distinguished richness and vividness, now required expression, or at least satisfaction from a similar expression on the part of others. Hence ancient and modern poetry, which in their earliest

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stage were apparently similar, being the simple description in verse of the deeds of gods and heroes, have taken opposite courses in attaining their full development. The all-importance of individual emotion to the moderns made its expression the one indispensable requisite of poetry, and imprinted on their imagination its profusive character; the comparative predominance of the intellect over the emotion among the ancients directed their poetical elaboration of the same themes into the channel of organic imagination.

9. Take any masterpiece of modern 'poetry not didactic, and not governed by direct imitation of the Greek, and its interest will, as a rule, be found to consist in some particular, concrete, emotions or passions, as they are felt by individuals, and to have no higher or determining *τέλος* beyond these. Take on the other hand a masterpiece of Greek or Roman antiquity, and the particular, concrete, emotions of individuals will be found to be subordinate to some general, abstract, theme of the poem or drama, and it will appear that the chief or governing aim of the poet is to exhibit this, not to express those. They become means by which the all-important abstract theme is exhibited and illustrated; as, for instance, the conflict of divine and human laws in the *Antigone*. Some great portion of human life and human destiny, with the passions and emotions which belong to it, is grasped from above and brought, statically as we may call it, in one great picture before the mental eye. But in modern art no abstract but an empirical portion of human life is taken from the whole, and this is exhibited in its actual complication of motives, and difference of characters, and evolution

of events; the spectator or the reader demanding at every moment some striking situation, or some vivid expression of feeling. An instance from antiquity will render this contrast sufficiently plain.

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10. The theme of the so called Marriage of Peleus and Thetis of Catullus, a poem of unsurpassed beauty and grandeur, is the glory of marriage, idealised by means of an instance in which all the circumstances of happiness are united, and which is invested with all the imagined glories of the heroic age. Those who consider the subject of the poem to be merely the marriage of Peleus and Thetis are at a loss to account for the disproportionate length of the episode, as it then appears, the story of Theseus and Ariadne. But the truth is, that the theme of the poem, the glory of marriage, is exhibited by the two contrasted stories, which then properly assume almost equal importance. Thus, it is the very marriage bed of Peleus and Thetis which is covered with the tapestry exhibiting the story of Ariadne:

“Talibus amplifice vestis decorata figuris
Pulvinar complexa suo velabat amictu.”

Thetis is given in marriage by Jupiter himself; Ariadne deserts her father's home for Theseus. The first union receives its crown in the birth of an heroic son, Achilles; the inconstancy of mind which leads Theseus to desert Ariadne, in the second, is the cause of his own father's death:

“Sed quali solam Theseus me mente reliquit,
Tali mente, deæ, funestet seque suosque.”

Again, the circumstance that the union of Peleus and Thetis was an union between a mortal and an immortal finds its counterpart in the advent of Bacchus.

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But though old wounds may be healed, there is no future in the picture; while for Peleus and Thetis the song of the Parcæ weaves into the fruition of the present the anticipated fame of their son. Yet not for a moment is the poem didactic; it has no 'moral;' it does not recommend, it exhibits and idealises, marriage. The so called 'moral,' of which the moderns are so fond, is one means of giving unity to works composed on the modern principle, unity being their great desideratum. The ancients could dispense with so dangerous an instrument.

11. Even in lyrical poems the same generalising tendency is apparent, in the classical mode of treating them. The Marriage Ode of Junia and Mallius, in Catullus, beginning "Collis o Heliconiei," is an instance. Not only is this apparent in the artistic oppositional arrangement of the different sections of the ode, as they are brought out in the edition given by my friend, Mr. Robinson Ellis; but the feelings expressed are those essentially inherent in the circumstance of civilised marriage, in whatever rites it is clothed and celebrated, and the ode is one appropriate to the subject at all times and places, of permanent not transitory interest.

12. Turning to the opposite or modern mode of poetical composition, let us take Shelley's Prometheus Unbound as an instance. Though it is dramatic in form, a form which lends itself most easily to the organic mode, it is a lyric rather than a drama, the imagination is profusive throughout. It is Shelley expressing, through the mouthpiece of his characters, his own intense feeling of the divinity of love, his triumphant anticipation of its final and eternal victory over tyranny and fear. Again, though the theme is

thus general, as well as the form dramatic, yet it is embodied in a particular history developed by particular persons; a general subject is particularised, not, as in Catullus, a particular one generalised. Both the circumstances distinguishing modern from classic art are found here, the imagination profusive, the interest particular.

13. Sometimes however, when the poet leans to the critical and organic mode of thought, only one of these circumstances is found in his work. "The Ring and the Book" of Mr. Browning is an instance. The method here is organic, consisting in the exhibiting the history under different aspects, as it is related by the different actors in it. Each of the different sections of the poem is like a distinct mass of building in architecture, which in relation with the rest contributes to compose a well-proportioned and harmonious whole. But the interest is entirely particular, centred in the special characters, and in the special history which they enact. It is a wonderful feature in the art of this poem, that each person, while throwing a new light on the action, eo ipso displays his own character as well, thus producing a Shakespearian effect by original and non-Shakespearian means.

14. Finally let us take an instance from a modern, who of all moderns stands nearest to the Greeks, in point both of organic and constructive tendency and of generality in choice of theme. Goethe's *Faust* is general in its theme, which is, as it seems to me, the antagonism between action and enjoyment in the aims of human life. *Faust* begins with action, the self-denying laborious ambition of the student, bent on the rewards of knowledge. The counter ambition of enjoyment, as summed up in love, supplies the

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framework of the rest of the First Part, which seems, but only seems, to find its main theme in the history of Gretchen, because it ends with her salvation. But Faust is thus left undisposed of. In the Second Part he takes, as it were, an entirely new start in life, and, as Goethe himself has told us, necessarily on a higher or larger field. But here again it is the same antagonism between the same two ambitions, action and enjoyment, which is his fate; and he too finally receives his salvation in consequence of his having acted and hoped to the end:

“ Gerettet ist das edle Glied
Der Geisterwelt vom Bösen:
Wer immer strebend sich bemüht,
Den können wir erlösen.”

But here too, notwithstanding the theme being general and the form dramatic, and notwithstanding that which distinguishes it from the Prometheus Unbound, the mode of thought being critical and not lyrical, the exhibition of the subject being aimed at and not the outpouring of the poet's personal feeling,—still there remains the essentially modern characteristic that the theme, though general, is particularised, and the interest allowed to attach to the persons, actions, and characters exhibited, and to the adventures which befall them, in exclusion to that attaching to the general features of which they are types and instances. In the First Part this takes place by the absorbing interest of the story of Faust and Gretchen, in the Second Part by the superabundant imagery, and motley train of persons and things, with which Faust is surrounded.

15. Religion agrees with poetry in having an art of expression, which art is the cultus. But it differs

from poetry in this, that, while fact and fiction are entirely indifferent to poetry, only* truth of fact and of reasoning is contained in religion. The object or framework of the idealised religious emotions is necessarily represented as eternally true and real. But since these emotions are deeply interesting to the religious character, he will be constantly reasoning about them either speculatively or practically, for all emotion stimulates thought; and since at the same time any framework which he forms from time to time, being dependent on the degree of his intellectual knowledge, must necessarily fall infinitely short of ideal truth, his speculations about that framework must be both erroneous and numerous. The nature of that great object or framework, which for us is a Person as already said, man's relations to him, and his dealings with man, will be variously conceived; and every conception which becomes current from time to time will be pervaded by the religious emotion, and will form part of religion. Whatever in these speculations is conceived as erroneous is discarded from the religious creed as superstition; and what is superstition to one man is religion to another. An extreme, though not necessarily a gross, form of superstition is when the possibility of some transient article of creed being superstition is denied, for this is an attempt to make the finite and the transient into the infinite and the eternal. Religion is founded in the nature of man, not in his knowledge, in the permanent emotion pervading transitory frameworks. There is however a limit to the variations of the frameworks, for, since religious emotion is always reflective, the framework must always be a Person. The worship of inanimate objects is

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no exception, but on the contrary furnishes the most striking instances of the law; for the fetish is personified in imagination before it is worshipped, and, in the next stage, where the stars, or sun, or tree, or river, are found to be inanimate, and the person or god separated from them, it is the person and not the star which remains as the object of the religion. The religion of Comtian Positivism also is no exception to the general law; "Le Vrai Grand Etre" or "l'Humanité" is obviously personal in the required sense of the term; though the fact that it is an invention and not a discovery; a form devised purposely in which to clothe the religious emotion, is a strong argument against its truth. Nor do I see how innovations in religion, if they are true, can ever be anything else than discoveries of that which men have been previously worshipping and previously feeling without knowing it, that is, under forms which were its inadequate expression. Superstition simulates religion as sentimentalism simulates poetic imagination. The two cases resemble each other also in this, that they are both a weakness of the mind and not a strength; sentimentalism is a weakness of the intellectual activity, superstition of the emotional; sentimentalism rests in the enjoyment of given emotions, superstition in the intellectual support given to the religious emotions by accustomed frameworks; its emotion cannot stand alone, but needs the conceptions which have become habitual to it. The most intensely religious men have the least needed such habitual conceptions, have most freely declared their transitory and non-religious nature, as, for instance, Jesus of Nazareth and St. Paul. When a character is of the religious type, but has the emotional ele-

ment less developed than the intellectual, while the habit of the intellect is accumulative rather than constructive, the resulting character is that of the fanatic or the persecutor. Examples of great ability and acuteness in effective reasoning are frequent among religious men of this type.

16. The ill-balanced character of the religious type is often at variance with the dictates of justice; he errs in practice by the injustice of making into a law for others observances which are dictated to him by his conscience, and which have no validity except for those by whose conscience they are dictated. Justice is an universally applicable standard of right and wrong, and transgression of it cannot be re-justified on the ground of a natural and original emotion, even though that emotion be alleged to be the moral sense or the religious emotion of the individual. A moral sense in contradiction to justice is an impossibility, being a contradiction, for the moral sense is love and justice combined. The question therefore which can alone be debated between men in doubtful cases is this,—what the dictates of justice truly are, and not what can be approved to any individual's moral sense; not what he thinks just before debate, but what both parties think just after debate. The reason of this is plain. Both according to our analysis in §§ 31-37, and according to every day experience, what a man does not think just he cannot think morally right or good in conscience; for justice is one of the two elements of the moral sense, and that which gives it its validity. But, since any one may be mistaken as to what is just, he may think a thing morally right which is in truth, though not suspected by him, unjust. He

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must act on his own, perhaps truly unjust, moral sense; and there is no contradiction in him, though he acts unjustly. The only contradiction is between his moral sense, with its merely apparent justice, and the moral sense of some other man, with its true justice, or justice as it truly is though not supported by the moral sense of any individual. All examination of the moral right or moral wrong of a feeling or an action is therefore examination into the justice of it; and the moral sense is determined by this examination, the examination not prejudged by the moral sense. See in reference to this point what Hegel says in his *Rechtsphilosophie* § 137, especially the sentence: "Was im wahrhaften Gewissen nicht unterschieden ist, ist aber unterscheidbar, und es ist die bestimmende Subjektivität des Wissens und Wollens, welche sich von dem wahrhaften Inhalte trennen, sich für sich setzen und denselben zu einer Form und Schein herabsetzen kann. Die Zweideutigkeit in Ansehung des Gewissens liegt daher darin, dass es in der Bedeutung jener Identität des subjektiven Wissens und Wollens und des wahrhaften Guten vorausgesetzt, und so als ein Heiliges behauptet und anerkannt wird, und ebenso als die nur subjektive Reflexion des Selbstbewusstseyns in sich, doch auf die Berechtigung Anspruch macht, welche jener Identität selbst nur vermöge ihres an und für sich gültigen vernünftigen Inhalts zukommt." See also his remarks against mere "subjective conviction," *Überzeugung*, as a criterion of moral right and wrong, in the same work § 140. e. Now although every man ought to act upon his own conviction of what is morally right, and thus conflict is unavoidable between opposite views of what is right, yet we have

the promise, in the common ground of justice, which flows from the formal element in consciousness, of ultimately approximating at least to an universal agreement; a promise which is also confirmed by the fact, that the emotions and passions of men have one and the same normal course of development, as was shown in the preceding §.

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17. The religious emotion is the idealisation of two emotional constituents, love and the love of duty, or of the moral sense in its fullest acceptation. These two constituents are both visible in the religious emotion, and form two subordinate types of the character,—the character which delights chiefly in love, and that which delights chiefly in obedience. The one loves God as a friend, almost as if he were an equal; the other venerates him as a king or as a judge; the one reposes in his fatherly affection, the other in his justice and his power. Yet in both cases alike the conception is of an ideal object, enclosed in no special form of space, not visible, not tangible, nor addressing himself to any sense, but to the emotions alone, the feelings which arise only in representation, and enduring not for any particular portion but for the infinity of time. Such is the imagination which belongs to the religious emotions; religion like poetry is compounded equally of emotion and of intellect, and in their equal union there is no weakness, but rather energy and power.

18. Whichever of the two forms, love or awe, predominates in religion, one circumstance is common to both and peculiar to them, a circumstance which proves the correctness of the analysis of religion here offered. It is the intimate union and communion between man and his God, an union which

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exists between no other persons whatever. Towards any other person, however dear, a man is always, in the deepest feelings, "himself alone," an isolated being; he can neither be sure that he communicates his own feeling, nor that he understands theirs, even though, a rare case, there should on both sides be a continual and strong wish to do so. To whom could he or dare he tell all he feels and at all times? But this intimate union or rather oneness can and often does exist between a man and God. This shows that God is his better self, his True Ego, idealised. Hence the omniscience of God, "unto whom all hearts are open, all desires known;" hence the fact that his "service is perfect freedom;" hence those phenomena which are summed up under the Christian phrase, the working of the Holy Spirit; hence the eternal readiness of God to forgive, but only on repentance; hence the terrors of the wrath of God, from which there is no escape; hence a man does not give up his individuality, nor become a slave, by the most unreserved submission to the will of God, but in relying on God is most effectually self-reliant.

19. It should be mentioned that this fact of isolation, which is here analysed into self-consciousness withheld from communicating its thoughts or feelings to others, and from comprehending theirs, is regarded as a necessary manifestation of a free and individual entity, the Ego, by those who hypostatise the self-consciousness or the will; for instance Hegel, *Rechtsphilosophie*, §§ 91, 92, 106, *Zusatz*. But such an Ego offers no explanation of the fact, however well it may seem to harmonise with it. The moral judgments of conscience are one form which this

isolation assumes, which Hegel mentions, in § 106. But what shows the correctness of the analysis here offered is, that the sense of isolation is not a fixed quantity or intensity, but increases with the intensity and the rarity of the feelings in which it arises; for instance, when we think of our own death, as in Pascal's "Je mourrai seul." Poets and philosophers who dwell most upon uncommon and intense emotions are spoken of as treading unapproachable mountain heights of poetry or philosophy;

"The solemn peaks but to the stars are known,
But to the stars, and the cold lunar beams:
Alone the sun arises, and alone
Spring the great streams."

It is the every-day love between man and woman that is described as one that cares not to walk

"With death and morning on the silver horns."

And, in the judgments of conscience, we fall back most readily upon the idea of responsibility to God alone, when we act from feelings which are most difficult of explanation, or in which we expect least sympathy from others.

20. As hardly any one is without some poetic imagination, so also hardly any one is without some religion. The same may be said also of the third domain in which mental activity is entirely an end in itself, that is, of philosophy properly so called. No one is entirely without the love of knowledge about those matters which he regards as the most important, and which have therefore the greatest interest for him. But, since the love of advancing in knowledge is very much weaker in most men than the pleasure of resting in a conception as already

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known and therefore true, the philosophy of most men consists in their religious creed, whatever it may be; and this creed serves them for a philosophy. Hence the antipathy of such men to philosophy itself in its genuine shape; and hence too the frequent misconception of the scope of philosophy, the notion that its chief business is to investigate the proofs of the existence and attributes of God, and other problems of what used to be called "natural religion."

21. It is now necessary to turn back and contemplate these two imaginative types in connection with the normal course of development of character. The point where reflective imagination begins is a point where the current of development of character ceases to flow in one undivided channel, and branches into two streams; or where, to use another metaphor, the trunk of the tree of life divides into two great upward-going boughs, religion being one, poetry the other. Now there is little fear but that religion will be able, both *de facto* and *de jure*, to bring into subordination all other emotions and tendencies of human nature taken alone; but its ability to do so with poetry, and with emotions which may be taken into durable alliance or incorporated with poetry, is not so evident. Poetry has all emotions for its field, and renders all ideal. But there is one emotion or rather passion, which is certainly not incompatible with the moral law, which is of immense extent and power, and which is always found incorporated with poetry, the passion of *eros*. Poetry, being the completion of the æsthetic emotions, has all the justification which can be derived from perfection of form in the frameworks of its imaginative emotions. It is then complete in itself, and asks no other justification.

Indeed the conception of justice, properly speaking, is alien to it. From lacking justice however between man and man, it has not the claim to govern life generally, to subordinate other emotions to those incorporated with itself from time to time, or to subordinate other types of character to the poetic type. But it may seem to be incapable of subordination itself to the religious type, to be in one word its independent rival. And, being allowed this independent position *de jure*, it may become from its great interest, and from its extent of domain over all the emotions, supreme *de facto*, although not *de jure*, over the religious type, and keep this from exerting even its natural influence. The prevalence of the poetically imaginative type of character, and of the laws which it would establish in society, might conceivably involve the elimination of the moral law of right and wrong, and the denial by some, the forgetting by others, that there was any such distinction. The emotion which was incorporated into poetry, or which it was the main purpose of poetry to glorify and promote, would then exclude and obliterate by its increased intensity the emotions of the moral sense.

22. The emotion which is most capable of entering into such an alliance with poetry, that is, of being carried up into such a powerful degree of æsthetic and emotional imagination, is no doubt that of eros. Other emotions and passions would come in along with it, but this would be the predominant emotion, coordinating and subordinating the rest. The contest between the rival forms of imagination, which has never slumbered in modern Europe, seems likely to be vigorously renewed in the present day, on oc-

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casion of the anarchy caused by the dissolution of old systems of legal morality. Were these systems the only antagonist in the field, the contest might be considered as already decided. But these systems have been reared upon a foundation, which they have indeed forgotten or mistaken, but which is nevertheless theirs, the foundation of the moral law, as it has been here attempted to analyse it. The moral law of conscience and of freedom will be an adversary of far greater weight than those laws or customs of authority, with which alone the champions of poetic emotion have seemed to others, or have supposed themselves, to have to do. Indeed it is not to be thought that any of these champions have supposed themselves adversaries of the moral law, but rather its vindicators and upholders, in upholding liberty against the restrictions of authority, custom, and law. Their antagonism to it consists not in an explicit denial of its content, but in the implicit denial contained in the assertion of liberty without theoretical limitation.

23. This contest between the rival claims of religion founded on the moral law and of poetic emotion seems to me to be the point upon which, in whatever forms it may be clothed, or whatever language may be held about it, the greater part of ethical questions, the greater part of practical controversy, will henceforward turn. We know that we are to be free; the critical question is, what shall be the law of our freedom. Is it to be a freedom of indulgence in some poetic emotion, or a freedom of self-command, imposing limits on poetic as well as on other emotion; is poetic imagination with the passions which it incorporates to become morally right and justified, which

it can only be by theoretical subsumption under, and practical submission to, the moral law of conscience, or, by refusing this subsumption and submission, to replace the moral law by its own non-moral emotion? This is the practical question to be solved practically by the most advanced nations, be they which they may, at the present time, the *de facto* supremacy of the moral law and religion founded on it, as against its rival the idealisation of the emotions generally, or indifferently, by poetic imagination; a question which in another shape is this, whether any *de jure* supremacy shall exist *de facto* at all. This is a question important in a very different way from that in which the question of Utilitarianism, or any theory of the general scope of ethic, is important. Supposing any such theory, as the utilitarian for instance, to be adopted, there yet remains the more immediately practical question to be answered, what mediate ends, what mediate commands, fill up its outline, and in what several degrees of precedence among themselves. On the utilitarian theory this question is to be determined by weighing against each other different kinds of happiness or pleasure; on the theory of a moral law, by the relations of different kinds of emotion to the law of conscience. But the contest between poetry and religion is one instance of such a balance between mediate ends or commands; an immediately practical question, demanding an answer from some theory or other, and manifesting the emptiness of whatever theory has no answer to give, drawn from its own principles.

24. The real forces, then, which are at work now, and will be more manifestly so from day to day, in the evolution of society, are three; 1st, the idea of

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religion founded on the moral law, of liberty which is the source of law; 2nd, the idea of imaginative pleasure unfettered by any law; 3rd, the idea of positive law, custom, and authority, as the source of morality. The two first are ideas of liberty, and alike opposed to the third; standing alike on the same ground, the conception of moral liberty being supreme. But upon this ground, and within these limits, they are opposed to each other, as tending the one to substitute licence for liberty, the other to maintain self-control against licence. This is the logic to which the analysis of feelings here given leads us, the mode in which it arranges for examination the phenomena of the conflict and evolution of characters in modern society. The position of civilisation at the present day is analogous to its position in Europe at the period of the Renaissance. A Reformation saved the church system not only in the north but also in the south of Europe from decay, in presence of the growing Humanism, as it has been called, of the time. The struggle between Humanism and Authority was prolonged by its decision being delayed. We are now living at a later stage of the same struggle, but with this difference from the Renaissance period, namely, with the conception, gradually acquired in the meantime, of fixed and universal laws of nature, to which all phenomena are subject, not only in the physical but also in the moral world.

25. These new forces are however, it must still be held, not such as to change the general direction, but only partially to modify the course, of the normal development of character, and consequently of society. The same causes, which assure the ulti-

mate supremacy of the moral law over other emotions, will probably assure it also over those imaginative ones which do not spring from the same source. The justice of poetry is simply consistency; the emotion adopted by imagination is the standard and limit of the justice; the enquiry whether this emotion is itself just towards other emotions, or towards other men, and the consequent testing of justice and arriving at truth in it, has no place in this mode of mental activity. If it had, this mode of mental activity would itself be or contain the moral law, would no longer be distinguished from that to which it is now opposed. The moral law, therefore, and the religion founded on it, while recognising the claims of the emotions which are bound up with poetic imagination to exert themselves, and the independence of poetic imagination itself, its autotely or right to have its End imposed solely by itself, yet imposes limits upon that exertion in two directions, and on two grounds, first, in its relations to other persons besides the person of the Subject imagining, second, in its relations to the moral law itself, which it is bound to preserve from the danger of being *de facto* weakened or stifled.

26. If the supremacy of the moral law could not maintain itself in the individual character, it certainly could not maintain itself in society; nor yet could it do so, were it only an exceptional case here and there, and not the great mass of mankind, in whose character the moral law were *suprême*. What then is meant by saying that the moral law is and ought to be supreme, in the individual character, over the tendencies which flow from poetic imagination? Let us suppose that *eros* is the passion which is allied

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with poetry. Now supremacy means not destruction or forbidding, but simply subordination, limitation, supplying a negative condition. It is not required that the two passions, eros and religion, shall be capable of existing in great strength, at the same moment, in the same mind, in order to prove that they are capable of combination, that religion does not refuse to combine with eros, but can subordinate without destroying it. If it were necessary to combine the two passions, while each was in full vigour, into a single complex state of consciousness in order to make them out compatible, they must be regarded as irreconcilable. But it is not the particular nature of the passions in question, it is the general incapacity of the mind, or of its nervous organism, to feel any two different passions strongly at the same time, which is the cause of this kind of incompatibility. This, therefore, is not the decisive circumstance; but on the contrary the decisive trial is when the passion of eros is *remembered* in moments of feeling the moral sense, or in moments of religion. The passion of eros thus remembered must be capable of approval by the moral sense, that is, must be capable of subsisting in consciousness without the emotion of remorse, or with that of good conscience; and so much of its accompaniments must be abandoned as cannot consist with this reflection.

27. The laws regulating external action and conduct, whether imposed by the individual upon himself, or by the concurrence of individuals upon society, must be the expression of the moral sense of the individual, or of the individuals in common, so acting as above described, and taking all circumstances, all impulses, and all tendencies, into account.

But since the mass of individuals never stand upon the same moral level as the greatest and best among them, the laws imposed by society never can be such as the best and greatest individual would impose upon himself, or upon society were it composed of his equals in moral matters. For them some greater legal restraint is needed, and they usually impose it more perseveringly than the moral reformer does, than those moral reformers at least who do not represent the principle of authority and custom. Their tendency is to allow insufficient liberty of action to those who draw their principles more directly from an inward source, whether it be from poetically or from religiously imaginative emotion. Here opens a field into which it is beyond the scope of the present work to enter. One thing only must be laid down as the result of the analysis hitherto conducted, namely, that only those restraints of law are morally justified which are recognised, dimly perhaps but yet undoubtingly, as good and right by the conscience of him on whom they are imposed; which are restraints therefore which he will make effort from within to obey and impose on his own will, and which are therefore regarded by him as aids to his own truer life. The law must be such that the persons on whom it is imposed shall never be able, in foro conscientiæ, to lay the blame of suffering its penalties on the injustice of the law, but must lay it on their own weakness and self-indulgence.

§ 74. 1. Difference of sex has been named in § 60 among the influences external to character; but this relates only to the actions, circumstances, and feelings, determined by the rest of the bodily organism, not by the organisation of the cerebral hemispheres.

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It accords with analogy to suppose that the difference of sex does not stop short here, but extends to the cerebral organisation and functions; in which case there will be differences of character natural and original to the two sexes. The foregoing analysis gives some additional support to this view, by means of the different tendencies it points out in character, to which the differences commonly observed in life between the modes of thought and feeling of men and of women may be referred. The phenomena, as commonly observed, would be explained if we suppose that in man the formal, in woman the material, element is most prominent; in man the representative framework, in woman the pervading emotion; this would be the general law or general fact, of which the remainder would be cases. The first minor fact depending upon this law is not less general in its range; it is that men are most ready at perceptions of justice, as compared to the other emotions with which justice or injustice is combined, while women are most readily struck with those other emotions in preference to justice. The charm of justice as such, or in the abstract, is rarely perceived by women. The same holds with respect to another contrast between the emotional and the intellectual, in the case of truth. Coleridge says (Table-Talk, Aug. 6, 1831) that he had known many women love the good for the good's sake, but rarely or never the true for the truth's sake, meaning thereby not veracity but truth in the strict sense of the term. The good is a general term for all ultimately pleasureable emotion.

2. We may trace the same fundamental difference in other groups of emotion. In love and eros women are both more affective and less regardful of

consequences than men. Hence arises, as will presently appear, the great charm of feminine modesty and reserve. Woman's pity, tenderness, sympathy, are proverbial. Again with regard to the antipathetic emotions, it is sometimes held that women are more unreasonable than men. Perhaps it would be true to say, that neither in love nor in hatred can they so easily make allowances for shortcomings of their friend or their enemy as men can, at least not such allowances as would be made from a comprehension of his character and position. But on the other hand they can pardon more readily without making such allowances, for this depends on a change in the emotion itself, not upon a judgment passed on its framework.

3. When we turn to the emotions which belong to the two groups of comparison and to that of reflection on self, we find them dominated by circumstances which belong chiefly if not entirely to the difference of general bodily organisation between the two sexes; which makes it difficult to determine whether anything is due to differences of character alone. Since men are by their general organisation more fitted for careers of public life and activity, upon success in which the domestic life depends, women naturally take a subordinate position; and the ways and thoughts and feelings of men in a certain manner limit their horizon. Men form a much larger part of the entire world of women than women of the world of men. Both sexes are gainers in consequence of this relation. For man is secured a home where he no longer has to combat with rivals, but can refresh himself after labour; for woman a field where her affective energies can be exercised

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without opposition. But this relation between the sexes immensely modifies the development of the emotions now in question, since the greater part of their objects are found in public and not in domestic life. The ambition of men and women is thus directed to widely different objects, without our being able to refer it to a cause originating in the character. Men form as it were the public of women, and women rival each other, not so much for excelling each other simply, as for excelling in those circumstances which are of importance in the eyes of men. The fundamental and distinctive characteristic of women is accordingly the desire of pleasing, which becomes a second nature, but the root of which nevertheless it is not possible to find distinctly in the character itself.

4. But, it may be objected, if the two features just mentioned, greater affectiveness and greater desire of pleasing, distinguish women in comparison with men, ought not women to be more demonstrative of these characteristics towards men, than men are towards women, whereas society shows the very reverse to be the case? For the custom of society is that, both in love and in attracting admiration of the opposite sex, it is men and not women who make the advances, and compete as it were for favour. The explanation which removes this objection will serve to show the correctness of the analysis already given. The general position of men in regard to women, stated at the beginning of the preceding paragraph, forbids women to put themselves forward or to make advances. For it may be laid down as a general rule that, in all matters of choice, of offering and accepting, the stronger party who has most to offer is the

one by whom the offer is made, because he feels that he has more to fall back upon if his offer is rejected, and his recognised independence saves him from the imputation of presumption. It is undignified and a want of modesty for the less independent person to put himself forward. This is seen between persons of the same sex in striking up acquaintances; it is always the person of higher standing who moves the first. Again, to take an instance from buying and selling, the buyer proposes to buy, and not the seller to sell. Sellers who hawk their wares or unduly advertise them render their wares suspected by that very act. A tradesman's dignity consists in awaiting the demand of the purchaser. The same sense of dignity and modesty renders it incumbent on women to await the advances of men, and put them to prove their merits; because men are richest in the careers of life open to them. But between married people, who are no longer strangers to each other, the laws which regulate the intercourse of strangers are abrogated, and the natural course of feelings has its full sway. Here takes place that change in the relations between man and woman, described by the indignant "Princess" in the verse,

"And play the slave to gain the tyranny."

The change is most real and important; but it is very far from being a change from slave to tyrant, or from tyrant to slave; rather it is a change which secures the freedom of both, a change from restraint to liberty.

5. Since the motives which render women retiring and undemonstrative towards men are of general force and applicability, and at the same time the cir-

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cumstances which bring them into action are due to general bodily organisation and not to the character alone, we may infer that, if those circumstances should be counteracted or cease to operate, and women should consequently enter as freely and as frequently as men into the various careers of public and active life, then, whatever might be the gain in other directions, the characteristics of reserve and modesty, so far as they are not due to the character alone, would tend to give place to a forwardness equal to and perhaps greater than that of men, which in itself would be a considerable loss, in depriving social life of one of its charms. And conversely, should events lead to such a general opening of public careers to women, and at the same time the qualities of specially feminine reserve and modesty not be lost, then we might infer that these qualities were the result of motives founded directly in the character itself.

6. Lastly, with regard to the poetical and religious emotions. Women often have the moral sense more intensely than men, but it is the element of love or some specific emotion, not that of justice, which then predominates. With them too the love of duty is more frequently carried up into religion; and in religion again it is the emotion of love or of veneration, not the comprehension of the framework of these emotions, that is prominent. They feel very strongly the pleasure of obedience and implicit submission to what they have once accepted as supremely good and right. These characteristics qualify women, on all points of conduct about the moral right and wrong of which there is no dispute, to be the supporters and inspirers from whom men may derive fresh ardour

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and devotion; and these points are innumerable in daily life. In poetry the union of intellect and emotion in that equal proportion which constitutes poetical imagination has rarely been displayed by women; though fancy and the expression of emotion are frequent. It is the broad grasp of teleological and constructive reasoning which seems deficient, not acuteness or quickness of intellectual perception generally. In some modes of speculative and especially in the effective branch of practical reasoning they often excel, where the ends are known, and the question is to devise the means. The lack of interest in scientific truth for its own sake, apart from the interest of the things to be known, or the persons about whom they are known, seems to explain at once the intellectual ability and the intellectual weakness of women when compared to men.

7. It is a different question altogether, and one which has not hitherto been touched here, how far the differences observed between men and women, even those which are supposed to originate in character, are the fruit of a long course of education, of habits, institutions, and modes of life, with their hereditarily transmitted results, and how far consequently they may be altered or obliterated by a permanent change in the direction of that course of education. To reach a *tabula rasa*, indeed, in the character of any individual, we should have to go back in its history far beyond its birth, to the point where brain begins to be distinguished from nerve in the life of the race to which the individual belongs. In other words, there is no *tabula rasa* met with in the individual at all. But this leaves untouched the question of the modifiability of the character at any

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stage of its career. Because certain traits are referred by analysis to character, they are not therefore to be supposed immutable. The character, as well as the influences operative on it, is in a state of perpetual modification. But, when any trait has once been included in the character of the race, its chances of permanence may be considered as immensely great, compared to traits which are not so included. If there is a fundamental difference in the character of the two sexes, it would probably require, in order to obliterate it, a greater change in the direction of the course of education, of habits, institutions, and modes of life, than could be effected by human volition; for the tendencies of character would themselves operate against such a change. What we could do would be to set these tendencies of character free to act and react for themselves, unprotected, but also untrammelled, by many customs and institutions which now exist.

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§ 75. 1. The analysis of character which has been now attempted, imperfect as it is and erroneous as it will no doubt prove to be in too many points, nevertheless shows one thing clearly, namely, that order and system prevail in the endowments and functions of consciousness which depend on the cerebrum, as they prevail in the rest of the living and sentient organism. And it is upon an analysis, either this or such as this, that any complete and true system of rules of action, laws to guide volition in all its branches, must be based, if they are to be valid and trustworthy. But it does not follow that any such rules or laws can be deduced from the analysis alone; it follows only that the analysis supplies one of their tests. It has a negative or contributive

value, showing what is not valid, and not declaring what is valid, among such laws of conduct. Yet there may be a system of rules for applying such tests, deduced from the analysis itself; there may be a Logic of Practice. And such a logic if correctly framed would be of no inconsiderable value, in guiding our judgment both of those laws and customs which already exist and of the changes which it may be proposed to introduce in them.

2. At every point of history man finds himself in presence of and surrounded by a thick growth of habits and laws, feelings and thoughts, which previous generations have bequeathed to him, and which have their roots in his own nature and modes of acting. The question is constantly recurring, What it is best to do in respect of them. Now strict and accurate observation of the course of history, of the effects of such and such habits, thoughts, and so on, supplies him with more or less general and systematic, more or less wise, rules with regard to his dealings with himself and his fellows, by dealing with these habits and thoughts. But there can be no science of these dealings (to use one word to include all its possible cases) in the strict sense of the term science, no "science of history" for example, until the nature and functions of man, in which these habits and thoughts have their root, have been analysed, and in this way the origin and nature of history, so to speak, laid bare. The science of history, that of law, and that of ethic, remain imperfect until their several systems of phenomena, known to us by observation or by experiment, are connected with their physiological basis, and with the system of states of consciousness dependent on physical structure and function.

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There are three things to be done; history to be studied, character to be analysed, and the two connected together by referring history to character in the first place, and character to history, by its reaction on it, in the second. There would then arise a complete and deductive science, since we should know the agent thoroughly, together with the modes of his reaction upon a large proportion of the influences which can be operative on him; and without knowing all these influences we may have a deductive science, but not so without knowing thoroughly the nature of the agent.

3. We have now before us an attempt at the analysis of the nature of the agent, man. History in all its branches, such as law, politic, ethic, art, government, education of the young, religion, has been by others often systematically, though of course not yet exhaustively, studied. But the two have not yet been connected together. Until this shall be done, not only there is no deductive science of the history of man, but there is no deductive science of command or of practice; that is, there is no science from which can be deduced practical rules deciding what changes ought to be made in existing habits and thoughts, in particular subjects and particular cases. Yet this, it seems to many, is what Ethic specially proposes to herself to do; an expectation surely which springs from not having considered the position of ethic in all its bearings. It is now clear that an immense work has still to be performed before ethic can deduce authoritatively any practical laws of conduct whatever, namely, the work of connecting history with character. For the present, and perhaps for a long time to come, the empirical wis-

dom founded on experience, that is, on history alone with only empirical observation of differences of character, is all that can be legitimately attempted. And thus it is upon the practical wisdom of practical men, in the popular sense of the term practical, and not upon the results of speculative analysis, that we must still place our reliance. The remainder of this work, therefore, will contain no attempt to lay down any particular rules of either social or political practice. The following Book will be merely a Logic of Practice as an Organon for testing actions, together with such illustrations of its application to history as I may be enabled to furnish.

4. Yet even such a logic, furnishing as it must at least do, the method and the framework for studying practical questions and solving practical problems, will not be without its use in their study and solution. They will assume a new shape in being brought distinctly before the mind and in having the logic applied to them, a shape which it may be hoped will render them more tractable. For in the first place it may be expected, that we shall be able to deduce from the foregoing analysis a solution of the great overshadowing question of principle debated between the Utilitarian and the Moral Law schools of ethic, the question whether the perception of duty as distinct from pleasure or happiness is or ought to be a motive in determining practical judgments. And the settlement of this preliminary and general question will almost by itself constitute the Logic of Practice, since there is no other question which is not a case falling under it; the difficulty in these subordinate cases consisting in the doubt under which head to group them, how to apply the logic to them.

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And as this cardinal question itself turns upon a conflict of emotions, so also it will be found do the majority of cases subordinate to it, all of which seem to have a certain justice in their favour. For instance, we may be at a loss to decide the claims of eros and the religious emotions, not only in a particular concrete case, such as might be the subject of a drama, but generally to decide which of the two ought to yield when both are present in great intensity, or whether there is any mode in which the claims of both can be satisfied, by subordinating one to the other without making the one subordinated less pleasureable. For all conflicting emotions which have justice in them are, to that extent, also conflicting duties ; and it must seem that, if religion is incompatible with the satisfaction of any such emotion and such duty, religion cannot be the supremely valid emotion which it sometimes claims to be. The question then is, can religion so incorporate eros with itself as to produce a character, the energy or the life of which has greater and nobler pleasures than either of its elements taken separately or in conflict. Or take the case of questions which spring from a conflict of the law of veracity with the emotion and law of love, as when veracity will expose a friend to ruin or death ; or again from conflicts of personal honour with love, as when, having been sworn to secrecy you are induced, by considering the consequences of secrecy to others, to break your promise ; or again, how far profession of goodness is a means of becoming really good, how far dressing for a character tends to produce that character, how far, in general terms, habit of external action tends to produce the tone of mind from which such actions will flow na-

turally. Connected with this last case is the problem of the relation of Law to Morality, how far external restraint and command, whether of punishment, law, or public opinion, is useful and advisable to make men better in heart, according to the proverb "l'appétit vient en mangeant;" how far we are ever justified in working from without inwards instead of from within outwards. Or again, how far law may be ultimately dispensed with, and whether the tendency is to make laws more minutely circumstantial and strict, or to remove the restraint of law altogether; in short, in what true liberty consists, and by what means it is best furthered. Then there is another problem of great intricacy which receives much attention at the present moment, the claims of women to equal tasks, equal advantages, sameness of career with men. (See Mr. J. S. Mill's noble plea for freedom in his "Subjection of Women.") The problem is not solved by showing that the original character of the two sexes is different, for there are many instances of feminine men and also of masculine women, and what law is to be laid down for these cases? How distinguish them in the first place, how deal with them in the second? Nor would it be solved if we could show historically, as Mr. MacLennan's work on Primitive Marriage tends to show, that women once held the most important position in the human society as head and bond of the family, as the only known common ancestor. These are only preliminaries to the great practical question, What it is desirable to aim at for the future, or more precisely, What is the law of true liberty?

5. Such at least are some of the questions which it will be well to keep in mind while attempting the

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development of a Logic of Practice, such as I propose to attempt in the following Book. I do not profess and shall not attempt to solve them, since they require the study of history to be combined with that of ethic proper. The logic however must consist in solving the main question between pleasure and duty, and in exhibiting a scheme in which the relations between them are definitively settled. Without such a question being finally answered there can be no Logic of Practice worthy of the name.

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